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ABSTRACT
This essay locates the origins of the religious and political 
radicalism of Joseph Priestley in his early abandonment of Calvinism: 
having deprived himself of a powerful, subjective system of 
explanation, he sought a view of the world that could be justified by 
entirely objective criteria. He was assisted in this project by the 
psychological theory of associationism - which purports to provide an 
empirical explanation of mental activity - and by the concept of 
candour: which in the eighteenth century embodied not only frankness 
but also a certain generosity of spirit and a willingness to engage in 
unacrimonious debate.
In the central chapters of this essay, four aspects of his work 
are examined: his activity as an historian (and to some extent as a 
scientist, an historian of nature), his theology and preaching, his 
philosophical writings and his political theory, in each of these areas, 
his work is marked by concern for objectivity and devotion to 
associationism. He saw history as a providential mechanism in which 
mental associations played an essential role and he looked to history 
to provide empirical, objective justification for Christian belief.
He found, however, that there were some Christian dogmas - notably 
that of Christ's divinity - which could not be so justified, and he 
abandoned them. He thus came to oppose (even more strongly than 
orthodox dissenters) the religious foundations of the British state; 
he advocated instead a candid free market in ideas (by means of which 
God’s providence could operate unhindered).
The final chapter describes how this project came to grief, 
having written an historical account of the growth of those Christian 
doctrines to which he was opposed, Priestley hoped that he could engage 
in candid conversation with his critics. But he underestimated the
alarm which his opinions provoked, especially in the years after the 
fall of the Bastille: the debate grew heated, he was publically 
vilified and, at last, forced into exile.
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Together let us beat this ample field;
The latent tract, the giddy heights explore 
Of all who blindly creep or sightless soar; 
Eye Nature's walks, shoot Folly as it flies 
And catch the Manners living as they rise; 
Laugh where we must, be candid where we can; 
But vindicate the ways of God to Man.
Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man
Together let us beat this ample Field.
... Be candid where we can,
But vindicate the Ways of God to Man.
Epigraph to Joseph Priestley and Richard Price,
A Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism
and Philosophical Necessity
CHAPTER ONE
EPISODES IN THE LIFE OF JOSEPH PRIESTLEY: FROM 1733 TO 1730.
In actual fact, clarity is a purely 
rhetorical attribute, not a quality of 
language in general, which is possible 
at all times and in all places, but only 
the ideal appendage to a certain type of 
discourse, that which is given over to a 
permanent intention to persuade.
Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero
I.
Joseph Priestley was b o m  on March 23 1733, and he was b o m  once 
only. A second birth, that rebirth in the Holy Spirit whereby alone 
could salvation be attained, had, he came to believe, been denied him. 
The discovery that this was so caused the young Joseph the greatest 
torment; and, though he recovered from his distress, he was never to 
enjoy that powerful sense of assurance which those who have undergone 
conversion know. So, denied subjective assurance, he sought objective 
certainty and, in a long and varied career, he carried this search into 
many fields: into theology, philosophy, science and politics. In each 
of these fields he rejected implicit faith and in each of them he dug 
deep to uncover the roots of belief.
The moral of Priestley's story and of this essay lies not in the 
psychological origins of his radicalism - though I shall shortly try to 
justify the bald and speculative account of it given in the previous 
paragraph - but in the predicament to which he had brought himself by
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leaving his father's house. One of the great attractions of the 
Calvinism which he abandoned in adolescence is that it provides a way 
out of what Richard Popkin has called 'the intellectual crisis of the 
reformation1. By abandoning Calvinism, Priestley plunged himself back 
into the crisis and so needed to find a new means of resolution.
In Popkin's account, the crisis has its origins in Luther's 
defiance of the Holy See. To defy Rome was to challenge the criterion 
by which the truths of scripture had for centuries been ascertained.
But how can such a criterion, once challenged, be either defended or 
refuted? Where is the criterion accepted by all the contending parties 
according to which this criterion and its rivals may be judged? 'In the 
battle to establish which criterion of faith was true,' writes Popkin,' 
a sceptical attitude arose among certain thinkers, primarily as a 
defense of Catholicism.'^- These Catholic theologians would ask how the 
Protestant, who claims to found his faith upon Scripture, knows that he 
has interpreted the Scriptures correctly. How, indeed, does he know 
that the Bible is the word of God? How does he know which books 
constitute the Holy Scripture? The Roman Catholic answer is that 
unaided human reason cannot help us to such knowledge; the implication 
is that, where reason fails us, we have no alternative but to turn to 
the authority of the Church. But the sceptical project can be carried 
much further before this or any other stop is put to it. Montaigne 
showed that it could be carried as far as the ancient sceptics had 
carried it, putting into question all the evidence of the senses and 
even the faculty of reason itself.
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Eventually, a solution would be found to these doubts in the form 
of what Popkin calls 'mitigated scepticism': while admitting the force 
of the sceptical assault, mitigated scepticism allowed that, though our 
knowledge of the world may fall short of mathematical certainty, yet it 
is probable enough for most of the purposes of life. The growth of 
mitigated scepticism in the seventeenth century coincided, of course, 
with the rise of empirical science; and science, as well as religion, 
was in need of standards of proof less rigid than those which they 
sceptics assumed. The result was the abandonment of the old scholastic 
dichotomy between scientia - certain knowledge, the preserve of logic 
and the mathematical sciences - and opinio, the merely probable 
knowledge that belonged to the humanities, to rhetoric and the empirical 
sciences. In its place was put a continuum of knowledge, stretching 
from fiction to the morally certain. And, though standards of proof 
were now less formal, the scientific enterprise imposed a new obligation 
to assess the value of testimony: both the testimony of one's own senses
9and the testimony of others.
Though many Calvinists were involved with the new science, these 
new standards of knowledge did not touch their theology at all. For the 
Calvinist, God is so infinitely removed from humankind that knowledge of 
him is inaccessible to human reason. Certain knowledge of God's grace 
can be had only when God chooses to make himself known in some great 
revolution of the spirit. It follows, then, that to abandon Calvinism 
without either abandoning Christianity or embracing Roman Catholicism is 
to find oneself back in the grip of the sceptical crisis of the 
Reformation. This is what happened to Priestley and to many others who
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had been raised as Calvinists in the England of the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries.
Though the modification in standards of proof which I have 
mentioned is commonly associated with the early Royal Society and the 
first Newtonians, it would be a mistake to suppose that matters had been 
resolved by the mid-eighteenth century. On the contrary, the 
persistence of anti-Newtonian and non-Newtonian theodicies and the 
controversy which surrounded the work of David Hume indicate that these 
were still live issues. So Protestants like Priestley, seeking some new 
and secure ground of belief, did so in an atmosphere of intellectual 
turmoil. Out of this turmoil arose the notion of 'Rational Dissent'. 
This came to mean two things: firstly, a determination to find objective 
justification for religious belief in either the books of scripture or 
the book of nature; secondly, an opposition to all civil jurisdiction 
over religious belief and practice.^ For religious dissent in England 
still laboured under legislative restriction: by the Corporation Act of 
1661, nobody could enter upon civic or municipal office who had not 
taken conmunion according to the Anglican rite within a year previous to 
his election; by the Test Act of 1673, all who held office, either civil 
or military, under the Crown had to not only to take communion but also 
pledge oaths of allegiance and supremacy and repudiate the doctrine of 
transubstantiation.
Acts of Indemnity, passed almost annually after 1727, enabled 
Protestant Dissenters to evade the Acts by the means of 'occasional 
conformity', by taking the sacrament after rather than before election 
to office. Nonetheless the existence of such legislation reminds us of
the nature of the society in which the crisis of the Reformation arose. 
It was a society in which all thought was - or was supposed to be - so 
unified that religious dissent looked like political dissent. This is 
the world which Peter Laslett has memorably called 'the world we have 
lost': a world of small groups, in which the principal unit of economic 
organisation was the family; in which the affective relationships which 
govern life in the family also governed other connections, political as 
well as economic, so that political factions were described as the 
'friends' of their leading figure (’Mr. Pitt's friends', 'the King's 
friend's'). Though Dissenters could not be full members of this 
patriarchal system of loyalty and patronage, it would be a mistake to 
suppose that they stood completely outside it: their catechism reminded 
them that, 'The fifth commandment requireth the preserving the honor of, 
and performing the duties belonging to, every one in their several 
places and relations, as superiors, inferiors, or equals.'^ But 
Priestley and the Rational Dissenters did devise a political philosophy 
that challenged the basis of the old society, and it i3 clear that they 
did so by turning on it the same radical gaze that they had brought to 
bear upon religious doctrine.
Priestley, though, laboured under a serious difficulty. Reason 
was of the greatest importance to him, but the concept of reason had, 
along with the standards of proof, been modified in the seventeenth 
century. At the height of the old society, reason, like political 
legitimacy, had exerted its authority downwards: it was 'candle of the 
Lord', a guide to wisdom. But by Priestley's time it was a merely 
ratiocinative faculty, incapable of action until moved by the passions.
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Hume acknowledged this change in a well-known declaration: 'Reason is, 
and ought to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any 
other office than to serve and obey them.' He was not alone; in the 
following chapters, we shall see that this state of affairs was 
recognised by thinkers much less acute than Hume: John Wesley, John 
Brown, the political writer, and even so incompetent a philosophaster as 
James Oswald. Priestley, however, did not recognise this change and 
much of the story that follows will be taken up with his replies to 
those who did recognise it.
There are various ways in which one might try to find a home in a 
world in which reason has lost much of its authority. One might urge 
the importance of direct divine illumination, which is what Wesley did; 
one might argue that there is a human faculty moi^ useful than mere 
ratiocination, which is what was done by Oswald and the other Scottish 
philosophers of the commonsense school; one might assume that human 
society is the only proper sphere of human activity and that human 
society is a given and unarguable fact, in no need of rational 
justification, which is what Brown did. As we shall see in the 
following chapters, none of these solutions was acceptable to Priestley: 
he thought that both Wesley and the commonsense philosophers were, in 
their different ways, irrationalists; he thought Brown's political 
philosophy oppressive; and he saw Hume as little more than a destructive 
sceptic. Instead, he proposed an intellectual project in which 
objective certainty was to be sought in every area of knowledge: nothing 
was to be taken on trust; scriptural truth was to be sought in history, 
truths about the natural world in the incorrigible perceptions of the
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mind. He was assisted in this project by the psychological theory of 
associationism, which purported to show how the complex workings of the 
mind could arise from very simple basic operations.
As Priestley saw it, his project could be carried on only if the 
mind was cleared of prejudice and people were prepared to engage in 
unacrimonious debate. Hence the importance to him of the concept of 
candour, which in the eighteenth century implied not only frankness but 
also generosity of spirit. (The importance of candour in the 
eighteenth-century had, of course, a lot to do with the new significance 
of testimony as a source of knowledge.)
Hie failed. The final chapter of this essay tells the story of his 
failure; the chapters before it describe the construction of the 
intellectual vehicle which he was eventually to crash against the wall 
of the old society.
II.
Joseph Priestley was b o m  into the very heart of English religious 
Dissent. His father - a man of strong religious principles, who prayed 
morning and evening with his family - was a cloth-worker, and as such he 
followed a trade whose association with religious radicals went back to 
the Lollards of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Joseph's mother 
died when he was six, but he remembered her as a pious woman who taught 
him his catechism, gave him his earliest instruction and impressed him 
'with a clear idea of the distinction of property, and of the importance 
of attending to it.1 Upon her death, Mr. Priestley found himself alone 
with a family larger than he could look after unaided and in 1742 young
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Joseph was sent into the care of his widowed aunt, Mrs. Keighley. She, 
though 'truly Calvinistic in principle', was, Priestley tells os, 'far 
from confining salvation to those who thought as she did on religious 
subjects': all Dissenting ministers, no matter how obnoxious their 
principles might be to her, were welcome in her home. Whilst under her 
care, Joseph went, to the local free school and also received instruction 
in Hebrew from a Dissenting minister, who later opened a school of his 
own which Joseph attended. However, ill health caused him to leave 
school, and the rest of his education was private - conducted in part by 
'Mr. Haggerstone, a Dissenting minister in the neighbourhood' and 'Mr. 
Thomas, a Baptist minister' - until 1752, when he went up to Daventry 
Academy.^
He was brought up amongst the members of the Heckmondwike 
Independent Church. By the age of four could repeat by heart the (very 
long) Shorter Catechism, agreed upon by the Assembly of Divines at 
Westminster, ... Anno 1648, a document, the work of the English 
Presbyterian ministry, which sets out in lucid detail the Calvinist 
scheme of salvation: the complex mechanism of election, justification, 
adoption, and sanctification. He was a precocious child and, by the age 
of thirteen, he was acquainted not only with the Catechism but also with 
most of the works of Bunyan. And so by the time of the illness which 
nearly killed him - a 'weakly consumptive habit' of which he writes and
which his brother tells us he acquired around the age of twelve or
/i
thirteen - he was well acquainted with Calvinism at its grimmest.
The God of the Westminster Catechism and of Bunyan's works is 
absolute sovereign of all. Before the creation of the world he
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predestined a few of its future inhabitants to salvation and the vast 
majority to eternal damnation. All are b o m  with their fate 
predetermined; nothing they can do will alter it. This is an important 
point: we are saved by faith but faith itself is a free gift of God's 
grace; only the elect, those already predestined to salvation, are 
capable of possessing a saving faith. Their conversion begins with 
their calling, which brings them to awareness of their sinful state. It 
is not a sudden experience, but neither can it occur without a broken 
heart.
The authors of the Catechism do not specifically allow that those 
who are saved may know certainly of their condition or that others may 
know of it. Their church, the Presbyterian Church, must therefore 
necessarily include both the elect and the damned. But Priestley's 
parents and aunt were Independents, and Independents believed that, by 
minute self-inspection, one might discover signs of one's spiritual 
condition. So their church was a gathered community of the elect. As 
their favourite poet told them:
We are a Garden wall'd around,
Chosen and made peculiar ground.'
These lines are by Isaac Watts, poet and philosopher, and - with his 
friend the educationalist and theologian Philip Doddridge - one of the 
greatest Dissenting writers of the day. But though both these men, the 
twin pinnacles of.Dissenting intellectual achievement, were 
Independents, the general tenor of Independent life was less 
rationalistic than that of life amongst the Presbyterians. The contrast 
is reflected in their different ways of appointing ministers: a
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candidate for the Presbyterian ministry would be examined in his 
knowledge of philosophy, divinity and the Greek and Hebrew scriptures, 
but the Independents looked principally for men who could tell of their 
faith, repentance and religious experience. And whereas the 
Independents restricted their communion to those able 'to give an 
account of the work of grace', of the direct action of the Holy Spirit, 
on their souls, the Presbyterians demanded of intending members only 
that they live respectably and have some knowledge of Christianity.
This habit of introspection among many Calvinists drew them to 
keep diaries and to write autobiographies. Many of these books of 
religious experience were published; the greatest of them was Bunyan's 
Grace Abounding. They tend to follow an established pattern: the author 
tells of God's early mercies towards him; next, of his own unregenerate 
life and resistance to the gospel; then of his awakening to a sense of 
sin, of his struggles with Satan, and of his eventual attainment of 
comparative tranquillity in the light of divine mercy. Such was the 
literature that the young and sickly Joseph Priestley read, and he 
writes of it in a passage of his Memoirs that describes, I would 
suggest, the beginning of a conversion experience:
The sickness of my constitution, which often led me to think that 
I should not be long-lived, contributed to give my mind a still 
more serious turn; and having read many books of experiences, and, 
in consequence, believing that a new birth, produced by the 
immediate agency of the spirit of god, was necessary to salvation, 
and not being able to satisfy myself that I had experienced any 
thing of the kind, I felt occasionally such distress of mind as it 
is not in my power to describe, and which I still look back upon 
with horror. Notwithstanding I had nothing very material to 
reproach myself with, I often concluded that God had forsaken me, 
and that mine was like the case of Francis Spira, to whom, as he 
imagined, repentance and salvation were denied. In that state of
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mind, I remember reading the account of the man in the iron cage, 
in the 'Pilgrim's Progress,' with the greatest perturbation.
Francis Spira, whose story was related in a number of pamphlets, is a 
Protestant who becomes a Roman Catholic for worldly motives and dies in 
despair. Of his story, the excellent Richard Baxter, a moderate 
Protestant, wrote, 'The reading of Spira's case causeth or increaseth 
melancholy for many.'^ The man in the iron cage, one of the most 
haunting characters in Bunyan's allegory, is similarly afflicted with 
despair. Once 'a fair and flourishing' Christian, he has despised 
Christ's righteousness and preferred the things of this world. The 
spirit has deserted him and he cries out:
I am now a Man of Despair, and am shut up in it, and in this Iron 
Cage. I cannot get out; 0 now I cannot ... God hath denied me 
repentance; his word gives me no encouragement to believe. ... 0
must meet with in Eteriu.uy:
This does not seem suitable reading for an impressionable twelve year 
old. Nor does Grace Abounding, which Priestley had presumably read; yet 
it was books like these that formed the principal part of the young 
Joseph Priestley's literary diet.
This brings us close to what is surely the important point: 
according to question twenty of the Westminster Shorter Catechism, God 
did not condemn all mankind to eternal damnation, but, 'out of his mere 
good pleasure, from all eternity, elected some to everlasting life, did 
enter into a covenant of grace, to deliver them of the estate of sin and 
misery, and to bring them into an estate of salvation by a Redeemer.
The vital phrase here is 'mere good pleasure', and its precise import is 
very terrible indeed. So great is the distance between God and his
Eternity! Eternity! with the misery that I
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creation that men, however obedient they may be, could never merit any 
reward but damnation unless God had voluntarily held out his hand to 
them. The elect, those very few who have been saved, have not only done 
nothing to deserve this, but are incapable of doing anything to deserve 
it; and this incapacity is not merely contingent but logical, for God 
has been determined upon their salvation not merely from before their 
births, not merely from the creation of the world, but 'from all 
eternity'. As Thomas Hooker said in the mid-seventeenth century: God, 
'to show the sovereign freedom of his pleasure', will deny salvation to 
some who have begged it of him and have lived virtuous lives, whilst 
granting it to others 'who never sought h i m . B y  thus stressing the 
transcendence of God, the Calvinists had created a system that was 
beautifully rational, coherent and closed. The product of this inhuman 
mechanism was inevitably, as Max Weber points out, 'a feeling of 
unprecedented inner loneliness of the single individual. In what was 
for the man of the age of the Reformation the most important thing in 
life, his eternal salvation, he was forced to follow his path alone to 
meet a destiny which had been decreed for him from eternity.IAJ
It is an odd feature of Priestley's Memoirs, most of which were 
written in 1781, that they begin rather like an attempt at a spiritual 
autobiography, though written in a style more suited to an age of 
reason: cooler, less introspective, more given to dwelling upon outward 
and secular circumstances. Thus, we have the recital of God's early 
mercies towards him and of the happiness of a Calvinistic home: 'Looking 
back, as I often do upon this period of my life,' he writes, 'I see the 
greatest reason to be thankful to God for the pious care of my parents
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and friends, in giving me religious instruction.' We have too the 
mention of early sinning. This was necessary in any spiritual 
autobiography, though the sins were often of an apparently trivial 
nature, and the only one that Priestley records is the removal from his 
uncles's house of a pin with which he had been playing.^ In most 
autobiographies the sinning usually becomes more significant than this. 
Priestley cannot, or will not, furnish his readers with any more 
interesting sins, but his account follows the pattern in going on to 
mention a monitory endangering of its subject's life. Next comes the 
spiritual awakening. For some this was occasioned by a sermon, for 
Bunyan by hearing some poor women of Bedford 'sitting at a door in the 
Sun, and talking about the things of God', for Priestley by the reading 
of books of experiences. But here the resemblance between Priestley's 
book and the classic spiritual autobiography beings to come apart. It 
would appear that he had reached the earliest of the several stages of 
the Calvinist conversion process, a consciousness of sin, but that he 
had not been granted repentance; which may well be what he means by 
invoking the cases of Spira and of the man in the iron cage: they were 
both men who were profoundly aware of their sins but, having been denied 
repentance, they could do nothing about it. This is why an iron cage is 
so appropriate an image for the despair of a Calvinist whose heart God 
has hardened: he can see out but he cannot get out; his prison is wholly 
private, no-one can rescue him, but from it he can watch Christian 
walking to the celestial city.
In an excellent essay on The Puritan Way of Death, David E. 
Stannard draws attention to modem psychological studies which have
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shown that the most persistent and basic of the fears with which young 
children associate death is that of separation from their parents. In 
New England, Puritan sermons played on this fact: congregation were told 
that on judgement day reprobate children would see their own parents 
concur in their damnation.^ Priestley, harbouring fond memories of his 
pious mother and enjoying the tender care of his pious aunt, may well 
have been particularly tormented by such doctrine: he was surrounded by 
people who had experienced the second birth that was denied him and 
whose love for him would turn to condemnation on the day of judgement. 
The important point, then, is this: the content of Calvinist theology is 
deterministic, the tone of Calvinist preaching and of Bunyan*s writings 
is exhortatory. The young Joseph Priestly, already in a physically 
weakened state, was at once being exhorted to do something and told that 
there was nothing much that he could do.
In fact, Priestley nowhere tells us what, if anything, he did do. 
Having written of his illness, his distress, and his failure to 
experience a new birth, he changes tense in his next paragraph:
I imagine that even these conflicts of mind were not without their 
use, as they led me to think habitually of God and a future state. 
And though my feelings were, then, no doubt, too full of terror, 
what remained of them was a deep reverence for divine things, and 
in time a pleasing satisfaction which which can never be effaced, 
and, I hope, was strengthened as I have advanced in life, and 
acquired more rational notions of religion. The remembrance, 
however, of what I sometimes felt in that state of ignorance and 
darkness, gives me a peculiar sense of the value of rational 
principles of religion, and of which I can give but an imperfect 
description.
With this paragraph, which takes us from 'terror1 to 'rational 
principles', we leave the world of Calvinist theology and enter upon an 
age self-consciously enlightened. It might almost be said that we leave
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a world of religious feeling and enter one of theological thinking.
This passage, from the very early pages of Priestley's Memoirs, is 
almost the last in which we are afforded any substantial glimpse of the 
author's inner life.
It may well be that between these two paragraphs, between the 
terror and the rational principles, lies a change of heart so great as 
to constitute a genuine conversion. Certainly, Priestley's journey out 
of 'ignorance and darkness' seems to have been dramatic enough to fit 
the account given by the psychologist of religion Walter Houston Clark, 
who defines 'conversion' as: 'that type of spiritual growth or 
development which involves an appreciable change of direction concerning 
religious ideas and behaviour. Most clearly and typically it denotes an 
emotional episode of illuminating suddenness, which may be deep or 
superficial, though it may also come about by a more gradual process.' 
Clark finds that studies of the phenomenon lend themselves to analysis 
into three stages: first, a period of unrest, perhaps merely of vague 
depression, formerly called 'conviction of sin', often arising from the 
potential convert's becoming aware of the gap between the soul and the 
object of its worship; next, the conversion crisis itself; and third, 
after the crisis has been brought to a climax, a sense of peace and 
harmony. Such experiences often take place in adolescence: a time of 
change, doubt and restlessness, when ideas of God become more abstract 
and less literal. It is also a time when the child begins to long to 
join the adult community, and so, if the community is a religious one, 
it will be natural for the conversion experiences of its adolescents to 
take the form which the local model suggests.^ The shape of these
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passages of Priestley's Memoirs suggest the memory of a time when he may 
well have tried in just this way to fit his own experience to the 
available model. But this, as we have seen, he could not do.
Indeed, the crisis itself - that stage in the conversion process 
where the mind is t o m  between two incompatibles, between its imperfect 
self and its idea of perfection - is not likely to be resolved by 
trying. As William James suggests, 'to exercise the personal will is 
still to live in the region where the imperfect self is the thing most 
emphasised.1 In these circumstances, the personal will must relax; it 
must allow God or its own unconscious to take over.^ But there is 
nothing in Priestley's subsequent history to suggest that such self­
surrender would ever have come easily to him. The exercise of the 
personal will, of its questioning and theorising faculties, was (it 
later became apparent) what he lived for. And he was indeed attracted 
by two incompatibles: by Calvinism, which demands introspection and 
surrender to the will of an absolute divine sovereign, and his own 
nature, which was extrovert and self-sufficient.
Of course, the extrovert and the self-sufficient tend, on the 
whole, not to be candidates for conversion. They are what James, in a 
famous and useful piece of labelling, calls the 'once-born': optimistic, 
little given to soul-searching or to metaphysics, they are at home in a 
world ruled not by a stem judge but by a merciful and kindly God. The 
autobiography, as opposed to the memoir, and the spiritual autobiography 
in particular, is a literary medium to which they are not very readily 
drawn. Clark does, however, nominate as a self-portrait of a 
benevolent, unreflective, spiritually-shallow mind, Benjamin Franklin's
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Autobiography. May we perhaps couple with it the Memoirs of Franklin's 
good friend Joseph Priestley?
Priestley himself provides us with an argument for not doing so. 
Having spoken of the ’peculiar sense of the value of rational principles 
of religion1 which the remembrance of his ’state of ignorance and 
darkness’ gives him, he goes on to say that, ’the want of these peculiar 
feelings is compensated by something of greater value, which arises to 
others from always having seen things in a just and pleasing light; from 
having always considered the Supreme Being as the kind parent of all his 
o f f s p r i n g . B u t  this, he adds, has not been his experience. He seems 
to be telling us that he has not enjoyed that gradual and pleasing 
growth, under the eye of a benign and merciful God, which is the 
prerogative of the once-born. Instead he has struggled through pain out 
of darkness. But can we really, following James' classification, rank 
Priestley with the 'twice-born', those inconsolably sick souls, weighed 
down with a sense of the evil of the world and the transience of its 
pleasures, who can be made well only by some great revolution of spirit? 
Obviously not; but, though James appears to being structuring his 
dichotomy around an event in the life of the soul - its rebirth - he 
should better be seen as offering us two ideal types of personality.
The culture in which Priestley was raised takes as normative the 
experiences of one of these types: the Westminster Catechism 
rationalises and classifies these experiences and Bunyan's work depicts 
them in painful detail. But not everybody could be forced into the 
mould. The experience which Priestley reports in his Memoirs and which 
he claims still to look back upon with horror was not a rebirth - he was
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not at all one of the twice-bom - but it was, or may have been, a
conversion experience: he emerged from it with a picture of God more
suited to his own extrovert, optimistic nature. There was no breaking 
or
of the heart subduing of the will: he was a once-born Christian.
The reason for invoking James' categories of the once-born and the 
twice-born is that they encourage us to a particular arrangement of 
events and character traits. Reading the Memoirs with James' terms in 
mind, we can see much of Priestley's character - his philosophical 
character as well as his character as a man - crystalising around a 
single, formative experience. Of course, we must be wary of looking 
upon any autobiographical work as a transparent window on actual events; 
two empiricist philosophers much more distinguished than Priestley, John 
Stuart Mill and Bertrand Russell, both describe at length personal 
crises, secular conversion experiences, for which no’ evidence can be 
found other than their own accounts. Events may not have occurred as 
Priestley describes them, or, if they did, they may not bear the 
interpretation that I have placed upon them; but two things need to be 
said about the idea that Priestley underwent a formative, 'conversion' 
experience. Firstly, it is a plausible idea given the Calvinist milieu 
in which he was raised. The diary of his younger contemporary Thomas 
Belsham, who was brought up in just such an environment, is a vivid 
record of obsessive self-examination: ’My state of mind through this 
week has been variable,' wrote Belsham at the age of seventeen. 
'Sometimes I am, at least I think myself to be, pretty deeply affected 
with divine things, but at other times I am quite hardened.' Belsham 
doubts his own sincerity; he fears irresolution; he pours out his soul
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'with great freedom of speech' in his private devotions but finds 'this 
tender, affectionate frame' much diminished by the time he goes to 
supper and too cool to be fanned back into flame at bedtime. His 
attention is fixed entirely upon what he thinks and feels rather than 
upon what he does or says, and over everything he writes, over every 
punctilious observation of every flickering of mood and motive, lowers a 
single, inescapable terror: 'I am ready to fear that God has not elected 
me, and that I am irrevocably doomed to everlasting misery.' All this 
happened to Belsham while he was a student, enjoying the relatively 
liberal education offered at Daventry Academy, and he gives us no reason 
to suppose that either he or his tutors considered his behaviour in any 
way out of the ordinary (monitoring and writing down one's 'experience' 
was, indeed, a course recommended by Doddridge himself). We cannot 
assume that the atmosphere at Heckmondwike was any less claustrophobic 
than that at Daventry. Priestley, who was latter to deprecate such 
introspection - Christ, he said, he seeks to command our obedience, not 
our feelings - had, no doubt, close personal knowledge of it.
Secondly, the idea of Priestley's conversion has at least a 
certain symbolic force in that the rejection of Calvinism - with its 
rebirths, its elections, its justifications and its sanctifications - is 
the single decisive act from which follows all his subsequent 
intellectual career. For, by abandoning Calvinism, he had deprived 
himself of a source of extraordinary assurance. Weber writes thus of 
the experience of the Calvinistic converted:
The phenomenon of the religious sense of grace is combined ... 
with the feeling of certainty that grace is the sole product of an 
objective power and not in the least to be attributed to personal 
worth. The powerful feeling of light-hearted assurance, in which 
the tremendous pressure of their sense of sin is released,
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apparently breaks over them with elemental force and destroys 
every possibility of the belief that this over-powering gift of 
grace could owe anything to their own co-operation or could be 
connected with achievements or qualities of their own faith and 
will.21
But it would appear that no such feelings of light-hearted assurance had 
broken over Priestley's soul. He could not enjoy that feeling of 
certainty, which the converted enjoy, that their grace is the gift of an 
objective power. A Calvinist needs no objective or external principle 
with which to legitimate his system of beliefs. The system is an 
entirely closed one, and its principle of certainty is not subjective 
but inner and fugitive (which is presumably why there are so few 
Calvinist philosophers: Calvinists do not need to have their beliefs
99validated by the universe). But Priestley had, as he believed, split 
it open and admitted the light. Now, if he was to open the eyes of 
others, he was in need of one or more objective, external principles of 
legitimation.
After the spiritual crisis that darkened his adolescence, the 
ideas of Calvinism and of gloom were ever associated in his mind. 'It 
has pleased God, in the course of his providence,' he wrote in 1783, 'to 
open my own eyes, after having been educated in all the gloom and 
darkness of Calvinism, and I am determined (in conjunction with my 
philosophical researches) to do all that I can do to open the eyes of 
others.' It is not at all surprising that one of his sermons should 
have been entitled 'Christianity, the light of the world', nor that in 
it he should have invited his hearers to compare the uses of light with 
the nature and benefits of the Christian religion and the character of 
its founder.
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The imagery, though particularly attractive to Priestley, was not 
a personal quirk; it formed part of the Rational Dissenters' image of 
themselves as enlightened people. As late as 1828, we find Lucy Aikin - 
granddaughter of Priestley's colleague, John Aikin, and niece of his 
friend Mrs. Barbauld - telling a distinguished co-religionist that,
'Long before my time, ... my kindred - the Jennings, the Belshams, my 
excellent grandfather Aikin, and his friend and tutor Doddridge - had 
begun to break forth out of the chains and darkness of Calvinism, and 
their manners softened with their system.'^ As we can see from this 
roll of honour, the young Joseph Priestley, coughing consumptively over 
his Pilgrim's Progress and pondering his eternal destiny, was not 
without earthly allies. Already the sensibility of the age had turned 
against the remorseless theology of Bunyan's novel, and James Foster, 
enlightened divine, great preacher and enemy of mystery in religion, was 
wont to say that the only character in the entire book who spoke sense 
was Ignorance: 'a very brisk lad', who will believe in Christ but not in 
the evil of his own heart; who relies for salvation upon the religion of 
his country, on prayer, fasting and almsgiving; who has been 'a good
ocLiver' and is damned eternally on the last page.
In his long debate with Christian, Ignorance does indeed sound 
rather like a Rational Dissenter, and Priestley was before long 
sufficiently of Ignorance's way of thinking to be refused admission to 
his aunt's church. Interrogating him 'on the subject of the sin of 
Adam', the church elders found that he 'appeared not to be quite 
orthodox, not thinking that all the human race (supposing them not have 
any sins of their own) were liable to the wrath of God, and the pains of
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hell for ever, on account of that sin only. . ..'^ He had some time 
before been much troubled by his inability to feel 'a proper repentance 
for the sins of Adam1, but the conversation of more liberal minds - Mr. 
Haggerstone his tutor and Mr Walker, a local preacher - had done much, 
he says, to open his eyes and by the age of nineteen he was an Arminian: 
that is to say, he followed the sixteenth-century theologian Jacobus 
Arminius in repudiating the doctrine of predestination. Though he had 
'by no means rejected the doctrines of the Trinity, or that of 
Atonement' he was now heterodox enough to be unable to concur in the 
desire of his aunt and relatives that he attend a strict Calvinist 
academy in London. Instead he went, in September 1752, to the new 
academy at Daventry.
III.
Education, general education, was of the greatest importance to 
Dissenters; they believed that children had an inalienable right to it 
and parents an inalienable duty to provide it. Denied access to the two 
English universities - which, as ecclesiastical institutions, were 
closed to Dissenters and to Papists - they founded academies of their 
own and the best of them were very good indeed: they made a contribution 
to English life far out of proportion to their size and the number of 
their pupils.
When Priestley enrolled, his Academy had only just moved to 
Daventry from Northampton, where it had been run for more than twenty 
years by Philip Doddridge, its founder. Worn out by a life of incessant 
toil, Doddridge had died eleven months before, but the Academy bore the
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impress of his mind and so did Priestley's education. Doddridge was an 
educationalist of original mind and wide interests. He had introduced 
English as the language of instruction, which meant, as Alexander Gordon 
has pointed out, that 'lectures in English would be illustrated from 
English sources, at once more easily and rapidly consulted, and modem 
in their range of thought1.^ '
As we have seen, Priestley's scientific education had already 
begun. It was Mr. Haggerstone who had taught him his geometry, algebra 
and mathematics; and at the same time Priestley read, 'but with little 
assistance from him', W.J. 'sGravesande's Elements of Natural 
Philosophy, Watts* Logick and John Locke's Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding. Since he finds it worthy of mention that Haggerstone had 
been taught by Newton's pupil Colin Maclaurin, he may also have by this 
time have read Maclaurin's excellent textbook, An Account of Sir Isaac 
Newton's Philosophic Discoveries (he certainly possessed a copy later in
nolife). ° But though the Academy did not introduce him to science - and 
though its lectures on science, having so much else to compete with in 
the curriculum, cannot have been very advanced - it may well have 
afforded him his first glimpse of scientific practice. In most cases 
the students at Daventry used the sane scientific textbooks as their 
contemporaries at Cambridge, but presumably they learned their science 
as the students at Northampton had learned it: by experiment. This 
certainly was an important innovation.
Priestley, however, was most grateful to the Academy not for this 
but for something else: 'It was a reference to "Dr. Hartley's 
Observations on Man" in the course of our lectures, that first brought
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me acquainted with that performance, which immediately engaged my 
closest attention, and produced the greatest, and in my opinion the most 
favourable effect on my general turn of thinking through my life.' ^
Hartley's book - which Priestley, incomprehensibly, found both
stimulating and affecting - is one of those works which, by the
systematic application of one or two easily-grasped principles, seem
suddenly to illuminate vast areas of human existence. In this case, the
big idea is an alliance of Newton's speculations about the aether with a
doctrine of the association of ideas drawn principally from Locke.
According to Newton's Principiat the aether is, or may be, a subtle
medium or 'spirit', filling the entire universe and pervading all
material objects. It is posited as a means of explaining the cohesion
of such objects: through the aether are propagated those forces of
attraction that draw together the particles of which solid bodies are
comprised. Moreover, we may also, Newton proposes, account for physical
sensation 'by the vibrations of this spirit, mutually propagated along
the solid filaments of the nerves, from the outward organs of sense to
onthe brain, and from the brain to the m u s c l e s . H e r e  Newton's 
speculations end and Hartley's begin. Hartley suggests that the 
vibrations in the brain - the movements back and forth of its 
constituent particles, movements short enough and small enough not to 
disturb the brain itself - set up sensations, and these sensations come 
by repetition to be associated with the particular material object that 
gave rise to the original vibrations in the aether. (This can happen of 
course, only if sensations remain in the mind for some little time after 
the objects which cause them have been removed, but the phenomenon of
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persistence of vision - extended by analogy to the other senses - 
demonstrates that this is indeed the case.) The repetition of sensation 
thus gives us our stock of what Hartley calls 'simple ideas of 
sensation'. Now, if two or more sensations are impressed upon the brain 
at exactly the same time or in successive instants of time, then they 
may by repetition come to be associated together. The result of this 
will be that any one of these sensations alone will be able to excite in 
the mind the simple ideas generated by the others. There are 
innumerable instances of this, says Hartley; for example, the name, 
taste, smell or tangible qualities of a natural body excite in our minds 
the idea of its visible appearance. Of course, this means that such 
often-repeated sensations are never to be had in an unmodified form: 
every experience leaves its trace in the shape of faint vibrations which 
may, to a greater of lesser degree, divert from their course the 
vibrations set up by the object immediately before us. Thus it is that 
our experiences of the smell of a rose is modified by association with 
our ideas of the feel of a rose and of its appearance (and also, 
presumably its name; so that a rose by any other name might not smell as 
sweet).
Ideas, then, function in Hartley's psychology much as elementary 
particles do in Newton's physics: their mutual interactions - almost 
infinitely complex but in principle open to analysis - account for all 
the phenomena before us. Or, as Hartley puts it, 'simple Ideas will run 
into complex ones, by Means of Association.
The essential and most original aspect of Hartley's principle of 
association is his premise that the ideas thus associated need not have
-25-
what Locke calls 'a natural Correspondence and Connexion one with 
another.’ It is not logical rapport but mere contiguity that unites 
them. In this respect, associations function in the same way as the 
conditioned reflexes made famous by one of Hartley's intellectual 
descendants, I.V. Pavlov: the bell rings and the dog salivates, simply 
because the sound of a bell ringing has come through repetition to be 
associated with the serving of dinner, not because there is any logical 
connection between bells and food.^ Locke had made use of this sort of 
association - 'This strong Combination of Ideas, not ally'd by Nature' - 
but only to account for defects in reason. There were, he said, many 
examples of it (as when people come to associate pain with the room in 
which an event painful to them has taken place, even though there is 
nothing painful about the room itself), but his chief purpose in 
mentioning it was to warn parents and teachers: they would be well 
advised to 'think it worth their while diligently to watch and carefully 
to prevent the undue Connexion of Ideas in the Minds of young People'.^  
By extending the principle of associations to account for the 
connections of any ideas whatever, Hartley has added considerably to the 
explanatory power of Lockean psychology.
According to Locke, the bricks out of which are constructed all 
that our minds contain are 'simple ideas'. Some of these derive from 
reflection - from, that is, the mind's observation of its own workings - 
but the primary source of such ideas is our sensory experience of 
objects external to us. There is no source of ideas but these two, 
sensation and reflection, and the mind can have no ideas at all until
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the senses have begun to allow them in. Until then it is a blank slate: 
the famous tabula rasa of classical empiricism.
Locke's ’simple ideas’ are, then, pretty much the same as 
Hartley's ’ideas of sensation’ (though Hartley does not allow of 
reflection as a source of ideas). The two philosophers differ, however, 
in their accounts of what happens to the mind once it is furnished with 
ideas. According to Locke, the tnind, passive in the reception of simple 
ideas, is active in forming complex ideas out of them. It combines, it 
compares and it abstracts, all at its own will and pleasure. But Locke 
gives no account of how it acquires the power or the volition to carry 
out these activities, and any attempt to draw such an account from what 
he does say is likely to arrive at a doctrine much like Hartley's. For 
Hartley goes beyond Locke in making the mind almost entirely the product 
of its environment: sensations, combining in accordance with the 
principle of associations, account for all the mind's ideas, the complex 
as well at the simple. The mind forms ideas in obedience to a universal 
law and not solely at its own will and pleasure, though it will 
naturally learn to shun violent vibrations, which are painful, and to 
seek more moderate ones, which give pleasure. Indeed, it is out of 
these simple pleasures that are constructed not only the higher 
pleasures but also the moral sense; and it is from the complex 
interractions of pleasing ideas that sympathy at last emerges, and, 
after sympathy, altruism and the love of God.
So the theory of associations appears to redeem one of the most 
alluring promises of empiricism: it offers us something for nothing, or 
almost nothing. Hartley purports to show how a mind that is truly a
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blank slate, with no innate capacities and little in the way of 
volition, can acquire a rich and complex body of ideas, refined 
intellectual and artistic tastes and a moral sense. In fact, though,» 
this happy result has not been obtained without cost. Locke had good 
cause to restrict the scope of associations largely to derangements of 
reasoning, for serious difficulties arise when the environment is 
invoked as almost the sole means of accounting for the shape and content 
of the mind.
If the mind is made up of mental atoms, called 1 ideas *, and if 
these atoms exist in a one-to-one correlation with objects or events in 
the external world, and if it is this correlation rather than any 
rational principle that governs the way these atoms are put together, 
then it is reasonable to ask how they have come to be put together in an 
apparently ordered way. After all, there is nothing very orderly about 
the way in which a newly-born baby, dragged from the womb into noise and 
brightness and confusion, is exposed to the world. And the 
impressionable mind of the infant may easily form illogical 
associations, as Locke pointed out.
Succinctly put, the problem is this: given our partial view of the 
world, how can mere repetition of experience enable us to form reliable 
generalisations about it? What we have here, of course, is a version of 
the philosophical problem of induction, which had hitherto been confined 
to the domain of the natural sciences. By making the mind to be so much 
the product of its environment, Hartley has brought the problem indoors: 
our basic beliefs - that glass is brittle, that fire will b u m  - are now
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seen to be of a piece with the most remote scientific hypothesis, and as 
problematic.
This had not happened to Locke. What he has to say about the mind 
can reasonably be read as a philosophical account of the nature of our 
concepts rather than as a psychological account of the way in which we 
happen to acquire them. Though he does talk about the acquisition of 
concepts, his attention is largely focussed elsewhere: not on their 
origin but on their status, their extent, their relation to experience 
and to language. Hartley, on the other hand, tries to develop an 
account that is at once both philosophical and psychological. He is in 
general agreement with Locke as to the compounded or molecular nature of 
our ideas, and his account of them is, like Locke's, analytic: that is, 
he seeks to show how most complex concepts may be broken down into their 
simpler constituent parts. But, seeking to explain how these concepts 
came to be 30 constituted, Hartley also offers an account that is not 
analytic but synthetic. Here - in psychological or historical mode - he 
describes how sensations are transformed into simple ideas and simple 
ideas into complex ones. This double method of analysis and synthesis 
is perfectly in accord with Newtonian orthodoxy but it will not work 
here. In the first place, no analysis that Hartley offers of our 
concepts can break them down into anything like the confused state of 
our earliest experiences. Of course, this would not matter much if 
Hartley's work were merely analytical - a philosophical analysis can be 
a promissory note; not the trick itself but a demonstration that the 
trick can in principle be managed - but if Hartley's work were merely 
analytical it would not be very different to Locke's. It is, in fact,
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the synthetic, psychological aspect of the Observations on Man that 
makes it look like a significant advance on the Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding. Unfortunately, none of Hartley's attempts at synthesis 
can possibly explain how the bright, buzzing chaos into which we are 
b o m  can be sorted out into the comparatively tidy view that we come to 
have of the world. So his psychological account will not justify his 
philosophical account, nor can he reduce the tidy concepts of his 
philosophical account to psychological terms.
Ten years after the publication of Hartley's book, these 
difficulties were brilliantly laid bare by Laurence Sterne. The 
eponymous hero of his Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy takes it for 
granted that Locke's Essay is 'a history-book ... of what passes in a 
man's own mind* and he proceeds to demonstrate by his own attempts at 
autobiography what might happen were such a book to be used as template 
for a real history. Led astray by those strong combinations of ideas 
not allied by nature, against which Locke had warned, Sterne's 
characters can seldom keep to the straight and narrow of rational 
narrative. In the famous and seminal first chapter, Tristram Shandy's 
mother reminds her husband to wind up the clock. This is an untimely 
remark - it interrupts Tristram's conception and so disperses those 
animal spirits without which he will later be prey to many infirmities 
of mind and body - but it is nonetheless quite understandable in light 
of the fashionable metaphysics of the day. Shandy pere is in the habit 
of winding the clock on the first Sunday of every month and, shortly 
thereafter, of attending to his more intimate duties as husband. So 
what more natural than that, 'from an unhappy association of ideas which
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have no connection in nature', his wife should have thought of the clock 
at such at moment? If her husband is irritated by the interruption it 
is because the associations which his mind has formed are not the same
”3 eras her's. For, of course, there is no, guarantee at all that two 
different minds will form the same set of associations, which is why 
Sterne's characters are so often at cross purposes. Sterne speaks only 
of Locke and not of Hartley, but, by taking Locke seriously as the 
author of the history of what passes in a man's mind - that is, as a 
psychologist rather than as a philosopher - he beautifully depicts a 
world run on Hartley's principles.
There appear to be two ways of avoiding these difficulties. One 
is simply to assume that the law of associations is not everywhere 
sovereign, which is what David Hume had done, some ten years before 
Hartley, in his Treatise of Human Nature. Though Hume speaks of 
'universal principles', his version of the principle of association is 
weak: it 'is not to be consider'd as an inseparable connexion' but 
rather 'as a gentle force, which commonly prevails. ...' Moreover, 
contiguity, which is the kind of association that most concerns Hartley, 
is for Hume only one of three kinds and by no means the most important. 
He seems to accord equal importance to association on grounds of 
resemblance, and he certainly accords much greater importance to the 
relation of cause and effect. This is significant: cause and effect is 
a relation that holds between enduring objects in the external world, 
not merely between impression in the mind; so even though the relation 
itself may be a mental matter, Hume's analysis of it takes him away from
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psychology out into the realm of natural philosophy. It therefore also 
takes him away from associationism.-^
The other way of avoiding the chaotic fate of Tristram Shandy is 
Hartley's way, clearly laid out by him in the second volume of the
07Observations.J Suppose that the human mind is but part of a complex 
mechanism so providentially ordered that everything must in the long run 
be for the best: such a mechanism will naturally ensure that the 
formation of the mind is orderly and coherent. In his second volume, 
Hartley attempts to show that the mind is indeed part of such a great 
machine. 'By general Providence,' he explains, 'I mean the adjusting 
all Events to the greatest Good of the whole; by particular, the 
adjusting all to the greatest Good of each Individual; and, 
consequently, by both together, the adjusting the greatest Good of the 
Whole, and of each Individual, to each other; so that both shall fall 
exactly upon the same P o i n t . T h e r e  is nothing irregular about this 
providence: it operates according to the laws of cause and effect. So 
Hartley's doctrines regarding providence further emphasise the mind's 
status as a part of nature, subject in its formation and its workings to 
laws which hold sway throughout the created universe. He is quite frank 
as to the deterministic implications of all this. Religion, he says, 
clearly presupposes freedom of the will 'in the popular and practical 
Sense' - in other words, it allows that we can exert a voluntary power 
over our volitions - but our volitions are causally determined, and the 
law of associations reveals to us that this determination is ultimately 
physical in character. There is no effect, not even a psychological 
effect, without a cause, and identical causes will bring about identical
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effects; we are free as it is possible to be (and certainly free enough 
to be accountable to God for what we do), but our freedom does not place 
us beyond the reach of nature's laws.
In Hartley's universe there is no absolute uncertainty. Such
uncertainty as we experience is relative to our circumstances as
fallible creatures of limited vision. God alone is certain in his
knowledge: if he knows that a thing will happen then that thing must
happen, because, of course, certain knowledge that an event will occur
t
simply is not certain knowledge unless that eveij^  really will occur. So 
determinism, as Hartley argues, is a prerequisite of divine providence: 
if all actions were not necessary, then God would be neither omniscient 
nor omnipotent, and if God were not omniscient or omnipotent then he
oncould not exert his power providentially as he does. 7
It is difficult not to suspect that it was this aspect of the 
Observations of Man, as much as anything else, that aroused Priestley's 
enthusiasm. So recently exiled from the deterministic embrace of the 
Puritan universe, he found here a determinism as firm as Calvin's but 
more benign. Hartley's book, he says in the Memoirs, converted him to 
'the doctrine of necessity'; it deepened his spirit of piety 'and freed 
it from the rigour with which it had been tinctured.'^ In later life 
he was frequently to pay tribute to Hartley's influence and there is no 
doubt that associationism is a very significant element in his own work; 
perhaps, indeed, the most important element of all.
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It is impossible to overestimate the significance to Priestley of 
his first looking into Hartley's Observations; certainly nothing else of 
comparable importance happened to him at Daventry. Presumably he missed 
the courses of civil government and on pneumatology, which were given in 
the second year and which, following Doddridge, would have made much use 
of the great continental jurists, Pufendorf, Grotius and Le Clerc, as 
well as Locke and the celebrated Whig martyr, Algernon Sidney.^ But 
then if he was excused these course it must have been only because he 
was already tolerably acquainted with these authors.
Theology was of greater importance to him. Doddridge's lectures 
on the subject were undogmatic - charitable to all, comprehensive in 
their coverage of every side in controversial issues - and in this their 
author appears consciously to have followed in the footsteps of his 
great seventeenth-century predecessor, Richard Baxter. Inspired by a 
great hatred of the sectarian strife of his age, ever ready to associate 
with good men of all parties, Baxter had prided himself on being 'a 
CHRISTIAN, a MEER CHRISTIAN, ... of that Party which is so against 
Parties ...' Though he believed his religion to be scripturally- 
founded, he was not bibliolatrous. Much, he was convinced, had not been 
revealed but had been left to man's discretion. In any case, the Bible 
was the effect of secondary causes: it was the product of a particular 
time and place and was therefore to be read critically: it is our 
Rational faculty that proveth us men.' Things above reason were not 
articles of faith. His own conversion having been a very gradual 
awakening rather than a great revolution of spirit, he came to place
IV.
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more importance on sincere desire than on spiritual achievement and to 
be suspicious of the orthodox Calvinist claim that a great chasm yawned 
between the elect and the reprobate.^
Baxter’s influence was profound, especially in an age whose 
sensibilities were turning away from the rigours of orthodox Calvinism. 
He agreed with Calvin that a very few had been predestined to salvation 
regardless of what they thought or did upon earth, but he agreed also 
with the Arminians that God desired the salvation of all. Those who had 
not been predestined to heaven were not on that account predestined to 
hell: God would extend to them all necessary grace, but it was for them 
to decide whether to accept or to refuse it. This, with all its good- 
hearted inelegance, is a reconciler's doctrine. Philip Doddridge, ever 
careful to explain that he was not a 'high' Calvinist, was happy to 
place himself in the Baxterian tradition, and like Baxter he desired 
Christian unity - or, at least, Protestant unity - above all things. 
'Your innate candour and benevolence,' wrote one of his many 
correspondents in 1745, 'your contempt of party distinction, joined to a 
worthy pursuit of usefulness and good fame, have induced you sometimes 
to attempt the reconciliation of parties to each other, and to show 
yourself a friend to both; but this is not an age for success in such 
s c h e m e s . I n  the interest of unity, Doddridge advised preachers to 
decline 'the highest points of Calvinism, even supposing them to be 
believed, viz. the imputation of Adam's sin, Reprobation, Irresistible 
grace, &c.'^ In his system of divinity he concentrated on non­
sectarian issues: the nature of the human mind, proofs of the existence
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and attributes of God, the immortality of the soul and the genuineness 
of scripture.
It was, then, the spirit of Baxter that spolce to Priestley, at 
some remove, in the lectures he heard at Daventry. He had already met 
with it before - Mr. Haggerstone and Mr. Walker, whose liberal 
conversation had helped him through his difficulties, were both 
Baxterians - and it pleased him very much. He thought the course at 
Daventry 'exceedingly favourable to free inquiry' and looked back on it 
with great satisfaction:
In my time, the academy was in state peculiarly favourable to the 
serious pursuit of truth, as the students were about equally 
divided upon every question of much importance, such as liberty 
and necessity, the sleep of the soul, and all the articles of 
theological orthodoxy and heresy; in consequence of which, all 
these topics were subject of continual discussion. Our tutors 
also were of different opinions: Dr. Ashworth taking the orthodox 
side of every question, and Mr. Clark, the sub-tutor, that of 
heresy, though always with the greatest modesty. 5
David Bogue and James Bennett, nineteenth-century nonconformist 
historians, dated the decline of Protestant Dissent from the lectures of 
Doddridge. Reasonably enough, they pointed out that if Doddridge and 
his followers really believed that the mind began as tabula rasa, then 
it was very wrong of them to inscribe error as well as truth upon the 
tablet and then to expect the innocent young to make up their own minds 
upon the subject. 'If such conduct be defended under the name of 
liberality, would it not be still more liberal,' they asked, 'to admit 
persons who were yet speculating whether Cnristianity, deism, or
A f .atheism, was more consistent with truth?' ° This liberality went by the 
name of 'candour', and candour was a quality very popular with 
enlightened Dissenters.
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Generally, to be candid was to value others for their sincerity 
and personal virtues, no matter how heretical their opinions might seem 
to be. This now-obsolete use of the word - to mean 'freedom from 
malice, kindliness, sweetness1 - is one of several given in the Oxford 
English Dictionary. A more familiar meaning of the word, as 'freedom 
from mental bias', dates from at least as early as the seventeenth 
century; and there is yet a third - 'freedom from reserve, openness, 
frankness' - which Watts seems to have had in mind when, talking of the 
prefect tutor's relations with his students, he wrote: 'He should also 
have much candour of soul, to pass a gentle censure on their 
impertinences and to pity them in their mistakes ...'^
It is by no means always clear which of these several meanings an 
eighteenth-century user of the word may intend by it. When, for 
example, Sir William Blackstone says that from Priestley's History of 
Electricity, 'I conceived a very favourable impression of his talents as 
a candid and ingenious writer', is he praising Priestley for the 
frankness with which he writes of the errors of electrical scientists, 
for the amiable disposition which causes him to mention these errors 
only when they have contributed to the discovery of truth, or for 
something else?^® It is difficult not to suspect that in cases like 
this, 'candour' and 'candid' function merely as buzz words: candour is a 
quality you unreflectingly attribute to somebody you like or wish to 
compliment.
Even when employed with deliberation, the word was in the 
eighteenth century made to do an inordinate amount of work; a fact well
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brought out by D.O. Thomas in his study of Priestley's good friend 
Richard Price, Dissenting preacher and philosopher:
The general connotation of 'candid' was possession of good 
character; it suggested purity, integrity, and freedom from moral 
blemish, and derived a special force from its association with 
luminosity and brilliance. More particularly, the word suggested 
the possession of a sweet and reasonable disposition, a freedom 
from malice and rancour and, above all, an unremitting zeal for 
the pursuit of knowledge.
Concentrating principally of this latter aspect of candour, Thomas goes 
on to explain that it involves 'the claim that all beliefs should be 
subject to rational criticism'; the assumption 'that in principle the 
truth can be discovered and communicated'; the belief that 'the appeal 
to reason is the only legitimate form of persuasion'; the requirement 
that we be dispassionate, patient and humble in our search for the 
truth; 'a sense of the equality of rational agents and a sense of 
community in the search for knowledge.1 ^  Thomas can hardly be said to 
be offering us a definition; instead, he combines most of the meanings 
of the word and then extrapolates freely from them. But he is not 
confused: he accurately reflects the complex of ideas which the word 
summoned up for Dissenters of Price’s day and persuasion. For them and 
for many of their contemporaries, candour was a much more important and 
a more substantial concept than we take it to be.
But it was by no means an unproblematic concept, as Bogue and 
Bennett - writing at a time when its lustre had considerably dimmed - 
were very well aware:
The misapplication of the word candour was more injurious in its 
effects on religious sentiments, than can now be well conceived. 
It was supposed to possess indescribable virtues. Candour was 
sounded from many a pulpit; and like charity, it was supposed to 
hide a multitude of sins. An orthodox minister who had candour, 
was to believe that an arian or socinian was a very good man; and
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that if he was sincere in his opinions, and not rigid in 
condemning others, he ought not to be condemned himself. The 
influence of this idea was exceedingly pernicious; for it led to 
an indifference with respect to truth and error, which depraved 
both their sentiments and dispositions, which relaxed the springs 
of Christian integrity and conduct, and gradually brought them to 
call good evil and evil good, to put light for darkness and 
darkness for light.
We can, perhaps, conjecture why things should have come to this. First 
we have Richard Baxter, himself firmly rooted in the intellectual and 
spiritual traditions of English Calvinism, anxious to reconcile the 
contending parties of his time, choosing to stress in his writings that 
which unites, ’mere Christianity', rather than that which divides. This 
choice in no way represents a lack of integrity: Baxter can say of 
Bunyan that, though 'an unlearned Antinomian-Anabaptist ... yet (abating 
his separation) I never heard that Bunnian was not an honest godly man. 
If then he attained the design of Christianity, was he not a 
Christian?'^1 In other words, he can say that Bunyan is to be accepted 
in spite of his heresies but not regardless of them. These heresies - 
his Antinomianism, Anabaptism and separation - are put in their place 
but they are not ignored. After Baxter we have Doddridge, inspired by 
similar benevolence but bestowing it upon doctrines as well as men. 
Accordingly, controversial doctrines are either ignored (as Doddridge 
advises preachers to do) or taught with no bias to any side of the 
controversy (as he did at Northampton and as his followers did at 
Daventry). But how are students to decide between the various parties 
in any controversy, lacking, as they are presumed to do, any particular 
bias of their own? Why indeed should their tutors not do as Bogue and 
Bennett ironically suggest, and teach atheism and deism as well as 
Christianity? The answer, presumably, is that the touchstone of
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religious truth is still the Bible. But then arises, as we have seen, 
the problem of how the Bible is to be interpreted without the 
magisterium of the Church. This is answered by the new concept of 
candour to which Thomas refers: ’One of the important elements in the 
ideal of candour is the claim ... that the appeal to reason is the only 
legitimate form of persuasion. ’ And so candour - which once meant 
treating all men alike in spite of their doctrines and then came to mean 
treating all (or almost all) doctrines alike - now means subjecting all 
doctrines alike to the scrutiny of an externally-obtained principle of 
rationality.
Candour is less a quality of feeling than a quality of the 
behaviour that mediates between people. (Hartley thought it a quality
C Othat accompanied the sympathetic affections. ) It is, moreover, a
quality of specifically public behaviour: its historical importance is
that it modifies and refines the behaviour of people who do not yet, and
may never, know each other well. It is a thing needed not in the
village but in the city, not in the organic community but in the public
square and the market place. This surely is why it was so much favoured
by those Dissenters who called themselves rational. For one thing, they
were socially unknown qualities - to others, at least - as soon as they
As MViL cfUfi td U j
stepped outside the meeting house. Separatedytrom the traditional and
well-understood network of social relations, the world of patriarchal
authority and religious establishment, they were strangers meeting
strangers. As such, they faced the problem of establishing
relationships of trust with those who could not rely upon a common
loyalty to squire or parson. The problem was increased by the fact that
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many of them lived in cities - the monstrously-burgeoning London or the 
new industrial centres of Birmingham and Leeds - for the city was a 
world of strangers, people whose material concerns were similar but who 
had not yet come to recognise their community of interest. (Their 
interests were, of course, conmercial; but commercial interest did not 
provide the obvious and solid focus of attention which real estate 
provided.) They were people whom one could not 'place1 in the old ways: 
in terms of family, property or traditional trade. Naturally, people 
thus situated were in need of forms of social intercourse which were 
polite but not too personal: a repertoire of conventional phrases and 
gestures, displayed in order not to reveal the self but to establish 
connections between people who were, and might remain, strangers to each 
other.^
V.
At Daventry, Priestley tells us - evidently impressed by his own 
daring - he 'saw reason to embrace what is generally called the 
heterodox side of almost every question.' But he adds that he and his 
contemporaries all left Daventry 'with a belief, more or less qualified, 
of the doctrine of atonement', and that 'the extreme of heresy' among 
them was Arianism.^
Named for Arius, a fourth-century theologian, Arianism denies that 
Christ has existed from all eternity, is consubstantial with the Father 
and is divine by nature. The Unitarian Priestley, looking back on his 
innocent youth, may not have thought it strong water, but it was not at
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all acceptable to the Presbyterian congregation of Needham Market in 
Suffolk, where, still only a candidate for ordination, he was appointed 
minister in 1755. Here, though he eschewed controversy in the pulpit, 
his conversation betrayed him, and his hearers, he says, 'fell off 
apace'. He was not, he insists, unhappy there, but his situation was 
not well remunerated and he was glad to accept appointment as minister 
to the 'good natured, friendly people' of Nantwich in Cheshire. Here, 
combining his spiritual duties with those of a schoolmaster, he lived 
for three years without controversy. In 1761, though, the tutorship in 
languages and belles lettres at the new Dissenting Academy at Warrington 
fell vacant and the trustees unanimously chose him for the post.^
He had first been considered for a job at Warrington three years 
before. At that time, the trustees had thought him too young for the 
job, but they did remark that he was 'of most unexceptionable character; 
of steady attachment to the Principles of Civil and Religious Liberty; 
and Remarkable for a Degree of Critical and Classical Learning not 
common in one so young ... u It was typical of the spirit of 
Warrington that learning and a regard for liberty should have been what 
its trustees were chiefly looking for. John Taylor, who was divinity 
tutor at the Academy from its inception in 1757 until 1761, began each 
year with the same address, which, according to the Academy's historian, 
Herbert MeLachlan, 'set forth what may be called the guiding principles 
of the Academy.' In it Taylor adjures his pupils to believe nothing he 
teaches them unless it appears to them 'to be supported and justified by 
proper evidence from Revelation, or the reason of things.' Anything 
that they do believe is to be rejected later if, 'upon partial and
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faithful examination', it appears 'dubious or false'. Finally, they are 
to keep their minds 'always open to evidence', to banish from their 
breasts 'all prejudice, preposession and party-zeal', to try 'to live in 
peace and love' with their fellow Christians, asserting for themselves 
and allowing for others 'the inalienable rights of judgment and 
conscience.'^  This was the spirit that informed Priestley's own 
teaching. At the end of every lecture he would encourage his students 
to discuss its subject and to let him know of any objections they might 
have to his treatment of it. All his fellow tutors were determinists 
and Arians, and they differed amongst themselves only on the doctrine of 
the Atonement. It was a most agreeably candid place.
During the six years that Priestley spent at Warrington, the pace 
of his life quickened considerably: he lectured not only on languages 
and rhetoric but also on history, law and economics; he wrote on 
theology, education and politics; he married Mary, daughter of Isaac 
Wilkinson, the iron-founder, and sister to John Wilkinson, the inventor 
of the blast furnace; he devised an educational aid, his Chart of 
Biography, and for it was awarded an LL.D. by the University of 
Edinburgh; he began his scientific career and was elected Fellow of the 
Royal Society. It was here too that he was ordained. Thus he fulfilled 
part of that 'general plan' which he claims to have laid at Daventry, 
where ordination and the duties which it imposed had constituted 'the 
great object' of his endeavours: 'and I can truly say that I always 
considered the office of a Christian minister as the most honourable of 
any upon earth, and in the studies proper to it I always took the
C O
greatest pleasure.'JO
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His numerous theological publications afford, perhaps, some idea 
of what these pleasurable studies consisted in. He is not a devotional 
writer: he is a polemicist and a systematiser, and all his labours 
amongst the church historians are bent towards controversial ends. But 
while it is doubtless significant that he chooses to single out for 
mention the studies proper to his office rather than any of its other 
duties, the fact that he undertook this office at all is itself worthy 
of note. Indeed, Bogue and Bennett, evangelical Calvinists both, 
thought it worthy not merely of note but of astonishment:
Induced by the love of books to enter the ministry, into which 
zeal for the glory of Christ and compassion for the souls of men 
should have led him, the consequences to himself and the church 
were just such as every discerning Christian would have 
anticipated with anguish and alarm. To rid himself of the dread 
which he had felt from a consciousness of being unregenerate, he 
adopted the compendious but hazardous method of denying the 
necessity of regeneration. Hence all his future aberrations from 
the truth; for to the carnal mind, light appears darkness and 
darkness light, evil good and good evil, bitter is put for sweet 
and sweet for bitter. Hence also the mere man every where shews 
himself instead of the Christian. 9
When reading what the nineteenth century has to say of the eighteenth, 
one should always be wary of mistaking a higher level of noise for 
greater depth of feeling; nonetheless, this outburst surely has a 
convincing ring, if only because it gives voice to doubts which many of 
Priestley's readers must feel. The suggestion that it was the love of 
books that induced him to enter the ministry is particularly perceptive 
there is indeed something inescapable bookish about Priestley's 
religion.
His career after his ordination, as recorded in his Memoirs, has 
done nothing to dispel the suspicion which his coolness arouses. In
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1767, to the great disappointment of the Warrington trustees, he moved
to Leeds to become minister to the congregation of the Mill-Hill Chapel;
health
a growing family and a wife in delicate/having, he says, necessitated 
this removal to a better-remunerated position. At Leeds, where he began 
the chemical experiments that secured his intellectual reputation, he 
had every reason to be satisfied with his lot: 'My salary exceeds that 
of most Dissenting minsters, and I may say that the whole of my time is 
at my own disposal, so that I can pursue what studies I please without 
interruption.' Eventually, however, the promise of an even more 
comfortable post lured him away from the Mill-Hill pulpit and into the 
service of the Earl of Shelburne, whose librarian and 'literary 
companion' he was from 1773 to 1780.^
He had hesitated for some time before accepting Shelburne's 
invitation. Could he offer his lordship services commensurate with a 
salary large enough to tempt him from Leeds? Was he not too ignorant of 
politics and of modem history to be of assistance to a statesman like 
Shelburne? Would not his position be, as some warned, ’too dependent 
and humiliating'? Many friends, indeed, advised against acceptance, but 
none of them was personally acquainted with Lord Shelburne; those who 
knew him encouraged Priestley to enter his service. At last, a personal 
visit from his prospective employer helped Priestley make up his mind.
It was agreed that he would have two hundred and fifty pounds per annum 
for life, a town house adjoining Shelburne's and another very near his 
country seat at Caine. His course was now determined. He delivered his 
farewell sermon at Leeds on May 16, 1773.
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These hesitations are worthy of note because they reflect upon 
Priestley's sense of the importance of the pastoral office. In his 
Memoirs, he gives as his reason for leaving Leeds merely the inadequacy 
of his salary - 'only one hundred guineas per annum, and a house' - and 
the consequent impossibility of his making any provision for his family 
(he had now three children) after his death. But few Dissenting 
ministers were as well paid as Priestley, and his willingness to leave 
the ministry for what he represents as purely financial considerations 
has drawn a tart comment from Michael Watts, historian of Dissent:
That Priestley succumbed to Shelburne's offer, when Andrew Fuller, 
for example, was struggling along at Soham at £21 a year in the 
late 1770s, is indicative that Priestley's Christian ministry was 
somewhat lacking in zeal. And when he left Shelburne's household 
at Caine and became co-pastor of the New Meeting in Birmingham in 
1780 it was on the understanding that, in order to enable him to 
continue his "philosophical and other studies", baptisms and sick- 
visiting would be left to his fellow minster and Priestley's own 
duties would be confined to Sundays. 2
Of course, Priestley's 'philosophical' studies - the chemical 
investigations that he pursued with particular success while in 
Shelburne's service - may have been one the reasons why he needed so 
large a salary: by the end of his time in Birmingham, he had put 
together one of the best laboratories in Europe. Besides, it can be 
said in his defence that, though he may not have baptized or visited the 
sick (and, since there were two ministers, why should there not have 
been a division of labour?), he seems to have been proud of the 
attention that he paid to his other duties:
With this congregation I greatly improved my plan of catechizing 
and lecturing, and my classes have been well attended. I have 
also introduced the custom of expounding the scriptures as I read 
them, which I would earnestly recommend to all ministers.
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It appears too that neither Priestley's congregation nor Dissenting 
onlookers thought his services inadequate. The Birmingham Dissenter 
Samuel Kenrick, writing to a Scottish minister in 1781, noted the wide 
variety of Priestley's interests but saw no reason to suggest that they 
implied a lack of zeal for his pastoral duties: 'This wonderful man, who 
writes & does so much is always at leisure to receive a friend - visits 
& examines his people almost as regularly as you do - & has one if not 2 
days a week to meet Messrs Bolton, Watt, Keir & the other ingenious 
artists and literati at Birmingham - in his physical walk.' Nor did the 
Mill-Hill congregation complain at their pastor's work. Quite the 
contrary: on his resignation, they wrote to him to acknowledge their 
gratitude for his 'affectionate and earnest endeavours ...'^
Of course, these testimonies are not of a form that would satisfy , 
Bogue and Bennett, nor even, perhaps, Michael Watts. Neither Kenrick 
nor the Mill-Hill congregation has anything to say about Priestley's 
Christian zeal or enthusiasm for God's glory, nor can we confidently 
suppose that they are silent about these matters merely because they 
take them for granted: Priestley and his congregations were well suited 
to each other. But it cannot have been love of pecuniary gain that led 
Priestley to seek ordination: he had no illusions about the difficulties 
to which the holders of pastoral office were exposed. Just before his 
marriage, in 1762, he wrote of these difficulties in a letter to John 
Seddon of Warrington:
I am seriously preparing for ordination. As all things in this 
world are uncertain, I think it a point of prudence not to omit 
anything that may possibly be of advantage to me, if ever it be my 
lot to be obliged to have recourse to the ministry for the whole 
or any part of my subsistence, particularly, as I am going to have 
a dearer, and more important stake in this world than I have ever 
yet had in it. I can sincerely say, I never knew what it was to
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be anxious on my own account; but I cannot help confessing I begin 
to feel a good deal on the account of another person. The hazard 
of bringing a person into difficulties which she cannot possibly 
have any idea or prospects of affects me, at times, very 
sensibly.
The emphasis in the second sentence is mine and it draws attention to 
the fact (as it seems) that, for Priestley, the honourable office of a 
Christian minister need not be identical with the tenure of a pastorate. 
A minister, we may conclude from this and from the Memoirs, could 
justify his ordination and pursue his ministry with appropriate zeal 
without being attached to a particular congregation. He might instead 
serve as Priestley did while in Shelburne's employ: writing on 
theological matters; defending the truth in public controversies; 
discovering it by theological, philosophical, scientific and historical 
investigations; preaching, like Priestley at Caine, the occasional 
sermon. Few, perhaps, were fitted to this sort of life - most were 
better employed in baptising and in visiting the sick - but Priestley 
had little doubt as to where his own talents lay or how great they were: 
the question which troubled him apropos Shelburne's invitation was where 
he would be most 'capable of doing any good in the world', whether at 
Caine or in Leeds.00
This was how Priestley chose to glorify the God whose hand he saw 
in all things. And at last Birmingham - its congregation 'the most 
liberal of any in England' - seemed to him a particularly appropriate 
place in which to do his sort of good:
I consider my settlement at Birmingham the happiest event in my 
life, being highly favourable to every object I had in view 
philosophical or theological. In the former respect, I had the 
convenience of good workmen of every kind, and the society of 
persons eminent for their knowledge of chemistry, particularly Mr. 
Watt, Mr. Keir, and Dr. Withering. These with Mr. Boulton, and
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Dr. Darwin, ... Mr. Galton, afterwards Mr. Johnson, of Kenelworth, 
and myself, dined together every month, calling ourselves the 
Lunar Society, because the time of our meeting was near the full 
moon.
None of it was to last, of course: all the materials of Priestley's 
intellectual life - his house, his library, his laboratory - were 
consumed suddenly and violently on Bastille Day 1791.
The mob that destroyed Priestley's house - and would have 
destroyed his happiness had he not been of so cool and resolutely 
'philosophical' a temperament - had presumably some idea, however crude, 
of who and what he was. In the final chapter of this essay, I shall 
examine the part that Priestley himself played in creating for them the 
caricature that they attacked; in the four chapters that precede it, I 
shall trace the formation, during the seventeen-sixties and seventies, 
of the ideas that led him into such fatal controversy in the seventeen- 
eighties and nineties. Priestley himself has indicated the route that I 
shall take through his works; its twin landmarks are the Institutes of 
Natural and Revealed Religion, which he published in three volumes from 
1772 to 1774, and the History of the Corruptions of Christianity, which 
he published in 1782. In the final volume of the Institutes, he looked 
briefly and critically at the work of the Scottish 'commonsense' 
philosophers, and he returned to the subject in 1774 with an Examination 
of their works. The ideas into which this work led him were expanded in 
1777 in his Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit, a philosophical 
essay to which he appended a theological sequel - an 'historical account 
of the system of heathenism concerning, the pre-existence of souls in 
general, and of the pre-existence of the soul of Christ in particular' - 
which he had originally intended to be part of the fourth volume of the
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Institutes. This fourth volume never appeared as such; it burst its 
bounds and was finally published as a substantial work in its own right: 
An History of the Corruptions of Christianity.
The Institutes, the Examination, the Disquisitions and the 
Corruptions thus constitute a sequence in Priestley’s work. All his 
other most important writings - the Lectures on History and General 
Policy, the Essay on the First Principles of Government, and his 
numerous scientific publications - are related in significant ways to 
this theologically-orientated sequence; in his scientific writings, for 
example, he explores God's creation, and in his political writings he 
seeks to provide a social environment in which his theology may prosper. 
These works are all parts of a single intellectual project which is 
radical in the most literal sense of the word: it is an attempt to 
uncover the roots of belief and to arrive at those basic minimal 
elements which can be rationally defended in free and open debate. 
Hence, of course, the importance to him of the concept of candour; 
though, as we shall see in the final chapter, it was his obstinate 
attempt to keep a candid debate going when it was no longer tactful to 
do so that helped to kindle the fires that consumed his house.
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CHAPTER TWO.
THE HISTORY OF MAN AND THE HISTORY OF NATURE.
Dear boy, you will not hear me speak 
With sorrow or with rancour 
Of what has paled my rosy cheek 
And blasted it with canker;
'Twas Love, great Love, that did the deed 
Through Nature's gentle laws,
And how should ill effects proceed 
From so divine a cause?
Sweet honey comes from bees that sting,
As you are well aware;
To one adept in reasoning,
Whatever pains disease may bring 
Are but the tangy seasoning 
To Love’s delicious fare.
Richard Wilbur, ’Pangloss's Song’
I.
Taking up his post as tutor in languages and belles lettres at 
Warrington, Priestley had, as he later confessed, 'no particular 
fondness' for these subjects, and would rather have taught mathematics 
and natural philosophy. Nonetheless, he applied himself - with 'great 
assiduity', he tells us - to the duties of his position and, in doing 
so, discovered a serious flaw in Warrington's curriculum: 'though most 
of our pupils were young men designed for situations in civil and active 
life, every article in the plan of their education was adapted to the 
learned professions'. To remedy this defect, he composed lectures not 
only on languages and on oratory and criticism but also on 'History and
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General Policy', the 'Laws and Constitution of England’, and the 
'History of England'.1
Priestley maintains that those intended for the active life of a 
lawyer, soldier or merchant will have little use for the adornments of a 
classical education. The academic curriculum of the universities as 
well as the dissenting academies, admirably suited though it may be to 
prepare men for the pulpit or the library, is sadly neglectful of topics 
more immediately important: 'The subjects I would recommend are CIVIL 
HISTORY and more especially the important objects of CIVIL POLICY; such 
as the theory of laws, government, manufactures, commerce, naval force 
etc., with whatever may be demonstrated from history to have contributed 
to the flourishing state of nations, to rendering a people happy and
opopulous at home, and formidable abroad. ... Though Priestley is 
anxious to disclaim any desire to teach politics 'to low mechanics and 
manufacturers', his attention is not directed at the middle class alone. 
Many great historians, including some of those upon whose writing he 
relied, had insisted on the exemplary value of their work; from it 
nascent rulers were to learn the arts of government. Priestley fully 
agrees: political evils result not from a want of patriotism but from 
ignorance of the real constitution and interests of the country. 
Education should, by remedying this ignorance, contribute much to the 
well-being of the nation and ultimately, it may be hoped, to better 
3government.J
Having written all his lectures, Priestley found himself with time 
on his hands. He was, however, engaged in electrical experiments and 
had been making occasional visits to London, where he had met a number
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of distinguished men of ideas, Benjamin Franklin among them. It was 
Franklin who had encouraged him in his project of writing an history of 
electricity and had furnished him with some of the necessary materials. 
As the list of works consulted which Priestley appended to his History 
indicates, he was very zealous in his pursuit of source materials, but 
he did not confine himself to reading the works of others: he repeated 
many of their experiments himself and was led by them to devise new 
experiments of his own, thus applying to the historiography of science a 
dictum current among humanist historians since the renaissance, that 
only those who had participated in affairs of state could hope to write 
useful civil history. The result of all this industry and ingenuity was 
one of his most successful works: The History and Present State of 
Electricity, with Original Experiments, published in 1767 and so 
successful that Priestley undertook another (and, as it turned out, less 
successful) project, The History and Present State of Vision, Light, and 
Colours.
By the early seventeen-seventies, then, Priestley was known to his 
pupils as a general historian and to the public at large as an historian 
of science; but there was a further area of historical investigation 
that was more important to him than any other. In the introduction to 
his Lectures on History, he remarks that:
no person can be a good divine, much less undertake any part of 
the controversy with unbelievers, unless he be very well 
acquainted with history, civil as well as ecclesiastical. Indeed, 
more than half of the books of scripture consist of history. And 
as all the prophecies of the Old and New Testament must be 
verified by history, none but a good historian can be a judicious 
commentator upon such important parts of the sacred writings.
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The historical bias in Priestley's theological thought is on full 
display in the Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion which he 
published in three volumes from 1772 to 1774 but which he had begun 
writing, he tells us, whilst still a student at Daventry.^ Despite the 
title of his work, he devotes little of it to natural religion, and is 
much more concerned to examine 'the evidences of the Jewish and 
Christian Revelations.'
II.
The Lectures on History is not a piece of original scholarship.
It leans heavily on the work of earlier historians - is, indeed, 
intended partly as a guide to their writings - and its author frequently 
has occasion to quote some of his more illustrious predecessors: 
Bolingbroke, Voltaire, Montesquieu and Hume, every one of whom is keen 
to stress the importance of the study of history. This, in fact, is a 
common empiricist theme: a philosophy according to which knowledge 
derives only from experience must naturally, when it turns its attention 
to public affairs, place considerable weight on the collective 
experiences recorded in works of history; these are the experiments of 
mankind, 'the profitable things of Antiquity.'^  But, of course, the 
problem for the student of history was how to identify these profitable 
things and separate them from the useless learned lumber with which, it 
was agreed, only crabbed scholars concerned themselves. This was the 
task which Bolingbroke undertook.
Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, the earliest of the 
Enlightenment historians from whom Priestley quotes, and one who seems
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to have influenced him considerably, sets the tone for his followers 
with his scepticism and his contempt for mere antiquarianism. As a 
great statesman addressing himself in his Letters on the Study and Use 
of History to a fellow member of the House of Lords, he is naturally 
concerned with the lessons that may be learned from the study of 
history. 'The true and proper object' of this study is, he says, 'a 
constant improvement in private and in public virtue', and he has 
nothing but contempt for the under-labourers, the dessicated 
antiquarians, who study history so as to become not wiser but more 
learned: theirs is a foolish affectation. The true value of history is 
expressed in a famous phrase often credited to Bolingbroke but 
attributed by him to Dionysius Halicarnassus: 'history is philosophy 
teaching by examples.'^ That is, history is a source of illustrations*
of theory, a testing ground for theory, and, perhaps, its raw material. 
For Bolingbroke, knowledge of history without experience of the world 
makes pedants, and experience without a knowledge of history makes half­
finished players in the theatre of life:
If experience alone can make us perfect in our parts, experience 
cannot begin to teach them till we are actually on the stage: 
whereas, by a previous application to this study, we con them over 
at least before we appear there: we are not quite unprepared; we 
learn our parts sooner, and we learn them better.
Bolingbroke does not expressly declare that history is anticipated 
experience, but the sentiment - a commonplace throughout the century - 
is clearly implicit in this passage. He goes on to point out that the 
examples which history puts before us may be considered superior to the 
lessons of exlperience in that they are complete; we see not merely the 
origins of a policy but also its outcome. Thus we may learn from the
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mistakes of others, 'and their good and their ill success are equally
Qinstructive.'°
Bolingbroke is a disagreeable figure - sententious and dishonest 
as a politician, glittering and superficial as a philosopher - but his 
historiographical theories proved very agreeable to many of his 
contemporaries. Voltaire was certainly influenced by them and 
throughout his career expressed opinions similar to Bolingbroke's about 
the use of history and the uselessness of antiquarianism. Similarly, 
David Hume had no doubt as to the exemplary value of history or the 
historian's duty to abridge and arrange the countless facts which 
threatened to overwhelm it.^ By this means, and by this means alone, 
would history become what it ought to be: an instrument of education, 
improving both morals and intellect. It was, of course, an instrument 
which Dissenters as well as sceptical philosophers were very ready to 
employ. 'History is a necessary study in the supreme place for 
gentlemen who deal in politics', says Isaac Watts. 'The Government of 
nations and the distressing and desolating events which have in all ages 
attended the mistakes of politicians, should ever be present in their 
minds to warn them to avoid the like conduct.'^
But a barrier stood in the way of the exemplary use of history, 
a barrier whose existence was so widely acknowledged that we find it 
alluded to alike by Bolingbroke and by one who had little love for him:
The common remark as to the utility of reading history being made: 
JOHNSON: 'We must consider how very little history there is; I 
mean real authentick history. That certain kings reigned, and 
certain battles were fought, we can depend upon as true; but all 
the colouring, all the philosophy of history is conjecture'.
- 61 -
Bolingbroke devotes the whole of one of his Letters to this problem, 
insisting that a lot of what passes for history is not so much untrue as 
untrustworthy; that it mingles the plausible with the wildly improbable, 
the well-attested with the doubtful, the biassed with the disinterested. 
In an essay written some years before the Letters, he had tried, like a 
number of his contemporaries, to allay these doubts by tabulating rules 
according to which works of history might be assessed. A putative fact, 
he had there said, may be regarded as probable if it contains nothing 
that contradicts general experience. If, in addition to this, it is 
’supported by the testimony of proper witnesses, ... it becomes really 
probable in the highest degree. ...’ In general, degree of assent will 
be proportional to the number, character and circumstances of the 
original witnesses.1^ In the Letters Bolingbroke is careful to 
repudiate the extreme scepticism, or 'Pyrrhonism', deployed by Pierre 
Bayle in his very influential Dictionnaire historique et critique, which 
had been published in 1697. The Pyrrhonists, says Bolingbroke, argue 
that because ancient history is too improbable to be believed, more 
recent historians must - notwithstanding their 'greater air of 
probability' - be similarly uncreditworthy and therefore of no use to 
mankind. But this is to go too far: truth may often by attained, or at 
least falsehood exposed, by the use of concurrent testimony. This is a 
method of which Voltaire, perhaps following Bolingbroke, was to make 
considerable use. The Whigs, he said, contradict the Tories and the 
Tories contradict the Whigs, so we may accept as indisputably true only 
what both parties agree upon. Priestley in his turn was later to 
enumerate various considerations of this kind - which were, he said,
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’well understood by all persons who attend to them' - in the 'Maxims of 
Historical Criticism' which he appended to his Letters to Dr. Horsley.1^
From these considerations of the comparison and evaluation of 
sources, it naturally follows that history may be better studied the 
more sources there are, and, consequently, that recent history is the 
most reliable. Hence Bolingbroke's advice that European history need be 
studied in detail only from the end of the fifteenth century and 
Voltaire's dismissal of the first five centuries of Roman history.. For 
medieval historians, with their credulity and their 'Gothic barbarism', 
Voltaire had nothing but contempt; and Hume, though he wrote several 
volumes of medieval history, had no very high opinion of the subject: 
real history, useful history, began with the renaissance.1^
Outside the despised company of antiquaries, there can have been 
few contemporaries of Bolingbroke, Voltaire and Hume who would have 
sought edification in accounts of Gothic barbarity; it was only when 
they turned their attention to scriptural history that the philosophical 
historians became really controversial. Bolingbroke, for example, is 
cool and almost conciliatory in tone but obviously malicious in intent. 
The Jews, upon whose writings alone sacred history is founded, were, he 
says, a superstitious people, 'among whom the custom and art of pious 
lying prevailed remarkably. ...' None but Jews believed Jewish 
historians until the establishment of Giristianity, which is in part 
founded upon their works and the prophecies related in them, 'reflected 
back upon them an authority which they had not before, ...' Following 
Richard Simon (a Roman Catholic priest whose Histoire critique de Vieux 
Testament was published in 1678), Bolingbroke suggests that the
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scriptures be regarded as only intermittently inspired, to be believed 
only when they touch on matters of faith and doctrine but not when they 
purport to describe historical events. So much of the Old Testament is 
confused, broken and full of interpolations that it could not possibly 
be the work of the Holy Ghost, who must surely have higher editorial 
standards. The authority of the New Testament may, however, be taken 
for granted, and so it may lend this authority to certain parts of the 
Old.15
Bolingbroke, obsequiously careful to disavow any irreligious 
motives, nonetheless leaves his readers with an unsettling sense of 
incredulity and, if they are believers, a serious problem. Either they 
reject his method of biblical interpretation and swallow the Old 
Testament whole, ignoring or trying to refute his criticisms, or they 
join him in selective reading. But this latter course is (and is 
obviously intended to be) an inherently unsatisfactory compromise; for 
might not the writers of the Old Testament - who, it is agreed, were 
credulous, confused and piously mendacious - have been lying even when 
they wrote on matters of faith and morals? Can there possibly be a 
reliable method of discovering which parts, if any, of the Old Testament 
are inspired? To put it another way: if the pious reader cannot refute 
Bolingbroke's textual criticisms, then either he must ignore them and 
take a leap of faith or he must adopt Bolingbroke’s readings of 
scripture and still take a leap of faith. The choice seems to lie 
between Catholic fideism - obedient submission to the authority of the 
Church - and deism, or even atheism. Protestantism is no longer an 
available option. As Simon pointed out, Protestants put their faith in
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the Bible but, in doing so, they put their faith in what can now be seen 
as confused and mutilated writings that cannot be understood without the 
assistance of some interpretative tradition. The Bible alone is not 
enough.10
For many Englishmen, anxious to be rational Protestants, this was
an inescapable dilemma even before Bolingbroke1s Letters appeared. In
1697, Charles Leslie tried to solve it with a set of four criteria for
the evaluation of scripture. According to Leslie, any putative fact
recorded in an historical work must: first, be such that the human
senses may judge of it; second, relate to something done publicly;
third, be commemorated by overt acts and public monuments; and fourth,
be commemorated by monuments instituted and actions commenced from the
time the public acts were performed. The first two rules are supposed
to insure that no imposition can have taken place at the time of the
alleged fact, the last two that there has been no subsequent imposition.
The traditions of Mohammed and of the pagan deities fail this test, says
Leslie; those of Moses and Christ pass with flying colours. Thus Leslie
feels able to say that he receives the scriptures 'upon the testimony,
not authority, of the Church; and I examine that testimony as I do other
facts, till I have satisfied my private judgment there is no other way'.
Leslie's tests, naive and inadequate though they are (it was quickly
pointed out that the heathen often set up festivals to commemorate
events that had never taken place), were made great use of by succeeding
generations of Christian controversialists. But, of course, once it was
be
accepted that the Bible could^put to the test in this way, a change had 
come over Christian thought; something pure and simple had become
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haj
muddied and difficult. The way/been opened for all kinds of Biblical
interpretations, and such talk encouraged scepticism or deism. And to 
try to refute deism - as the greatest of English classicists, Richard 
Bentley did in a triumphant polemic - is to go further than any 
Protestant ought to go; for the more learned the refutation, the more it 
seems to imply that the Bible is not, as Protestants believe it to be, a 
divinely lucid text whose meaning is clear even to the humblest of 
men.
None of this would have come as a surprise to the author of the 
Histoire des variations des eglises protestantes. Writing in 1688, 
Jacques Benigne Bossuet, Bishop of Meaux, was moved to compare the sad 
array of Protestant sects ranged before him - Lutherans, Zwinglians, 
Calvinists - with the various heresies that had afflicted the early 
church. And in his opposition to error he found a kindred spirit from 
those times: ’The heretics, says Tertullian, change their rules, that is 
their confessions of faith; everyone of them believes himself entitled 
to change and modify the tradition by his own light, for it is by his 
own light that the author of the sect has formed the tradition; heresy 
remains true to its nature if it does not cease to innovate, and its 
progress is similar to its origin.' Acting thus, according to no lights 
but their own, individual heretics are not able to foresee clearly all 
that follows from their innovations. Those innovations will themselves, 
therefore, be liable to further innovation; and so on, down a road 
leading ever farther from the Catholic truth. But who are these 
heretics, asks Bossuet, that they should set their opinions before the 
accumulated wisdom of the majority? Against the presumptuous
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questioning of the inconstant individual, he sets the wisdom of the 
collectivity as represented by the Catholic Church, custodian of the 
Christian tradition. To question this authority is to break the living 
continuity of that tradition.1^
Bossuet was a sworn enemy of Simon (rather to the dismay of the 
latter, who thought that he had done well by the church), but about this 
one important particular they were in agreement: outside tradition there 
is no certainty, no secure vantage point from which tradition may be 
surveyed and critically analysed. Of course, such arguments will tell 
most powerfully against Protestants; against, that is, those who wish to 
retain some but not all of tradition's content. They do not at all 
touch the atheist or the deist. It was a work of Bossuet's, the 
Discours sur l'histoire universelle, that provoked Voltaire's mistress, 
the Marquise du Chatelet - herself untouched by traditionalist arguments
- to an outburst against the idea of universal history as a providential 
drama of creation, fall, covenant and redemption. Against one of the 
pages which Bossuet devoted to the story of the Jews, she wrote, 'One 
may talk much of this people in theology, but it merits little space in 
history.' The implication of her comment is well expressed by Eric 
Voegelin:
The note becomes revolutionary by its implication ... that profane 
history has the monopoly of determining the relevance of peoples 
and events. The center of universality is shifted from the sacred 
to the profane level ... Christianity will be understood as an 
event in history. Through this shift of the center of 
interpretation the dualism of sacred and profane history 
disappears. The profane history is profane only as long as sacred 
history is accepted as the absolute frame of reference and when 
this position is abandoned, the two histories merge on the level 
of secularized history.
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So by the time Priestley walked into the lecture-hall, the value of 
profane history was widely acknowledged, but its very success posed a 
threat to Christian belief. One of his main tasks would be the writing 
of a sacred history, agreeable to his need for an objectively-sanctioned 
Christianity, that would escape alike the strictures of the deists and 
of Simon and Bossuet.
III.
The Lectures on History and General Policy open in strikingly 
Bolingbrokean terms. ’History ...' says Priestley, unsurprisingly, 'may 
be called anticipated experience’. Its advantage over personal 
experience, he continues, still echoing Bolingbroke, is that the lessons 
which it lays before us are complete. Knowledge cannot be acquired but 
by experience, and the most exalted understanding is merely that which 
is best able to draw conclusions from facts and experiments. All this 
is decidedly commonplace, but Priestley's associationism gives him a 
rationale for his faith in the educative function of history. It will, 
he says, be evident to us that an acquaintance with history tends to 
strengthen virtue 'if we consider in what manner virtuous impressions 
are actually made on the mind. How do we acquire a love for virtue, but 
by frequently viewing it in those points of light in which it appears 
desirable to us, and in a situation of mind in which no bias is laid 
upon us in favour of vice?'
But, of course, Priestley cannot allow himself the scepticism of 
the philosophes; his fear and hatred of fideism are too great and, 
besides, he has two strong objections to historical scepticism. The
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first arises simply from his Protestantism. His religion is biblical in 
foundation, and so - though, in fact, he does not believe all of 
scripture to be divinely-inspired - he requires a method of textual 
criticism more dependable than Bolingbroke's. Furthermore, as a 
Socinian he would like to be able to show how true Christianity has been 
corrupted by the priests, and in order to do this he needs reliable 
historical information; it will not do merely to follow Bolingbroke in 
supposing wholesale mendacity.
His second objection to scepticism arises from his belief in 
divine providence, a belief in God’s constant interest and occasional 
agency in the world which places him in marked contrast to his 
philosophical forbears. There are no providential explanations in 
Voltaire’s Essai sur les moeurs nor in Hume's History of England. 
Voltaire’s God is a passive spectator, not of the drama - for there is 
no plot, no predetermined scene on which the final curtain will descend
- but of the game (for there are rules, which God wrote before retiring 
to the stands).
Priestley finds the importance of a belief in providence most 
clearly demonstrated by the effect a lack of it had on the heathen. 
Without belief in providence, belief in the existence of God can have no 
influence on human behaviour. Whatever may have been the benefits of a 
natural religion such as the heathen philosophers professed, none of 
these benefits was moral. Religion and morality were not connected in 
the philosophical mind, and the philosophers, notwithstanding their 
belief in a supreme being, felt no compunction to try to abate the 
lewdness and cruelty of their times. Modem deists and believers in
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natural religion, Bolingbroke among them, are no better: they too 
separate religion from morality, and they neither encourage virtue nor 
discourage vice.^1
For Priestley, the hand of God is everywhere apparent, 'ever 
bringing good out of evil and gradually conducting things to a more 
perfect and glorious state. ...'^ He can turn nowhere without seeing 
evidence of the divine handiwork: the History of Electricity reveals the 
work of God in the phenomena of nature and the progress of science; the 
Lectures on History and General Policy show how human history, even in 
its darkest-seeming moments, is part of a vast and benevolent plan.
Thus convinced that all will ultimately be for the best, Priestley can 
regard history with a reasonably contented eye. He knows that 
scientific error leads in the end to truth and that even manifestly 
objectionable institutions, like Popery, have had their uses and, though 
evil in themselves, have sometimes been the instruments of good 
(monasteries, for example, were the asylums of learning in the Dark 
Ages, and Romish superstition gave rise to knight-errantry, which helped 
to preserve the peace in lawless times). History, then, is a play with 
a happy ending and a divine author, so it is natural that we should want 
to read the reviews so as to find out a little more about the dramatist. 
It is surely for this reason that Priestley treats even secular 
historians with a respect much greater than that accorded them by 
Bolingbroke and Voltaire.
By the time Priestley turned his attention to these matters, the 
anti-sceptical project was at least a century old. Bayle's Pyrrhonism 
was merely the application to historical and scriptural studies of that
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scepticism which, in the opinion of many, underwrote the errors of 
Cartesian cosmology. Not surprisingly, the Newtonians were particularly 
anxious that scepticism should not carry the day, and this anxiety is 
well displayed in 'sGravesande1s Mathematical Elements of Natural 
Philosophy and Hartley's Observations on Man.
'sGravesande prefaces his work with the 'Oration Concerning 
Evidence' which he delivered at Leyden in 1724. Here he concerns 
himself, like other Newtonians, with a truth to which Aristotle long ago 
drew attention: that it is the mark of an educated mind to seek in each 
subject only such precision as the nature of that subject admits. He 
agrees with Locke that mathematical proofs impose themselves instantly 
and irresistibly upon the mind, but he fears that attempts to apply 
mathematical methods to other sciences - doomed as they are to 
frustration - will in their failure engender scepticism. But there are, 
he reminds us, many truths which cannot be proved by mathematics and 
many methods of proof other than the mathematical; the evidence for our 
belief that the sun, having set, will rise or that the Romans were once 
a powerful people is not mathematical but 'moral', and the persuasion 
which follows from it is 'moral certainty'.
Hartley too is concerned with moral certainty (though he does not 
employ the term) and he is very noticeably not overawed by mathematics, 
which he refuses to allow to lord it over other methods of enquiry. His 
treatment of epistemic probability is unusually graphic: observed 
effects or experimental results are compared to the ordinates of an 
unknown curve and the total or all possible circumstances or outcomes to 
the abscissa on which these points stand. The general law for this
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curve is, then, analogous to ’that Law of Action, which, being supposed 
to take place in the given Circumstances, produce the given Effects.'
The more ordinates that are given, and the smaller and more nearly equal 
the distances between them, the more reliable will be our conclusion.
Of course, our general mathematical law will be unreliable if the curve 
is of a particularly outlandish shape, and induction may similarly 
mislead us; but Hartley, following Abraham de Moivre, believes that this 
will not usually be the case, for God maintains the statistical
r\ i
regularities of nature. This does not imply, as it might appear to, 
that Hartley is indeed intent upon reducing the concrete world to 
measurable quantity. The real direction of his thought becomes 
strikingly clear when, in a very curious passage, he suggests that this 
comparison of integral mathematics and induction is the more exact 
because mathematical conclusions, arrived at by differentiation, are 
'liable to the same Uncertainties, both in Kind and Degree, as the 
general Maxims of Natural Philosophy drawn from Natural History, 
Experiments, ' It is not the objective relationship between 
mathematical ideas which interests Hartley but rather something entirely 
psychological: the intuitive coalescence of ideas which forms the basis 
of mathematical reasoning and is, he says, 'the highest Kind of 
Induction'. On any given occasion, he adds, our inference that two plus 
two equals four will be drawn from our experience of previous instances:
Where the Instances from whence the Induction is made are alike, 
as far as we know, to that under Consideration, at least in all 
things that affect the present Inquiry, it affords the highest 
Probability, and may be termed Induction, in the proper Sense of 
the Word. Thus we infer, that the Bread before us is nutritive 
and wholesome, because its Smell, Taste, Ingredients, Manner of 
Composition, are the same as those of other Bread, which has 
often before been experienced to be so. 5
- 72 -
The affect of these passages is not to pull down mathematics from its 
haughty position on the pedestal of certainty. Rather, by blurring the 
boundary between scientia (certain knowledge, best exemplified by the 
'high* science of mathematics) and opinio (conjectural knowledge, 
typified by the 'low' sciences of chemistry and natural history),
Hartley is able at once to allow that real knowledge may be found in 
fields other than mathematics (' it is a practical Error of great 
Importance to suppose that ... historical Evidences are inferior to 
mathematical ones') and to undercut the arguments of the sceptics.
If the conclusions of historical arguments ever seem less than 
mathematically certain, this, Hartley believes, is because of their 
greater complexity and also because the putative concurrent evidences 
may be questionable. For this reason, all manner of information, and as 
much of it as possible, must be brought to bear on any historical 
questions: 'the Discoveries of Natural Historians, Astronomers, 
Linguists, Antiquaries, and Philosophers of all Kinds, have brought 
great Light and evidence upon this Branch of Knowledge within the last 
Two Centuries; and are likely to do so more and more.' Hartley finds 
this method - the use of concurrent evidences drawn from a variety of
sciences - well exemplified by Sir Isaac Newton's work on chronology,
26and so does Priestley, who devotes a whole lecture to it.
But, notwithstanding all that Newton, Hartley and Priestley say 
about the dependable historicity of the scriptures, there can be no 
doubt that it is the truth of the scriptures that they principally 
intend to prove. In pursuing this end, Hartley, like Priestley after 
him, employs the methods of analogy and concurrent evidence. Firstly,
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he explains that the Biblical writings, both the Old Testament and the 
New, resemble in the manner of their handing down to us those Greek and 
Roman works of philosophy, poetry and history whose genuineness nobody 
doubts. If the latter are dependable then so are the former. This, of 
course, is an ad hominem argument: Hartley praises Newton for using the 
scriptures as a means of correcting the errors of heathen histories and 
he intends here only to tell those who reject scripture that they cannot 
do so without also rejecting the classical writings for which they 
profess such respect. Naturally, the classical humanists thus addressed 
might answer that they believe the Greek and Roman writers when they 
relate common history but not when they describe miracles, and that they 
are prepared to serve the Jewish authors in the same way. But to this 
Hartley replies, after the manner of Charles Leslie, that the prodigies
%
related in the Bible differ from those of classical mythology in that 
they are always described by eye-witnesses and were often of a public 
and long-lasting nature. Furthermore, the numerous particular 
circumstances - times, places and persons - mentioned in the scriptures 
argue for their historical authenticity. These circumstantial details 
enable us to ascertain the agreement of scripture with natural and civil 
history. Thus the Biblical account of the flood is borne out by what 
Edmund Hailey and William Whiston have to say about the potential 
effects of the passage of a comet close to the earth.
Priestley follows Hartley in his approach to the validation of 
historical accounts but he has to meet a new and serious challenge which 
his master was able to ignore. In his Enquiry Concerning I-Iuman 
Understanding, published in 1748, David Hume points out that the
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evidence for the Christian religion must necessarily be less than that
of our own senses: we must rely upon the testimony of the gospel
writers, and, since they had no evidence greater than that of their
senses, the evidence can only have diminished in its transmission to us,
for no-one will place greater confidence in the testimony of another
than in what his own senses tell him. 'But a weaker evidence can never
destroy a stronger', and so the evidence that we have for miraculous
events - the evidence of testimony alone - can never overpower
the knowledge that we have acquired by our senses, which teach us that
nature is governed by irrefrangible laws and that miracles never happen.
To say, as we surely must, that the raising of the dead is outside our
experience is to say in fact that all experience is against it: 'And as
a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full
proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any
miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered
27credible, but by an opposite proof, which is superior.' But none of 
the miracles which history records, or which ingenuity has invented, is 
accompanied by such a superior opposite proof: none is reported by 
sufficient reliable witnesses to be believed; and Jewish and Christian 
testimonies are very far from reliable, presented to us as they are 'by 
a barbarous and ignorant people' in a book 'written in an age when they 
were still more barbarous, and in all probability long after the facts 
which it relates, corroborated by no concurring testimony, and 
resanbling those fabulous accounts which every nation gives of its
ooorigins.' .
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Before dealing with these powerful arguments, Priestley makes it 
quite clear that he will not easily part with his belief in miracles. 
Some, he says, deprecate them as being inconsistent with God's wisdom: 
they contend that all all-wi.se deity would have made his work perfect 
from the start, so that it would not require his intervention. To this 
objection (which is the one that Leibniz had made against Newton's 
account of divine activity), Priestley replies that, though this sort of 
perfection may be aimed at by men - who cannot always be present during 
the operation of their works - it is unnecessary for God, who is always 
and everywhere present. 'Besides,' he continues, 'it is of the utmost 
importance to the great ends of the rational creation, that the Almighty 
maker should be considered as present with his works.' For all we know, 
indeed, the present scheme of things, which requires God's constant 
surveillance and occasional interposition, may be the best of all 
possible schemes.
Implied in this is a distinction between the divine scheme as it 
really is and the divine scheme as it is apprehended by mortal men. The 
latter version, arrived at through long observation of constantly- 
recurring phenomena, naturally excludes such singular events as 
miracles: the former, God's version (which, we may suppose, is 
infinitely more complex than any the mind of man could frame), may well 
include them. Thus miracles are not, properly speaking, violations of 
the laws of nature, 'because they are no more than the effects of an 
adequate power in nature, exerted at proper season'. Priestley's 
understanding of the word 'miracler is, then, a properly Newtonian one, 
differing from the Leibnizian doctrine that, since God is wholly
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separate from nature, all his acts must by definition be supernatural.^9 
Of the great importance of miracles he elsewhere makes no doubt: 'The 
evidence of Christianity rests upon numberless, well-attested,
onastonishing, and uncontrouled miracles. ... u
Priestley agrees with Hume that the evidence for miracles must be 
the testimony of an observer; but, just as Hartley has met sceptical 
arguments by aggrandizing opinio, so Priestley suggests that the 
importance of testimony is much more general than Hume will allow. Here
- following a path already beaten flat by a century’s traffic of 
Anglican thinkers and divines - he maintains that not only is testimony 
our source of information as to the laws of nature; it is in fact the 
foundation of most of our knowledge. Even that knowledge which has come 
to us through our own observations must, once the moment of observation 
has passed, be recalled by memory, which is itself a form of testimony:
Now belief, which depends upon recollection, is somewhat similar 
to that which depends upon testimony. In one case we believe that 
we ourselves have seen a thing to be what we now apprehend it to 
be, and in the other case we believe that other persons have seen 
it to be so.
Like Hartley (and, indeed, ’sGravesande), Priestley believes that there 
is little difference between historical and mathematical persuasion: we 
scarcely more doubt, he says, that Julius Caesar was killed in Rome than 
that two plus two equals four; if there is any difference in our degree 
of persuasion, it is very slight. Again following Hartley - and, 
implicitly, replying to Hume - he argues that, though the uncertainty 
which attends every testimony 'can never be wholly removed by any 
subsequent testimony', neither can that which attends conclusions drawn 
from self-evident truths, 'and especially when the chain of deduction is
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of considerable length.' By now, Priestley has so prepared the ground 
as to be able to grant most of Hume's premises. He is happy to allow 
that testimony may be outweighed by superior evidence and that immediate 
sensory evidence is certainly superior; but, such evidence apart, any 
claim that is not impossible a priori may be proved by testimony.
Turning at last to Hume's own arguments, Priestley accuses him of 
arguing in a circle by asserting that miracles are contradicted by 
experience when what is to be proved is whether miracles really do 
occur. In the context of Priestley's discussion, this is a reasonable 
objection, though it is a poor piece of Humean exegesis. Hume's 
argument is directed not against the possibility of miracles as such but 
against the use of reports of miracles as the foundation of religion.
His concern is to weigh testimony against experience, not to suggest 
that previous experience must weigh more heavily than perception in the 
minds of those who are actually witnesses of a miracle. However, 
Priestley, having raised testimony almost to the level of perception in 
his reader's estimation, feels able to ignore this fact.
He is able also to withhold his approbation from that eastern 
prince who, says Hume, refused to believe the first reports he heard 
from Europe of frozen water. Hume supposes that the prince 'reasoned 
justly'; the freezing of water, since it happens suddenly and not by 
degrees, is an event for which nothing in the experience of those who 
have not seen it can prepare them; the reports, though not contrary to 
the prince's experience, were not conformable to it and were, indeed, 
'contrary to the rule of analogy'. According to Hume's definition, 
analogy - the foundation of all our reasoning on matters of fact - is
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that form of inference which 'leads us to expect from any cause the same 
events, which we have observed to result from similar causes.' Its 
perfection and reliability will, in all cases, depend upon the 
similarity of the observed causes. If this is what analogy is, then the 
eastern prince certainly did reason justly according to its rules; and 
Hartley, whom Priestley follows in these matters, appears at first to 
agree with Hume that this is indeed what analogy is. He describes it as 
that method of inference which is based upon the enumeration of similar 
but not identical instances; a method more or less reliable as it is 
'built upon more or fewer dependent or independent Evidences, &c.' But, 
similar though this definition may be to Hume's, it occurs in a general 
discussion of assent that begins with mathematics and ends with history, 
whereas Hume's definition is given in a chapter entitled 'Of the Reason 
of Animals': no question here of mathematics or of history. The 
assumption that testimony may be counted among the forms of evidence to 
be employed in the drawing of inferences, which is built in to Hartley's 
account, is excluded from Hume's. He considers testimony only in his 
chapter on miracles, which might appear to be of only marginal 
importance to the Enquiry and in which it is made clear that testimony 
is rather a second-rate sort of evidence.
By his own and Hartley's lights, then, Priestley is justified in 
withholding his approval from the eastern prince's reasoning. He 
supports his case with an ad hominem argument, customary recourse of the 
exasperated common man against the obdurate sceptic: the 'actual power 
of testimony' is so strong that, were half a dozen reliable witnesses to 
attest to having met a mutual friend who had risen from the dead, no-one
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could doubt it, 'whatever Mr. Hume or any other person may pretend 
concerning the natural incredibility of all accounts of miracles. ...'^
Having dealt thus with Hume, Priestley is able to set out his own 
'Rules for estimating the Value of Human Testimony'. In this decidedly 
commonplace canon - the Institutes is, after all, a textbook - he 
follows Hartley, who follows Locke: the credibility of testimony must 
depend upon the number of witnesses and upon their situation and freedom 
from bias; dependent witnesses, those 'through whose hands the same 
narration is conveyed to us', are less to be valued than independent 
ones; a mark of reliability in a number of witnesses is their agreement 
as to the main outline of their testimony and disagreement as to 
details; minute agreement is a mark of collusion; the more improbable 
the alleged fact related, the more stringent are the demands that we 
make of the evidence. Priestley's intention as an historian is to 
furnish himself with as much concurrent evidence, drawn at best from 
independent sources, as possible. The Lectures on History reveal how 
extensive these sources may be: not only historical literature but also 
poems, speeches, diaries and letters; and not only literature but also 
monuments, coins, medals, customs and even language itself, for 
'language takes a tincture from the civil policy, the manners, customs,
o  /
employment, and taste of the nation that uses it. ...
It must be this need for concurrent evidence that prompts 
Priestley to catalogue at such enormous length the sources of historical 
information. The Lectures are heavy with a prodigious load of borrowed 
erudition. In five lectures, Priestley moves steadily along the ranks 
of classical historians, from Herodotus and Thuycdides to Velleius
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Paterculus and Nicephorus Gregoras. In contrast to the disdainful 
Voltaire, he leaves us with the impression that the body of authorities 
to which we can turn is so great that, unless an improbably large number 
of classical historians were out-and-out liars, the received account of 
Greek and Roman history must be reasonably accurate. Turning to his own 
country, he relies upon Bishop Nicolson (one of that great company of 
late seventeenth-century English antiquarians at whom Bolingbroke was 
wont to sneer), whose English Historical Library furnishes him with a 
list of historians stretching from Gildas and Bede to Hall, Holingshead 
and Sir Richard Baker. From Nicolson also, as well as from other 
authors, he draws a formidable catalogue of unpublished sources: letters 
patent held in the Paper Office, leagues and treaties in the Receipt 
Office of the High Court of Chancery, in the Petty-Bag Office and the 
Chapel of the Rolls, and numerous other examples of the 'learned lumber' 
that Bolingbroke despised. It is safe to assume that Priestley himself 
wasted no time in puzzling over the Latin of medieval clerks or the 
handwriting of Tudor secretaries, but his very readiness to countenance 
such activities - the fact that he thinks mention of them fit for young 
ears - indicates a view of history very far from Bolingbroke's or 
Voltaire's. He does not hold, and will not allow his students to hold, 
that sceptical posture which can be maintained only at a fastidious 
distance from the sources. He wants his students to get their hands 
dirty, at least in imagination, and to learn something of the fine 
detail, the grain and the cross-hatching, of the historical picture.
In this he is not alone. Gibbon's work on the Roman Empire and 
William Robertson's on Scotland and America are but the most striking
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examples of that new and laborious attention to detail and to documents 
that was a marked feature of the second half of the eighteenth-century. 
New information was coming to light, neglected sources were being 
combed, and even the scholars of the seventeenth-century, so long the 
objects of philosophical scorn, found in Gibbon a defender. Like many 
of his contemporaries, Priestley unites the serious interest in sources 
which characterised those scholars with the generalising, philosophical 
concerns of Bolingbroke and the philosophes. The Lectures on History 
and General Policy celebrate this marriage. Intended, like 
Bolingbroke1s Letters on the Use of History, to serve partly as 
commentary upon selected historical topics and partly as a guide to 
sources, they measure with their greater attention to detail and to 
'learned lumber' the distance that historiography had travelled since 
Bolingbroke's day. In this work of Priestley's, and even more in the 
care with which he prepared his histories of electricity and of optics, 
it is surely not extravagant to see something of the spirit which 
informed Edward Gibbon's more renowned history.^
IV.
The rich detail of the History of Electricity, unearthed by 
laborious research into original documents, and the wealth of source 
material to which Priestley alludes in the Lectures on History have 
their counterpart in his scientific work. In his time 'natural 
philosophy' was theatre: the philosopher, the itinerant lecturer, toured 
the country with his air-pump or his electrical Leyden jar, 
demonstrating God's power in spectacularly staged 'experiments'.
- 82 -
Priestley’s own scientific activities were admirably suited to this sort 
of display - he was very keen that amateurs try their hands at it and 
he was himself a dealer in the equipment with which they could do so - 
but the general trend of his thought is away from such things. His 
emphasis in the preface to the History of Electricity is not on science 
as the scene of extravagant displays of divine power but rather on the 
progress of science as a demonstration of the constant hand of 
providence in human affairs. In science as in history, God is in the 
details. Special effects have their place, which is why he has defended 
miracles against Hume’s scepticism, but we should not allow them to 
distract us from the pageant of which they are a part, which is why he 
is keen to assimilate miracles to natural laws. Helped by a concept of 
the divine which, like Hartley's, stressed God’s immanence rather than 
his transcendence, Priestley is able to play down the divine irruptions 
in human history. The God in whom he is interested is not the God who 
made the sun stand still for Joshua but rather the God who constantly 
supervises his handiwork. Indeed, Priestley regarded the neglect of 
God's part in human affairs as one of the corruptions introduced into 
Christianity from pagan philosophy: 'When ... by means of this 
philosophy, the Supreme Being was made to disappear, and to withdraw 
himself from the affairs of men, a considerable change could not but 
take place in our ideas of his attributes and character, and 
consequently in the disposition of our minds with respect to him. °
Priestley, like Hartley, deduces God's providence from his power, 
wisdom and goodness. He argues that, as matter itself is incapable of 
motion unless acted upon from without, so all the powers of nature, of
matter in motion, can themselves by only the effect of the constant 
activity of divine energy. But though divine providence may be deduced 
from the divine attributes, Priestley more commonly moves in the 
opposite direction, which is why he is so interested in the history of 
science:
knowledge, and a variety of improvements depending upon knowledge 
(all of which are directly or indirectly subservient to happiness) 
have been increasing from the time of our earliest acquaintance 
with history to the present; and in the last century this progress 
has been amazingly rapid. By means of increasing commerce, the 
valuable productions of the earth become more equally distributed, 
and by improvements in agriculture they are continually 
multiplied, to the great advantage of the whole family of mankind.
The results of this progress are far-reaching: with cultivation, the 
earth itself is becoming a better place, 'a more healthy and pleasurable 
place for its most important inhabitants'. If matters continue thus, it 
will 'become a paradise, compared to what it was formerly, or with what
07it is at present.
Of course, even on this happy planet there is evil, but all evils 
are partial and, in the long run, beneficial. Many things in nature - 
'tempests, lightning, diseases and death' - may frighten us, but the 
great system of which they are a part produces so much more happiness 
than pain. If it is to operate by universal laws, it cannot operate 
without producing partial evils as well as general good; and if it did 
not operate by universal laws, we would not be able to govern our lives.
O Qfor we would never know what to expect from one moment to the next. 
Besides, the good always preponderates over the evil, Priestley 
concludes, echoing sentiments which he elsewhere quotes and which he 
thought very fine indeed:
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All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee;
All Chance, Direction, which thou canst not see;
All Discord, Harmony, not understood;
All partial Evil, universal Good. ...
These lines of Pope's, the literary expression of a widely-held belief, 
remind us both of the popularity of the doctrine of providence and of 
the nature of what was believed in. Pope's providence, and Voltaire's 
and Leibniz' 3 - the comfort of numerous men of all European nations, of 
many sects and parties, of various shades of philosophical and 
scientific opinion - was not the providence of Christian tradition. It 
paid no especial attention to the Jews or to the Roman Snpire, nor did 
it address itself directly to the souls of the godly. It was not to be 
invoked as an explanation of any particular historical event, whether 
happy or unhappy. Instead, it was a providence that acted, as Pope 
explained, 'not by partial, but by gen'ral laws'. These laws, of which 
those discovered by Newton are the most striking, admit of no exception 
(the heavy object must tend earthward, whether it hit Aeschylus or 
Goliath): they are, however, part of a divine plan shaped so as to 
promote the ultimate good of the whole. So widespread was the belief in 
this plan that a deist like Voltaire and a Christian like Colin 
Maclaurin could join in denouncing Spinoza as an atheist who, failing to 
recognise the purposes of this great machine, could not understand even 
that the eyes were made for a purpose and that they therefore proclaim 
the existence of a divine artificer.^
Priestley devotes the last three of his Lectures on History to 
providence:
The noblest object of attention to an historian, and to every 
person who considers himself as a subject of the moral government 
of God, I have reserved for the last place,; and that is, the
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conduct of Divine Providence in the direction of human affairs. 
This is the most sublime subject of contemplation that can employ 
the mind of man; and ... has the happiest tendency to inspire our 
hearts with the sentiments of piety and virtue.
At fist sight, history, like nature, may seem a mere tangle of 
perplexities; but, properly regarded, it can be seen for what it really 
is: ’an exhibition of the ways of God,1 which, as our knowledge grows, 
may soon come to rival nature as our principal means, scripture apart, 
of attaining to a knowledge of those ways. Seeming again, though less 
favourably, to echo Pope ('presume not God to scan'), Priestley admits 
that, 'It may, by some, be thought presumptuous in man to attempt to 
scan the ways of God in the conduct of human affairs.' But the same 
objection, he points out, might be made to the study of natural science:
Both methods are equally attempts to trace out the perfections and 
providence of God, by means of different footsteps which he has 
left us of them, differing only in this, that the one is made more 
distinct than the other, What is the whole science of physiology 
but an attempt to investigate the reasons, or final causes, of the 
structure of the several parts of nature, with a view to seeina 
farther into the wisdom and goodness of the Divine Being 
manifested in his words?
The human anatomy is an organism directed towards certain ends. In 
studying its construction, we must look not merely for causes but for 
final causes, and not merely for final causes but for reasons.
Priestley, like Maclaurin before him, assumes that ultimately 
physiological explanations will be teleological in form; a description 
of the function served by an organism will take shape as a description 
of the end which it serves in the bodily economy (a description, that 
it, of its final cause) or even of the reason why it was put there. And 
it was put there, of course, by an all-wise and benevolent creator; a 
fact which will doubtless guide the theologically-minded physiologist in
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his researches. The historian must approach his own work in a similar 
way. Of each event he must ask what function it served, how it 
contributed to human happiness. That it did contribute, or will 
contribute, to general happiness is, of course, beyond doubt; the system 
of human nature and of natural laws which gave it rise was created and 
set in motion by the same all-wise and benevolent creator.^
Belief in God's wisdom and goodness is as axiomatic as the 
assumption of human rationality and it is not to be abandoned in the 
face of apparently contradictory evidence:
we never think we ought to give up our belief of the wisdom and 
goodness of God, because we are not able to see how every 
appearance in nature is reconcilable with them. ... Let an 
historian, therefore, attend to every instance of improvement, and 
a better state of things being brought about, by the events which 
are presented to him in history, and let him ascribe those events 
to an intention in the Divine Being to bring about that better 
state of things by means of those events; and if he cannot see the 
same benevolent tendency in all Other appearances, let him remain 
in suspense with regard to them. 3
It might seem that Priestley has here rather over-egged his 
methodological pudding. He informs the reader of the Institutes that 
the world in general and human history in particular proclaim the being 
of a providential God; in the Lectures on History, however, the 
existence of this benevolent being is presented as an assumption which 
ought to underlie the historian's work. But it cannot be both an 
inference and an axiom; it cannot be derived from evidence and at the 
same time be an unfalsifiable assumption guiding the examination of this 
evidence. Which then is it to be? To answer this question, we have to 
imagine Priestley as author of the Institutes turning to the unbeliever 
and asking whether the ever-increasing glories of creation do not
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bespeak a benevolent and supreme architect. The unbeliever is being 
asked not to draw an inference but to share an attitude: to place 
himself here, where the world can be seen as an harmonious whole which 
cannot but be the work of benevolent intelligence, rather than there, 
from where it seems a mere inchoate flux. It is as though the 
lecturer's hand, sweeping outwards in expansive gesture, indicates not 
some logical derivation chalked on a blackboard but an electrical 
machine which exemplifies God's power even if it cannot prove his 
existence. Intellectual showmanship of this sort, rather than 
metaphysical argument, is what comes most naturally to Priestley 
(though, of course, he prefers accumulated detail to spectacular 
instances). There is no reason to doubt that his belief in God - which 
seems always to have been a deep, unshakeable conviction, not an 
inference or a deduction - did indeed serve just the purpose that he 
said such a belief should serve, that it caused him to look in human 
affairs for marks of progress and to suspend judgement where those marks 
appeared to be absent. Neither need we doubt that his belief was 
strengthened by a contemplation of God's works.
Here as elsewhere, the clear tendency of Priestley's thought is to 
emphasise not the great coups de theatre of the divine drama - the first 
b o m  slain, the Red Sea parted, the water turned to wine - but rather 
those defter touches of the story in which the hand of the author is 
ever apparent. History is God's creation, moving, in obedience to a 
pre-ordained plan, towards a pre-determined end; we may, says Priestley, 
trace 'the series and connexion of events ... so that we may say the 
plan of this divine drama is opening more and more, and the grand
- 88 -
catastrophe growing nearer and nearer, perpetually'. But he would 
doubtless have agreed with Bossuet that, 'Except for certain 
extraordinary strokes, where God wished his hand alone to show itself, 
there has never been any great change which has not had its causes in 
preceding centuries'. In his wisdom, God 'prepared the effects in the 
most remote causes', and it is the historian's task to seek for these 
causes and, in doing so, to uncover God's 'secret dispositions'.
Priestly is as ready as Bossuet to allow for those 'extraordinary 
strokes with which God, by miraculous means, intervenes directly in 
human affairs. These miracles have however been few, and the age of 
miracles is passed. Priestley will certainly not admit as authentic all 
the miracles recorded by Bossuet's co-religionists and he devotes some 
space in the Institutes to trying to prove that there have been no 
miracles other than those described in the Bible. Elsewhere he suggests 
that:
We shall learn to respect the laws of nature the more, if we 
consider the extraordinary provision that the Author of Nature has 
made to preserve their uniformity, and to supersede the necessity 
of the frequent violation of them, which he has done by means of 
occasional and seasonable miraculous interpositions. In fact, the 
proper use of miracle has been to make more miracles unecessary.
As we have already seen, Priestley carries his love of order and 
harmonious scientific principles so far as to be prepared to assimilate 
even miracles to natural laws; and he is ready, it seems, to allow the 
historian to ascribe to natural causes even some of those events which 
the Bible calls miracles, Thus in his lectures On the Theory of 
Language and Universal Grammar, which he published in 1762, he suggests 
that, though the diversity of human language is held to have been 
produced by God's direct action in destroying the tower of Babel, 'it is
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no impiety to suppose, that this, agreeable to most other operations of 
the deity might have been brought about by natural means'. And, like 
any secular-minded philosophe , like Voltaire or Montesquieu, he goes on 
to suggest what these means may have been. °
Nonetheless, Priestley's providence remains closer to Bossuet's 
than to any more profane model. Ronald Meek has attributed to Bossuet 
'a classical statement of what may perhaps be called the providential 
version of the law of unintended consequences'. All political actions, 
says Bossuet, have such consequences; our governors, whatever they do, 
cannot help but minister to ends not their own:
God alone can reduce everything to his will. That is why 
everything is surprising when one looks only at particular causes* 
and nevertheless everything advances with regulated progression.
It was soon understood that the working out of these consequences need 
not be seen as providential. In his Fable of the Bees, published in 
1714, Bernard Mandeville observes that, 'Nothing was more instrumental 
in forwarding the Reformation, than the Sloth and Stupidity of the Roman 
Clergy; yet the same Reformation has rous'd 'em from the Laziness and 
Ignorance they then labour'd under, and the followers of Luther, Calvin, 
and others, may be said to have reform'd not only those whom they drew 
in to their sentiments, but likewise those who remain'd their greatest
AOOpposers. ° The reform of the priesthood is, then, the unintended 
consequence of the the Protestants' action working itself out according 
to the laws of human nature. The reader is left to decide for himself 
whether or not these laws were established, with just^/consequences in 
mind, by divine omnipotence. Mandeville had, in fact, begun to discern 
the operation of that Invisible Hand which Adam Smith was to, make
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famous sixty years later in The Wealth of Nations. The hand, of course, 
is that not of God but of secular circumstance; it ensures that, from 
the private pursuit of personal gain, public good will arise. But 
Priestley, though writing long after Mandeville and freely acknowledging 
the importance of Smith's book, has made no attempt to move beyond 
Bossuet. The Roman Catholic Church, he explains, 'is prodigiously 
better than it was before the existence of protestantism. There are 
fewer abuses in the papal constitution than formerly; and popish 
princes, though they remain attached to the rites of the Romish Church, 
have, in fact thrown off all subjection to the pope.' Like Mandeville, 
he adds that the old Puritans and the modem Dissenters have performed a 
similar service for the Church of England.^9 3ut, though his 
illustration of the law of unintended consequences is the same as 
Mandeville's, his interpretation of it is Bossuet's.
Nor does he lack materials for such interpretations. Nothing - 
not even, as Christ tell us, the fall of a sparrow - can come to pass 
without God's knowledge. The divine hand is involved equally in all 
events, great and small, though we may more easily discern it in the 
great. It is never so apparent to us as when we see good brought out of 
evil, dire events springing from trivial causes, or purposes mistook 
falling on their inventors' heads: a King's desire to divorce his wife 
brought about the Reformation in England; the intolerable oppression of 
Phillip II of Spain resulted in the freedom of the Dutch States; the 
defeat of the Athenians before Syracuse is a terrible thing to read of 
in the pages of Thucydides, but it saved the rest of Greece form slavery 
and, since imperial nations can never themselves be free, it saved
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Athens too.^ Surveying this spectacle, Priestley was moved to a 
striking sentence that (except, perhaps, for its mention of liberty) 
could easily have been written by the Bishop of Meaux himself:
This is certain, that all the capital events in this world, which 
have contributed to bring about a better state of things in 
general, all the situations in human affairs favourable to 
liberty, virtue, and happiness, were brought about in a manner 
independent of the policy, the designs, or even the wishes, of all 
human beings, and must be ascribed wholly to the good providence 
of God, wisely over-ruling the passions and powers of men to his 
own benevolent purposes.
Obviously, divine omnipotence could have ordered things otherwise, it 
might have made human nature and government perfect from the beginning, 
but the course that it did adopt must ipso facto have been the best: 'In 
short, it seems to have been the intention of Divine Providence, that 
mankind should be, as afar as possible, self-taught; that we should 
attain to every thing excellent and useful, as the result of our own 
experience and observation; that our judgments should be formed by the 
appearance^which are presented to them, and our hearts instructed by 
their own feelings'. When we have at last perfected our forms of 
government, we will enjoy our new state of felicity far more than we 
would if we had not had to progress from error to truth, from 'barbarous
COand imperfect systems of policy' to our more happy state.
V.
Looking as he did on human history as a story of gradual
amelioration, Priestley was not much disposed (at least at this stage of
tzhis career) to think in terms of discreet revolutionary leaps. The word 
'revolution' had a least two meanings in his time - it meant both a
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complete overthrow of some existing order and a cyclical process, a 
revolving of things to their original condition - and it is presumably 
the less violent of them that he has in mind when he uses the word in 
his Lectures on History: 1 the present happier state of things was 
brought about rather by an accidental concurrence of circumstances, than 
by any effects of human wisdom and foresight. We see the hand of Divine 
providence in these revolutions which have been the passive and blind
COinstruments of their own felicity. But neither was he likely, as one 
who thought always of the golden age as being in the future, to embrace 
very readily the idea of a return to some earlier state of felicity.
Thus we find in his writings no fond regard for that 'ancient 
constitution', guarantor of Saxon liberties, after which many of his 
contemporaries used nostalgically to hanker; and neither do we find any 
mention of the 'Norman yoke', supposed by many radicals to have 
destroyed those liberties. Priestley sees Saxon law as no more than 
embryonic feudalism and he describes the Norman conquest not as a 
revolution in the modem sense of the term, not as the imposition of 
foreign and tyrannical ways, but as the importation of a more perfect 
form of something already present.^ Nor is the passing of this system 
seen as a sudden upheaval. The decline of feudalism, the rise of order 
'out of this chaos and confusion', was a gradual process with a number 
of causes, social, economic and military: 'But what is most of all 
remarkable with respect to the feudal system is, that a form of 
government so ill calculated to secure the most valuable ends of 
society; a constitution to totally inconsistent with security and 
liberty, and so unfriendly to commerce and science; should, in several 
instances, have terminated, by the natural course of things, in
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governments in which men enjoy the greatest security, together with all 
desirable liberty; and where the utmost scope is given to the genius of 
man in the extension of arts, manufactures, commerce, and science.'-^ 
This happy result, it will be noted, is attributed to 'the natural 
course of things', to divine providence working through the laws of 
human nature.
History is, then, a gentle slope, not a rugged cliff-face marked 
by sudden changes in inclination. Priestley devotes a lecture to 
periods in history, in which, having reached 'the Norman Conquest, by 
which the feudal tenures were established, and the whole system of the 
feudal law competed', he goes on to talk of the 'gradual declension' of 
this system. There is, however, one event of whose epochal significance 
he makes no doubt at all:
But the most important period in our history is that of the 
revolution under king william. Then it was that our constitution, 
after many fluctuations, and frequent struggles for power by the 
different members of it (several of them attended with vast 
effusion of blood), was finally settled, A revolution so 
remarkable, and attended with such happy consequences, has perhaps 
no parallel in the history of the world. This it was, as Mr. Hume 
says, that cut off all pretensions to power founded on hereditary 
right; when a prince was chosen who received the crown on express 
conditions, and found his authority established on the same bottom 
with the privileges of the people; so that there ha£ been no 
difference between our kings and parliament since.
There is little enthusiasm here for revolutions as such, and nothing at 
all like the enthusiasm professed by Priestley's fellow Presbyterian the 
Reverend Robert Fleming, whose Divine Right of the Revolution had first
appeared in 1706. In this and other works frequently reprinted 
throughout the century, Fleming depicted human history as progressing 
through revolutionary violence: Moses, King David and William of Orange
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were alike in being revolutionary heroes, Che leaders of popular 
insurrections. Priestley will have none of this and, like I-fume, sees 
the Glorious Revolution as a singular and unprecented event ending the 
turmoil of earlier days and quite unlike the factional, aristocratic 
revolts of medieval times.^ Being so singular an event, it need not be 
taken as a precedent. The British constitution, though not without 
’some radical and very considerable defects’, is so manifestly superior 
to others ’that there are few foreigners who do not give ours the 
preference to their own’. Revolution - or, indeed, the introduction of 
’any material change into an established form of government’ - is an 
extremely hazardous enterprise: ’No human sagacity can foresee what
C Oinconvenience might arise from it.
Influenced, perhaps, by this gradualist view of English political 
history, Priestley’s picture of revolutions in knowledge is notably 
lacking in violence. I.B. Cohen has drawn attention to a concept 
current in the eighteenth century of revolution as a process involving 
two stages, ’in which first an existing or accepted system (whether of 
knowledge or of government) had to be destroyed, and then a new system 
had to be erected in its place’, and he notes a number of uses of this 
concept in contemporary discussions of the history of science. Thus 
Jean d'Alanbert, in the Discours preliminaire which he wrote in 1751 for 
the great Encyclopedie, praises Descartes as one who showed ’intelligent 
minds how to throw off the yoke of scholasticism, of opinion, of 
authority ...’, and was ’a leader of conspirators who, before anyone 
else, had the courage to rise against a despotic and arbitrary power and 
who, in preparing a resounding revolution, laid the foundations of a
more just and happier government, which he himself was not able to see 
established.' And the year before, the Baron de Turgot had thus 
apostrophized his fellow countryman: 'Great Descartes, if it was not 
always given to you to find the truth, at least you have destroyed the 
tyranny of error. Priestley too (in his lecture on historical 
periods) accords Descartes something like this position:
The Saracens occasioned the revival of the Aristotelian philosophy 
in Europe, which no person had the courage to controvert before 
Descartes, who died about the time that Newton was bom. In his 
time, however, the foundations of the true philosophy were laid by 
Lord Bacon, the work was prosecuted with much assiduity by Boyle, 
and carried by Newton to a great degree of perfection. 1
But Priestley's language has nothing of the clarion quality of his 
French contemporaries': no political imagery here, no talk of 
conspirators, of the throwing off of yokes or the destruction of 
tyranny. Rather, this paragraph is merely the culmination of an account 
of the many revolutions (in the mildest sense of the word) of human 
knowledge. The arts and sciences, we leam, flourished in Greece, then 
in Rome, then in Constantinople, where they were preserved while 'all 
the rest of Europe was involved in the most deplorable ignorance and 
barbarity. ...' At this time, however, science was cultivated by the 
Saracens, who - diligent in their pursuit of mathematics, astronomy, 
medicine, and history - also translated into their own language all the 
most valuable Greek writings, particularly those of Aristotle. It was 
the Saracens who brought learning back into Christendom by way of Spain. 
At this time, then, the works of Aristotle were a beam of light in a 
gloomy and barbarous Europe, and only later was it necessary, or,
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indeed, possible, for their authority to be challenged. Since the time 
of that challenge, progress has been rapid:
he who considers that no bounds can be set to our knowledge (since 
the works of God are, like their author, infinite), that every new 
discovery is but an opening to several more, and consequently, 
that the progress of real knowledge may be expected to go on, not 
merely in an uniform manner, but to be constantly accelerated; and 
who shall reflect upon the astonishing improvements that have been 
made in this branch, and indeed.in all the branches of real 
knowledge, in little more than two centuries that have elapsed 
since the expiration of that long period of darkness, cannot help 
forming the most glorious expectations.
Thus the History of Vision. Here, Priestley fits Descartes into this 
glorious story in a manner rather different from either d ’Alembert’s or 
Turgot's. He explains that, since the renaissance ('the revival of 
literature'), many people - 'Telesius in Italy, Lord Bacon in England, 
and others in different places' - had challenged Aristotle's authority 
but that none of them had sufficient reputation to set up in opposition 
to it; 'Indeed, nothing but some new and general system of philosophy 
could have answered the purpose.' Descartes' system, though it owed its 
establishment less to its creator's discoveries and good judgment than 
to 'the fertility and boldness of his imagination', did indeed answer 
the purpose. Like all new things it met with opposition, but soon it 
came nearly to rival the Aristotelian system in popularity; 'so that 
there was danger, lest the world, instead of being emancipated from 
servitude, should only have changed one master for another' adds 
Priestley, slipping at last, though rather casually, into political 
imagery. But all possibility of a new servitude was, of course, averted 
by Newton, whose philosophy 'bids fair to stand as long as that system, 
the great laws of which it so satisfactory [sic] unfolds.'^
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Only a system, not a mere band of conspirators, could overthrow a 
system. Descartes' philosophy constituted such a system; he tried to 
philosophise 'after the manner of the ancients', disdaining experiment 
and attempting to deduce natural phenomena from preconceived first 
principles. Priestley is not at all surprised that this now discredited 
method of proceeding should long have been so popular:
It was a compendious road to universal knowledge, and peculiarly 
flattering to the ambitions of those who wished to appear as the 
heads of secret sects, and the founders of systems. We should 
also consider, that the amazing variety which we now find in 
natural powers and principles, though arising, we have reason to 
believe, from the greatest uniformity and simplicity in their 
primary causes, was a thing of which the ancients had no idea.
Some one great key, that was able to unlock all the mysteries of 
nature, always appeared to them to be within their reach, and 
though so many of them had failed, it suggested no suspicion that 
one key would not answer the purposes, but only led them to try 
others. ^
Thus we have an analysis of scientific revolution rather more complex 
than d'Alembert's or Turgot's. Human nature, we learn from Priestley's 
sympathetic account, is naturally attracted to system builders and their 
works. So much so, indeed, that the mere refutation of a system will 
not suffice to bring about its abandonment by the generality of men: 
there must first be another to replace it; better an erroneous system 
than no system at all. Descartes' work was valuable because it was 
strong enough to topple the Aristotelian system but not so strong as to 
become an unshakeable orthodoxy itself. It was in its turn supplanted 
by the Newtonian system and 'the more humble, patient, and laborious 
method of investigation. ...' Once more, we see how providence has 
again and again brought real good out of apparent evil: the Saracens, 
though infidels, preserved the Aristotelian philosophy; the Aristotelian 
philosophy, though erroneous, was water to the parched intellects of a
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barbarous Europe; the Cartesian philosophy, though founded on mistaken 
conjecture and false principles, overthrew the Aristotelian system, as 
mere patient empiricism could not, and thus prepared the way for modem 
researches. The impression with which we are left is one not of 
revolution - a violent upheaval, suddenly shattering the Aristotelian 
fabric - but of revolutions, as of a spiral slowly twisting upwards.
Cohen points out that, later in his life, Priestley expressed the 
view, unusual for the times, that revolutions in science were not always 
progressive: 'Nothing is more common, in the history of all the branches 
of experimental philosophy, than the most unexpected revolutions of good
Aor bad success.'° But even in one of his earlier works, he concedes 
that the spiralling is not always upwards:
The progress of human life in general is from poverty to riches, 
and from riches to luxury, and ruin: in Architecture, structures 
have always been at first heavy, and inconvenient, then useful and 
ornamental, and lastly real propriety and magnificence have been 
lost in superfluous decorations. Our very dress is at first plain 
and awkward, then easy and elegant, and lastly downright 
fantastical. Stages of a similar nature may be observed in the 
progress of all human arts; and languages, being liable to the 
same influences, hath undergone the same changes.
This account of things - which, though it occurs in a course of lectures 
on language, is clearly and expressly intended to refer to 'human life 
in general' - is not at all what we would have expected from its author. 
It expresses a view popular with many of his contemporaries, who 
attributed the degeneration and decline of states to a lack of civic 
virtue. Nothing, they believed, was more likely to corrupt civic virtue 
than luxury; but unfortunately luxury was b o m  of wealth, and nothing 
was more likely to promote wealth than the civic virtues of frugality 
and industry. There is little room in this pessimistic doctrine for a
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theory of progress. The story of political life is one of decline 
rather than constant improvement, of a cycle of corruption which can be 
slowed down or arrested only by the steady maintenance of the public 
spirit.^ To what, then, can we attribute this use by Priestley of a 
philosophical language quite antagonistic to his own?
One possibility is that what we have here is simply the case of a 
young man (Priestley was twenty-nine when these lectures were published) 
slipping carelessly into one of the commonplaces of the age. On the 
other hand, Priestley certainly did believe, even at this early date, in 
both progress and divine providence. The year before the appearance in 
print of these lectures, he had published a school textbook on English 
grammar, in whose preface he had informed his readers that:
We need make no doubt but that the best forms of speech will, in 
time, establish themselves by their own superior excellence: and, 
in all controversies, it is better to wait the decisions of Time, 
which are slow and sure, than to take those of Synods, which are 
often hasty and injudicious. A manufacture for which there is a 
great demand, and a language that many persons have leisure to 
read and write, are both sure to be brought, in time, to all the 
perfection of which they are capable.
But here perhaps, in this very expression of faith in progress, we have 
an indication of how our question might be answered. Priestley believes 
in the progress of language and industry, but he believes also that both 
may be brought 1 to all the perfection of which they are capable1; at 
which point, presumably, progress must have an end. He expands upon 
this theme in his lectures, illustrating it with 'a short history of the 
revolutions of the Roman language.1 Here he explains that there are 
limits to the growth of a language, determined by the limits to the 
improvement of human life and the human mind. Once a people has words
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and expression sufficient to convey the full range of ideas of which it
is capable, any further modification of the language 'were absurd and
burthensome'. So it is with trees: once they have attained their full
growth, their 'redundant juices' will merely nourish destructive
nPiexcrescences, fungi and mosses.00
As we have seen, Priestley thought that the art of government was 
still in its infancy. So were the natural sciences:
It may be said, that there is a ne plus ultra in every thing, and 
therefore in electricity. IpQis true: but what reason is there to 
think that we arrived at it.
In science and in politics, we are to infer, the ne plus ultra is so 
distant that when it is attained the world will indeed look like 
paradise compared with today. So far are we from reaching perfection in 
these areas that, though not every step is a step forward, there can be 
no question yet of degeneration, nor, indeed, will there be any question 
of it for a very long time. But in more limited areas of human 
endeavour, perfection may be, and has been, reached; and, having been 
reached, it will be, and has been, lost. In his maturity, Priestley 
surely would not so readily concede that linguistic perfection may be so 
easily reached (for if the boundaries of improvement in language are 
also those of improvement in human life and the human mind, these 
boundaries must be very distant from us), but he was always able to 
admit that when perfection had been attained in any field, then 
corruption might follow. For which reason he detects something very 
like a cycle of corruption in the world of the arts. Painting, poetry 
and music may indeed reach perfection and, having reached it, can do 
nothing but decline. It is not so with science: Pope and others have
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left us with as many valuable poems as we can be expected to handle; 
Newton has merely uncovered the illimitable possibilities that lie 
before us.^
And, of course, there was one area in which perfection was early 
attained: in religion it was reached in the early years of the first 
century and, after that, decay inevitably followed. It is for this 
reason, as we shall see in a later chapter, that so ardent a believer in 
progress as Priestley could write An History of the Corruptions of 
Christianity.^
VI.
Writers on historiography, though they usually deplore Whiggism -
the vision of the past as a triumphal progress and its use as a sanction
for the present - are not infrequently guilty of it themselves. The
Whig interpretation of the history of historiography sees in the
closely-written, footnoted texts of nineteenth and twentieth century
historians an efflorescence only dimly foreshadowed in the providential,
exemplary or conjectural histories which preceded them. The authors of
these earlier, primitive works are patted or slapped in so far as they
succeed or fail to anticipate the standards of twentieth-century
research. This is not, of course, a matter for criticism - an
intellectual history without taint of Whiggism would be very colourless
7?indeed - but it should urge us to caution. Whig history, as Sir 
Herbert Butterfield pointed out, tends towards simplification, and this 
is a tendency which commentators on Priestley's historical writings have 
certainly not escaped. As an ecclesiastical historian, Priestley, says
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Sir Leslie Stephen, is neither impartial nor very knowledgeable; and
7*5T.P. Peardon thinks him an advocate rather than a scholar. Of course, 
simplification is not always falsification, and there is some truth in 
these charges: if one is convinced, as Priestley was, that history, 
though a mighty maze, is not without a plan, one will naturally proceed 
differently from those who think that there is no plan (or, indeed, no 
maze, just an overgrown thicket); one will be a topiarist, snipping away 
with one's scholarly shears so that the true millennial shape of things 
may be distinguished from irrelevant greenery. But Priestley never 
moved across the historical landscape with quite the clumsiness that 
Stephen and Peardon attribute to him; even empiricists are capable of 
agility, and to understand the cast of Priestley's mind as an historian 
we must seek its origins in the circumstance of his education as an
s
empiricist.
The Newtonian world-view is geometrical, but few learned of it in 
its geometrical form. Many read the Opticks - a lively, empirical work, 
full of experiments and hypotheses, little encumbered with equations - 
but, naturally shy of mathematical physics, they would content 
themselves with abridgements and epitomes of the Principia. If these 
textbooks were not to be as incomprehensibly mathematical as Newton's 
own work, they would need to employ mechanical models. Often the same 
textbook would deal with both the Opticks and the Principia in similar 
terms, thus reducing any sense of distinction between them. The very 
title of 'sGravesande's book tells us that in it the 'Mathematical 
Elements of Natural Philosophy' will be 'confirm'd by Experiments', and 
the pages which follow abound in such experiments. Nor are these mere
thought-experiments or illustrations; they are performable, and both of 
’sGravesande's two heavy volumes are full of pull-out engravings of the 
machinery (specially designed for the book) with which they could be 
performed. This, says ’sGravesande, will make the science easier to 
understand, for ’all Mathematical Demonstrations are abstracted’. And, 
most significantly, he adds that in this he is following ’the Example of 
the English, whose Way of teaching Natural Philosophy gave me occasion 
to think of the Method I have followed in this Work.
This is the style of English natural philosophy: easy, familiar, 
fond of experimental conjuring tricks, given more to striking metaphors 
than to mathematical abstraction. All Priestley's scientific works 
belong to this genre; he writes of his experiments in an anecdotal 
manner and criticises the more abstract style of scientific literature 
as too discouraging. Scientists, he says, generally write 
synthetically: they state as a proposition to be proved that which it 
took them many experiments to discover and they describe their 
experiments (or some of them) as though all had been made 'to verify a 
true preconceived theory'. This synthetic method is certainly the best 
way of promoting the understanding of a science, but the analytic 
method is the best for promoting scientific progress. The History of 
Electricity, Priestley explains, has been written analytically; he has 
tried to describe how discoveries were made and with what intention.
Even the genius of Sir Isaac Newton would seem a little less 
unapproachably great were his achievements to be recounted in this 
way. ^
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One of the effects of this conversational style is to make natural 
philosophy seem continuous with other activities. So the desire to be 
the Newton of the moral sciences - not an uncommon ambition in Britain 
in the first half of the eighteenth century - will appear quite 
attainable; success will not necessitate reducing the subject to 
mathematical formulae, because, as natural philosophers like 
'sGravesande have shorn, one can be impeccably Newtonian whilst still 
attending largely to empirical minutiae.^ Priestly could, then, regard 
himself as a man of his time, embued with the Newtonian spirit, without 
feeling obliged to reduce the complex phenomena of human history to 
points upon a philosophical graph paper. We have already seen how 
detailed his view of the past could be; it is a view that he extends to 
law as well. His Course of Lectures on the Constitution and Laws of 
England survives only as a syllabus prefaced by an introductory address, 
but this is quite enough to indicate that these lectures are not about 
jurisprudence: they do not seek to derive the principles of law from 
those of natural reason; instead, they deal with the structure of the 
English legal system, the constitutional status of regal and 
parliamentary authority, the powers of the higher and lower courts, the 
contents of common and of statute law. In his introductory address, 
Priestley points our that 'there is a necessity of obliging every member 
of the state to conform to the pre-established rules of it, whether he 
approves of it or not1; that laws are so complex that no-one could 
conjecture a priori as to their origins; and that, as many of them arose 
from circumstances that no longer exist, they cannot properly be 
understood without historical knowledge.^
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There is no hint in any of this (as there might be if the author 
were a French philosophe) of a system of abuses crying out for reform, 
nor any suggestion that things ought to be reduced to more orderly, 
rational principles. As Priestley grew older his sympathy for what many 
thought of as a ramshackle and Gothic constitution markedly diminished, 
but in the seventeen-sixties he was still happy to approach the laws and 
history of his nation very much as a natural philosopher might approach 
physical phenomena: he brought principles to them, he drew principles 
from them (or claimed that he did), but he no more felt obliged to 
reduce them to his principles than natural philosophers felt obliged to 
reduce the natural world to mathematical principles.
Of course, it used to be alleged that the thinkers of the 
Enlightenment did indeed seek to reduce the complexities of human life 
to inert theory. It was widely supposed - and in some circles perhaps 
it still is - that they failed to recognise the diversity of human 
nature, that they thought it static and took eighteenth-century Western 
European man as their model for the whole race in every period of its 
history and in every comer of the globe. Hume's concise expression of 
this view has won for him the status of representative miscreant: 'It is 
universally acknowledged that there is great uniformity among the 
actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains
70still the same, in its principles and operations.' Now clearly, if 
history is to serve an exemplary purpose, if it is to furnish us with 
useful information about God's ways, some assumption must be made as to 
the sameness of human nature. It is not obvious, though, that this 
assumption need be other than a fairly minimal one. As Sir John Steuart
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said in 1767, 'Man we find acting in all ages, in all countries, and in 
all climates, from the principles of self-interest, expediency, duty or 
passion. In this he is alike, in nothing else'. Five years later, 
Diderot explained that human beings have no more in common 'than a 
similarity of structure, the same needs, an attraction towards the same 
pleasure, and a common aversion from the same kinds of pain. ...'^9
Of course, these assumptions are still either too basic or not 
basic enough. On the one hand, they will not provide the basis of a 
universal theory of human behaviour, because it is difficult to think of 
any form of human behaviour - however altruistic-seeming - that could 
not be explained in terms of self-interest. On the other hand, they 
will not help to explain people's own understanding of their behaviour, 
because their understanding of their interests will vary from time to 
time and from place to place. These are, however, the assumptions to 
which Priestley restricted himself; indeed, since his belief in that 
similarity of structure to which Diderot refers was founded in 
associationism, he could scarcely go beyond them. Hartley teaches that 
we bring nothing mental into the world; all the furniture of our minds 
is acquired from outside and arranged as associations dictate. It 
follows then that our mental furniture will be heavily marked by local 
styles. Naturally, there are constants - a chair must be a thing for 
sitting on, whether it be a Chippendale carver or the throne of 
Ozymandias - but very much depends upon geographical or temporal 
circumstance. If this were not so, then neither history nor geography 
would be as useful as they are. 'History ...', says Priestley, 
'furnishes all that can be said upon the curious subject of national
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characters, whatever hypothesis we adopt with respect to them; whether
we plead for the prevailing influence of climate, or the infection of
onexample and the force of habits of long standing.lov He is aware, too, 
that such characters may change with time; the Persians, now a most 
abstemious people, were quite the opposite in ancient times. And 
whatever the reason for these differences, there is only one way in 
which we can learn of them:
Experience and self-examination may assist us in adjusting the 
general theory of the human mind. But it is in history alone 
that we can see the strength of its powers, the connexion of 
its principles, and the variety to which individuals of the 
species are subject, together with many other particulars, 
equally curious and useful to be known by a person who is 
desirous thoroughly to understand this very important and 
interesting subject.
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CHAPTER THREE.
THE THEOLOGY OF ONE GOD AND A RATIONAL HEAVEN.
I shall not want Honour in heaven 
For I shall meet Sir Philip Sidney 
And have talk with Coriolanus 
And other heroes of that kidney.
T.S. Eliot, 'A Cooking Egg1
I.
Though Priestley had left Daventry Academy ’with a qualified 
belief of the doctrine of atonement *, he decided while at Needham Market 
to apply himself more closely to the question, and to this end he 
collected and arranged such Biblical texts as seemed to him to be 
relevant to it.1 In 1761 he published some of his findings under a 
compendious title which puts succinctly his views on the subject: The 
Scripture doctrine of Remission, which shews that the Death of Christ is 
no proper Sacrifice, nor Satisfaction for Sin, but that Pardon is 
dispensed solely on account of Repentance, or a Personal Reformation of 
the Sinner. We can see in this early work the germ of much that came 
later in Priestley’s theological development: textual analysis, guided 
by associationist philosophy, is brought to bear upon the scriptures in 
order to show that an orthodox dogma is without Biblical foundation. 
Here, as in his later writings, the effect of such criticism is to 
smooth out the differences between the sacred and the profane. Just as 
Priestley presents history in gradualist rather than cataclysmic terms,
so he denies chat there are any decisive climacterics in the existence 
of Che individual; and ulCimaCely he will smooch ouC Che differences 
even beCween Che living and Che dead.
In The ScripCure DocCrine of Remission, Che principal argumenc 
which Priestley offers for his views is from silence: neither 'in plain 
terms' nor 'by way of parable' does Christ say that he came to take on 
men’s sins and offer himself in propitiation to God; and if atonement 
were necessary to salvation, it would surely be inconsistent with God's 
benevolence that so many good people be kept in ignorance of so 
important a matter. Priestley concedes that there are Biblical texts 
which, by referring to the Messiah as a sacrifice, seem to give support 
to the doctrine of atonement, but he urges us to remember that their 
authors are Asiatics, who 'go so far beyond us in the boldness and 
freedom of their figures.' Only on the assumption that they are 
intended figuratively can we understand the variety of words with which 
Christ's mission is described.^
Priestley's work on this subject was, perhaps, his earliest 
exercise in that historically-founded scriptural exegesis which was to 
be the basis of much of his theology. He was guided through this field, 
as through so many others, by the principles of associationist 
psychology. All languages, he maintains, are naturally poor; it has 
been necessary for their speakers to augment their vocabularies by 
forming 'artificial or compound' words, 'especially in treating of moral 
or religious subjects, in which our ideas themselves must necessarily be 
much compounded, and borrowed from sensible things'. However, it is in
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the nature of association to give a factitious sense of reality to these 
terms of art:
what was at first evidently compounded or figurative, by frequent 
use ceases to be conceived to be so: compound ideas and 
expressions in time pass for simple ones, till, after a vigorous 
scrutiny, their derivation be seen, and they appear to be 
factitious. In like manner, it is very possible to call one thing 
by the name of another, by way of allusion only, till at last the 
allusion be forgotten, and the nature of the thing itself be 
mistaken.
Priestley's enterprise is a sort of puritanical deconstructionism, 
assuming as it does the essential textuality of thought. He admits that 
compounded words 'very much enrich a language', that figurative language 
may 'enliven a discourse, give colour and strength to the expression', 
and even 'facilitate the discovery of truth', but he always assumes (and 
this is what makes his thought puritanical) that behind the figures is a 
truth that may be expressed without their assistance. Difficult though 
it is for modem Europeans to see through to the true meaning of a text 
written by ancient Asiatics - some of whom adhered to the literal 
meaning while others wandered from it in very different ways - we may, 
by examining the language and the circumstances in which it was written, 
and by comparing the figurative texts with the more literal, arrive at 
the truth of the matter.
And the truth of the matter is that forgiveness of sin proceeds 
from God's free mercy, that it is our character and good works which 
alone may make us worthy of this mercy. Christ's sermons 'are chiefly 
in a moral strain': he say nothing of atonement, but teaches that 'good 
moral habits and good works, the love of God, and the love of our
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fellow-creatures, will, of themselves, effectually recommend a man to 
the favour of God, and intitle him to a place in heaven.'^
Jesus Christ, then, usually held to be a divine sacrifice offered 
up as nothing else could have been to propitiate divine justice, is a 
teacher and exemplar, not a sacrifice at all. But if he is not a 
sacrifice, then nothing in the scheme of things seems to demand that he 
be divine. It was, no doubt, a realisation of this that prepared 
Priestley for the final step. This he took at Leeds: 'By reading with 
care, "Dr. Lardner's Letter on the Logos", I became what is called a 
Socinian ...'^
Socinians follow the sixteenth-century Italian theologian Fausto 
Paulo Sozzini in denying Christ's divinity. They differ from Arians in 
that Arians, while denying the orthodox doctrine of the 
consubstantiality and co-eternity of the Father and the Son, will allow 
that the Son was created by the Father out of nothing as an instrument 
in the creation of the world. Socinians, on the other hand, will not 
allow that Christ had any being at all before his incarnation. He was, 
they believe, a man like other men, differing from other men solely in 
that he was entrusted by God with a divine mission. The Socinians' 
doctrine is, then, strictly Unitarian. To teach it from the pulpit was 
still a crime in England.
II.
It was in Leeds in 1771 that Priestley made his first major 
attempt at a theoretical justification of his new position. The 
Methodists, he says, then very numerous in the town, were listened to by
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'many of the lower sort' of his own congregation. To win back these 
stray sheep, he published, 'in the cheapest manner possible', An Appeal 
to the Serious and Candid Professors of Christianity.^  The Appeal is a 
pamphlet, concise and popular in style; presumably it was for the higher 
sort that Priestley published, from 1772 to 1774, the three volumes of 
his Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion. But though the Appeal 
is intended as a popular work and the Institutes as an elementary one, 
neither eschews controversy. The Christianity they expound is not 
orthodox; it is the Socinianism of Priestley's maturity.
Calvinism is an austere and imposing edifice, and so large that 
Priestley, though he had painfully made his escape from it, still stood 
in its shadow. Like Calvin, he was not a theologian, concerned with 
personal experience of God, but a systematiser; and his system is shot 
through with Calvinistic elements.^ As we have seen, the Calvinist is a 
lonely and alienated figure. He knows that good works will not win him 
salvation - only God's gratuitous and incomprehensible mercy can do (or 
could have done) that - but, knowing also that good works are a 
necessary sign of divine election, he will order his life towards the 
methodical performance of such works. Man is too estranged from God to 
be reconciled with him, and the object of the Godly life is not
Q
reconciliation but obedience.
In Calvinism, Weber remarks, 'real penetration of the human soul 
by the divine was made impossible by the absolute transcendentality of 
God compared to the flesh. ...'9 Priestley's God, though less 
inscrutable in his decrees that Calvin's, is no more approachable. The 
Christian is calmly and constantly grateful to this God, but he is never
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enraptured nor his soul ever pierced with divine love. True 
Christianity reveals itself not in transports of religious affection but 
in a sober and Godly way of life, methodically conducted. In all this, 
Priestley's theology seems not so much a reaction against Calvinism as a 
development of it. He has abandoned nothing of Calvinism's rationality, 
order and disenchantment, though he has quite lost its sense of 
individual alienation and isolation.
True Puritan anxiety was, of course, except in New England, a 
thing of the seventeenth century rather than the eighteenth (though its 
documents survived to trouble sensitive minds, as Priestley's Memoirs 
and Belsham's diary reveal), Relatively secure in the practice of their 
faith, Georgian Dissenters could allow themselves a certain complacency 
that was never available to their predecessors. We have only to compare 
the writings of John Bunyan with those of Isaac Watts to see how things 
had changed.1^ In this respect too Priestley's work, is a development of 
what has gone before. The Reverend Thomas Walker, a predecessor of his 
at Leeds and one of those 'heretical ministers' who had frequented his 
aunt's house, had been an anti-trinitarian, sceptical of the doctrines 
of atonement and of original sin. These heresies had lost him many of 
his congregation, and so we may assume that Priestley - who found at 
Leeds 'a liberal, friendly, and harmonious congregation' with 'no 
unreasonable prejudices' - was left with the heretical or broad-minded 
rump.11 Much more at ease, both economically and socially, than their 
Puritan ancestors, they learned from Priestley that they were to pursue 
an orderly and rational life, a life of bourgeois virtue in which the
Puritan's fearful sense of alienation had dwindled to a rather routine 
insistence on the Christian's role as a stranger in the world.
The God who presides over this ordered life is an intelligent 
uncaused first cause of the world. Moving along familiar Newtonian 
lines, Priestley argues that the admirable organisation of the universe, 
the fitness of things and the fittedness of them to each other, bespeaks 
the existence of this supreme artificer. More strikingly, he suggests 
that creator and creation must be coeval; for if there was ever a time 
when nothing but God existed, then an eternity must have passed before 
that time - an eternity in which God possessed but did not exert the 
power to create the universe - which supposes an infinite stretch of 
time in which God, contrary to his nature, possessed but did not exert 
all his perfections. The idea that God and the universe are coeval is 
preferable because it implies 'that there never was a time when this 
great uncaused being did not exert his perfections, in giving life and 
happiness to his offspring.' There is an infinity of creation in time 
and space: 'infinite space is replenished with worlds, in which the 
power, wisdom, and goodness of God always have been, and always will be 
displayed.'x
This is not a very Calvinistic view of the Deity. Calvin's God, 
like Newton's, created the universe by arbitrary fiat of his sovereign 
will; Priestley seems to be saying that God could not but have created 
the universe, that he created it because his own nature determined him 
to do so.1^ And, of course, a God in whom there is no unrealised 
potential is a God to whom we will not look for miracles, since he could 
not be more active in the world than he is already. Such a God will
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reveal himself, as Priestley has indicated in his other writings, in the 
regular course of nature and of human history. He will not, of course, 
exert any direct influence on the human mind, which must mean that the 
Godly life consists not in waiting upon divine grace but in the 
methodical obedience of God's will as it is made known to us in 
scripture. Priestley's God, then, though he lacks the arbitrary and 
absolute will of Calvin's God, is no less distant or austere.
These are the views of God and of his providence to which reason 
ought to incline us. They are, however, only what might have been 
learned from nature, not what actually has been learned. A belief in a 
unified and beneficent God, though both rational and natural, will 
scarcely occur to anybody who has not been instructed in the matter. 
However, the historical priority of monotheism to polytheism, and also 
the fact that the Greeks were never sceptical about future rewards and 
punishments until they began to reason on the matter, may indicate 'that 
the most important doctrines of natural religion were communicated by 
divine revelation to the first parents of mankind.’1^ The importance of 
these doctrines is brought home to us by the references made to them in 
scripture; references so numerous and so strong that it may seem 
impossible that any who profess veneration for scripture should have 
ignored them, yet this was the very first corruption of Christianity:
But though the infringement of the principle of divine unity was the 
first corruption, it may in fact be derived, as Priestley tries to show 
in the Appealt from another corrupt doctrine: that of original sin.
If, as Priestley believes, to accept Christianity is to make a 
rational choice between alternatives, then it follows - contrary to the
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Calvinists and the Methodists - that men have the power to do the will 
of God. It is clear from scripture, which exhorts us to turn from our 
evil ways and to make ourselves clean, that our repentance depends upon 
our own efforts; and would God have given us commandments which he had 
not given us the power to obey? To be sure, God has, Priestley argues 
in his published defence of the Appeal, subjected us to certain 
infirmities of body and soul, but these are intended to test and to 
exercise us. It may be that we suffer by Adam's sin, as anyone may 
suffer as a result of what his ancestors did, 'but it is not possible 
that we should have sinned in him.'1  ^ Here, crying out perhaps against 
a doctrine that had caused him so much anguish in his youth, Priestley 
demands to know how one may repent of a sin to whose commission one has 
not consented. And is not the monitory language of scripture, urging us 
to fly the wrath to come, incompatible with a doctrine that allows the 
human race no free choice?10
From this false and pervasive doctrine of original sin follows 
that of Christ's divinity, which is no less false and no less pervasive, 
which is quite without scriptural foundation and, indeed, contrary to 
God's first commandment. Its introduction (which, among other 'shocking 
corruptions of genuine Christianity', is to be attributed to Popery) was 
made to seem necessary by the dogma of original sin: 'So fatal have the 
consequences of the sin of Adam been represented, that you have been 
told that nothing but the blood of God himself could reverse them; and 
therefore you have been taught to believe, that Jesus Christ, whose 
proper title is the Son of Man, as well as the Son of God, was not 
merely man, but very and eternal God himself. ...' But it is clear that
Christ himself, who made no claims to omniscience, acknowledged God’s 
power to be superior to his own. He was indeed especially approved by 
the Father, but only because of his perfect obedience to the divine will 
and his willingness to die for the benefit of mankind. Nor need the 
fact that he was 'made by the immediate hand of God’ and b o m  of a 
virgin make any difference to our view of him as a man, for Adam too was 
made by God's own hand. And because Christ, a man like us, has been 
resurrected, 'we have a more lively hope of our own resurrection. ...'
Without the doctrine of Christ's divinity, Priestley continues, 
that of the atonement cannot stand, but is is in any case unnecessary:
You have been taught by divines, that if Christ be not God, he 
could not have made an infinite Satisfaction for the sins of 
mankind. But, my brethren, where do you learn that the pardon of 
sin, in a finite creature, requires an infinite satisfaction; or, 
indeed, any satisfaction at all, besides repentance and 
reformation, on the part of a sinner
The orthodox answer to Priestley's question is that an offence committed 
by a finite creature may require infinite satisfaction if it is an 
offence against infinite majesty - the nature of the punishment is 
determined by the nature of the being offended, not by the extent or 
duration of the offence - and Priestley's failure to engage with this 
answer surely indicates a deficient sense of the holy.19 In fact, his 
approach to the issue is hardly at all that of a theologian, exploring 
the paradoxical border lands between fallible humanity and the spotless 
object of its worship, but rather that of a defence counsel making a 
plea in mitigation. He concludes that there is no case to answer: even 
if our unworthiness were as great as Calvinists suppose it to be, it 
would still be finite and in need only of finite atonement. In fact, no
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atonement is necessary. Though we cannot be justified by works alone 
and all stand in need of God's free grace and mercy, that grace and 
mercy arise solely from God's essential goodness.
How exactly, then, is salvation to be earned? What are the duties 
that we owe to our creator? Judaism and Christianity - alone among the 
religions of the world, Priestley believes - demand piety or devotion:
'a right disposition of mind with respect to God, and the actions which 
flow from that disposition.' There should be in this disposition 
nothing of the terror that a 'cruel or capricious being' might inspire; 
our love of God should be a filial love, flowing naturally from our 
gratitude for his providence and disciplined by prayer, which should 
keep us ever mindful of him. This business of keeping God in mind is 
something to which the authors of scripture pay very careful attention. 
They do not merely give us instruction 'but are more especially careful 
to inculcate the necessity of cultivating such an inward temper of mind 
as will form a complete character, which will lead us to the observance 
of every particular duty, and make the constant practice of it easy and 
delightful.'^0
III.
For Priestley, however, Christ's importance lies not principally
in his moral teaching. The 'one great end of the life and death of
Christ' was 'to give mankind the most satisfactory evidence of a
resurrection and a future life. ...' It was very necessary that he
should do so; reason and nature are much less reliable as sources of
21
information about the after life than revelation and example.
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Nonetheless, Priestley does devote some space to arguments that 
may, he thinks, be adduced in favour of the idea of a life after death, 
chief among them a translation into his own more optimistic terms of a 
familiar Christian argument concerning the problem of evil. He has 
already argued that a sufficiently wide view of humankind and its 
history will reveal that good greatly preponderates over evil; but 
whatever the proportions in which good and evil stand to each other, 
their distribution is undoubtedly inequitable. The world is as perfect 
as we could wish it to be (given that ours is 'a state of trial and 
discipline in which to form virtuous characters) but the equation of 
reward and moral worth is clearly not balanced in this life, and so, 
since God is just, there must be another. Besides, that constant 
improvement in the knowledge and wisdom of our species which argues the 
existence of a benevolent deity is also an argument for an after-life; 
our capacity for improvement is clearly infinite but our lives are not: 
'And can it be consistent with the wisdom of God, to leave his 
workmanship so unfinished, as it must be, if a final stop be put to all 
our improvements at death?'
Indeed, Priestley later suggests that 'an enlarged acquaintance 
with the works and providence of God will make a considerable part of 
the happiness of the wise and good hereafter.' He had early, in the 
History of Electricity, given voice to his favourite theme of the 
inexhaustibility of nature; it always underlay his optimism, providing 
in this life a reason for believing in the hereafter, while in the 
hereafter it would provide the blessed with a pleasant occupation (for, 
in heaven as on earth, happiness would be of an active nature). In the
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next world, not only our scientific but also our historical knowledge 
will be improved, because we shall be able 'to converse with the chief 
actors in all great events.' This increased knowledge will, of course,
9 ' l
serve but to deepen our awareness of divine providence.
The obvious and close connection between the mind of man and his 
body might seem, Priestley admits, to argue against the possibility of 
an after-life - 'To all appearance, they grow, decay and perish 
together' - but God, who created both, can if he chooses revive both: 
'Admitting that death is an entire cessation of thought, similar to a 
state of perfectly sound sleep, or a stupor, yet, if the purposes of 
God's providence and moral government require it, he can make us to 
awake from this sleep at any distance of time. ...'^ This is far from 
being the orthodox view, which is that there is an immaterial soul which 
is released from its fleshly prison at death, judged and sent either to 
heaven or to hell (or, according to Roman Catholic theology, to 
purgatory), there to await the final judgement, when it will be reunited 
with its resurrected body. Against this Priestley holds that the idea 
of the separate existence of the soul is an Eastern corruption, 
agreeable neither to scripture nor to the appearance of things. As to 
the latter: we know that when the body is asleep thought is suspended 
and that a blow to the head may well derange our thinking faculties: 
'much more must all our faculties be deranged, and a period be put to 
sensation and thought by death.1 J Priestley admits that certain 
scriptural texts seem to favour the doctrine of the separate existence 
of the soul; but the general arguments of scripture are, he maintains, 
against it. Besides, if the soul were separable from the body what
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need would there be for a resurrection of the dead? And why should 
there be a general judgement on the last day if each individual, except 
those still living at that day, will have been separately judged at his 
own death?
In our life virtue and vice will meet with their just rewards, 
but, Priestley believes (contrary to orthodox Christian dogma), virtue 
alone will merit infinite recompense. If we have been virtuous, we 
shall, bodily imperfections laid aside, enjoy what scripture promises
oo
us: a state of 'indefinite and positive happiness'. Our knowledge and 
felicity will continue to increase in the next life as they have in 
this, and, improvement feeding upon itself, virtue will daily become an 
ever more ingrained habit. Continuance in virtue, then, will merit 
continuance of reward; but the degree to which continuance in vice will 
be possible in the next life must surely be limited. Tne orthodox 
doctrine of eternal punishment is absurd and unjust - finite creatures 
are capable only of finite crimes, so how can they merit infinite 
punishment? - but, with virtue so with vice, perseverance fixes our 
habits and makes change difficult. It may be, of course, that the 
motives to virtue will be the same in the next life as in this, that the 
corrective mechanisms of pain and reward may operate in the same way,
'so that ... those who are not made virtuous by the sufferings and 
discipline of this life, will be recovered to virtue and happiness by 
the long continuance of unspeakably greater suffering; and of a much 
severer discipline in the life to come.'^9 But the force of habit is 
potent. The difference in flexibility of mind between a child and a 
grown man is very great; that between men as they are now and men as
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they shall be after death may be so great that the reformation of one 
'who dies a slave to vicious habits' may demand an incredible amount of 
time, if indeed it is possible at all. Might it not, then, be 'more 
agreeable to the analogy of nature' to expect that, as few seeds survive 
to become plants and few plants bear fruit, 'so the bulk of mankind, who 
never attain to any high degree of wisdom or virtue, should finally 
perish also, and be entirely blotted out of creation, as unworthy to 
continue in it; while the few who are wise and virtuous, like full ripe 
fruits, are reserved for future use'?^
There is no doubt that Priestley's reluctance to have much truck 
with an eternal punishment that is both genuinely eternal and genuinely 
punishing is to his credit. His voice may not be a lone one - Lord 
Shaftsbury, Thomas 3umet, Samuel Clarke, Isaac Newton and David Hartley 
had all been at least sceptical about the doctrine, while others had 
suggested that the fire of hell was a refiner's fire, purifying the 
sinner by consuming his sin - but he is by no means in a majority. 
However, what is most striking about his opinion on the matter is surely 
not the comparative lenity of the fate with which he rewards the wicked 
but the mundanity of the heaven to which he condemns the virtuous.
St. Paul says that the trump shall sound and we shall be changed; 
Joseph Priestley says the the trump shall sound and things will go on 
pretty much as they did before, In the next world, our knowledge of God 
will be enlarged, jnot by direct acquaintance, not through the beatific 
vision, but by the very means that we have employed in our mundane life. 
To be sure, the means will be improved - our inferences will be more 
accurate and we shall meet Sir Philip Sidney and have talk with
-123-
Coriolanus - but they will, after all, be the same means. Now, we 
should perhaps hold back a little before criticising this dull picture 
of a celestial literary and philosophical society in permanent session. 
The words 'beatific vision' are resonant indeed, but in many orthodox 
minds they may have held place for nothing in particular: their use may 
indicate not richness of thought but poverty, a resort to splendid 
cliche where imagination fails. But even allowing for this, it is 
difficult not to feel that there is something constrained in a mind 
which apparently has no room for those experiences of timeless ecstasy 
which have given men a conception of heaven or those (perhaps more 
common) feelings of personal worthlessness which have made them feel 
worthy of perpetual misery. What is at issue here, of course, is not 
the truth of Priestley's opinions but their consistency. Was such 
etiolated doctrine consistent with his claim to be a Christian? Why 
should he have wanted to maintain both the doctrine and the claim?
Ilis Calvinist background is not wholly to be blamed. Calvin, it 
is true, declined 'to speak or think, or even desire to know, concerning 
obscure subjects, anything beyond the information given in the Divine 
Words', and Calvinism, thus restricted in its range, was more a system
of morals and of discipline than of theology; but this self-denying
32ordinance by no means bound all Calvinist imaginations. John Bunyan, 
taking his pilgrims to the gates of the Celestial City, knew that 'the 
beauty, and glory of it was inexpressible', and he knew that even in his 
dream he could see little of it, for the pilgrims only were admitted, 
'And after that, they shut up the Gates: which when I had seen, I wished 
my self among them'. But he knew also (because scripture had told him)
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what was the principal glory of the city: 'In that place you must wear 
Crowns of Gold and enjoy the perpetual sight and Visions of the Holy 
One, for there you shall see him as he is.'^
Of course, much had changed since 3unyan dreamed his dream, and 
Priestley's theological rationalism has its antecedents in Churchmen 
such as Locke and Clarke and Dissenters such as Doddridge and Watts.
But, for Doddridge and Watts at least, the search for some reasonable 
harmony between religion and the new science did not preclude a love for 
the rich melodies of traditional Christian symbolism. Doddridge, 
rationalist though he was, presents a vision of heaven (and it is a 
vision, not a philosophical prediction) that more resembles Bunyan's 
than Priestley's:
There all the millions of his saints *
Shall in one song unite,
And each the bliss of all shall view 
With infinite delight.
The case of Isaac Watts is even more striking. The three books of his 
Horae Lyricae abound in hymns which picture death not as Priestley sees 
it, as a transition to a state much like our present one, but as an 
utter change, and a change to be prayed for and longed for. This is 
orthodox Christianity, and the titles of these hymns clearly signal 
their author's preoccupations: 'Felicity Above', 'Death and Eternity', 
’Pardon and Sanctification', 'Sovereignty and Grace', 'Launching into 
Eternity', 'Breathing Toward the Heavenly Country'. Whereas Priestley's 
after-life is resolutely corporeal, Watts' is quite notably not so:
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Dead be my heart to all below.
To mortal joys and mortal cares;
To sensual bliss that charms us so 
Be dark, my eyes, and deaf, my ears. 5
Turning to his Saviour, Watts reveals himself as something Priestley 
neither is nor wants to be: the self-conscious inheritor of the 
traditions and symbols of catholic Christianity. He can speak of Christ 
as 'the heavenly lover', of the sacrament as 'This heavenly flesh, this 
sacred food', and, in one of his best-known hymns, the crucified Son of 
God is depicted in terms quite different from what the author's 
Calvinism might have led us to expect:
His dying Crimson like a Robe 
Spreads o’er his Body on the Tree,
Then I am dead to all the Globe,
And all the Globe is dead to me.
All this should be enough to convince us that the landscape of
Priestley's theological thought is flat and unadorned because he wanted
it so. The religious tradition in which he was raised did not lack an
architecture both rich and antique with which he could have relieved
these plain tracts, but he chose to ignore it. A remark of Watts' may
help us to understand one reason why this should have been so:
'sometimes I seem to have carried Reason with me even to the Camp of
Socinus; but Chen St. John gives my soul a Twitch, and St. Paul bears me
back again (if I misCake noc his Meaning) almosc Co Che TenCs of John 
37Calvin.' WaCCs is mainCained in harmonic mocion beCween chese Cwo 
poinCs
because he
believes ChaC we should neicher leave our reasonings behind us nor 
'overleap Che Bounds of faich, and give Che Reins Co all our Reasonings
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upon Divine Themes in so wide and open a Field as that of Possibles and 
Probables.' But for Priestley, as we noted in the last chapter, the 
field of possibles and probables holds no terrors. He sees it not as a 
treacherous marsh but as the natural terrain of human thought. Here as 
elsewhere, some will be less sure-footed than others, but security 
certainly is attainable and some may hope to feel firm ground beneath 
their feet. Believing this, he can do without Watts' sort of balance: 
he need not tread a narrow path between the uncertainties of rational 
speculation and the certainties of faith and scripture; reason - as 
employed in historical, philosophical or scientific research - can give 
us as much certainty as we require. There is consequently all the 
difference in the world between the flat, dry light in which Priestley 
pursues his research and the brilliance that Watts celebrates:
Stand, and adore! how glorious He
That dwells in bright eternity!
We gaze, and we confound our sight
Plung'd in th'abyss of dazzling light.
Faced with such a dazzling light, our vision confounded, what could we 
do but stand and adore? But has not Priestley told us that the 
'happiness of heaven ... will not be of an indolent, but of an active 
nature' ? ^
Ceaseless and methodical activity in some public vocation is, of 
course, a well-known requirement of the Calvinist ethic. Puritans, ever 
the enemies of solitude and of cloistered virtue, were consequently the 
enemies of inactive contemplation as well: the rapturous acquaintance 
with God which Bunyan's prose promises and Watts' poetry anticipates is 
not a thing to be had before death. Richard Baxter may have called one
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of his most famous works The Saints1 Everlasting Rest, but this rest, he 
makes clear, is to be enjoyed only after a life of constant and 
systematic work. As he elsewhere says, 'work is the moral as well as 
the material end of power. ... It is action that God is most served and 
honoured by ...'^  The Calvinist's relentless rationalism has left 
him with a picture of God as a remote and unapproachable sovereign and 
of the world as a place in which the supernatural has no part: a world 
in which rationally-ordered labour is an obligation of all men, both 
because it is a sign (though not, of course, an infallible sign) of 
Divine election and because it is a distraction from the temptations of 
the flesh. Priestley's rational theology leaves him with a God 
similarly remote and a world similarly disenchanted; but, with standards 
of proof less rigorous than those of the seventeenth century, he can 
employ a much more thorough-going rationalism. His willingness to 
settle for opinio and not to hold out for scientia even in religious 
matters gives him an enormously-expanded view of the prospects for human 
activity; his associationist psychology teaches him how such activity 
leads to happiness; his belief in providence naturally inclines him to 
think that God, who created the machinery of associations, desires and 
will promote this activity. God, who wants us to continue our 
scientific and historical research in the next world as in this, can 
hardly be expected to reveal himself to us if this will mean an end to 
all activity in the rapt adoration of which Watts speaks. It would 
appear, then, that our knowledge of God must always be inferential.
And, since God is inexhaustible, there can be no end to the drawing of 
inferences: heaven is an eternal research project with limitless 
resources and no completion date.
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'We have no sermons addressed to the passions that are good for 
anything,' said Samuel Johnson in 1778. Of elegance, he thought, there 
was no lack - 'every body composes pretty well' - and he reviewed the 
sermonisers of the day with a connoisseur's relish: '... Seed has very 
fine style ... Jortin's sermons are very elegant. - Sherlock's style too 
is very elegant. ...' But where was passion to be found? In the 
sermons of the Methodists, perhaps, but these Johnson thought no better 
tnan moD oratory.
More than half a century earlier, Jonathan Swift had told 
preachers that it was their business first to tell the congregation 
their duty and next to convince them that it was their duty. As to 
'this Talent of moving the Passions': those unfortunate enough to think 
that they possessed it should use it seldom and with caution, 'For ... 
Philosophers have long agreed, that Passion should never prevail over 
Reason.' Swift - who preferred a 'plain convincing Reason' to 'the Art 
of wetting the Handkerchiefs of a whole Congregation' - did not believe 
that impassioned oratory could be 'of any great use towards directing 
Christian Men in the Conduct of their Lives, at least in these Northern 
Climates. ...fZfl This widespread belief that reason and passion were 
incompatible was of the greatest importance to eighteenth-century 
religious thought in general and to Priestley's in particular. When 
Priestley addressed his Appeal to the Serious and Candid Professors of 
Cnristianity to a congregation exposed to the Methodist temptation, it 
was to win them from the dangers of enthusiasm, from passion 
unrestrained by reason.
IV.
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Since 1739, John Wesley had been touring the kingdom to preach in 
open fields to huge crowds. His success was often spectacular, its 
effects epileptic: his hearers would fall to their knees, many crying 
out out aloud, many trembling convulsively. This may not have been the 
reaction that he was looking for - though he certainly believed that 
instantaneous conversion alone was valid - but these epiphenomena, 
though often short-lived, helped both to draw attention to the movement 
and to fix in the public mind its principle characteristics: passion and 
urgency. The reason why these qualities should have been so marked a 
feature of Methodist preaching is made clear in the following passage 
from one of Wesley's sermons, which at the same time powerfully, though 
rantingly, exemplifies them:
See! See! He cometh! He maketh the clouds his chariots! He 
rideth upon the wings of the wind! A devouring fire goeth before 
him and after him a flame bumeth! See! He sitteth upon his 
throne, clothed with light as with a garment, arrayed with majesty 
and honour! Behold, his eyes are as a flame of fire, his voice as 
the sound of many waters!
How will ye escape? Will ye call to the mountains to fall on 
you, the rocks to cover you? Alas, the mountains themselves, the 
rocks, the earth, the heaven, are just ready to flee away! Can ye 
prevent the sentence? Wherewith? With all the substance of thy 
house, with thousands of gold andsilver? Blind wretch! Thou 
earnest naked from thy mother's womb, and more naked into eternity
We see here a notable feature of Wesley's homiletic style: those
frequent interrogations with which he draws his hearers in, forcing them
to apply his teachings directly to their own lives. The language of
Methodism was often vivid and colloquial, its imagery concrete, and so
successfully did it work upon a working-class audience, that it posed a
serious threat to the Dissenting sects, whose congregations were
/ ^
becoming ever smaller and more predominantly middle-class.
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Neither temperament nor literary gifts fitted Priestley for the 
role of hot-gospeller and he wisely did not attempt it. The title of 
his Appeal to the Serious and Candid Professors of Christianity told his 
readers what to expect, and the first page confirmed their expectations:
Let me intreat you therefore, my brethren, to give me a patient 
and candid hearing. Attend, in the spirit of meekness, to what I 
shall say from the earnestness of my heart; and exercise the 
reason which God has given you, upon this occasion, which is the 
noblest on which it can be exercised, and for which you may, 
therefore, conclude that it was principally given you.
The reader is to understand that Priestley, though his tone is level and 
his manner sober, though he makes no overt appeal to the emotions, is 
every bit as sincere as the Methodists. Speaking from the earnestness 
of his heart, he begs for a candid hearing. By this he means, 
presumably, a charitable hearing, but the importance to him of candour 
as freedom from bias or prejudice is apparent throughout the pamphlet. 
Candour is important because the Christian life is founded upon an act 
of free choice, which, since it cannot be evaded, should be made 
rationally and knowledgeably. To make it in this way, with deliberation 
and not with the tearful rashness of a Methodist convert, is to make 
proper use of one of God's gifts. Religion and rationality alike 
proceed from God: 'They cannot, therefore, be contrary to one another, 
but must mutually illustrate and enforce one another.'
This confident assertion seems to place Priestley clearly in a 
tradition not merely of rationalism but of reasonableness; a tradition 
that stretches from Erasmus and Hooker in the sixteenth century to 
Priestley's masters in the eighteenth. It is, for example, not 
difficult to find in the works of those Anglican metaphysicians and
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moralists of the seventeenth century who are known as the Cambridge 
Platonists phrases similar to those which Priestley uses. Thus Benjamin 
Whichcote states that in religious disputes 'nothing without reason is 
to be proposed; nothing against reason is to be believed'; and Henry 
More claims that, ’To take away reason is to rob Christianity of that 
special prerogative it has above all other religions in the world, 
namely that it dares appeal unto reason.'44 ^ But the apparent agreement 
between Priestley and these men masks a real and Important difference. 
Priestley's reason, and Wesley’s, is not the reason of Whichcote and 
More.
The philosophers of the mid-seventeenth century retained an 
Aristotelian concept of reason. Unlike later thinkers, they did not 
regard it merely as a calculative faculty, capable of assessing those 
facts and arguments that must be assessed if we are to attain our goals 
but itself incapable of setting us such goals. For Whichcote, More and 
their contemporaries, reason is capable not only of helping us to our 
goals but also of comprehending goals; or rather the goal, the telos 
which man will attain if he realises his ethical nature. In other 
words, Hume's assertion that 'Reason is, and ought to be the slave of 
the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve 
and obey them' is quite foreign to their t h o u g h t . M o r e ,  for example, 
does distinguish between reason and the passions, but he certainly does 
not believe that reason is incapable of motion unless stimulated and 
given direction from without. This is made clear by the words with 
which he defines the subject of his Snchiridium Ethicum: 'Virtue is an 
intellectual power of the Soul, by which it over-rules the animal
impressions or bodily Passions; so as in every Action it easily pursues 
what is absolutely and simply the best.' The best is whatever appears 
best to right reason, and this reason is not merely a ratiocinative 
faculty; it is a copy in the mind of man 'of that Reason or Law eternal 
which is registered in the Mind D i v i n e . R e a s o n  enables us to see 
things as they really are; and seeing them thus, we will pursue the good 
and eschew the bad. To pursue virtue is to to rectify our minds, to 
realise that potential which we all possess in some measure to see 
things as they really are. Believing this, More can speak as he does of 
the motives to virtuous conduct without lapsing into ethical egoism: his 
language is so often exhortatory because he is trying to draw from his 
readers what may be in them.
Between More and Priestley, however, falls the shadow of John 
Locke. Priestley and his fellow Dissenters, like Doddridge and Watts, 
followed Locke in maintaining that, though there were innate faculties - 
judgment, for example, was a divine gift - there were no innate 
principles: as Watts said, 'We are b o m  ignorant of every good and 
useful thing.' For him and for all Locke's epigoni, reason is not, as 
it is for More and his contemporaries, a faculty capable of revealing to 
men the ends they should pursue. Instead, it has a much humbler 
function: the discovery and ordering of proofs, the perceiving of
AQ
connections between them and the drawing of inferences from them. ° It 
is difficult for anyone holding such a view of reason to give much of an 
account of judgment. Watts himself, in a book (known to the young 
Priestley) professedly intended to explain 'The Right Use of Reason in 
the Enquiry After Truth', says much about the acquisition of knowledge
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but little about its use. The reader is advised to furnish his mind
with 'a rich Variety of Ideas1 - historical, political, geographical and
scientific - because this will enable him 'to judge of Things aright',
but the connection between judgment and knowledge is never properly
e xp l ained.That the one depends on the other is clear - in youth,
experience is small and so judgement weak - but the closest Watts comes
to describing the nature of this dependency is in a passage in which he
explains that, as our knowledge of things increases, so does our
knowledge of the differences between them, of the agreement and
disagreement of ideas. But how do we come to recognise differences when
we see them? How, in particular, do we do so when the differences are
quat'tathe
not physical or quantitative but moral or quantitative? Locke's own 
short chapter on judgement does little to answer this question: it 
simply explains that judgement is rather a second-rate sort of faculty, 
supplied to us for our use where certain knowledge is not to be had.^
The empiricist picture of man with which we are here presented, a 
picture which came to be generally accepted in the early eighteenth 
century, is very different from More's. Man, as here depicted, does not 
have a single telos which he may discover with the aid of reason, a 
faculty which is a copy of divine reason and which may be so educated 
that he may learn to conform with this reason. Rather, man is a plain 
tablet upon which any number and kind of messages may be inscribed. His 
goals, salvation and the knowledge of God, are external. He must learn 
of them as he learns the laws of physics or of mathematics, by proof and 
induction, and he must compare them in his mind with other possible 
goals. Such an epistemology and philosophy of mind are likely to push
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ethics in the direction of egoism. Moral education, no longer (as it 
had been for More) the realisation of dimly-perceivable potential, 
consists now in teaching people to know their interest and to assess 
theories accurately.-*1
The upshot of this is that the philosophers who flourished before 
Locke and those who came after them are very different from each other 
even when they seem to be most similar. Hartley and More, for example, 
both see the love of God as originating in gratitude for his bounty, but 
more important than their agreement is the fact that More can, as 
Hartley cannot, move easily from descriptive to prescriptive language. 
Hartley cam make the move only by showing firstly that God exists and 
then that the love of God affords us a greater pleasure than any other
CO
love and ’is therefore our primary Pursuit and ultimate End. For 
him, then, the love of God is one among a number of sources of 
pleasures, all of which must be evaluated before we can decide which is 
the best (he first examines sensation, imagination, honour self- 
interest, concluding of each in turn that 'it ought not to be made a 
primary Pursuit').^ Of course, Hartley believes that man and the world 
in which he dwells are alike the handiwork of a benevolent deity; and, 
this being so, it would be an odd state of affairs if the path of 
obedience to God's will did not lead also to happiness in this world or 
the next. Moreover, there is in Hartley's work what Leslie Stephen 
calls a 'queer mathematical mysticism': the world is so providentially 
arranged that the search for happiness, properly pursued, will lead at 
length to 'perfect self-annihilation and the pure love of God.' But the 
fact remains that Hartley's methods are egoistic as More’s are not, that
Hartley must appeal to self-interest before he can appeal to reason.
The moral sense, according to Hartley, is not innate but a product of 
the association of pleasurable sensations with certain objects. To be 
moral is not (as it is for More) to draw out what is within us, but to 
point ourselves in the right direction; a course which self-interest 
will dictate. More, on the other hand, writes in the evening of a 
tradition in which it was natural to think analogically and in terms of 
correspondence: man the microcosm mirrored the macrocosm of nature; 
human reason, which taught men how to behave, was a copy of divine 
reason, which ordered the universe. For him religious or moral 
performances arising from 'mere self-love' are 'at best but as 
preparations, or the more refined exercises, of a sort of theological 
Hobbianism.1 Self-love cannot be the foundation of the love we owe to 
God and creation, nor can it 'raise the soul towards the Divine nature. 
Nothing can ascend into heaven but what comes down from it.'^
More's reason furnishes ends as well as means; Hartley's does 
not. Given the tools, Hartley's reason will finish the job; but it 
cannot choose its employer, and it is to this incapacity of eighteenth- 
century reason that we can ascribe the style of eighteenth-century 
sermons. If reason cannot act unless first the passions are engaged, 
then either the preacher must address the passions or he must address 
the reason while assuming that he and his hearers are agreed as to the 
direction in which reason must take them. The former approach issues in 
the eloquence of the Methodists, the latter in the prudential discourses 
of the Established Church and of the Dissenters. This is made clear by 
Isaac Watts, who is quite explicit about the psychological basis of
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sermonising. He allows that too often preachers, instead of offering 'a 
pathetic address to the heart', furnish their hearers with a coldly 
rational discourse. But to address the heart and not the reason is to 
ignite the devouring flames of enthusiasm; reason, though incapable of 
action alone, is nonetheless the only faculty by which we can tell right 
from wrong. However, God has furnished us 'with those powers, which we 
call passions, or affections of the heart, in order to excite the will 
with superior vigour and activity to avoid the evil and pursue the 
good.' The art of the preacher lies in knowing how to address these 
passions in a proper manner.^
In the earlier part of the century, Anglican sermons - delivered, 
according to Oliver Goldsmith, 'with the most insipid calmness' - 
aspired more to the condition of polite letters than to that of 
spiritual exhortations. Dissenters, too, went to the meeting-house not 
to participate in an act of worship but to hear a 'Lord's Day Lecture', 
and at least one critic, writing in 1730, thought their prayers too 
short and their sermons too long. It was the man whom Priestley calls 
'the excellent archbishop Tillotson', who had died in 1694, who gave the 
age its tone. His published sermons - each of them proceeding from a 
dignified exordium by ordered stages and logical divisions - enjoyed 
immense popularity.^ One in particular, comfortingly entitled 'The 
Precepts of Christianity not Grievous', was the most popular of the 
eighteenth century; much reprinted, much parroted by lesser men on a 
Sunday morning. It preaches a religion which offers us both present 
pleasure, the 'satisfaction of having done our duty', and future 
rewards; a religion demanding rather fewer sacrifices than a modem
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slimming plan. Human sinfulness is not an object of concern, nor the 
cross an object of contemplation. The preacher appeals to his 
congregation's prudence rather than their sense of unworthiness.^ So 
do other Georgian preachers: Bishop Butler, who seldom mentions Christ 
or the Holy Spirit, urges his hearers to love God because 'it is 
reasonable and right so to do'; Bishop Seeker teaches that Christianity 
is peculiar in that 'it makes Application to Men as reasonable 
Creatures', that it claims our assent by the proofs it offers and 
requires faith 'only because it produces Evidence for the Ground of our 
Faith'; and among the Dissenters, Philip Doddridge, though he believes 
that preaching should be done 'with an holy fervour and ardour', 
believes also 'that religion consists more in an intelligent, rational, 
and determinate choice of^ the will than in any ardent transport of the 
affections.'^
It was this sort of thing that caused one of Doddridge's friends 
to lament the decline of faith and evangelical truth, and to complain 
that his ears were being continually 'dinned with reason, the great law 
of reason, and the eternal law of reason. ... u Evangelical truth was, 
of course, what the Methodists claimed to be offering, and Anglican 
priests and Dissenting ministers alike were worried that such preaching 
would win their congregations from them. But Wesley himself was not one 
to decry reason. His task as he saw it was to teach people that God's 
grace, the only source of true happiness, was available to all; and, 
though he differed from his orthodox brethren in the sense of urgency 
with which he undertook his labours, on the importance of reason he was 
at one with them. He distinguished very clearly between the two
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concepts of reason: reason as 'the faculty of reasoning, of inferring 
one thing from another', and reason as 'eternal reason, or the nature of 
things: the nature of God and the nature of man with the relations 
necessarily subsisting between them.' Christianity, he maintained, was 
agreeable to both kinds of reason; to the former because it was founded 
on the nature of God and of man, and to the latter because this kind of 
reason was a gift of God, to be used 'in searching out the things of 
God.' But to reason without true judgement is to reason from false 
premisses, and true judgement in matters of religion is to be had only 
from 'a clear apprehension of the things of God', which is an internal, 
spiritual sense:
What then will your reason do here? How will it pass from things 
natural to spiritual? ... What a gulf is here! By what art will 
reason get over the immense chasm? This cannot be till the 
Almighty come in to your succour, and give you that faith you have 
hitherto despised. 1
It is apparent from this very clear statement of the problem that one 
kind of reason, 'the faculty of reasoning', has invaded the domain of 
the other. For that 'eternal reason, or the nature of things' of which 
Wesley speaks is much like the providential mechanism of Hartley's 
philosophy: by an application of ratiocinative reason we learn our place 
and God's in this order of things; we see then how Christian faith is in 
accordance with our best interests. Nothing that Wesley says leads us 
to suppose that 'eternal reason' alone is capable of inciting us to 
action. And that 'faculty of reasoning' which occupies much more of his 
attention is also incapable, as he recognises much more clearly than 
Hartley or Priestley, of bridging the gulf between the natural and the 
supernatural worlds. The bridge is, and can only be, God's grace,
penetrating the human heart in a moment of heat and passion while cold 
reason stands by helpless.
V.
In some measure, Priestley's style in his sermons, like that of 
the Methodists in theirs, is a reaction against what has gone before. 
This may not be immediately obvious: Priestley's sermons dwell in the 
light of common day, and the words with which Bishop Warburton described 
the style of Tillotson's preaching - 'simple, elegant, candid, clear, 
and rational' - surely name qualities which Priestley sought to bring to 
his own pulpit. But though few tears can have been shed when 
Priestley preached, though he is not likely to have inspired 
instantaneous conversion, his sermons are fervent in manner as many 
contemporary sermons seem not to have been. Their style - measured but 
not unemotional, avoiding both the tearfulness of the Methodists and the 
austerities of the orthodox Anglicans - is the product of two aspects of 
his theology. On the one hand, he has abandoned the doctrine of 
predestination and so he must evangelise; on the other hand, he does not 
believe in the direct action of God on the human mind, and so he tries 
to persuade his hearers not to open their hearts to divine grace but to 
take thought.
This latter aspect of his theology is the subject of a sermon 
preached in 1779, whose published text bears an epigraph, drawn from the 
Essay on Man, which sets the scene for what follows:
... the first Almighty Cause
Acts not by partial, but by gen'ral laws.
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God, the preface explains, certainly does act in the world, but always 
through secondary causes. The Calvinist doctrine of sovereign and 
irresistible grace is to be rejected: there is such a thing as grace, in 
that 'the agency of God upon the minds of men' is 'real and constant', 
but this agency, being always exerted through natural means, cannot 
produce change 'without proper opportunity, and especially without 
proper time ...' There can be no possibility of instantaneous or death­
bed conversions.64
These things are told us for our comfort. Christianity, if it is 
a habit of mind and not a mysterious transport of the soul, is available 
to everyone, not merely to those who have undergone conversion. The 
Independents, he says in another work, 'require ... such an account of 
what they call experiences in religion, as there is not a shadow of 
ground for in the New Testament, and which few but enthusiasts will 
pretend to.' This concentration on 'the state of the heart with respect 
to God' is downright inimical to virtue. We can judge only of our 
outward conduct: these facts, 'plain facts, of which every man can judge 
by the evidence of seeing and hearing', are all that the early church 
concerned itself with. God intended us never to be without hope or 
fear: if we do our Christian duty, we will have reason to hope; if we do 
not, if we yield to temptation, we will have reason to fear. This is 
all the scriptures give us authority to say, To go further is to 
trespass upon uncertain and treacherous ground, where fools delude 
themselves into believing that they have felt what no-one could feel, 
and knaves delude others by adopting 'the peculiar style' required:
What can be more precarious than to judge of a man's fitness for 
Christian communion by certain internal feelings which are 
incapable of being described, except by strong metaphors; by a
-146-
kind of faith that is different from believing, and a new birth, 
that is something else than a change of affections and conduct, 
proceeding from rational .motives; a new birth, in which a man is 
entirely passive, and to which nothing he does, or can do, does in 
the least contribute.
This flight from 'strong metaphors' is, of course, a flight from any 
specifically religious literary style. Priestley was prepared to 
concede that figurative language might enrich a discourse - he had made 
this clear nine years before in the Scripture Doctrine of Remission - 
and he was even prepared to use it himself: he talks of Christ as a 
source of light and he goes on to explain (or labour) the metaphor.
But, such mild figures apart, his language is religious only inasmuch as 
it employs the terms of the theological trade: 'grace', 'salvation', 
'judgement', etc. His attitude, both puritanical and scientistic, 
recalls that of the early Royal Society as recorded by its historian 
Bishop Sprat, who in 1667 praised 'a close, naked, natural way of 
speaking; positive expression; clear senses ... bringing all things as 
near the Mathematical plainness, as they can ... In religion as in 
science Priestley wants plain facts, plainly set down. The inner, the 
fugitive, the unwilled, matters which must be spoken of metaphorically 
or not at all - those things which have commonly be considered the 
essence of spirituality - can have no place.
Like Sprat, Priestley advocates a empirical, prosaic prose as a 
specific against religious illuminism. Sprat's enemies were the 
millennarian sects of his time; Priestley's are the Methodists: 'my only 
question at present is this, -' says v-Jesley, "'is thine heart right, as 
my heart is with thine heart?'"; and the question, like many of 
Wesley's, demands that the hearer look not only at his behaviour but
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into his own soul, to see whether Christ is revealed therein, whether he 
lives in Christ and Christ with him, whether he loves God with all his 
heart, mind and strength.0
Only in 1791 did Priestley record at length his opinion of the 
Methodists and their founder. He admired John Wesley for his honesty 
and industry, his knowledge and intelligence, his unremitting zeal to 
secure his own salvation and to promote that of others, but he found him 
also to have been 'strongly tinctured with enthusiasm, from the effect 
of false notions very early imbibed.' Turning from Wesley - that 
unfortunate man, 'bewildered and distressed', uncertain of his salvation 
even after many years of good work - to the Methodists of 1791,
Priestley congratulates them on having abandoned belief in instantaneous 
conversion and with it the miseries of uncertainty and soul-searching:
Besides, to judge by internal feelings, or emotions of the heart, 
which are the springs or causes of our conduct, is to invade the 
province of God, who alone knows, and judges by, the heart; 
whereas our actions are open to the inspection of all men. Men 
perpetually deceive even themselves with respect to the real 
motives of their own conduct, though they are, no doubt, more 
accessible to themselves than to others; but about the uniform 
tenor of their actions, there can be no mistake.
Priestley's repeated insistence throughout his career as a preacher on 
an active rather than a reflective faith may appear to place him 
squarely in the camp of the author of 'The Precepts of Christianity not 
Grievous'. But while Tillotson too concentrates on behaviour, on 
earnest endeavour, on the performance of certain acts and abstention 
from others, he does not seem greatly impressed by the obstacles which 
stand in the pilgrim's way. Persecution is rare nowadays, a life of sin 
more burdensome than one of virtue, and besides, 'Some virtues plainly
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tend to the preservation of our health, others to the peace and quiet of 
our minds; and which is somewhat more strange, to the advancement of our 
esteem and reputation: for ... men are commonly so just to virtue and 
goodness, as to praise it in others even when they do not practice it 
themselves.^9 But this broad highway, smooth and metalled, is not the 
one down which Priestley would have his hearers travel. His road is 
narrow and rocky; the surmounting of obstacles is an essential part of 
the journey.
These obstacles bulk so large in Priestley's mind because, though 
he shares with Tillotson an egoistic ethic, the psychological theory 
which he has inherited from Hartley does not allow him to see the mind 
as a completely unfettered agent in an ethical free market. On the one 
hand the power of association is such that the young mind will ever be 
prey to corrupting influences; on the other hand the power of habit is 
such that these associations may exert such a hold over the fully-formed 
mind that no promise of future reward snay be enough to free it.
If these obstacles are to be surmounted, Christians must keep 
constant guard over their passions. They may not be able to prevent 
'irregular passions & desires' from arising within their hearts, but 
they will refuse indulgence to such irregularities. They will not allow 
themselves to give way to anger. They will avoid temptation, eschewing 
those places and that company in which their virtue will be subjected to 
the greatest trial. And, of course, they will shun the distractions of 
worldly p l e a s u r e . ^  They will be, in the literal sense of the term, 
fearful. A proper fear of displeasing God, a fear that is not 
superstitious or enthusiastic, is a good sign that our hearts are right
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towards the Almighty and that we are seeking his kingdom before all 
other things. (Thus far, and thus far only, will Priestley go in trying 
to persuade his listeners to tax themselves with the sort of questioning 
that Wesley demands; but the evidence sought in this interrogation is of 
an external and unambiguous nature: we can know that we fear God if we 
behave as God-fearing people behave and manifest a disposition to 
justify ourselves in his sight.) Christians should not, of course, fear 
calamity or affliction or the world's censure, but they should fear God 
and live with a quick sense of their own moral instability and of the 
dangers to which their resolution may ever be subject.^1
Among the obstacles that stand between the Christian and the 
proper employment of this knowledge, prejudice is at least as formidable 
as the passions are. Indeed, Priestley sometimes speaks as though the 
passions are to be feared chiefly became they may obstruct a serious re­
examination of prejudice. The healthy mind, free from passion, 
prejudice and enthusiasm ’is capable of judging fairly & justly 
concerning things & following without reluctance or restraint the 
dictates of reason.Prepossession and prejudice in judgement are the 
disorders to which the human mind is most subject, for long custom and 
the esteem in which we hold our parents and teachers cause us to be 
attached to opinions acquired in childhood and youth. But our passions 
are not to be despised; no part of us can have been made in vain, for we 
are the handiwork 'of a perfectly wise and good being’. Like reason 
itself, the passions were doubtless given us by a beneficent deity to be 
cultivated and exercised; and 'when they are are constantly employed in 
such a manner as reason directs, then the mind is active, vigorous, and
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healthful.' It is only the domination of the mind by some particular 
passion that renders it unsound:
So that the great art and business of life consists not in the 
vain efforts to suppress and destroy the several affections of our 
nature, but in exercising a wise government over them - 
proportioning our desires to the real value of things; gratifying 
our passions in their just and natural order, restraining and 
subduing them when they become impetuous and predominant, and 
regulating them according to the dictates of reason, moderation 
and virtue.
God has revealed to us our destination and he has given us maps and 
reason with which to read them; the passions are sails to hasten us on 
our way. But the wise man will employ reason not only to give direction 
to the passions but also to moderate, and indeed calibrate, them: 'he 
will proportion the degree of his affections by the nature of the 
objects on which they are placed. He will seek the most important 
blessings and the highest good with the warmest affections, and things 
of an inferior nature with restrained and moderated desire ...'
The oddity of all this should be very apparent: Priestley believes 
that the passions are and ought to be the slaves of reason, but his 
reason is a faculty incapable of moving itself. Hence, surely, the 
shifty air with which he discusses the psychology of religious 
affection. He can slip only uneasily between prescriptive and 
descriptive language, because there is no other way in which he can move 
from the one to the other.
The account which he gives in the Institutes of the origin and 
nature of religious affection is very similar to Hartley's, employing, 
like Hartley's, an egoistic but divinely-ordered psychology. God, has 
furnished us with passions which incite us to certain pursuits; our duty
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is to decide which passions to indulge and which pursuits to follow.
The light of nature reveals to us two basic rules of human conduct: we 
must obey God's will and we must seek our own happiness; and, in fact, 
the second rule coincides with the first, because God desires our 
happiness no less than we do.^ Passions, the springs of action, are of 
two kinds - the desire which we feel for objects of pleasure and the 
aversion which we feel from objects of pain - and they may be grouped 
according to their objects into five classes: the sensual pleasures; the 
social pleasures, the pleasures of self-love; the pleasures of 
association, whose objects, though not in themselves capable of 
gratifying our desires, afford us intellectual or imaginative pleasure 
by virtue of the ideas which association has transferred to them; and, 
finally, most refined of all our passions, the moral sense. Priestley 
reviews in turn each of these classes of passion, and like, Hartley, 
considers the degree to which their gratification should be our object. 
He concludes with no doubt as to which are the most important: they are 
those which form that sub-class of the social passions which Priestley 
calls the 'theopathetic affections'.
Throughout his consideration of the passions, Priestley has 
awkwardly, and apparently unaware of what he is doing, mixed descriptive 
language with prescriptive, psychology with exhortation. In treating 
now of the theopathetic affections, he sounds unabashedly like a man 
with a product to shift (and, indeed, rather like Tillotson). The love 
of God, we learn, does not interfere with any real gratification: by 
restraining our passions, it makes possible the proper enjoyment of 
them; it is consistent with a regard for our own greatest good and with
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attention to the good of others; it is an antidote to the evils of this 
life, for all that comes to pass does so because of that divine will in 
which we should rejoice; it alone is a passion which will never want 
proper gratification and so will never occasion pain. We have only to 
consult the principles of right and equity to see that if a human father 
or benefactor deserves our love and obedience, God should command 
proportionately more.
A proper love of God is not, of course, either superstitious or 
enthusiastic. On the contrary, as Priestley told his congregations, 
Christianity gives to us that government over ourselves which is the 
very opposite of these superstitious passions. It gives us 'rational 
and consistent principles of Religion', encouraging free enquiry and the 
use of our understanding and judgment. It teaches us that God is 
'possessed of all moral excellencies’, is 'the righteous & merciful 
Govenour of the world’ who will reward with eternal happiness all whose 
virtues resemble his. And, above all, Christianity has given us in 
Christ the best of examples. Secondly, ’Christianity hath a tendency to 
restrain those irregular passions which disorder & corrupt the mind.’
The gospels teach us to regulate our appetites and passions. They teach 
us to ’abstain from all fleshly lusts which war against the soul and to 
cleanse ourselves from all impurity of the flesh & spirit, & perfect 
holiness in the fear of God.1 Ultimately, Christianity is to be valued 
because it sets before us both a great prize and the means of winning 
it.75
Urgency without enthusiasm, egoism without complacency: these are 
the characteristics that serve to locate Priestley's sermons on the
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theological map of his time. He rejects the complacent tone of the 
Anglican sermon because of the great sense of urgency which his 
associationism gives him: man comes into the world an almost infinitely 
malleable creature,but such is the effect of habit that his character 
soon hardens and reform becomes ever more difficult. So it is never too 
early to begin to acquire good habits or to place oneself within a Godly 
sphere of influence; and, while reform is possible even for the habitual 
sinner, degeneration is, by the same token, possible even for the 
virtuous, and so the Godly life must be one of constant care, never of 
complacency. But, though Priestley shares the Methodists' sense of 
urgency, he can share neither their belief in instantaneous conversion 
nor their emotionalism; God's operation on men's minds is always 
mediated through secondary causes, and those who would be Christians 
must calmly take thought and pay proper regard to these causes.
We can easily see that it is Priestley's love of objectivity, his 
distrust of the personal and the unverifiable, that move him in this 
latter act of rejection. And it is the same love, and the same 
distrust, that lead him also to turn his back on Anglican moralism; for 
in rejecting this moralism, he presupposes a picture of the human mind 
not as a thing obscure and subjective but as the creature of external 
circumstance. Similarly, it is his objectivism that closes to him the 
book of catholic Christianity from which Watts draws so much of his 
Imagery: reason demands constant mental exertion, and so we need not 
expect ever to stand in rapt and silent awe before our Maker. Besides, 
a rational reading of scripture reveals to us that Christ saved us by 
his example and his precept, not by his blood.
A salient characteristic of radicalism is its tendency to 
eradicate distinctions not only between classes of men but also between 
different modes of discourse or categories of thought. Priestley's 
rather mundane eschatology demonstrates this tendency and so does his 
style of preaching. Both are founded on the assumption that the 
gradient of life is constant - there is no sharp incline, no crest of 
the hill - and Priestley's picture of the heaven towards which he hoped 
those who heeded his preaching would strive reveals that even death is 
not a crisis in human experience.
This antipathy to distinctions is even more marked in Priestley's 
introduction to the first volume of the Theological Repository. Here he 
explains that it 'becomes all friends of science to endeavour to find 
proper expedients for facilitating the extension of knowledge.1 The 
best method of doing so, he believes, is to promote communication 
between those active in various fields of knowledge, and an essential 
first step in such commerce would be the publication of histories of the 
various arts and sciences. And, indeed, Priestley, in his role as 
anonymous editor, is able helpfully to cite an example of such a work: 
The History and Present State of Electricity. There are, in fact, close 
similarities between the preface to that work and the introduction to 
the Theological Repository. In both, Priestley urges the importance of 
histories of the various departments of learning as aids to the 
furtherance of knowledge in those departments; and in both he goes on to 
enjoin his fellow toilers to communicate their discoveries to each 
other.
VI.
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This useful activity would be prodigiously facilitated, he 
suggests in the Repository, 'if the glorious scheme of an universal and 
philosophical language were carried into execution so that learned men 
might be able to correspond in it in one-tenth part of the time that it 
would require to make themselves masters of any other common language 
...' The assimilation of religious to scientific knowledge can 
scarcely be taken farther than this. Priestley, however, was impatient; 
other bodies of knowledge seemed to be progressing so much more rapidly 
than theology. He admired the protestants of the reformation but 
lamented that, while their reforms had been accepted, their example had 
been ignored: 'not a single step has been advanced in the period of 
about 200 years that have elapsed since their times and ours; a period 
in which there has been an almost total revolution in the whole system 
of thinking in Europe, and which has affected moral and theological 
subjects as much as any other.
Priestley was not alone in finding theological life too slow for 
his liking. Others too had contrasted the stagnation of religious 
thought with the rapid improvements that had taken place in other forms
70
of knowledge as well as in technology and agriculture. Such 
expectations followed naturally, of course, from the ethos of natural 
philosophy; if science, presented in a conversational mode, is made to 
seem perfectly continuous with all other areas of human endeavour, then 
any of these areas that do not resemble science in their progress will 
seem v ery anomalous indeed. The danger in this - a danger to which 
Priestley is clearly exposed - is that, as Michael Oakeshott puts it, 
'when the scientist steps outside his own field he often carries with
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him only his technique ...'^9 That is to say, the scientist, when he 
leaves the laboratory, cannot bring with him the practical knowledge 
which he has employed there and which is the principal part of his skill 
as a scientist. This practical knowledge, like all practical knowledge, 
can be used only in the specific situations from which it has emerged.
By the same token, it cannot be taught in abstract but must be acquired 
in practice. Technique, on the other hand - which, with practical 
knowledge, is an essential part of any ordered human activity - can be 
taught: it can be formulated in rules and the rules can be learned.
There is an obvious similarity between this technique and that new, 
spare concept of reason which began to emerge a generation or two before 
Priestley.
The decisive feature of the old concept of reason is not its 
supposed divine origin but its heuristic power, its ability to furnish 
ends as well as means. Technique, like the new reason, cannot furnish 
ends but skill can: 'A cook', says Oakeshott, 'is not a man who first 
has a vision of pie and then tries to make it; he is a man skilled in 
cookery, and both his projects and his achievements spring from that 
skill.' But the putative advantage of technique is its egalitarianism. 
Both Bacon and Descartes thought that they had a discovered a technique 
of research with roles that could be written down, which would transform 
the art of discovery into a purely mechanical business; scientific 
method would be a machine by means of which laws of nature would be 
generated and in the operation of which all minds would be nearly on the 
same level. In the years after Bacon and Descartes technique was 
sovereign. There were all manner of books to tell the inexperienced how
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to do things: how to think, to writs poetry, to live. The complex 
traditions of English rights and liberties were abridged into a 
political crib, Locke's Second Treatise on Government, and religion 
found the greatest of its cribs in Paley's Evidences of Christianity. ^
These two works - the former published in 1696, the latter in 
1794; the first originating a mode of thought, the second consummating 
one - both frame and characterise Priestley's century. He certainly 
shared many of their assumptions: he had no time for privileged realms 
of discourse, whether that discourse was of the holy or of the noblesse. 
We examined in the last chapter the Baconian hopes embodied in his 
History of Electricity. This, more than any other of his major works, 
is a manual: it tells the reader as much history as he needs to know, 
abridges the known facts about electricity into a series of propositions 
(which, Priestley is careful to point out, are theory-free) and then 
encourages him to go forth and make some history of his own. 'Many 
modest and ingenious persons,' says Priestley, 'may be engaged to 
attempt philosophical investigations, when they see that it requires no 
more sagacity to find new truths than they themselves are masters of;
and when they see that many discoveries have been made by mere accident,
0-1
which may prove as favourable to them as to others.
3ut, as Priestley himself points out, electricity 'is a field but 
just opened', and therefore particularly welcoming to unskilled 
husbandry. An older and better established science may be less open to 
the amateur enthusiast. The apparatus with which chemical operations 
are performed may be simple, and the operations themselves easily 
conducted, but it would be a mistake to conclude from this that anybody
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can conduct a chemical experiment: 'there are many little attentions and 
precautions necessary to be observed in the conducting of experiments, 
which cannot well be described in words, but which it is needless to 
describe, since practice will necessarily suggest them; though, like all 
other arts in which the hands and fingers are made use of, it is only 
much practice that can enable a person to go through complex
oo
experiments, of this or any other kind, with ease and readiness.'0 
This admonition, from Priestley's Experiments and Observations on 
Different Kinds of Air, published in 1774, is more than a warning about 
the need for mundane prudence in the laboratory. It clearly reveals his 
conviction that scientific discovery is not exclusively a matter of 
book-learning.
This conviction is accompanied by another: that scientific 
experiments are to be defined not in terms of a particular disposition 
of gases and fluids but in terms of the philosophy which directs that 
disposition. In 1775, when a certain Dr. Brocklesby accused him of 
scientific plagiarism, of copying another's experiments and giving his 
own names to the gasses produced thereby, he dealt lightly and 
pleasantly with his accuser. He compares Dr. Brocklesby to a Chinese 
craftsman who, trying to copy a European telescope, managed to reproduce 
everything except the curvature of the glass, and so built an instrument 
that resembled a European reflecting telescope in every respect except 
that of magnifying distant objects. Or perhaps Dr. Brocklesby is like 
Tobiah, the Tahitian visitor to the Dutch East Indies, who, strangely 
unsurprised by his' first sight of a horse, turned out to be under the 
impression that he was looking at a dog, differing only in size from
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those that he knew in his homeland. Tobiah and the Chinese workman both 
made the same sort of mistake, that of thinking that two things were 
alike when they were not, but Priestley extracts a further moral from 
the Tahitian's story. The untutored gaze of the Noble Savage, wise in 
its innocence, is not something that interests him. Instead he is 
impressed by the existence of important distinctions that are not 
apparent to the ignorant: had Tobiah been like Dr. Brocklesby, says 
Priestley, he might have complained that Europeans spend their time,
qo
frivolously and unphilosophically, in giving names to familiar things.
Priestley's remark to Brocklesby that 'experiments that appear 
nearly the same with others, may, in reality, be essentially different 
from them ...' may be taken in two ways: as an admonition that a certain 
practical knowledge, such as the Chinese workman lacked, is necessary, 
or as a reminder of the importance of that theoretical knowledge which 
was lacked by both the workman and Tobiah.^ In any case, we cannot 
help but draw from Priestley's remarks about chemistry two warnings: 
that only those with the requisite theoretical knowledge may know what a 
particular experiment really is, and that only those with both 
theoretical and practical knowledge can set up experiments and profit by 
their results. As observations on scientific method go, these are not 
very striking, but they do fit into the general pattern of Priestley's 
thought. His emphasis on the importance of both practical and 
theoretical knowledge is the scientific counterpart to his insistence 
that divine providence is to be learnt of in the complex detail of 
nature and history, not in instantaneous conversions or miraculous 
revelations.
Of course, it is associationism that shows how the mind manages 
this detail. Like knowledge, faith and persuasion admit of degrees. 
They are increased by the same means as those which generate them: 
attention to the evidence and contemplation of its objects. An account 
of the mechanism of generation is to be found in Hartley's Observations. 
Hartley distinguishes rational assent from practical assent, the 
'Readiness to act in such manner as the frequent vivid Recurrency of the 
rational Assent disposes us to act'; but, whilst defining the latter in 
terms of the former (of which it is 'the natural and necessary 
Consequence'), he allows that either may be found without the other. 
Mathematical propositions, for example, admit only of rational assent 
(though why Hartley should believe this to be so is not clear), and 
practical assent, sometimes of the greatest consequence, may be 
generated without any prior praesiaal assent. But even where practical 
assent has been produced alone, rational assent may still strengthen it. 
In religion, indeed, the two forms of faith 'are excellent means of 
begetting each other.
Priestley believes that Christianity demands practical as well as 
rational assent: ’a great deal must be done by a man, before he can be a 
Christian in the proper sense of the word, that is, not in name and 
profession only, but in deed and in truth; because a habit and temper is 
to be formed which can only be produced by the long continuance of 
proper actions.' Only by constant exercise can a Christian character be 
formed: 'Habits of mind are not acquired by putting cases, ... but by
Q(L
actual experience and feeling.' Turning his attention to church 
discipline (in a pamphlet which one of his biographers found altogether
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too illiberal), Priestley cannot think of the natter but in- 
associationist terms. Men are trained to virtue, and good dispositions 
formed, only by discipline:
In what manner is it that any art, liberal or mechanical, is 
acquired? It is seldom or never by instruction only, but chiefly 
by the attention of those who are skilled in it to the trials and 
exercise of those who are to be instructed. It is well known that 
without some superintendence of this kind, bad habits will 
inevitably be formed, and the scholars will make no proficiency in 
any thing. Even science, where practice is not concerned, is 
never taught to any purpose, without frequent and careful 
examinations, in which actual proofs are given that the principles 
of it are understood, and that progress is really made in the 
attainment of it.
Churches - 'Christian societies', as Priestley calls them - exist for 
the education of their members. Counteracting the insidious influences 
of the world, they help them to form good habits. It is for this reason 
that so much is expected of Dissenters, who do not labour under the
CQ
prejudices which encumber the established church.
Associationism must at first have appealed to Priestley as a 
powerful torch: a single clear beam, hard and straight, with which to 
pick out the details of any mental phenomenon, however obscure they 
might at first seem. But, in fact, as Hartley's laborious expositions 
reveal, associationist explanation tends away from simplicity: greater 
explanations beget lesser; parallel associations modify each other; the 
modified modifies the modifier, which, thus modified, modifies back, and 
so on. The result is that associationist theory has within it the 
potential to generate accounts of mental phenomena much more subtly- 
shaded than either Hartley with his habitual pedantry or Priestley in 
his usual haste would lead one to expect. (This is something to which 
historians of literary theory have, on the whole, been more alive than
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historians of philosophy of or psychology; understandably enough, since 
the journey from Hartley to Coleridge must be through country quite 
different to that whicih leads from Hartley to Bentham.^9) We saw in the 
first chapter how, according to Hartley, simple ideas of association 
have a tendency to form compounds by association, which compounds have 
in turn a tendency to coalesce into complex ideas. But things may be 
even more complicated than this, for, as Priestley remarks, 'all strong 
passions are liable to be transferred to indifferent objects, either 
related to the proper object, or those whose ideas are accidentally 
present to the mind, at the time that is is under the influence of such 
emotion or passion.' Hence arises that pleasure which, according to 
'all poets and writers of romances', lovers take in everything belonging 
to or associated with the objects of their affections: 'Pious David 
envied even the swallows which had built their nests and laid their 
young in the House of God.'^
When associationist explanation proceeds in the direction of 
analysis, its aim is, of course, to simplify: mental phenomena are 
resolved into their simpler component parts. When, however, it attempts 
to proceed synthetically, to trace the coalitions into which simple 
ideas enter, it soon presents a very complex picture indeed. Of this 
Priestley, who spoke of association as 'that great and universal agent 
in the affections of the human mind', was well aware, as he made clear 
in his Lectures on Oratory and Criticism:
it is probable, there is not one sentiment of pleasure or pain 
that can be called intellectual (not being a direct impression 
upon some of the external senses) but what is more or less 
compounded of almost all the other intellectual pleasures and 
pains too. The principle of association is predominant in every 
thing relating to our intellectual faculties: and, in a situation 
so exposed as ours is to joint impressions, from a variety of
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independent objects, our sensation cannot fail to be so commixed 
and combined together, that it must be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, completely to resolve any one of them into all their 
[sic] separate, component parts.
Clearly, if the mind is so subject to the impressions of its 
environment, we may expect that people differently-situated will have 
very different tastes. Hartley - though he believed that the love of 
God was a 'single criterion', common to all mankind - was happy to 
embrace this relativistic conclusion in the field of aesthetics. 
Priestley fights a little shy of it and appears torn between the 
subjectivism to which his psychologicistic theory leads him and the 
universalism to which his own predilections incline him. lie points out 
had we all the same degree of sensibility, and were we all subject to 
the same impressions and influences, there would be no diversity of 
taste at all; but that the great differences among us in degree of 
sensibility and in situation lead us to be differently affected by the 
objects we encounter. This, he says, is why what is thought good taste 
in the East is not valued in Europe; and it is, of course, why the 
Asiatic metaphors of the Bible may take European readers by surprise. 
However, 'persons whose education and manner of life have been nearly 
the same' may be expected to have similar taste: 'And, from this 
principle, we may expect that, in consequence of the growing intercourse 
between all the nations of earth, and all the literati of them, an 
uniform standard of taste will at length be established over the 
world.'
3ut at present we are not all exposed to the same phenomena, nor 
have we ever been. Though we may begin life as tabula rasa, the tablet 
is early written over with scribblings that - such are the effects of
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association - soon become very complex and difficult to eradicate. This 
it is that rouses Priestley the preacher to his sense of urgency: for 
all that his attention is directed to good behaviour rather than to 
fugitive religious affections, he cannot allow himself the bland 
assumptions of a Tillotson. But neither can he confidently hope, like a 
Wesley, that a single thunderbolt of divine grace will make all well. 
Consequently, for him the Christian way must always be arduous.
Happily, associationism, which reveals to us the difficulties of 
our position, reveals to us also a number of solutions. Christianity 
can never, as the Methodists vainly boast, be the product of a single 
act of will; it is a 'habit or disposition of mind1, which may be formed 
'by a course of discipline and exercise, calculated to keep the mind 
continually impressed with a lively sense of the great truths of 
Christianity; so as to overpower the influence of the objects which 
surround us, and which are continually soliciting our attention. 'Man 
is by nature a social animal, and so nothing is better calculated to 
combat the malign influence of the world than are Christian societies. 
Worshipping and moving in such societies, Christians will mutually 
influence each other for the good. Even a mere external conformity with 
the standards of a Christian society may be useful: if the 'foreign 
corrupt influence' on a member's heart is not too strong, it will 'in
no
time, produce a greater conformity of life, and of heart also.
It is difficult not to conclude that Priestley wanted things to be 
simple. He would have liked religion to be a matter of technique, its 
principles available to all, like those of the Franklinian doctrine of 
electricity, and available for translation into some universal
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philosophical language. The central image of associationism, that of a 
mental machine obedient to universal laws, seems to promise fulfilment 
of such wishes. But the‘Image of the mind which emerges from 
associationist analyses - that of an eddy of mutually-interfering 
currents, only gradually freezing into maturity - decisively denies all 
such promises.
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CHAPTER FOUR.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND OF MATTER.
I am still attracted by everything in 
Hobbes: ... his distrust of concepts 
(what else is his 'materialism'?) ...
Elias Canetti, The Human Province
I.
Joseph Priestley - though his work displays an abiding concern 
with certain epistemological issues, with the acquisition of knowledge, 
the validation of evidence and the operations of the mind - was in many 
ways hardly a philosopher at all. Setting out, as he did from time to 
time, along the road of metaphysics or of logic, he could seldom resist 
a detour into the broader, better-illuminated highways of psychology and 
empirical science. In two books, Disquisitions Relating to Matter and 
Spirit and The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated, both 
published in 1777, he expounded very substantial philosophical doctrines
- materialism and determinism - but in both these works (and 
particularly in the former), the weight of the argument is borne largely 
by scientific and biblical scholarship. For Priestley, materialism is 
not a way of looking at the world: it is the world looked at in a 
particular way, and that way was already fully developed when he turned 
to these matters.
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The principle feature of this way of looking at the world is, of 
course, its aspiration to objectivity. This is why there is so much 
psychology in Priestley's philosophy: psychologism seeks to ground 
metaphysics and logic in the observable phenomena of human behaviour, so 
that no appeal need be made to anything that is not either objectively 
verifiable or at least capable of being inferred from the objectively- 
verifiable. Indeed Priestley was first provoked into philosophy by his 
discovery of a school of thought that seemed to him to deny the 
obligation to be objective. He addressed their work in 1774, in An 
Examination of Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles 
of Common Sense, Dr. Beattie's Essay on the Nature and Immutability of 
Truth, and Dr. Oswald's Appeal to Common sense on Behalf of Religion, 
and, in doing so, addressed some very important questions of 
legitimation. These questions arise directly from one of the central 
intellectual problems of his age: the problem of scepticism.
II.
Newtonian writers, such as those Priestley read as a youth, are 
resolute in their opposition to scepticism. They are to some extent 
fallibilists - 'after our most diligent labour,1 writes one, 'the 
greatest part of nature will, no doubt, for ever remain beyond our 
reach' - but, though prepared to admit that there are many things that 
they do not know, they are most reluctant to admit that the things they 
do know are not known certainly.1 And the things they do know are 
established by standards of experimental proof that are entirely 
pyschologistic. Their rivals the Cartesians, seeking to deduce a
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philosophy of nature from first principles rather than empirical 
evidence, need to point to objective relations between propositions in 
order to establish their theories. For the Newtonians, on the other 
hand, a valid experimental and inductive proof is a psychological 
relation between beliefs, which must be known to be certain beliefs. 
Proof of the phenomena is guaranteed by the 1lack of speculative bias1, 
'carefulness* and 'sagacity of the theoretician'Here their tone is 
unmistakably, though ambiguously, Baconian.
It is ambiguous because, though their cautious and humble methods 
are Baconian, their concept of knowledge is not Francis Bacon's, however 
much they might like it to be. There was no place in Bacon's 
philosophical schema for a theory of probability. He was devoted to 
mechanics, geometry and astronomy: the 'high' sciences, in which 
certainty was attainable, in which, according to his scholastic concept 
of knowledge, we seek scientia and not mere opinio. 'If we examine the 
texts of Bacon or Galileo,' says Ian Hacking, 'we find a world of first 
causes.'J But it was this very search for first causes that the 
Newtonians were proud to have abandoned: Newton had furnished not first 
causes but constant conjunctions. Better this, said his pupil Colin 
Maclaurin, than the methods of the Cartesians, who teach us 'the danger 
of setting out in philosophy in so high and presumptious a manner. ...'^ 
Their presumption lies in their belief that they know what first 
principles are and can deduce their philosophy from them. This is the 
sort of behaviour that earns them stem Newtonian rebukes like that 
which 'sGravesande administers. Let us confess our ignorance, he says,
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rather than allow ourselves to be led astray by 'an inmoderate desire of 
knowledge.' ^
The Newtonians responded in two ways to this failure to find any 
first or efficient causes. Firstly, they modified scientific standards 
just enough to allow Newtonian physics into Salomon's House whilst 
shutting the door firmly on all rivals. This they did chiefly with the 
aid of the fourth of Newton's Regulae Philosophandit those rules of 
philosophising with which he prefaced the third book of his Principia. 
Secondly, they emphasised those passages of Bacon's philosophy in which 
he recommended modesty, caution and a willingness to undertake long and 
arduous researches.
We have seen already that 1sGravesande's way of answering the 
sceptics was to point out that th£re is such a thing as moral, as well 
as mathematical, certainty. Pursuing this theme in the preface to his 
Mathematical Elements of Natural Philosophy, he launches into an assault 
on both scepticism and the fideism which it could be used to justify. 
There are those, he says, who 'argue that all our Knowledge of natural 
Things is imperfect; that our first Reasoning about them is built on 
Hypotheses; and that that Analogy, without which we can discover nothing 
in Physics, is to be referred to Hypotheses.'^ By 'analogy' here is 
meant induction; so the position to which 'sGravesande is opposed is one 
of some sophistication, assuming as it does that inductions, though 
necessary to science, must be hypothetical in character. Faced with 
this very serious challenge, 'sGravesande appended to his preface an 
'Oration Concerning Evidence', in which he discussed the issue of moral 
certainty.
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Here, following Locke very closely (though without once mentioning
him), he explains that, sceptical though we may be as to whether our
perceptions correspond with reality, we cannot doubt that we have these
perceptions nor that we are able to compare them one with another. Such
acts of comparison are the foundations of mathematical reasoning; they
supply us with a way of escape from that infinite regress with which
some sceptics taunt us, claiming that a criterion of truth needs a
criterion by which it can be known to be valid: 'the Evidence itself is
the desir'd Criterium of Truth; viz, the very Perception of the
Comparison between two I d e a s . N o  doubt attends mathematical
reasoning: we can know its objects fully and clearly because they are
ideas and not things. This is what Locke calls 'intuitive knowledge',
and the next stage beyond the intuitive is the demonstrative, in which
the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement between two ideas not
directly but by means of one or more intermediary ideas. According to
'sGravesande, mathematical reasoning is of this kind: complex quantities
are broken down into their constituent parts and then reassembled step
by step, every stage in the reassembly consisting of the comparison of
ideas whose agreement or disagreement can be recognised instantly and
intuitively. This method of analysis, comparison and composition may,
says 'sGravesande, be applied to all sciences: it is only in its subject
matter, quantity, that mathematics is unique; logic, ontology and
pneumatology all deal, like mathematics, entirely in ideas. Thus it is
that we are able to deduce the divine existence 'from such Notions, of
ru5
which the Mind can in^wise doubt; which follows from the Nature of 
them.' The existence of an eternal, self-existent and omniscient God is 
mathematically certain. Nothing else concerning external reality is
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demonstrable in this way, but we do know - and this is all we need to 
know - that there exists outside us an infinitely wise and truthful 
being through whose agency we acquire the idea of all other phenomena.^ 
Though we may indeed be misled in our interpretation of these phenomena, 
it would be contradictory ('sGravesande continues) for us to suppose 
that God, having given us the means of acquiring ideas of external 
reality, would allow these means, properly employed, to lead us into 
error. God granted to man the enjoyment and use of the material world 
and, to this end, provided him with the senses. Given this fact, we can 
see that he must have ordained also the use of testimony and analogy, 
for these are necessary auxiliaries of the senses.
Like Locke, 'sGravesande sets up a division between the mind and 
the world which only an assurance of God's trustworthiness can bridge, 
but the chief message of his Oration is entirely optimistic. The book 
which it prefaces deals not only with mechanics and celestial motion, 
traditional staples of the 'high' sciences, but also with such 'low' 
matters as fire and air. Like Hartley, 'sGravesande believes that the 
divine warrant extends beyond intuitive knowledge to these humbler 
realms and that they too can enjoy scientia rather than mere opinio.
Hume applies the term 'knowledge' only to pure mathematics; 'sGravesande 
argues that we are allowed a much more generous employment of it, and in 
order to do so he must considerably aggrandise certain other terms. 
Testimony, for example, was once a very modest sort of foundation for 
knowledge, but 'sGravesande values it as highly as Priestley is later to 
do.
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He maintains of course, that we can know only the properties of 
matter, not the substance underlying these properties. We cannot know 
even the extent of these properties - nor fix, limit, or determine them 
a priori - for in any body there may always be properties of which we 
know nothing. After further examination, we may ascend to general laws 
of nature, such as Newton's first and second laws of motion, but we can 
never know whether such laws flow from the essence of matter or are the 
result of non-essential properties with which God has endowed it. Given 
this necessary limitation to our hopes ('Natural Philosophy explains 
natural Phaenomena, i.e. treats of their Causes'), we must conduct our 
research under the guidance of Newton's Regulae:
RULE I
We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are 
both true and sufficient to explain their appearances.
RULE II
Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, 
assign the same causes.
RULE III
The qualities of bodies, which admit neither of intensification 
nor remission of degrees, and which are found to belong to all 
bodies within the reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the 
universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever.
But it is the fourth rule - which 'sGravesande, perhaps because he is 
working from the first edition of the Principia, does not mention - 
which is the most far-reaching in its implications:
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RULE IV
In experimental philosophy, we are to look upon propositions 
inferred by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very 
nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be 
imagined, till such time as other phenomena occur, by which they 
may either be made more accurate or liable to exceptions.
With the aid of this rule, Newton was able to effect that modification 
of scientific standards which legitimised his own theories and ruled out 
their rivals. Imre Lakatos argues that it was intended to make two 
particular kinds of criticism impossible: criticism of Newton's theories 
for their lack of self-evident foundations such as Descartes sought and 
criticism of them for contradicting a priori first principles. 
Furthermore, alternative hypotheses, which fit all the phenomena but 
have not been proven inductively, are ruled out.11
Newton himself was prepared to admit that induction could not 
provide demonstrations of general conclusions; but it was, he thought,
the best way of arguing which the Nature of Things admits of, and 
may be looked upon as so much the stronger, by how much the 
Induction is more general. And if no exceptions occur from 
Phaenomena, the Conclusion may be pronounced generally. But if at 
any time afterwards an exception shall occur from experiments, it 
may then begin to be pronounced with such Exceptions as occur.
The implication here appears to be that, though induction cannot be 
infallible, its failures will, if we have been careful and thorough, 
necessitate no more than minor, ad hoc, changes in our conclusions. 
Lakatos claims, with some reason, that the effect of all this was to 
encourage dogmatism, but he goes too far when he suggests that 'Newton's 
authority strangled the development of Newtonian philosophy in 
Britain.'1^ There were philosophers who, whatever formal honour they 
may have done Newton's name, ignored the fourth rule and speculated
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freely. Hartley was one of them and Priestley, his disciple, was 
another. It was this which earned them the opprobrium of more dogmatic 
Newtonians like Thomas Reid.
III.
'sGravesande's methodological remarks are interesting chiefly 
because, prefacing as they do a Newtonian textbook, they indicate the 
way in which Locke's philosophy and Newton's physics were presented as 
two aspects of the same intellectual project. They represent the 
orthodoxy of the age; 'sGravesande has upgraded testimony and analogy, 
but he has left the human mind where Locke left it: at the centre of its 
own awareness, cut off from the external world, conscious only of 
certain ideas which may or may not accurately represent that world. The 
Reverend Thomas Reid, Professor of Philosophy at King's College, 
Aberdeen, was troubled by these pictures of a mind exiled and set out to 
find the wellsprings of their inspiration.1^
The rot, he says, began with Descartes' philosophic scepticism.
Descartes professed (absurdly) to doubt all but that of which he could
<*S
be certain, and he decided at last that his own existence, confirmed sfc 
it was in the inference cogito, ergo sum, was the one thing that could 
not be doubted. 'But why,1 Reid asks, 'did he not prove the existence 
of his thought? Consciousness, it may be said, vouches for that. But 
who is voucher for consciousness?'1  ^ Of course, Reid continues, we - 
or, at least, the sane amongst us - do trust our consciousness, and we 
do so because our minds are so constituted that we must. But must we 
not also, for the same reason, take upon trust our own existence?
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Besides, why, if we have decided to doubt everything, should we not
doubt also the existence of a thinking subject? Once the sceptical
enterprise is under way, there is no stopping it. Once we have reached
the stage of doubting not only the existence of the rest of the world
but even our own, then all coherence is gone; we can have no guarantee
of anything. Descartes, Locke and the rest are better at creating
doubts than resolving them. Having once allowed entry to scepticism,
they cannot keep it out. Bishop Berkeley sought to secure the world
against it by abandoning belief in a material universe, leaving merely
the self and its ideas, but Hume destroyed even Berkeley's ghostly
edifice 'and drowned all in one universal deluge' simply by drawing out
the full implications of the philosophical system instituted by
Descartes and continued by Locke and Berkeley. It is a received
principle of his school 'that every object of thought must be an
impression or an idea - that is, a faint copy of some preceding
impression.' These ideas were originally intended to serve philosophy
as intermediaries between mind and world. Berkeley, however, showed
that appearances could be explained without the supposition of any world
at all; ideas and the mind would do. But now Hume has shown that not
even minds need be supposed to exist. Ideas, which 'seem to have
something in their nature unfriendly to other existences', have
colonised the whole universe: 'the mind is only a succession of ideas
16and impressions without any subject. ...
Reid has no quarrel with Hume's argument, only with his 
conclusions; and if sound argument leads to a conclusion as absurd and 
paradoxical as Reid believes Hume's to be, then there must be something
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wrong with the premises. Clearly it is the 'theory of ideas', the 
doctrine that the mind perceives the world only through the medium of 
ideas, that is at fault. Abandon that - yield to the commonsense belief 
that the mind perceives the world directly, without mediation - and mind 
and world are at once restored. It is, of course, rather easier to call 
upon people to yield to common sense than it is to argue for the 
abandonment of a sophisticated philosophical doctrine. Reid's Inquiry 
into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, published in 
1764, is dedicated chiefly to the latter, more difficult task: the work 
of his fellow countrymen James Oswald and James Beattie are shrill 
attempts to silence the clamour of scepticism and to reinvest common 
sense with the authority it is supposed once to have enjoyed. Beattie's 
book, at least, sold very well.1^
IV.
There is an air of smugness about Priestley's Examination of the 
philosophy of Reid, Beattie and Oswald. That intensity of gloomy 
speculation, that relentless reiteration of unanswerable questions which 
caused Hume to fancy himself 'in the most deplorable condition 
imaginable, environed with the deepest darkness,' and from which he 
could find refuge only in the pursuit of mundane pleasures, in
18
backgammon and good company, seems never to have troubled Priestley.
He is at ease in the world and, like a good Newtonian, knows what he 
knows. Reid and Hume are concerned with the status of our beliefs - 
both want to know whether any of them may be said to approach the 
condition of scientia - but, though Hume claimed to be applying Newton's
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methods, and though a similar claim may be made on Reid's behalf, 
Priestley is a better Newtonian than either of them.^ Unlike them, he 
is not really a metaphysician; he is not really interested in the 
logical status of claims to knowledge about the world nor in the 
structure of the arguments with which these claims are supported. 
Instead, he is interested in making claims and in arguing about them.
The explanations in the child's-guide-to-philosophy with which he 
condescendingly prefaces the Examination are, for the most part, 
genetic: they are accounts, couched in the language of associationist 
psychology, of how the mind acquires its ideas. Priestley is not 
interested in the justification of induction, only in the justification 
of particular inductions. And his standards of justification are, like 
those of the Newtonians, psychologistic: in the making of inductions our 
'experience' is instructed 'by much and varied experience. ' The 
result of this is that Priestley ends up saying something very like what 
he criticises Reid for saying: that we rely on induction because of the 
constitution of our minds.
Throughout the book his attention seems to be directed elsewhere 
than towards metaphysics;:it is the political implications of 
commonsense philosophy that principally concern him. This is apparent 
in his very first mention of the commonsense philosophers, in the 
preface to the third volume of his Institutes of Natural and Revealed 
Religion. Here, he says of 'Dr. Beattie, and especially of Dr. Oswald,' 
that they
represent common sense as superseding almost all reasoning about 
religion, natural or revealed. ... By the very concise process of 
an appeal to this principle, they say, that any man may fully 
satisfy himself concerning the truth of the being, the unity, the
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attributes, and the providence of God, and also of a future state 
of retribution and even ... of the evidences of Christianity. 1
Priestley objects that these truths concerning God are not primary 
truths: they are not self-evident, not to be assented to without 
intermediary and more certain propositions. As we have seen, he 
believed that the Christian life must be founded upon an act of free 
choice and that, to assist men in the making of this choice, God had 
given them reason and the clear light of the gospel. Reason is a 
faculty which we must cultivate, ever wary of the corruption to which 
prejudice and superstition expose it. No opinion or doctrine, though we 
may have inherited it from our beloved parents or respected teachers, 
can be immune from rational scrutiny. To abandon reason, to abrogate 
free choice in matters of theology, is to lay oneself open to the 
sinister blandishments of Popery and established religion. Oswald and 
the others, Priestley believes, are each of them turning a disdainful 
and obstinate back on this, the only way to true Christianity. Why, he 
asks, do they object to reasoning in religious matters? And his answer 
is Newtonian (it echoes Maclaurin’s treatment of his Cartesian 
adversaries): the Scottish philosophers object to reasoning in religion 
because they expect a kind or degree of evidence of which the subject 
will not admit. Their epistemology and Hume's criticism of miracles 
rest on the same error: a failure to place due weight on the importance
oo
of testimony.
Earlier Newtonians had pointed out that an excessive zeal for 
mathematical proof would engender scepticism and that superstition was 
the counterpart of scepticism; Priestley, following them, asserts in the 
Examination that Reid errs in seeking ’a plenary assurance’ for our
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beliefs about the world.^ Reid is troubled by Hume's discovery that, 
if ideas are our only objects of thought and have no existence except 
when we are conscious of them, then all objects of thought ('Body and 
spirit, cause and effect, time and space') have a merely discontinuous 
existence. This, says Priestley, is a 'pitiful sophism’ and yet from it 
is derived all Reid’s curious philosophy; for in order to avoid Hume's 
conclusions, he thinks it necessary to abandon Hume's theory of the mind 
and so to adduce the instinctive principles of common sense. But it 
would better if, abandoning the search for plenary assurance, he had 
contented himself ’with a reasonable degree of evidence’. The ’old 
hypothesis' could then have been retained: 'It suits every case of 
sensations and ideas; and therefore, according to the received rules of 
philosophizing, has a just claim to be admitted.'^
In fact, Priestley is able to salvage the old hypothesis only by 
ignoring the arguments that Reid set out to meet. We can be certain 
that the mind exists, he says, because 'mind' is merely the name by 
which we denote ’that to which certain powers and properties, ... as 
perception, memory, will, &c.’ of which we are conscious, belong. But 
this is to ignore Hume’s claim that in introspection we are conscious 
only of particular perceptions, memories, acts of will and so on. There 
is no way of getting to the powers of which Priestley speaks, let alone 
to the substance of which they are supposed to be properties. All we 
can know about is a bundle of properties. Nor does Priestley succeed in 
proving the continuous existence of ideas:
We have just the same reason to believe the identity of an idea, 
as that of an external body, or that of our own minds themselves. 
The idea that I have of my wife or child to-day as much resembles 
the idea I had of them yesterday, though some hours of sleep have 
intervened, as my house of to-day resembles my house of yesterday.
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In this case I only judge by the resemblances of my ideas of it; 
and if the ideas of my house yesterday and to-day were not the 
same, I should have no medium by which to prove the identity of 
the house.
As well as equivocating uneasily between 'my house* and *the ideas of my 
house*, this decidedly impatient argument is, of course, a petitio 
principii unless wife, child and house can be shown independently to be 
something other than ideas in the mind. Priestley believes that he has 
done this, though the task in rather perfunctorily performed.
The argument is similar to one of 'sGravesande's (ample proof of 
its Newtonian orthodoxy). 'sGravesande could provide no greater 
certainty than moral certainty that our ideas correspond to a real, 
external world; but he could, he believed, provide a mathematically- 
certain demonstration that there was a God, author of these ideas, who 
would not deceive us. Priestley arrives at similar conclusions. He 
cannot agree with what he takes to be Reid's basic claim - that to have 
perceptions is necessarily to believe that they are occasioned by 
external objects - nor will he allow that this claim, even if true, 
could be at all helpful. A belief, though ineradicable, may yet be 'no 
more than a prejudice, void of all real foundation.1 'sGravesande's 
point was that God was trustworthy; he had not given us mathematical 
certainty as to the existence of an external world, but he had given us 
the senses, testimony and analogy, which he intended should lead us to 
the truth. Priestley now proceeds to argue in a similar spirit. Why, 
he demands, should God have implanted in- us 'a peculiar instinctive 
principle, merely for the sake of giving us a plenary conviction' of the 
existence of the external world, when he has left us with 'a kind of 
faith far inferior to mathematical certainty in things of infinitely
-191-
more consequence’? Furthermore, Reid concedes that there are no 
arguments by which it can be shown that there could be no sensation 
without an external world. It follows, then, if Reid is right about our 
instinctive beliefs, that God has implanted in all of us an ineradicable 
tendency to believe something which may not be true. But if this is so, 
then our belief in the existence of an external world must, contrary to 
Beattie and Oswald, be ’essentially different from that kind of evidence 
by which we are satisfied that two and two are four, which is 
independent of any arbitrary constitution whatever.' By their own 
standards, then the commonsense philosophers are able to offer only
nf.
relative, and not absolute, truth.
But what reason can we have for believing in the existence of an 
external world? Whatever that reason may be, it cannot be ’a mere
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unaccountable persuasion', as Reid supposes it to be. ' And if we 
experience no such persuasion as this, then we should at least be 
prepared to entertain Berkeley's hypothesis that there is no external 
world and that all our sensations are occasioned by the divine mind. 
Priestley is ready to do so. He will not say that is impossible that 
Berkely is correct, but asks us to consider whether it is probable that 
he is correct; for the philosopher with two rival hypotheses before him 
'will consider which is the more probable as being more consonant to the 
course of nature in other respects.' We know that if half the world 
were to look into the night sky at the same moment, they would all 
report the same sight: moon, stars and planets. Now, it is possible 
that this happy agreement would have been produced by the direct action 
of the Almighty upon all those minds, but is is surely more probable
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that the heavenly bodies really do exist and that our minds are directly 
impressed by them:
It is sufficient evidence for this hypothesis, that it exhibits 
particular appearances, as arising from general laws, which is 
agreeable to the analogy of everything else that we observe, it 
is recommended by the same simplicity that recommends every other 
philosophical theory, and needs no evidence whatever; and I should 
think that a person must have very little knowledge of the nature 
of philosophy, who should think of having recourse to any other 
for the purpose.
This argument marks, in its various appearances, a fundamental
difference between Reid and Priestley. Reid fears that to give a simple
answer to a simple question may be to neglect a complex problem: but, as
Priestley sees it, the trouble with Reid's system is that it is 'loose
and incoherent'; it lacks 'the recommendation of that agreeable
simplicity, which is so apparent in other parts of the constitution of 
,29nature.
It seems obvious that at the back of Priestley's mind when he 
writes about simplicity and about its use in deciding against Berkeley's 
idealism is Newton's first rule: that no more causes should be admitted 
into our philosophy than are necessary to explain the effects. Of 
course, it is typical of Priestley that he should apply to metaphysics a 
methodological rule of empirical science; but Newton's influence ran 
deep and spread wide, and Reid too brings Newtonian philosophy to bear 
upon his metaphysics. He differs from Priestley in the use to which he 
puts this inheritance and, crucially, on the question of simplicity and 
the value of hypotheses.
Newton's bold disavowal of hypotheses - 'Hypotheses non fingo' - 
was frequently cited by his followers, but in fact his use of the term
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was neither straightforward nor invariably condemnatory, though it 
gradually became more so. However, despite his own use of hypotheses 
(most notably in the queries appended to his Opticks), he was taken at 
his word and his disciples followed faithfully with similar injunctions
on
of their own. The danger, they believed, was that a respectable use
of hypotheses - as postulates, axioms, demonstranda - might easily lead
to more questionable practices. It is certainly, true, says
'sGravesande, that, when in doubt, we may entertain hypotheses, and that
such hypotheses are not to be completely condemned (they may be of
service in reducing to rule and order a set of complicated facts or
observations), but they should never be 'of so great authority as not to
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be overturned by contradictory observations'. Reid, who had been 
trained in natural philosophy and was well-read in Newtonian literature, 
was no doubt familiar with these objections. He certainly believed that 
the infinitely-complex handiwork of the infinite author of nature was 
not to be fitted into the Procustean bed of mere mortal hypothesis. He 
could hardly deny the importance of simplicity, but he was inclined to 
think that it had been over-emphasised: 'There is a disposition in human 
nature to reduce things to as few principles as possible. ... This love 
of simplicity, and of reducing things to few principles, hath produced 
many a false system. ...' And of these none is simpler, he implies, and 
none more false, than that of the great Descartes; though even the still 
greater Newton, who virtuously confined himself to more modest
32conjectures, was 'misled by analogy and the love of simplicity.
But Priestley's Newtonianism was, in part at least, refracted 
through Hartley's prism; and Hartley, alone of our Newtonian authors, is
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undeceived by the form of the queries and unambiguous in his description 
of their content. He talks happily of Newton1s 'conjecture1, of his 
'hypothesis' and of what Newton 'has advanced concerning the existence 
of this aether, and the properties and powers he has ascribed to it in 
... the Questions annexed to his Opticks. ...' Hartley's chief concern 
is that, since we cannot help but form hypotheses, we should do so as 
clearly and as openly as possible so as to avoid confusion. He is quite 
prepared to entertain an hypothetical entity (such as the aether) even 
though its existence 'be destitute of all direct evidence', providing 
only that it will serve to account for 'a great variety of 
phaenomena.'
Clearly, neither the rule of simplicity nor a well-trained skill 
in hypothesising will be of much help to Priestley in his dealings with 
Berkeley's idealism. He believes that the supposition that the material 
world exists is the simplest of those available; but in his version this 
supposition requires three entities (God, matter and minds), whereas 
Berkeley needs only two (God and minds). Nor will it do to say that the 
realist hypothesis 'is recommended by the same simplicity that 
recommends every other philosophical theory' and by the fact 'that it 
exhibits particular appearances, as arising from general laws, which is 
agreeable to the analogy of everything else that we observe.' The 
analogy is obviously false: as Newtonian philosophers we try to explain 
particular appearances by general laws which may themselves be tried at 
the bar of empirical experience; but no law which is intended to explain 
all appearances can possibly have the same empirical legitimacy, since 
empirical experience is precisely what it purports to legitimise.
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Indeed, Priestley can hardly be said to have had an open mind on the 
subject when he takes for granted the very dichotomy which Reid has set 
out to attack and which he ought therefore to be defending; he begins 
the 'Introductory Observations' which preface the Examination with a 
description of what happens when 'our minds are first exposed to the 
influence of external objects. ...'
The trouble appears to lie in Priestley's impatience with 
metaphysical argument. When he talks of simplicity and of general laws, 
he is speaking the language of Newtonian science, not of metaphysics. 
Hartley (whose interests are, quite legitimately, psychological rather 
than philosophical) has at least some idea of how an hypothesis is to be 
subjected to empirical experiment; but when Priestley talks of 
Berkeley's 'hypothesis' he is not talking of anything that could be 
experimentally investigated, though he remains unwilling to bring to 
bear upon the question any more appropriate criteria.
V.
This unwillingness to speak any language but that of empirical 
science is most apparent when Priestley turns his attention to purely 
logical issues. His logic, like Hume's, is associationist and 
psychologistic: it is a descriptive science in which the operations of 
the mind are explained according to the laws of association. He 
distinguishes, as Hume does, between the logic of reason, of necessary 
truths, and the logic of understanding, of causal inference, but the 
distinction is not for him a strong one, though he begins by talking as 
if it were.^ He may talk about classes of truths, about 'kinds of
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propositions1 which, 'being very different in their natures, require 
very different kinds of proof'; but, in fact, it emerges that he 
believes that different kinds of proof make for (rather than are 
required by) a difference between kinds of proposition and that classes 
of truths are really varieties of mental association. He is quite clear 
as to what sort of science he takes logic to be: 'as the doctrine of 
syllogisms was deduced from observation on reasoning, just as other 
theories are deduced from facts previously known; so the doctrine of 
propositions and judgment was deduced from observations on the 
coincidence of ideas, which took place antecedent to any knowledge of 
that kind.' The terms of logic - 'propositions', 'syllogisms', 'truth'
oc
- 'are things of art and not of nature. J It is not clear that 
Priestley intends to proceed from this to the contention that logical 
connections are all merely psychological. Though he is apt to bracket 
necessary with contingent propositions, one of his arguments against the 
Scottish philosophers depends upon a clear distinction between these 
kinds of propositions; as we have seen, he argues that if Reid is right 
in thinking that our ineradicable belief in an external world may be 
mistaken, then Beattie and Oswald must be wrong in thinking that the 
existence of such a world is a self-evident truth, logically undeniable 
and, in Priestley's words, 'independent of any arbitrary constitution 
whatever.'
Nonetheless, the effect of his account of the two different kinds 
of propositions, like that of his account of testimony, is to weaken the 
division between scientia and opinio. By reducing all knowledge to 
psychology - explicable in mechanistic, associationist terms - he frees
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himself even more decisively than Hartley does from devotion to 
mathematics as the paradigm of certainty. Mathematics pays the penalty 
for this; its truths are reduced to the status of tautologies, the very 
fate from which Locke was anxious to save them.^
Locke, indeed, was generally less of an empiricist than Priestley 
in his account of the operations of the mind. Priestley thought him 
'hasty* in allowing for two sources of ideas other than the sensation: 
understanding and volition, two 'simple Ideas of Reflection*, under 
which are subsumed 'Remembrance, Discerning, Reasoning, Judging,
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Knowledge, Faith, etc. 7 It is better, Priestley, thought to suppose 
that all apparently automatic or pathological volitions are explicable 
in terms of association. Fear, for example, may be explained thus, and 
there is no need to have recourse, as Reid does, to an instinctive 
principle of fear. Nor need we follow Reid in invoking such principles 
to explain the involuntary motions of the body; for, since acquired 
skills, such as that of playing a musical instrument, may be carried out 
automatically while we are thinking of something else, we ought on 
Reid's principles to attribute each of them to 'some original 
instinctive principle', which would be absurd. This is unfair to Reid, 
who, as quoted by Priestley, talks only of unconsciously or 
involuntarily performed acts, not of the unconscious exercise of 
consciously-acquired skills. Priestley, however, clearly has his mind 
on Newton's first rule and the principle of simplicity: 'I think it more 
natural to say, that the association between the ideas of certain sounds 
and the cause of certain motions of the fingers become in time so 
perfect, that the one introduced the other, without any attention; the
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intervening express volitions, previous to each motion, having been
■50
gradually excluded,
Reid’s error - the error, Priestley believes, of all commonsense 
philosophers - is to ascribe to instinct what has been acquired by 
experience and to experience what belongs to reason and judgement. The 
source of this error is the assumption that, because we sometimes seem 
to infer cause from effect without the aid of any middle term, then the 
inference is not a logical one. But it is logical, Priestley maintains, 
though the middle term is so rapid in its flight that we do not notice 
the medium of proof that has brought us to judgement.
These two conclusions - that all inferences are logical inferences 
and that logic is merely the verbal description of pre-verbal or even 
non-verbal operations of the mind - point towards an interesting 
implication which he is very happy to embrace:
If a dog can form the same conclusion from the same premises, I 
would not scruple to say that the dog reasoned as well and as 
justly as myself. I see no reason to deny brute animals the power 
of reasoning concerning the objects about which they are 
conversant. They certainly act as consequentially, as if they 
reasoned. ^
We, however, possessing brains of greater capacity than theirs, have a 
greater store of ideas and associations. These associations will often 
check or interfere with each other, bringing us to that state of 
suspense which children seldom and brutes almost never know and which we 
call ’deliberation’; that period of quiescence during which the will 
determines how to act. It is when our minds are in this state that we 
can attend to their workings, and thus it happens that we have a concept 
of the mind and of its operations that must be unknown to children and
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animals; it is not the ability to reason that they lack but only the 
knowledge that they possess this ability. However, though 'every 
perception may be resolved into a proposition, and therefore necessarily 
suggests a truth', some truths are apparent only in propositional form 
and are not composed of raw perceptions. They can be understood only by 
a mind capable of abstraction and so cannot be available to children or 
to brutes. Propositions regarding the existence of an external world 
are of this kind; belief in such a world cannot be universal, as Reid 
and his colleagues take it to be.^
Reid maintains that, for reasons unknown, sensation compels a 
belief in the present existence of the apparent object of sensation, 
just as memory compels belief in the past existence of its objects. 
Sensation and memory (but not imagination) are 'original principles of 
belief1. Another such principle, essential to the conduct of life, 
appears to be that of induction: 'Antecedent to all reasoning, we have, 
by our constitution, an anticipation that there is a fixed and steady 
course of nature; and we have an eager desire to discover this course of 
nature.'^1 This is a good example of what most annoys Priestley in the 
commonsense philosophers' work: 'scepticism and credulity go hand in 
hand'; obvious truths are frivolously doubted and questions that need 
never have been asked are answered with a frantic multiplication of 
instincts and original principles:
It is really astonishing that any man should ask the question that 
Dr. Reid does here, 'How come we to believe that the future will 
be like the past?' it is certainly sufficient to say in answer to 
this. Have we not always found it to be so? and, therefore, how 
can we suspect the contrary? Though no man has had any experience 
of what,js future, every man has had experience of what was 
future.
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This is not what it so blatantly looks like: an example, more ingenuous 
than deceitful, of those many notorious attempts to use induction to 
‘ justify itself. Logic, being for Priestley a merely descriptive 
science, cannot be used to justify anything; nor, concerned as it is 
with experience, can it have any truck with the future. To ask 
rhetorically, as Priestley does, how we can suspect that the future will 
not be like the past is to suggest both that such doubts are logically 
inappropriate and (what for him amounts to the same thing) that we are 
not really capable of harbouring them. How, indeed, could we be capable 
of harbouring them when induction - repeated sensations generating 
simple ideas, simple ideas coalescing into associations - is perhaps the 
most basic of our mental processes? What Priestley is saying, then, is 
that induction is an ineradicable principle of the human mind. This is, 
of course, just what he criticises Reid for saying.
VI.
So Priestley's battle against Reid, Beattie and Oswald may be 
seen as a defence of objectivity and of a psychologistic logic against 
the fideists of the North. Reid is, of course, the opponent who most 
engages him philosophically; in dealing with the other two he is 
concerned, as he sees it, less with philosophical error, more with 
political bigotry (and the ratio of argument to exasperation drops 
accordingly; indeed, when he turns to Oswald he finds himself able to do 
little more than quote at length and then gasp with disbelief at what he 
has quoted). Consequently, his treatment of these two most clearly 
reveals his concern with issues of legitimation. It is Beattie and
-201-
Oswald, not the more capable Reid, who remind him that theological 
difficulties may beget metaphysical doctrines and that these 
metaphysical doctrines may have immediate political implications. Here 
Oswald, normally reckoned (and rightly) inferior even to Beattie in his 
philosophical abilities, emerges as the most significant figure of the 
three. His very flounderings bear eloquent testimony to a deep unease, 
even if he is unable quite to put his finger on what has gone wrong.
Oswald does try his hand at diagnosis, and his attempts all centre 
on the claim that reasoning has usurped the place of reason:
Ask the learned how we come to the knowledge of realities which 
are not the objects of sense, and all with one voice declare - by 
reason. If by reason they mean that faculty in man whereby he is 
distinguished from a brute or an idiot, they say well: but if by 
reason they mean, as they commonly do, the skill of investigating 
unknown truths by truths more known, which in the schools is 
termed logic, and in common conversation is called reasoning, they 
are much mistaken.
According to Oswald, the human mind possesses three great faculties - 
perception, judgement and reasoning - and, though the first two are, 
within their proper spheres, almost infallible, we have allowed 
reasoning, and that alone, to get above itself: ’too much can hardly be 
said to persuade mankind to put less confidence in the faculty of 
reasoning, and more in the faculty of judgment, than they commonly do.^
Oswald is never explicit as to what he means by 'reason' or by 
'primary truths’, though it is clear from his account that reason is the 
faculty by which primary truths are known and that primary truths are 
those truths which are known by reason.^ We are, however, furnished 
with a list of some of them: 'The being of matter, the connection 
between cause and effect, the power of self-determination in animals,
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the moral perfections and being of God, with the essential difference 
between virtue and vice. ...' This is a somewhat promiscuous catalogue 
for a man who is so stem about ' licentiousness in reasoning *, and the 
truths listed in it appear to be simply those which Oswald happens to 
hold to be self-evident. ° But they have, it seems, been drawn together 
thanks largely to Locke's mistaken zeal. Locke has tried to reconstruct 
them on a scaffolding of abstraction grounded in empirical foundations, 
'and such knowledge must needs be precarious.'^  It is precarious 
because Locke, by laying so much weight on those truths which may be 
discovered empirically, has encouraged scepticism with regard to those 
which cannot be discovered in this way. But it is man's ability to 
learn such truths that separates him from the animals. In ignoring it, 
philosophers have depicted man as an ingenious half-breed in whom are 
combined the sensory apparatus of the lower animals and a certain talent
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for ratiocination. 1 Hume - improving on Locke and seeking to explain 
the operations of the mind 'by the received doctrines of the connection 
and association of ideas' - has gone farther than anyone else in this 
regard, but he has ignored that 'vast treasury of truths' to which 
animals have no access: truths of art and science, of religion and 
morality, of politics, commerce and agriculture, which neither carrot 
nor stick will din into the animal mind.^
In all these errors of philosophy Oswald sees the effects of a 
very general bad habit: that of neglecting immediate truths and running 
after the more remote. Even the ancient philosophers were guilty of it: 
though all the phenomena of nature bear witness to the being of God, 
though there can be no serious doubt of this great truth, they would
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insist on logical demonstration, and when reasoning failed them they 
fell into confusion and doubt. The incarnation of the Son of God ought 
to have ended all this perplexity, but it did not (‘alas! the folly of 
the human heart broke out anew'), for now fresh disputes arose, the 
devotees of different ’incomprehensible doctrines' pronounced anathemas 
on each other, and, at last, as learning declined, all fell 'under the 
direction of crafty priests and interested statesmen. . ^
The question of the burden of proof - where it lies and how it is 
to be discharged - is one that naturally recurs at times when 
legitimation is at issue. It troubles Priestley as much as it troubles 
the Scottish philosophers; his condemnation of their demand for 'plenary 
assurance', for more proof than the nature of the subject will allow, is 
not far removed from what Oswald has to say about the perennial folly of 
the human heart. Oswald's trouble, though, is that he is quite 
incapable of focussing his complaints. By fingering almost all the 
human race through almost all its history as the victims of a foolish 
lust for ratiocination, he leaves the reader in some doubt as to how 
anything can be called 'common sense' which is apparently so uncommon.
He is better when he brings the story nearer to his own times. At the 
Reformation, he explains, half the Christian world, by reading the 
sacred books and appealing to them ('not reasoning from them,' Priestley 
notes drily), were persuaded to shake off 'the dominion of ignorance and 
error'. Unfortunately there now arose a new spirit of contrariety 
amongst the fledgling Protestants, their minds ’much exercised in 
subtile and hot disputes with the Romish doctors'; for, having split 
from Rome, they now split from one another, each sect defending its
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creed with as much subtilty as had before been used against the Pope.
And now arose the swarm of sceptics and atheists, who, claiming the same 
right as everybody else 'to sound unfathomable depths1, argued against 
religion as subtly as the religious had argued against each other. The 
disputatious friends of religion leapt to the defence of their beliefs, 
little realising, confident of victory as they were, that it would be 
much better for them not to give legitimacy to a debate they could never 
win.^1
Here, and in his refusal to countenance any proof of the existence 
of God, Oswald reads like one of those Pyrrhonian sceptics who used 
doubt as a weapon in defence of the Christian faith.^ No purported 
proof of God's existence, he maintains, can withstand rigorous 
examination, nor could any proof, no matter how perfect, induce a belief 
in that existence stronger than the conviction that common sense alone
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can provide. Yet he finds that even ministers of religion,
'forgetting the dignity of their character', have condescended to argue 
the case like lawyers in court: 'May not this be called, with great 
propriety a throwing cold water on religion? and ought it not to be 
considered as one of the chief causes of that insensibility to all its 
concerns, of which we so frequently c o m p l a i n ? H e  has, of course, 
identified a genuine problem. The situation he describes - in which, as 
he says, scepticism is the reigning folly of the age just as formerly it 
was credulity - is exactly that which had earlier been brought about by 
the attempts to refute deism. He appears even to have understood that 
the choice now lay between embracing controversy as a way of life or 
finding an authority that could forever put an end to controversy. The
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former choice (which, of course, was Priestley's) was unacceptable to 
him: in our present plight, he explains, candour will avail us little; 
not only is it seldom in evidence but it is quite useless in bringing a 
conclusion to disputes about religion. Instead, what is needed is 
authority, not the authority of the state ('for that is improper and 
dangerous') but that of the mind and its faculty of common sense.^
How, then, is common sense to prove its credentials? Here all the 
Scottish philosophers proceed along the same path, though with different 
degrees of agility. In the absence of any over-arching criterion by 
which the discoveries of common sense may be compared with those of 
reasoning or of received philosophy, it is necessary to show that we 
possess certain concepts which neither correspond to sensory impressions 
nor can have been deduced from them. If these concepts are 
indispensable to our understanding of the world, then they can admitted 
as witnesses friendly to common sense. Thus Oswald remarks that we have 
a concept of something underlying those qualities which the senses 
reveal to us: we have not only perceptions of hardness, of coldness, and 
so on, but also ideas of things which are hard, things which are cold, 
and these ideas cannot derived from the senses. Nor can the senses 
alone have taught us how to determine that one thing is bigger than 
another, for difference in size is no more an object of sense than are 
cause and effect, energy and power.
There are passages similar to these of Oswald's in Beattie as well 
as in Reid, and they are not alone in their concern. In fact, to 
Priestley they sounded so like his friend Richard Price that he was 
surprised (or said he was surprised) that none of them should have
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acknowledged a debt.-^ Like the Scottish philosophers, Price wants to 
demonstrate that our moral and intellectual intuitions are rational and 
objective, not merely the products of sentiment. Like them, he argues 
that sensation alone can give us no idea of substance, that only the 
understanding can reveal to us a distinction between the externals which 
are the objects of sense and the substance to which they adhere. 
Similarly he argues that our idea of solidity cannot derive from 
sensation, since included within it (and essential to it) is the idea of 
impenetrability, something of which we can have no actual experience. 
Other ideas too - those of inertial force, of duration, space, infinity, 
power and causation - can be seen to be the products of understanding, 
not of sense. In fact, the very business of comparing two ideas, which 
Locke takes to be the understanding's only function, involves the 
derivation of a new idea that cannot have come from the senses: to 
compare two angles and perceive their agreement is to become possessed 
of 'a new simple idea', that of their equality, which derives wholly 
from the understanding and is quite different from the idea of the two
C O
angles compared. ° Sensory perception cannot give us such new ideas 
because sense 'lies prostrate under its object'; it is a wholly passive 
faculty, ignorant of what affects it, incapable of judgement or 
knowledge. In fact, all that it can give us are particular impressions, 
not general ideas. It is entirely different from the understanding.^
The same concern, though more eccentrically expressed, is apparent 
in another work whose unacknowledged influence Priestley thought he 
could detect in the commonsense philosophy: Hermes: or a Philosophical 
Inquiry Concerning Language and Universal Grammar by James Harris. Here
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again - in a book which combines some quite sophisticated concepts with 
rudimentary argument and crude analysis - we find a writer concerned to 
ground ideas in something more objective than sensation. Harris tries 
to upend the empiricist axiom that there can be nothing in the mind that 
was not first in the senses. The mind, he insists, is not a cistern 
passively receiving ideas; on the contrary, ideas are so numberless and 
transient that the mind can do nothing with them until it has held them 
and fixed them. This task falls to one of its most important faculties, 
1 IMAGINATION or FANCY1. ^  Once the imagination - a cool air hardening 
the impression on the wax - has done its work, the collective and 
connective powers of the soul are able to do theirs, and what they do 
cannot be done by any of the five senses. Which of the five could 
perceive, say, 'the Union of the Odour and the Figure'? Plainly, this 
could be done only by some faculty more exalted in the hierarchy of 
powers than any of them. The fact is that the senses cannot yield real 
knowledge: 'SCIENCE and REAL KNOWLEDGE' can only be 'of that which is 
general and definite and fixed'. We do not proceed, as the empiricists 
suppose, from particulars to generalities, from sense to abstraction; 
forms intelligible are prior to forms sensible, declares Harris (running 
his Platonist colours up the mast), and particulars cannot be known 
until they are subsumed under general categories like 'man' or 
'animal'.^1 For thought, like language, must be conversant with the 
general and the eternal before it descends to 'that infinitude of 
Particulars, which are for ever arising, and ceasing to be.'
In their various ways, and with very different degrees of success, 
all these writers reveal a concern with the central flaw in Locke's
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scheme: that, however refined and improved, it will not do what Hartley 
and Priestley want it to do: it will not give us a machine so fashioned 
that we can feed in mere sensations at one end and expect to get out at 
the other a sophisticated product that compares ideas, thinks new 
thoughts and harbours passions, desires and aversions. Unfortunately, 
though, the critic can offer little to anyone whose heart is set on such 
a machine. The blueprints are so impressive - so svelte and elegant, 
assuming neither innate ideas nor a teleological concept of reason - 
that any alternative is likely to seem a shoddy piece of wishful 
thinking. Oswald, it is true, tries to make his appeal to common sense 
look like an appeal to empiricism: a call to moralists and theologians 
to follow the physicians and the natural philosophers in giving up 
reasonings, hypotheses and general principles in favour of patient 
observation. He insists, moreover, and with some force, that he is 
talking about knowledge and not about mere feelings.00 But to someone 
as devoted to objectivity as Priestley is, feelings are exactly what 
Oswald appears to be talking about. All might have been well, Priestley 
suggests, if the Scottish philosophers had assumed as elements of common 
sense only indubitable, self-evident propositions, the axioms from which 
all thought must proceed (he appears not to distinguish between the 
axiomatic and the self-evident); but they have gone farther than this: 
they have called 1 sense1 what has always been called 'judgement *; they 
have sought to introduce particular propositions as axioms, and this not 
on Lockean grounds of the agreement of ideas but merely because of 'some 
unaccountable instinctive persuasions, depending on the arbitrary 
constitution of our nature, which makes all truth to be a thing that is 
relative, to ourselves only, and consequently to be infinitely vague and
precarious.1 Thus truth, once independent and absolute, acquires 
inverted commas. No longer can there be any appeal to reason, only to 
the feeling that something is true and incontrovertible. Conceit and 
arrogance will reign under the suzerainty of prejudice. Discussion will
be ended and opponents treated insolently, as persons of no common
64sense.^
In fact, this reliance upon the merely subjective will be no less 
pronounced even if the writ of common sense is allowed to run no further 
than first principles: 'who is to tell us what are first principles?' 
asks Priestley, fearing, as an associationist, that too often first 
principles turn out to be habits of belief early acquired.^ The 
Papist, he notes, supposes implicit faith in the church to be as much a 
first principle as faith in God, and it is a principle that acts upon 
his deluded mind as irresistibly as any of Beattie's or Oswald's do upon 
theirs'. (Frequently throughout the Examination Priestley finds that 
Rome provides him with an absurdity at which his reductio can be aimed; 
if commonsense philosophy can justify the excesses of the Harlot, then, 
we are encouraged to infer, that philosophy must be objectionable 
indeed.) While there is nothing particularly Protestant about this - 
Catholics as well as Protestants are called upon to submit to God's will
- there are clear parallels between the dangers of this philosophy, as 
Priestley saw them, and those of the Calvinism he had abandoned. For 
the Calvinist everything that matters in human life depends upon a 
faculty, grace, with which very few are b o m  and which cannot be 
acquired or even refined by human effort. Grace and common sense both 
leave the word of God in a somewhat marginal position. On the one hand,
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if grace and grace alone is necessary for salvation, neither God nor 
anyone else can tell us anything pertinent to the case. On the other 
hand, if all our moral obligations are, as Oswald says, 'objects of 
simple perception and judgment to men of sense', it is again difficult 
to see what room there can be left for God's word.^
Now, common sense is by definition and (unlike grace), the 
inheritance of the great majority of mankind; but the appeal to common 
sense, as Priestley sees it, is similar to the appeal to grace in that 
it puts an end to all argument and to all striving. The cause of truth 
is ill-served by such resignation: it would be better served by 'a 
persuasion the very reverse of Dr. Beattie's, viz. that the faculty by 
which we perceive truth is the furthest possible from any thing that 
resembles a sense: that every misfortune we do, or may labour under, 
with respect to judgment is naturally remediable, and consequently that 
it depends upon ourselves, as far as any thing of practical importance 
is concerned, to be as wise, judicious, and knowing, as any other person 
whatsoever.' M s  tendency of both Beattie and Oswald to abjure all 
rational argument in religion seems to open the way 'for all the 
extravagances of credulity, enthusiasm, and mysticism'; and where 
Priestley finds these he seldom fails to find a spirit of persecution 
too:
... I am afraid we shall find these new principles extending their 
authority farther than the precincts of metaphysics, morals, 
religion, Christianity, and protestantism, to which they have 
hitherto been confined. Papists may begin to avail themselves of 
them for the support of all those doctrines and maxims for which 
the powers of reason had proved insufficient; and politicians 
also, possessing themselves of this advantage, may venture once 
more to thunder out upon us their exploded doctrines of passive 
obedience and non-resistance. For having now nothing to fear from 
the powers of reason, and being encouraged by the example of grave 
divines and metaphysicians, they may venture to assert their
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favourite maxims with the greatest confidence; appealing at once 
to this ultimate tribunal of corranon sense, and giving out their 
own mandates as the decisions this new tribunal.
In other words, the spread of controversy throughout the intellectual 
world is not what Oswald takes it to be, a regrettable epiphenomenon of 
the Reformation, but rather the Reformation's greatest gift to 
humankind. Now nothing can be admitted as true but what is proved by 
sound reason. This was an issue that touched Priestley deeply; he was, 
he said - thinking perhaps of the Church under whose civil establishment 
he laboured or of the arbitrarily sovereign God who had so darkened his 
childhood - 'no friend to implicit faith, because, perhaps, it has been
LI Q
no friend to me. ...'
VII.
For all that Priestley writes sometimes as though he were prepared 
to admit certain general propositions as self-evident and indubitable, 
it is clear that for him no propositions are really to be allowed this 
privilege. Nor is there any reason why they should be if logic is 
merely a description of the operations of the mind. Moreover, it is 
possible to look upon matter itself in the same egalitarian light, and, 
once Priestley had realised this, he was off on the road to materialism.
Since the publication of Locke's Essay, the philosophical world 
had been haunted by his suggestion that, for all we know to the 
contrary, God might have given to matter the faculty of thought. It 
seemed to many to bring with it intimations of deism, of pantheism, even 
of atheism, and it was to be handled only with caution. 7 But caution 
was never prominent among Priestley's intellectual virtues and he rather
-212-
casually pulls out this dangerous weapon in the course of his quarrel 
with Reid. The provocation is Reid's sly version of that argument which 
all three Scottish philosophers, as well as Richard Price and James 
Harris, use against Locke's empiricism. Reid points out that we usually 
suppose our sensations to be given to us by the qualities of material 
bodies. But, though we have sensations of size, of shape, of motion and 
of other qualities, we have no sensations of the bodies in which these 
qualities are said to inhere. Nevertheless, we certainly have an idea 
of these bodies, and so the 'ideal' philosophy of Locke, Berkeley and 
Hume is faced with a dilemma (' an experimentum crucis, by which the 
ideal system must stand or fall'): either our ideas of extension, shape 
and motion have been derived from sensation or they have not. If they 
have not, then the ideal philosophy must fall because its dearest tenet 
is that all our ideas of the external world derive from sensation. If, 
however, these ideas have been derived from sensation, then the ideal 
philosophy stands and its claim that the 'material world, if any such 
there be, must be the express image of our sensations' is upheld. But 
the cost will have been high, for we are now back where Berkeley left 
us: with nothing to depend on but our sensations and with no way of 
knowing whether there is anything to which these sensations 
correspond.^
Priestley is not at all perplexed. He suggests that Reid has been 
'misled in the very foundation' of his argument by the philosopher's 
habit of referring to ideas as the images of external things. Such 
language, he explains patiently, is merely figurative; it means not that 
actual shapes of things are impressed on the mind but that the brain
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receives sense impressions 'and that between these impressions and the
sensations existing in the mind there is a real and necessary though at
present an unknown connection.' Of course, Priestley - eager for
physical rather than metaphysical argument - has missed Reid's point.
The distinction which he makes between impressions (the effects of the
external world on the organs of sense) and sensations (the effects of
on
these impressions the brain) is the very one that Reid will not 
allow, and cannot allow because he is questioning its validity. 
Priestley, to whom the distinction is fundamental, can only assume that 
Reid has made a silly mistake; if Reid can believe that mental images of 
things must resemble the things themselves, then he might as well deny 
'that the sound of a musical string is caused by the stroke of a 
plectrum ... because he can perceive no proper resemblance between the 
cause and the effect, between the sound that is produced and the shape 
of the thing or things by which the sounds are made. ...' Yet it is 
clear, Priestley contends, that the sound is a necessary and not an 
arbitrary sign of the stroke of the plectrum, clear too that such sounds 
vary as the bodies which produce them vary.^1
Now, the materialists of more recent times those who contend 
that mind and brain are one and the same thing - have used an argument 
similar to this but different in one single important respect. Thus 
Paul K. Feyerabend asks:
Is not the seen table very different from the felt table? Is not 
the heard sound very different from its mechanical manifestations 
(Chladni's figures; Kundt's tube; etc., etc.,)? And if despite 
this difference of appearance we are allowed to make an 
identification, postulating an object in the outer world (the 
physical table, the physical sound), then why should the observed 
difference between a thought and the impression of a brain process 
prevent us from making another identification, postulating this
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time an abject in the inner (material) world, viz. a brain 
process?'^
But Priestley, unlike Feyerabend is not seeking to establish the 
identity of two sets of phenomena, auditory and physical, mental and 
material; he is suggesting merely that one such set is the cause of 
another. This cause must operate somewhere, and so Priestley has 
decided that it must operate in the mind; mysteriously if the mind is 
spiritual, explicably if, 'as Locke and others suppose', matter is
70
embued with sentient power. Refusing to allow that mental images must 
resemble their objects, he has avoided what the modem materialist U.T. 
Place calls the 'phenomenological fallacy'; refusing to identify 
sensations and brain processes, he has fallen into something very like 
it. According to Place this fallacy 'is the mistake of supposing that 
when the subject describes his experience, when he describes how things 
look, sound, smell, taste, or feel to him, he is describing the literal 
properties of objects and events on a peculiar sort of internal cinema 
or television screen. ...' This Priestley is not doing, but he is 
making just that assumption which Place takes to be the basis of the 
phenomenological fallacy: the mistaken assumption that because things 
are known to us only by the physical sensations that they produce in us, 
the we must always begin with these physical sensations and infer from 
them the real properties of things. Rather, Place argues, it is only 
when we have learned to recognise the real properties of things that we 
can leam to describe our consciousness of them. This is, of course, 
very like what Reid says.
In Priestley's account, our growth to full consciousness is indeed 
an education in the making of inferences. We are told that the child
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begins life without any notion of a difference between the external 
world ’and the immediate objects of his contemplation', that only by 
attending to the phenomena of sensation does he come to learn that it is 
not things themselves but only 'some affection of his senses, occasioned 
by them' that are really these immediate objects • Believing this - 
taking it, indeed, not merely for truth but for truth universally 
acknowledged - Priestley is much puzzled by Reid's scepticism on the 
matter. 'It is very probable,' says Reid, 'that the optic nerve is an 
instrument of vision. ...'; to which Priestley replies that, if we can 
be so cautious about such a thing as this, then we might just as well 
say that feet and legs are only very probably the instruments of 
walking.^ But Reid's meaning is quite clear and it is neither perverse 
nor paradoxical, as we find if we turn to the rest of the passage from 
which Priestley quotes. Reid is alluding to the received doctrine that 
impressions are made by rays of light on the retina and carried thence 
by the optic nerve 'to some part of the brain ..., called the sensorium' 
(eighteenth-century equivalent to the internal cinema of which Place 
speaks), where the mind, 'which is supposed to reside there', perceives 
them. He points out that optical investigation has carried us as far as 
the retina - we know that without a retina there can be no vision - and 
that it can carry no further: we can assume that the optic nerve is an 
instrument of vision, that it receives some sort of impression from the 
picture on the retina, but we can know nothing of what this impression 
is. We can, however, say that it is not in the least probable that the 
mind perceives the images on the retina, nor is it in the least probable 
that there is an image in either the optic nerve or the brain; the image 
on the retina is formed by rays of light, and whatever impulse might be
conveyed thence cannot, whether it be the motion of a subtle fluid or 
the vibration of the optic nerve's fibres, resemble the object which is 
before the perceiving mind. Furthermore, it is no easier to understand 
how the mind could perceive images in the brain than to understand how 
it can perceive objects in the external world: 'In a word, the manner 
and mechanism of the mind's perception is quite beyond our 
comprehension. ...' Such are Priestley's preconceptions that, though he 
quotes much of this argument, he completely fails to see the point of 
it. He is quite devoted to that analogy between the behaviour of bodies 
and the behaviour of minds which Reid recognises as the false and 
treacherous foundation upon which the theory of ideas has been built.''
The gist of Reid's argument is that to postulate a sensorium is to
explain nothing, that it is merely to remove the problem to a point
further within the skull. Priestley, who seems to take the sensorium's
existence for granted, concentrates almost entirely on what Reid has to
say about the optic nerve. Satisfied that eye, retina and optic nerve
are necessary for vision because there can be no vision without them,
satisfied also that the brain must be necessary for perception because
disturbance of the brain causes disturbance of perception, he is
satisfied that these conclusions are not made less certain by our
inability to say exactly how the brain serves as instrument of 
7ftperception. °
Later on in the Examinations, in the appendix devoted to Harris' 
Hermes, Priestley provides a summary of the position to which his 
defence of the theory of ideas has brought him:
nothing is more evident, than that the principle which we call
mind, whether it be material or immaterial, is of such a nature,
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that it can be affected by external objects, and that its 
perceptions correspond to the state of the corporeal system, 
especially that of the brain. And there is the same reason to 
conclude that this affection is natural and necessary, as that the 
sound of a musical chord is the natural and necessary effect of 
the stroke of a plectrum. If my eye be open, and a house be 
before me, I as necessarily perceive the idea of a house; or if 
fire be applied to any part of my body, I as necessarily perceive 
the sensation of burning, as sound follows the stroke above 
mentioned. If a due attention to these facts obliges to alter our 
notions of mind, and materialism, the received rules of 
philosophising compel us to do it. ...
It was in this passage that a contemporary commentator found the first 
intimations of materialism in Priestley's thought.^ But here 
Priestley's materialism is encumbered, as it always would be, by his 
firm belief in the sensorium. Perceptions are said to 'correspond to 
the state of the corporeal system' - they are not identified with any 
such state - and, though the relation between brain-processes and 
perceptions may be one of cause and effect, it cannot be one of 
identity. We are said to perceive not the house but 'the idea of a 
house'. And we do not have ideas: we perceive them. It is obvious from 
this that perception is going to remain in Priestley's account a 
mysterious business and that structure alone is not going to be enough 
for his purposes. He needs to invoke a power of perception, and he is 
persuaded that this power will somehow be less occult if it is said to 
reside in matter rather that* in spirit. Hence his enthusiasm for 
Locke's suggestion (an enthusiasm very clearly misplaced: Locke - who is 
concerned with epistemology, not with a theory of matter - says merely 
that, for all we know, God may have added to matter the power of 
thought).80
There is nothing anachronistic in criticising Priestley for his 
belief in the sensorium: it may not have been a universal belief in his
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time, but it was certainly one which his contemporaries found it very 
difficult to escape. For example, we meet it in the Baron d'Holbach's 
System de la Nature, an essay in materialism too secular for Priestley's 
tastes (it was, he said, 'considered by many persons as a kind of bible
q-j
of atheism'01). d'Holbach deals with the five senses one by one, and 
each receives the same treatment: first a bodily process is described; 
then it is explained that this process causes perceptions in the brain 
and that from these perceptions the brain breeds ideas; finally, we are 
told that 'this' (presumably the entire process) constitutes, forms, 
causes, or may explain (the word differs from case to case) the sense in 
question. Thought, d'Holbach concludes, 'is nothing more than the 
perception of certain modifications which the brain either gives itself,
QO
or has received from exterior objects.,OA This assumption, that thought
*
is not a process in the brain but the perception of such a process, 
takes its rise, perhaps, from some residual dualism too deep-rooted to 
be cast off or even noticed. It may also derive from Locke's pervasive 
influence; certainly Hobbes, writing before Locke, has few difficulties 
of this sort and is therefore able to wield an altogether more robust 
materialism. Without equivocation or hesitation he can explain that 
sense 'is some internal motion in the sentient', that is is, by formal 
definition, ’a phantasm, made by the reaction and endeavour inwards from
OO
the object, remaining for the same time more or less.'OJ Sense, we 
note, is the phantasm - it is not the cause of the phantasm or the act 
of perceiving it - and the phantasm is solely a matter of mechanics.
This mechanics, a simple business of push and pull, is cruder than the 
physiology of vibrations, but it plays its part in an account of
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perception that is both more clear than Priestley's and in some measure 
more sophisticated.
Priestley returned to the subject in 1775, the year after the 
Examination. Convinced that to know Hartley was to agree with him, he 
had decided that the best way to 'divert the attention of the more 
sensible part of the public from such an incoherent scheme as that of 
Dr. Reid, and to establish the true science of human nature,' would be 
to make Hartley's work better known.Accordingly, he published his 
own edition of the Observations on Man and with it three prefatory 
essays in which the editor told the reader unequivocally what he was 
'rather inclined to think' about the relation between matter and mind.
The Hartley who appears in Priestley's edition is slimmer than the 
original, less cosmic in his interests, more concentrated on the single 
issue of the mechanism of the human mind. Persuaded that only the 
doctrine of vibrations has given rise to the rumour that Hartley's 
system is 'difficult and intricate', Priestley has dispensed with the 
doctrine. But, though convinced, and rightly, that vibrations are not 
logically essential to associationism, he is sufficiently attached to 
them himself to discuss them at length in the first of his three essays. 
This begins as an exercise in Lockean orthodoxy: the mind, we learn (or 
rather we do not learn, since it is all so familiar), contains ideas and 
sensations which can have come only from the external world and so must 
have been conveyed thence to the mind by the external sensory nerves.
But the nerves and the brain are material things, while the mind, ex 
hypothesi, is not, so Priestley is faced with a problem. He seems 
willing to allow that, ignorant though we are and must probably remain
about the nature of the mind, we may satisfy the demands of science if 
we are able to indicate 'a probable affection of the brain' which will 
correspond to the sensations and ideas of which we are conscious. (He 
always assumes, of course, not that we have sensations and ideas but 
that we are conscious of them; so consciousness itself remains 
unexplained.) Even this, he confesses, is to make everything except 
perception depend upon matter; and matter can take on even this last 
function if Locke was right and God has endowed it with the power of 
thought. So it is that Priestley now feels able to say that he is 
'rather inclined to think' that man does not consist of two principle so 
different from each other as matter and spirit, that perception and the 
other mental powers are the products '(whether necessary or not) of such 
an organical structure as that of the brain', and that to have recourse 
to one inmaterial principle of explanation is merely to confess our
QC
ignorance.
It was this passage that Priestley, enlarging on the theme two 
years later in his Disquisitions Concerning Matter and Spirit, saw as 
marking a decisive stage in his conversion to materialism. He became 
convinced by it that, 'if we suffer ourselves to be guided by the 
universally acknowledged rules of philosophizing', we will find 
ourselves obliged to postulate in man nothing but a material body.00 Of 
course, he still would not equate perception with processes in the 
brain, and in this new work he put the issue very succinctly: 'It is a 
very gross mistake of the system of materialism to suppose ... that the 
vibrations of the brain are themselves the perceptions.' He points out 
that we can easily conceive of vibrations unaccompanied by perceptions,
-221-
and so - ignoring the possibility that all perceptions may be vibrations 
even though not all vibrations are perceptions - he concludes that, 
since the two cannot be identical, we must suppose that the brain has 
not merely a vibrating power but 'has superadded to it a percipient or 
sentient power, like wise; there being no reason that we know why this
07
power may not be imparted to it.
As Priestley admits, he has 'the universally acknowledged rules of 
philosophizing' to thank for these conclusions. But his use of them is 
contentious. Hitherto, he sayS, they have been used as guides only in 
the investigation of 'the causes of particular appearances in nature'; 
in the investigations of 'the most general and comprehensive principles 
of human knowledge', they have been disregarded and often, indeed, 
contradicted. This seems strangely inconsistent to Priestley. For his 
part, he says, he will adhere to the Regulae rigorously and uniformly in 
all his investigations, and he requires that his reasoning be tried by
00
no laws but these. 0 But it is by no means clear that so generous an 
employment of these rules was what their author intended. To each of 
them Newton appends a gloss which serves to establish their jurisdiction 
quite precisely. Thus the second rule - which, following from the 
first, enjoins us to assign, 'as far as possible', the same causes 'to 
the same natural effects' - is illustrated by a number of examples 
carefully chosen: 'respiration in a man and in a beast; the descent of 
stones in Europe and in America; the light of our culinary fire and of
o n
the sun; the reflection of light in the earth, and in the planets.,oy 
This is particularly important in view of the uses to which Priestley 
puts the second rule. For example, he argues that since resistance has
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been shown in most cases to result from a power of repulsion, and in no 
case from anything else, the 'rules of philosophizing oblige us to 
suppose, that the cause of all resistance is repulsive power. ...' But 
it is surely stretching a point to suggest that the resistance of one 
magnet to another and the resistance to pressure of a solid object are 
the same effects in exactly the same way that the falling of a stone is 
the same effect in Europe as in America.^0
But though the Principia gives no warrant for a use of the Regulae 
as wide as this, it is difficult to see how Priestley could have behaved 
otherwise. Entrapped, like 'sGravesande, within his Lockean ego, he 
nonetheless believes that testimony and the senses will furnish him 
with information as reliable and as useful as he needs about the outside 
world. Such information can, of course, be information about 
appearances only - we can know properties but not the substance that 
underlies them, we can know the laws of nature but not whether these 
laws are essential or are imposed by God - and, this being so, we 
naturally need principles of parsimony that will discipline our 
scientific ingenuity. The Regulae, extended by Priestley to realms 
where they have not before held sway, provide these principles.
As reported by Priestley, the conventional view of matter and
spirit makes of them entities so different from each other that there
can be no interaction between them. Matter has properties but no
powers; it has length, breadth, thickness, and impenetrability, but it
is inert and sluggish, incapable or moving itself. Spirit, on the other
hand, has none of the properties of matter: it is quite without
-to
extension or indeed any relation at all^space, but it is capable of
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self-motion and it possesses powers of intelligence and perception.
Such a concept of spirit, Priestley believes, could be the product only 
of an abstruse and mistaken metaphysics. The truth, to which mature 
consideration guided by the rules of philosophising will lead us, is 
otherwise. It will be agreed that every material object, solid and 
impenetrable as they all appear to be, must be of some shape or other.
It will be further agreed that no such body could keep its shape unless 
there was some mutual attraction between its component parts, some power 
keeping them either contiguous to or at a certain distance from each 
other. This power of attraction, then, is 'essential to the actual 
existence of all matter. ...' Without it, no body would be compact and 
impenetrable, even if its component parts were placed close together.
In fact, as Priestley argues, with copious scientific illustration, it 
is very difficult to bring bodies into contact with each other, and this 
leads him to conclude that, just as bodies are given coherence by the 
mutual attraction of their parts, so they are given impenetrability by 
the repulsion of their parts.^ If, then, it is difficult to bring 
bodies into even apparent contact with each other, and if neither they 
nor their component parts can be shown ever to be in actual contact, and 
if these phenomena can be ascribed only to a power of repulsion, then 
'the established rules of philosophizing above recited1 leave us with no 
alternative: we are obliged to ascribe all resistance, all solidity and 
all impenetrability to such powers.
Whence come these powers? If we argue that they come from God, we 
will be forced to conclude that there is in the universe no matter 
distinct from God and his powers. 'A strange opinion,' comments
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Priestley, who believes that 'it is certainly more agreeable to the 
rules of philosophizing to consider all the constant effects of any 
substance as produced by powers properly belonging to that substance, 
whether they be necessarily inherent in it, or corranunicated to it.
09
...'^ But if we should consider as essential to matter those powers 
which it displays, we should also be careful that we attribute to it 
only those properties which appearances reveal it to possess. Applying 
this rule, we find that we can attribute to matter only powers of 
attraction and repulsion arranged in concentric spheres:
The principles of the Newtonian philosophy were no sooner known, 
than it was seen how few, in comparison, of the phenomena of 
nature, were owing to solid matter, and how much to powers, which 
were only supposed to accompany and surround the solid parts of 
matter. It has been asserted, and the assertion has never been 
disproved, that for any thing we know to the contrary, all the 
solid matter in the solar system might be contained within a nut­
shell, there is so great a proportion of void space within the 
most solid bodies. Now when solidity had apparently so very 
little to do in the system, it is really a wonder that it did not 
occur to philosophers sooner, that perhaps there might be nothing 
for it to do at all, and that there might be no such a thing in 
nature.
This opinion, Priestley adds, is not his alone. He cites a long passage
from his History of Vision in which he had referred to the theories of
John Michell and of Roger Joseph Boscovich, who regarded atoms as
ifAaaM-ttxda position
geometrical points, having no position but only magnitude and surrounded
by alternating spheres of attraction and repulsion. No doubt he
intended with these references to divest his doctrine of a little of its
aura of novelty and eccentricity. The Abb4 Boscovich, however, a pious
Jesuit, was much put out to find his work used as a prop for the
'abominable, detestable, and impious' system of materialism. His
remonstrances, addressed to Lord Shelburne, provoked a reply in which
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Priestley explained that materialism was the only doctrine 'consonant to 
the genuine system of revelation' and that the 'vulgar hypothesis' was 
the foundation of the worst corruptions of Christianity and especially 
those of the antichristian and abominable Church of Rome. 'I am,' he 
said in conclusion, 'not without respect, but with much less than 
formerly. ...' This does not appear to have smoothed things over.^
The unmannerly tone of Priestley's reply to Boscovich indicates in 
some measure where his real interests lie and why his Disquisitions are 
so different to Boscovich's Theoria. Whereas BosjG^vich argues with 
subtlety and thoroughness towards a comprehensive physical law which he 
then proceeds to apply to mechanics and to physics (respectfully 
relegating God and the soul to an appendix), Priestley takes just 
twenty-three pages to overthrow, to his own satisfaction, the whole 
established concept of matter. None of his arguments is mathematical; 
little in them depends upon the findings of the natural sciences. He 
knows what he wants - not just a theory of matter but a theory of matter 
which will allow for a material mind - and he believes that now he has 
it. For, he argues, if matter alone is capable of supporting all known 
human properties, then to suppose a mind that is anything but material 
is to multiply causes without necessity in contravention of the Regulae. 
The known properties of matter are, he says, attraction, repulsion and 
extension. Mind possesses all these and two others: perception and 
thought. These, however, are 'never found but in conjunction with a 
certain organized system of matter. ...', and so we can conclude (the 
implicit reference here must be to the first rule) that they 
'necessarily exist in, and depend upon, such a s y s t e m . P r i e s t l e y
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needs only to show that matter may possess what he calls ’the power of
simple perception' (which, very significantly, he defines as ’our
consciousness of the presence and effect of sensations and ideas').
Given this power, all the other faculties of the mind 'will admit of a
satisfactory illustration on the principles of vibration, which is an
affection of a material substance.' Thus he will not brook any
objection to his theory based upon some notion of the subtlety or
complexity of thought as opposed to the simplicity of matter; by
explaining how complexity may arise out of simplicity, associationist
Q f)psychology has already answered these objections.
From all this, we must, he believes, conclude that mind and brain 
are one and the same thing and that God and his universe are not at all 
what they have hitherto been taken for. The divine nature, it is true, 
is quite unlike the human, so man's materiality need not be taken to 
imply God's; but it cannot be allowed that God is immaterial if by that 
is meant what modem metaphysicians usually mean by it: that he has no 
property whatever in common with matter and bears no relation to space. 
Such a God would be debarred by definition from all communication with 
the world he had created. We may, indeed, say that God is immaterial in 
that he has powers and properties different from those of created 
matter; but may not the new concept of matter - as something from which 
'as we may say, the reproach of matter is wiped off' - allow us to 
consider even the supreme being as material?^
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This was an invitation that few were disposed to accept: the 
earliest critics of Priestley's materialism were hostile and not many of 
them brought a sympathetic understanding to their subject. Some thought 
that his opinions gave aid and comfort to atheism, and one anonymous 
author went so far as to say that they would encourage libertines to 
assault the wives and daughters of their n e i g h b o u r s . Even a friendly 
commentator was disturbed to see the 'swarm of atheistic libertines' 
taking up Priestley's doctrines for their own licentious purposes. The 
'hacknied cant of vulgar infidelity, prefaced with the name of a 
Mandeville or a Toland, ... lost nothing of its futility from such 
wretched authorities,' wrote Samuel Badcock. 'But when the name of Dr. 
Priestley was introduced to give it credit, that which was ridiculous by
QQ
itself became serious from its connexion.'^ It is curious that 
Badcock, writing in 1780, should have had to take his search for 
emblematic infidels back as far as Bernard Mandeville, who had died in 
1733, and John Toland, who had died eleven years before that. In any 
case, Mandeville must be here merely to make up the numbers; he was 
supposed to be the enemy of virtue but he was not known to be a friend 
of materialism. John Toland, on the other hand - Locke's maverick 
disciple, self-proclaimed 'free-thinker' - was a much more versatile 
bugbear: mocking the church and the scriptures, confounding matter and 
spirit. At the beginning of the century he had been prominent in that 
rogues' gallery of materialists with whom Newtonian writers were wont to 
frighten their readers: Hobbes, Spinoza, Lucretius, Epicurus; men who 
showed the swarm of atheistic libertines how to sting.
VIII.
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The Newtonian universe was one in which God’s providence operated 
constantly to animate lifeless matter and maintain regularity and order. 
The materialists, however, by teaching that matter was self-sufficient 
and self-animating, depicted a universe in which order was maintained 
without God’s providence (and, by analogy, perhaps also a polity in 
which order was maintained without authoritarian government). This drew 
from the Newtonians an energetic response, much of it articulated in the 
annual series of lectures established in 1691 by the will of Robert 
Boyle to defend the Christian religion 'against notorious Infidels.’
The Reverend Samuel Clarke had the free-thinkers in mind when in his 
Boyle Lectures he stressed Newton's doctrine that matter was 'brute', 
'stupid', 'dead' and 'lifeless'; incapable of sense or movement without 
the external agency of God, only source of motion in the universe.100
It seems quite easy to draw a line (of affinity, not necessarily 
of filiation) back from Priestley to these free-thinkers, and perhaps 
even to implicate him in the schemes of political subversion that Toland 
and others had hatched in their coffee houses and secret lodges. In 
fact only one contemporary of Priestley's appears to have done this in 
any determined way: John Robison, Professor of Natural Philosophy at the 
University of Edinburgh, who in 1797 published a most extraordinary book 
in which, as his title proclaimed, he undertook to furnish Proofs of a 
Conspiracy against all the Religions and Governments of Europe, Carried 
on in the Secret Meetings of Free Masons, Illuminati, and Reading 
Societies. Like his more famous contemporary the Abbe Barruel, Robison 
saw the hand of Freemasonry in the French Revolution; he saw in Toland's 
Pantheisticon a pattern for Masonic ritual and in Freemasonry itself a
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radical millenarian alternative to revealed religion. Freemasonry, says 
Robison, diverts our attention from God's providence and his promise to 
us of future happiness by making specious promise of perfect peace and 
happiness in this life. Its God is no God at all: 'God, without 
dominion, without providence, and final aims, is Fate.'101 These are 
the 'detestable doctrines of Illuminatism’, with which Priestley has 
openly sought to subvert a Christian nation. Priestley's espousal of 
pantheism is to Robison quite apparent:
Has he not been preparing the minds of his readers for Atheism by 
his theory of mind, and by his commentary on the unmeaning jargon 
of Dr. Hartley? ... For, if intelligence and design be nothing but 
a certain modification of the vibratiunculae or undulations of any 
kind, what is supreme intelligence, but a more extensive, and 
(perhaps they will call it) refined undulation, pervading or 
mixing with all other? ... As any new or partial undulation may be 
superinduced on any other already existing, and this without the 
least disturbance or confusion, so may the inferior intelligences 
in the universe be only superinductions on the operations of this 
supreme intelligence which pervades them all. - And thus an 
undulation (of what? surely of something prior to and independent 
of this modification) is the cause of all the beings in the 
universe and of all the harmony and beauty that we observe. -
This was the sort of criticism that Priestley had been at some pains to
avert. He was not, he said, a pantheist, like Spinoza (who made God 'to
be, as well as to do every thing'), because he allowed 'a source of
infinite power, and superior intelligence' from which inferior beings
were derived and from whose consciousness their consciousnesses were and
would ever remain quite distinct. He agreed with d'Holbach (one of the
principal inheritors of Toland's pantheistic materialism) that matter
could not exist without powers, but he argued against him that these
powers could have been imparted and organised only by a superior 
1 rnbeing. J Besides, his theory of mind, which is the principal object of 
Robison's animadversions, is not necessarily tainted with materialism.
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Priestley certainly believed that his metaphysical, religious and 
political doctrines were related, but the relationship, though intimate, 
stopped well short of implication. He said quite explicitly that his 
Socinianism did not depend upon his theory of what he called ’the 
uniform composition of man' and that this theory did not depend upon his 
materialism.10^ Indeed, he was, as we have seem, arguing for something 
very like the uniform composition of man as early as 1772, when he told 
the readers of his Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion that mind 
and body appear to 'grow, decay and perish together’ but that God can 
resurrect both after a period of death that has been ’an entire 
cessation of thought.’ Moreover, in Priestley's time a number of 
distinguished and orthodox apologists had advanced the idea that men’s 
hope of a future life lay only in the expectation that God would choose 
to resurrect them. As Samuel Badcock, pointing this out, remarked, ’Dr. 
Priestley stands not single in the argument.'10*^
Neither did Priestley stand single in the purely scientific 
argument: much of the story of matter-theory in the eighteenth century 
is the story of how Newton's doctrine that all causative action in 
nature is the direct consequence of God's will came to be supplanted by 
the doctrine that activity is inherent in matter. It is, indeed, 
scarcely surprising that more than one person's thoughts should have 
taken their course, since it is clearly indicated by two features of 
Newtonian theory itself: the paucity of matter in the universe and the 
primacy of forces. In his youth, Priestley had read the works of John 
Rowning, who had speculated whether every particle of a fluid might not 
be surrounded by alternating spheres of attraction and repulsion; and to
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get from Rowning to Boscovich and the mature Priestley it is necessary
only to realise that the solid lump on matter assumed to be at the
centre of each sphere is quite superfluous to a coherent account of the 
1 OfS
phenomena. Indeed, however obnoxious Priestley may have been, 
Boscovich's work answered a genuine need which British scientists felt 
most acutely. Robison himself, contemptuous though he was of 
Priestley’s associationism and of the materialism of impenetrable 
matter, had no doubt that a true theory of matter must ’resemble Mr. 
Boscovich's in many of its features.'10^
There is no doubt, however, that Priestley saw profound 
theological and political significance in his materialism. He provided 
some indication of what his new metaphysical discoveries meant to him at 
the beginning of the Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated, 
which came out as an appendix to the Disquisitions:
We ... are links in a great connected chain, parts of an immense 
whole, a very little of which only we are as yet permitted to see, 
but from which we collect evidence enough that the whole system 
(in which we are, at the same time, both instruments and objects) 
is under an unerring direction, and that the final result will be 
most glorious and happy. Whatever men may intend, or execute, all 
their designs, and all their actions, are subject to the secret 
influence and guidance of one who is necessarily the best judge of 
what will most promote his own excellent purposes. To him, and in 
his works, all seeming discord is real harmony, and all apparent 
evil, ultimate good.
In this passage (complete with its concealed and halting quotation from 
Pope) Priestley places himself firmly in a very well-known tradition of 
Western thought: that of the great chain of being, in which every 
creature is a link, stretching from God, through the angels, to man and, 
beneath man, the brute creation. The idea that God and the humblest of 
his handiwork are part of one continuum is given much support by
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Priestley's doctrine that all are made of the same matter; and clearly 
he agrees with Pope and many others that the chain is a hierarchy, 
because it is apparent that for him man, being both instrument and 
object, occupies a middle place in the scheme of things.10^ However, he 
gives us no reason to assume - as some of his more pessimistic and 
conservative contemporaries do - that man, occupying this intermediary 
place, is doomed forever to prudent mediocrity. On the contrary:
So long as we can practically believe that there is but one will 
in the whole universe, that this one will, exclusive of all 
chance, or the interference of any other will disposes of all 
things, even to their minutest circumstances, and always for the 
best of purposes, it is impossible but that we must rejoice in, 
and be thankful for, all events, without distinction. And when 
our will and our wishes shall thus perfectly coincide with that of 
the sovereign Disposer of all things, whose will is always donet 
in earth, as well as in Heaven, we shall, in fact, attain the 
summit of perfection and happiness. We shall have a kind of union 
with God himself; his will shall be our will, and even his power 
our power; being ever employed to execute our wishes and purposes, 
as well as his; because they will be, in all respects, the same 
with his. 110
In other words, the chain of being will be wound up into one tight and 
tangled ball. We can find strong intimations of this in Hartley, but 
Priestley is encouraged in his eschatalogical hopes not only by a 
psychological theory that shows how our desires may be one with God's 
but also by a metaphysical doctrine of the unity of all substance. By 
1777, he had already written his most important political text, An Essay 
on the First Principles of Government, but here we can see how 
materialism gives a new intensity to the vision which illuminates that 
work: a single will governing all the universe, a single overpowering 
end to which all effort - political, religious, scientific and 
technological - must be bent. The universe thus ordered is, of course, 
a deterministic one, but the knowledge that this is so should not,
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Priestley maintains, lull us into apathy; our own actions and decisions 
are necessary links in the causal chain, and so the success of our 
ventures can depend only on ourselves. Moreover, once we see that our 
moral constitution is, like everything else in nature, the product of 
established laws of cause and effect, then we will realise that it is 
upon ourselves and ourselves alone that our moral improvement depends.
So the knowledge that our minds are subject to natural laws should no 
more encourage us to neglect their improvement than the knowledge that 
vegetation is subject to the same laws should encourage a farmer to 
neglect his crops. 1 1 1
The contribution of Priestley's materialism to his political 
thought - strengthening as it did his self-confident individualism, 
adding new lustre to his materialism - was, then, to encourage him in 
the pursuit of ideas which had long held his attention. So also in the 
realm of theology: he was later to write that he had been 'greatly 
confirmed' in his Socinianism by his discovery of the material 
composition of the mind. ^ It was, however, not his materialism so 
much as his associationism that over the next ten years guided his work 
along the lines sketched in the Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity:
And the more we understand of human nature, which is an immense 
field of speculation, barely opened by our revered master, Dr. 
Hartley, the more closely, I doubt not, shall we perceive how 
admirably is the whole system of revealed religion adapted to the 
nature and circumstances of man, and the better judges shall we be 
of that most important branch of its evidence, which results from 
considering the effects which the first promulgation of it had on 
the minds of those to whom it was proposed both Jews and Gentiles. 
Let us then study the Scriptures, Ecclesiastical history, and the 
Theory of the Human Mind, in conjunction; being satisfied, that 
from the nature of things, they must, in time, throw a great and 
new light upon each other.
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Pursuing this programme, Priestley was able, he thought, to show not 
only how the Christian revelation was adapted to the minds of those to 
whom it was proposed but also how it became corrupted by false 
philosophy. He knew that this philosophy was false because it denied 
the material composition of the soul; he sought to explain its rise and 
dissemination in an account which owed a great deal to associationism, 
which remained, in religion as in politics, the most important, as it 
had been the first, of his philosophical loves.
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THE POLITICS OF COMMERCE AND OF CANDOUR.
CHAPTER FIVE.
Sometimes it seems impossible and I 
dream of a candid attic somewhere, all 
white and empty, looking over trees.
Then I finger the gold brocade curtains, 
with their tasselled gold tie-backs ...
Anita Brookner, Look at Me
I.
’For my own part,' wrote Priestley in 1776, 'I endeavour to think 
as little as I possibly can (which, however, is not very little) of 
Politics, and apply myself to pursuits in which I meet with less cause 
of chagrin, and in which I hope I am not uselessly employed. ' 1 It was a 
forlorn hope: the literary companion to Lord Shelburne could scarcely be 
deaf to the reports of high politics, nor could the self-appointed 
spokesman of Rational Dissent expect to be free for long from politics 
and chagrin. However, Priestley obviously wanted to think of himself as 
a man dragged reluctantly from his study by the importunity of public 
affairs. The implication that politics had become so noisy and so 
dangerous that no door could be shut against them is part of the story 
that he has to tell about the state of the nation in the latter half of 
the eighteenth century.
-244-
The story goes that, after years of persecution under the Stuarts, 
Dissenters found ease and toleration in the reign of George of Hanover 
and in that of his son. But under the third George, the story 
continues, things began to change, the influence of the court began to 
increase, that of Parliament to diminish, and so the Dissenters, natural 
friends to civil liberty, were drawn reluctantly into the politics of 
opposition.
This story fits well into the received account of English history 
(or, at least, with the account that has been received from Whig or 
Whiggish historians), according to which the accession of George I put 
an end to the ferocious party struggle that had marked English political 
life since the Glorious Revolution and the nation became a one-party 
state while its political elite gave itself up to tranquil corruption 
and the pursuit of place. This elite, men of property who had done well 
out of the Revolution, formed the oligarchy which was to govern the land 
for a hundred years. All executive power was theirs and so was 
parliament, a docile body easily controlled by a few grandees whose 
patronage lesser men had to court if they wanted a sinecure, a pension, 
a military commission, preferment in the church, a post in the civil 
service or any of the other good things that government had to offer.
However, of those who were denied a place at the table not all 
were prepared to keep quiet about their exclusion. In London and the 
provinces, the 'middling sort', Priestley's sort, were growing in 
number, in economic influence and in political awareness. But they were 
not growing in political power, and more and more they felt themselves 
to be excluded. As keepers of ledgers - heavily and regressively taxed
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to pay for Che corruptions of government - they suffered from the 
economic insecurity that resulted from the very widespread use of 
credit, and they objected strongly both to the uncertainties of the 
patronage system and to the inconsistent and capricious way in which the 
law was applied. According to J.H. Plumb, this political public grew 
as the electorate diminished. Ambitious, intelligent, articulate and 
unenfranchised, its members began to turn their attention to extra- 
parliamentary campaigning, and naturally this altered the political 
atmosphere. They formed clubs and societies in which to discuss the 
issues of the day and they were the proprietors of a vigorous and 
blossoming press.^
Though the Whigs and their successors were to remain fixedly in 
power until well into the nineteenth century (the received account 
continues), the accession of George III in 1760 brought to an end the 
serenity with which that power had been exercised. There had been 
little local difficulties before, of course - Jacobite invasion, 
quarrels over the excise in 1733 and the Gin Act in 1736, and a period 
of parliamentary unrest from 1754 to 1757 - but the events of the 
seventeen-sixties were something new: 'Seven ministries came and went,' 
says John Brewer, 'parliamentary opposition grew apace, the radical 
press burgeoned, and crowds became both more frequent and more 
prominent.1^  Sometimes the crowds became riots, and people were shot 
dead in the streets who had turned out in support of that astonishing 
demagogue and hero of the people, John Wilkes. Whig opinion had it at 
the time that the fault lay with the young King himself, that he sought 
to unbalance the constitution and arrogate to himself and to his friends
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the power which had been so beneficently wielded by the great families
£
of the land. Though there is little basis for the accusation, it is 
certainly true that the third George was not content, as the first two 
had been, to leave all those oligarchs to the unprincipled enjoyment of 
office. He came in and they went out. Not only were the old gang who 
had governed in the previous reign swept from office, but so were even 
the humblest of those who had acquired place or emolument under them.
Thus the received account. Revisionist historians have challenged 
it in significant details. It is now asserted that opposition and 
electoral strife were not brought to an end in the early years of the 
reign of George I, that the excluded did not all bridle at their 
exclusion, that there was nothing extraordinary about the ministerial 
crises of the seventeen-sixties and that the Wilkes affair was a mere 
political meteor, rapid in its passage and having no permanent effect on 
the configuration of the political heavens.^ But whatever the truth of 
the matter, it remains the case that Priestley and many others believed, 
or claimed to believe, that there was indeed something sinister about 
the young King’s friends. Nor was Priestley alone in finding the events 
of the day striking and unprecedented. 'By 1770 the ’present 
discontents" were well nigh an obsession,' writes Brewer. ’Government, 
opposition and radicals all addressed themselves to the problem of 
disorder. . . . ’ 8 Occurring in the midst of these discontents and 
contributing to them, the Wilkes affair may have left the political 
order unchanged, but in two respects the movement was undoubtedly 
significant: as H.T. Dickinson remarks, ’it established the first 
political society to campaign for a reform of Parliament and it immersed
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a mass audience in its own political ideas and in the political debate 
in general.'^ Perhaps the effects of the movement on this 'mass 
audience' were short-lived and local. Perhaps it does not represent the 
escape of the long-repressed resentment of the unenfranchised, anonymous 
masses. However, its importance to a group of urban intellectual vocal 
and discontented, cannot be denied, for it was neither slight nor 
transient. 10
Of these Priestley was a distinguished member. The political 
discontents of the seventeen-sixties more or less coincided with his 
entry into the great metropolitan world. Before, in the fifties and 
early sixties, he had been an obscure provincial preacher. In the mid­
sixties,, however, he began to play his part on a larger stage: he 
visited London, became a Fellow of the Royal Society and a member of 
what Benjamin Franklin called the club of 'Honest Whigs ' . 1 1 And. at the 
same time as Priestley began to move more at large in the world, the 
world itself began to seem a more lively place: it afforded the twin 
spectacles of instability and possibility. Many men, certainly those 
amongst whom Priestley spent his time, were exercised by the former 
spectacle, and it would be surprising if Priestley - himself adherent to 
a philosophy which depicted order as arising by Divine Providence out of 
chaos - were not to catch some of this concern. Moreover, certain 
responses to instability ran much against the grain of his own thought 
and by stinging him into response, made him articulate his own political 
ideas. This he did initially in 1768 in his Essay on the First 
Principles of Government, and on the Nature of Political, Civil and 
Religious Liberty (a copy of which he sent to Wilkes 'as a small
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acknowledgement for the many personal civilities he has received from 
him, and more especially for what he owes him as ... a lover of 
liberty.'-^) As he began, with this and other works, to engage in the 
controversies of the day, so he tried to grasp the possibilities for 
radical reform that offered themselves. To do so he had to persuade 
others to see the world as he and Rational Dissent saw it.
Consequently, he had to convince them that he spoke not for a narrow 
vested interest but for a community whose concern for justice, affronted 
by the corruptions of government, had dragged it protesting into the 
political arena.
It seems appropriate then, to delay our examination of the Essay 
until we have looked at those pamphlets, published a little later, in 
which he wrote of the Wilkes affair and of the Dissenters' new role 
(reluctantly undertaken, of course) as members of a loyal opposition.
II.
Not every myth about the politics of Dissent may be laid at 
Priestley's door. A number of historians have claimed that Dissenters, 
legally barred from Parliament and from public office, took no active 
part in politics until the French Revolution roused them from their 
quietist slumbers. It is further suggested that this very exclusion 
preserved their radicalism in all its native purity: there was nothing 
that could force them to compromise and nothing to diminish the sense of 
grievance that exclusion inspired in them. J This assumption, that 
Dissenters were excluded not only from office but from the very 
electorate, is quite mistaken. Many of them did, of course, come from
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those sections of the urban middle classes that were not to gain the 
franchise until the nineteenth century, but religious dissent was not in 
itself a legal reason for denying a man the vote; if it had been, 
Priestley would scarcely have written a pamphlet advising 'protestant 
dissenters of all denominations' how to vote in the general election of 
1774.^  Often, those Dissenters who possessed the vote were very ready 
to exert the influence it gave them: their power was important in 
several constituencies and sometimes it was decisive.1^
Of course, the elite of Rational Dissent were political and they 
were radical, and their noisy eloquence has persuaded many historians to 
equate religious and political dissent and to ignore those loyalist 
Dissenters who were enemies to insubordination at home and revolution 
abroad. As for Priestley himself, most prominent apologist of Rational 
Dissent: he is so loud in his protestation that Dissenters must by their 
very nature be friends to civil liberty that it is easy to overlook his 
repeated insistence that Dissenters as such have 'no peculiar principles 
of government at all. ' 10 The two claims are reconcilable, of course, 
but together they seem decidedly disingenuous. Priestley does indeed 
wish to father certain political principles on his fellow Dissenters but 
he wishes also to imply that these principles, being dictated by reason, 
are such as no reasonable person could take exception to. The claim 
that Dissenters have no political principles of their own is, then, an 
ideological one: it is a way of excluding from the thinking world all 
who reject those principles that Dissenters do in fact hold; it is a way 
of representing the interests of Rational Dissent as the common 
interests of all thinking people.
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It is also of a piece with the claim that he makes in his Essay on 
the First Principles of Government that he does not speak the language 
of party. At a time when parties were still thought of as factions, as 
bodies of men united for no other purpose than the pursuit of their 
personal interests - when party was 'that hideous monster', 'the 
greatest evil of this poor country' and 'the madness of many for the 
gain of a few' - Priestley was naturally anxious to show that he and his 
fellow Dissenters were not just out for what they could get.1^ His view 
of party was as low as anybody's: in a sermon first delivered in 1771 he 
warned of 'the man who hath no rule over his own spirit' that, 'In all 
affairs in which the publick interest is concerned he will be directed 
more by his attachment to a party & by inclination and humour than by 
the sober dictates of wisdom & the love of his country. ' 18 The 
Dissenters, Priestley implies, are neither so whimsical nor so narrowly 
self-interested as this. Of course, they are concerned with civil 
liberty, especially in so far as its abridgement by the Test and 
Corporation Acts seriously disables them, but in this they are moved by 
the most generous motives: 'So long as we continue dissenters, it is 
hardly possible that we should be other than friends to civil liberty 
and all the essential interests of our fellow citizens.'1^
In describing the political affiliations of Dissent, Priestley has 
in fact two claims to make, one theoretical and the other historical.
The theoretical claim, whose validity he often takes for granted, is 
txhat the logic of the Dissenters' situation obliges them to advocate not 
only the reform of Test and Corporation Acts but also other reforms in 
the state. (Here he is projecting onto his co-religionists concerns
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which are largely his own.) The historical claim is that Dissenters 
have in fact advocated such reforms and it is part of that Whig story 
with which this chapter began.
Priestley’s tale is one of suffering bravely bom, the memory of 
which has given the Dissenters their zeal for civil liberty. In 'the 
imperious reign of queen Elizabeth, and the more oppressive reigns of 
the Stewarts', many thousands of Puritans, 'nfln of whom the world was 
not worthy't suffered fines, confiscations, cruel punishments and even 
exile to the inhospitable shores of North America rather than abandon 
God's cause, the cause of truth and liberty.^0 This cause, battered by 
the Tudors, was nearly done to death by the their successors. They, 
however, were so bold in their attempts to enslave the nation that at 
last it rose in its own defence. The battle lines are depicted for us 
in primary colours: on one side are ranged King Charles and his haughty 
gang of Papists and High Churchmen, all bent upon absolute despotism of 
the French or Spanish kind; on the other side, muskets primed in defence 
of its 'natural and civil rights', is nothing less than 'the nation, not
01
the Dissenters only. ... A
But before long this boldly-sketched account of the Great 
Rebellion runs into difficulties, and these difficulties arise directly 
from Priestley's wish to depict Dissent as both politically neutral and 
conducive to a love of civil liberty. The Dissenters, he says, finished 
the war, as they had begun it, friends to monarchy; but it is the 
military leaders who 'will necessarily give the law to the state in all 
convulsions of this nature,' and in this case they happened to be 
Independents and republicans. Few but they wanted to cut off the King's
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head (though he deserved nothing less than a thousand deaths for what he 
had done), but nobody had the power to stop them. Their action was,
oo
however, dictated solely by political principle and not by religion.
Here is Priestley's dilemma. He has said that Dissenters have no 
political principles peculiarly their own; he has said that they are 
friends to the English monarchy; so clearly he cannot approve of this 
project to found a republic. But neither can he approve of what he 
calls 'the usurpation of Cromwell', for Cromwell was a dictator and 
Dissenters are friends to civil liberty. What then would he have 
approved of? Surely not the restoration of the dead King's son, 'an 
avowed papist' whose 'uniform aim was to establish Popery in this
90
kingdom. ...' The necessary admission - that the King was beheaded 
because he stood in the way of a political settlement whose architects 
were indeed motivated, in part at least, by theological doctrine - is 
never made, though Priestley does at one point confess that the trick 
cannot be worked, that the Puritans cannot be depicted as friends alike 
to monarchy and to what he calls liberty. The liberty they sought was 
liberty for themselves alone. Had they been able to do so, they would
r\ /
have established a tyranny as severe as that of their enemies.
Since then, however - and despite severe persecution under the 
restored Stuarts - the Dissenters have been the true friends, perhaps 
the truest friends, of their country. They have educated it in the ways 
of civil liberty, they have opposed the worst of its rulers and been 
loyal to the best. But such loyalty may no longer be rewarded: ’that 
those who actually guide the measures which are now carrying on in this 
country, are equally enemies to civil liberty and to you, can no more be
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doubted, than that William III, of glorious memory, and the two first 
princes of the house of Hanover, were friendly to both.'^ This was 
written in 1774, when the anxieties of Priestley and his radical friends 
had begun to find new focus in the American colonies. But it was a more 
local event that, they said, had first alerted them to the extent of 
ministerial corruption. Many Dissenters, said Priestly in 1769, 'from 
the force of habitual attachment to the present reigning family', 
continued to support the administration, but things had been materially 
altered by 'the late vote of the House of Commons in favour of Mr. 
Luttrell. ° The great political drama of which this vote was an 
incident clearly interested Priestley greatly and he took to the stage 
himself (though masked), writing, as he tells us in his memoirs, 'some 
anonymous pieces in favour of civil liberty during the persecution of 
Mr. Wilkes. ...'^
The 'persecution' began in 1762, when a general warrant was issued 
for the arrest of 'the authors, printers and publishers of a seditious 
and treasonable paper, entitled The North Briton', and the author, the
OQ
notorious John Wilkes M.P., was committed to the Tower of London. 
Sharp-tongued and witty, Wilkes had long been a thorn in the ministerial 
flesh, but, nonetheless, his arrest had disastrous consequences for the 
government. Not only was it a clear breach of parliamentary privilege; 
it was also a vicious stroke of precisely that arbitrary justice that 
the middling sort found intolerable, for it was made on a warrant that 
mentioned nobody by name and was defended on grounds 'of state 
necessity'. This is one of several infringements of 'the great 
privileges of Englishmen' which Priestley sets down in his bill of
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indictment against the administration. By construing censure as libel, 
he goes on, they have restricted the liberty of the press, 'that great 
security for every branch of our liberty, and the scourge of their 
arbitrary proceedings. ...'^
The courts found in Wilkes' favour, declaring that parliamentary 
privilege had indeed been breached, that general warrants were illegal 
and that state necessity was no defence. The government returned to the 
attack, this time trying to nail their enemy as author of an obscene and 
blasphemous poem, and Wilkes was already an outlaw when, in 1768, he was 
returned as member for Middlesex. He surrendered to his outlawry and it 
was while his case was before the courts that there took place the 
bloodiest of the riots that are associated with his name. At least 
eleven people, Wilkites and innocent bystanders, were killed as a result 
of what Priestley condemns as unnecessary and unconstitutional recourse 
'to that great engine of arbitrary power, a military force. ...'^ °
As on a contemporary playbill, tragedy was succeeded by a comic 
after-piece. Wilkes, convicted of indecent publication and seditious 
libel, was expelled from the House of Commons on a Government motion.
The freeholders of Middlesex - many of them middling tradesmen and 
manufacturers - elected him unopposed: the House re-expelled him;: the 
constituency returned him yet again, and the House expelled him for the 
third time in three months. For the fourth election, the Government, 
every bit as tireless as the freeholders of Middlesex, found a 
candidate, one Colonel Luttrell, to stand against Wilkes. He polled 246 
votes to Wilkes' 1143. A crowd of several thousand made its way to the 
King's Bench Prison to congratulate the winner, but the House of
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Commons, unmoved by the spectacle, voted by a majority of 197 to 143 
'that Henry Lawes Luttrell Esq. ought to have been returned a member for 
Middlesex and not John Wilkes Esq.'^
By this act of folly, the executive had made Wilkes into a truly 
national hero, for they had struck not just at him but at his electorate 
and, as they were told by many thousands of petitioners, at the 
constitution itself. Priestley had no doubt about the matter: 'The 
great Bill of Rights has been invaded by a repeated refusal, to admit 
the first county in England, to judge of the fitness of the person who 
shall represent them in parliament. .. • ^ The confrontation with 
Wilkes could now be depicted as a battle between the freemen of England 
and the oligarchs of Westminster for the freedom of election. It was at 
this time that a group of metropolitan radicals, aldermen, lawyers and 
clergy, founded the Society for the Supporters of the Bill of Rights, 
the first political society of the century to campaign for radical 
reform of Parliament, for more frequent elections, the ejection of 
'placemen and pensioners' and 'a more fair and equal representation of 
the p e o p l e . T h i s ,  clearly, was a programme with which Priestley 
could sympathise. 'The corruption of their representatives,' was, he 
said, what the people of England had most to fear, 'as being most liable 
to subject them to arbitrary power.' He cites two causes of corruption: 
firstly, the presence in Parliament of many 'placemen and pensioners, 
and those who are in expectation of emoluments of that kind', and, 
secondly, the long duration of parliaments, which made of a seat in the 
Conmons an investment capable of yielding seven years' return. Together 
these circumstance enabled the Court to secure and control a permanent
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majority. Both arose from the same original cause: an inequitable 
system of representation whereby most of the members represented 
'inconsiderable towns' whose few electors would vote as directed by the 
landowner or 'other adherent to the court' whose sole property the seat 
was.^ This analysis underwrites a programme of reform that is neither 
democratic nor original. Priestley, at one with the Supporters of the 
Bill of Rights, demands no more than opposition Whigs had been demanding 
for most of the century.
'It has been said,' Priestley remarks, 'that a great part of the 
resentment of the court against the Dissenters has arisen from a notion 
that they were the chief abettors of Mr. Wilkes; and I believe that, in 
general, they were the friends of his cause, because it was the cause of 
liberty and of the constitution.'^  He is careful to explain that the 
Dissenters played no greater part in Wilkes' affair than any other 
patriots, except in so far as, being so dependent on public liberty, 
they naturally had a greater interest than others in its defence. But 
he must have known full well that Dissenters were not necessarily lovers 
of liberty for all, certainly not of liberty as he understood it (he had 
said as much when discussing the Presbyterians of the seventeenth 
century). Besides, his kind of Dissent is radically different from the 
orthodox kind: neither Calvinist nor trinitarian, it is largely 
negative, consisting of the rejection of corrupt doctrine, and it 
depends for its propagation on the clash of opinions in public and the 
mutual interference of associations in the mind. It is a form of 
Dissent to which few subscribed: Presbyterianism may have been going 
Priestley's way, the way of Rational Dissent, but there were still
orthodox Dissenters, like the Independents and the General Baptists, who 
remained loyal to Calvin; and orthodox Dissent had always been ready, as 
militant heterodoxy was not, to circumvent the Test and Corporation Acts 
by way of occasional conformity.^ Priestley, however, represents the 
political principles of Rational Dissent as something to which all 
Dissenters must necessarily adhere; and, since he says that they have no 
political principles peculiarly their own, it is easy to depict them as 
people sensitive not merely to their own needs but to those of the 
country at large. Needing civil liberty more than others, they are its 
particular friends. Its friends are their friends, and so they have 
always been grateful adherents to the House of Hanover. The implication 
is clear: surely only some very singular and unprecedented breach of the 
constitution could ,have driven such loyal subjects into opposition.
This is how Priestley sees the parliamentary vote in favour of
07
Luttrell. At least one of the reasons for his adopting this attitude 
can easily be inferred: if the intellectual universe is to be in all 
respects - intellectual, moral and theological - a place in which there 
is nothing that is merely inherited, nothing that is unquestioned, 
nothing that is not freely chosen, then it will be better if there is 
free debate and a multiplicity of sects. There can be no orthodoxy, no 
establishment. (’In the present state of Christianity, I am for 
increasing the number of sects rather than diminishing them,’ Priestley 
wrote in 1770, when it was suggested that Dissenters act in concert with 
reforming clergy in the Church of England.^8) Hence the need for that 
free market in opinions which is his idea of civil liberty. The 
government's ineptitude in dealing with Wilkes has afforded him an
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opportunity of pressing even more strongly his claims for civil liberty; 
and he is able to magnify the threat to liberty by asserting that even 
the Dissenters, hitherto the House of Hanover's most loyal subjects, 
have been driven into opposition by the dark schemes of the young King 
and his ministers.
But there were those who, in the face of instability, wished to 
strengthen the unity of the state rather than weaken it. They provoked 
Priestley's only substantial treatise on politics.
III.
Like many a contemporary work, Priestley's Sssay on the First 
Principles of Government begins with one of those punctiliously humble 
prefaces in which the author explains that only the importunity of his 
friends has persuaded him to place his thoughts before the public. 
Priestley's friends, the 'several persons who were pleased to think 
favourably' of his Remarks on Dr. Brown's Proposals for a Code of 
Education, had told him (or so he tells us) that what he had said in 
that work about civil and religious liberty 'had placed the foundation 
of those most valuable interests of mankind on a broader and a firmer 
basis, in consequence of my availing myself of a more accurate and 
extensive system of morals and policy, than was adopted by Mr. Locke, 
and others who formerly wrote upon this subject.' So he has written, he 
says, a new and more general treatise, incorporating into it the 
substance of the earlier work. He is, however, anxious to point out 
that he intends 'no more than to consider the first principles of civil 
and religious liberty'; for more detailed and extensive information, the
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reader is referred to the lectures on history and civil policy which the 
author intends to publish 1 in due time.'^
These prefatory remarks of Priestley's are more than throat- 
clearing. From all this modesty, mock-modesty and self-advertisement 
emerge three significant facts: that the Essay grew out of a work on 
education; that its author believed that he enjoyed 'a more accurate and 
extensive system of morals and policy' than Locke; and that it was 
intended to guide or supplement empirical research, not to replace it. 
These three facts are all intimately connected with each other, and what 
binds them together is associationism. Priestley's advantage over Locke 
is that, coming after Hartley, he can wield that 'more accurate and 
extensive system' from which he has learnt both of the fundamental 
importance of education and of the difficulty of 'arguing a priori in 
matters of government. ' ^ 0 For the Christian associationist, history 
must be a collection of minutely-organised particulars ordered by a few 
general descriptive principles. And a few general nonnative principles 
will, it is hoped, govern the activities of men, the actors of history. 
The descriptive principles are, of course, those of associationism, for 
the mechanism of associations is the means whereby divine omnipotence 
operates on the world. Since nothing but good can come of God's 
decrees, the normative principles can be quite modest in scope, 
instructing men merely to refrain from standing in the way of progress 
(which in any case they can only delay, since the glorious outcome is 
predetermined).
This belief in God's role in history gives content to Priestley's 
idea of liberty and makes it something more than a negative desire for
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freedom from restraint.^ 1 Man, alone of all created beings, possesses a 
mind of boundless comprehension, a mind capable of surveying not only 
the present but also the past and the future. At every instant a great 
variety of ideas are ready to crowd in upon the sensations of the 
moment, and they may so exalt the emotions as to render the mind wholly 
superior to physical circumstance:
Thus intellectual pleasures and pains, in many cases, wholly over 
power all temporary sensations; whereby some men, of great and 
superior minds, enjoy a state of permanent and equable felicity, 
in a great measure independent of the uncertain accidents of life. 
In such minds the ideas of things, that are seen to be the cause 
and effect of one another, perfectly coalesce into one, and 
present but one common image. Thus all the ideas of evil 
absolutely vanish, in the idea of the greater good with which it 
is connected or of which it is productive.
Presented so early in the Essay with so bright a prospect, we can be in 
little doubt that for Priestley the sole end of political activity must 
be the attainment of the sum of human happiness,
Of course, the arithmetic is still in progress, as we can see when 
we reflect upon the great improvements which have taken place in the 
history of the human race. This impressive progress is peculiar to our 
species (’No horse of this age seems to have any advantage over the 
individuals of this kind that lived many centuries ago') and it will 
continue for as long as our energies and interests are not dissipated 
but employed in concerted affort.^ Our united strength will bring us 
more knowledge, and knowledge, according to the Baconian equation which 
Priestley was fond of quoting, is power:
nature, including both its materials, and its laws, will be more 
at our command; men will make their situation in this world 
abundantly more easy and comfortable; they will probably prolong 
their existence in it, and will grow daily more happy, each in 
himself, and more able (and, I believe, more disposed) to 
communicate happiness to others. Thus, whatever was the beginning
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of this world, the end will be glorious and paradisaical, beyond 
what our imaginations can now conceive. Extravagant as some may 
suppose these views to be, I think I could show them to be fairly 
suggested by the true theory of human nature, and to arise from 
the natural course of human affairs. But for the present I waive 
this subject, the contemplation of which always makes me happy.
Happy as the contemplation of this material prosperity may have made 
Priestley, it is difficult not to suspect that knowledge alone -, 
without power, longevity or comfort - would have been enough for him. 
After all, he believed that the chief blessing of the hereafter (when, 
presumably, all material needs will be catered for and longevity no 
longer a problem) would be the infinite opportunities it would afford 
for scientific and historical research. The growth of knowledge may do 
much to improve public health and welfare, but Priestley seems 
interested in such improvements chiefly because they may help to promote 
the growth of knowledge, for he was in no doubt as to the importance to 
science of material prosperity. A year or so before writing the Essay, 
Priestley had composed the sober but visionary preface to his history of 
electricity. Here too we are told that before us lie new worlds of 
knowledge, whose conquest will be so glorious as to eclipse even 
Newton's glory. Princes and merchants do nothing to bring about this 
intellectual millenium, though 'the patronage of the great' will 
certainly be necessary. But more important will be the mutual co­
operation of the scientists of Europe, who should apportion the task 
amongst themselves, divide the labour and share the expense. Whether 
Priestley writes of progress in general terms, as in the Essay, or in 
more narrowly scientific terms, as here, he always emphasises it3 
dependence on co-operation. And, he explains in the Essay, if there is 
to be co-operation, there must be social organisation: 'the great
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instrument in the hand of divine providence* with which this happy state
of affairs will be brought about is * society, and, consequently,
.45government.
This vision, which is at the heart of Priestley's politics, owes 
more to Francis Bacon than to John Locke. Like Bacon, Priestley was one 
of those millenially-minded radicals who, ignoring the past and 
overleaping the present, offer a beguiling panorama of the future. It 
may be an actual future, the inevitable outcome of God's plan of 
history, or it may be a possible future which will come to pass if human 
potentialities are realised. It may be a future known by divine 
inspiration, prophesied in Biblical texts or extrapolated from present 
trends. Priestley, ever the enemy of claims to inner illumination, 
relies upon the latter two sources of knowledge. His belief in the 
potential of science, his associationism and his determinism all help to 
shape his portrait of the future. His beliefs about the mechanics of 
associationism, determinism and scientific progress contribute to his 
ideas of how this vision of the future should regulate political conduct 
in the present. This is the role that scientific method has in his 
political thought. The millenium which is so shining a presence in the 
Essay is not a divine irruption into secular history but the working-out 
(under God's supervision) of processes already operating in that 
history.
We are told of this golden future several pages before we are told 
anything about a state of nature or an original contract. These 
familiar tools of the political philosopher's trade are commonly 
employed in a form of radical argument which is historical rather than
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millennial and synthetic rather than analytic. Now, whatever Priestley 
may have thought about the value of analysis to the historian, sheer 
convenience is likely to incline the associationist, as well as the 
political philosopher, to synthetic explanation. As Hartley admits, 
every human passion, every human perception, is so intimately bound up 
with so many other passions and perceptions that analysis would be an 
extremely complex business; better to begin with a set of simple 
perceptions and then add whatever complexities may be necessary to 
explain the phenomena. ° If it is extremely difficult to analyse the 
passions of a single human mind, how much more difficult must it be to 
analyse the affective structure of human society. And if, despairing of 
analysis, we set out to study society by the synthetic method, we will 
soon discover that this is a method with radical implications and that 
its radicalism is of a distinctly modem, neo-Hobbesian, variety.
Proceeding synthetically, the radical takes men and women in a 
state of nature, considered apart from any social endowments, as his 
first principles. He can then deduce what social effects ought to 
result from these causes, and his deduction is likely to proceed along 
the following familiar lines. Human beings, having been created free 
and equal, will surrender some of their freedom, and perhaps some of 
their equality, only if by so doing they can gain something that is 
either more valuable to them than unrestricted freedom and equality or a 
necessary prerequisite for the enjoyment of some measure of freedom and 
equality. This something is whatever may be gained by mutual co­
operation, a pooling of resources and, consequently, a certain 
restriction of freedom. It may be some material benefit - something
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that can be built only by team effort - or it may be, and in most 
accounts it is, something more fundamental: protection from assault and 
theft. (All these accounts depend upon an assumption which Hume makes 
explicit: that the state of nature is also a condition of material 
scarcity, for if nature supplied all our wants, there would be no need 
of private property and, hence, there would be neither jealousy nor any 
use for government, whose function is to remedy the effects of 
j e a l o u s y . T h u s  the radical accounts for the existence, not of 
society - for a mere love of company may be enough to account for that - 
but of civil society, with its powers of legislation and punishment and 
its participatory or representative government. Having done this, he 
can contrast his model with squalid reality, and then he can propose 
means whereby to close the gap between things as they are and things as 
they would be if reason (rather than prejudice, greed or whatever) had 
held the reins of history. This, indeed, is what Rousseau does: he 
expressly offers a description of the state of nature as philosophical 
fiction and then he advances a more historical account of the passage
A O
from this state to the actual present condition of society.
There are strong traces of this mode of thought in Priestley's 
religious writings, as we shall see in the next chapter, and it is by no 
means absent from his political works either. However, when he actually 
begins constructing his synthesis he does so in rather a casual manner. 
He does, it is true, try to proceed in a more or less Lockean way: he 
asks his readers to imagine a group of people living, 'independent and 
unconnected', in a state of nature, 'exposed, without redress, to 
insults and wrongs of every kind ... too weak to procure themselves many
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of the advantage^ which they are sensible might easily be compassed by 
united strength1, and he concludes that such a people might well decide 
to 'resign some part of their natural liberty, and submit their conduct 
to the direction of the community' in order to gain the advantages which 
unity alone can bring. But he does this without any very marked 
enthusiasm: 'for the sake of gaining clear ideas,' he says, somewhat 
half-heartedly, we must 'do what almost all political writers have done 
b e f o r e . T h e  business of drawing out the implications of man's 
actions in a state of nature, to which Locke devotes most of his Second 
Treatise, is conducted by Priestley in three pages of large type and 
wide margins.
The fact is that Priestley's enterprise is not quite the 3ame as 
Locke's. The state-of-nature argument may be used, as Locke uses it, to 
explain the development of legitimate society; but if it cam solve this 
problem, it can also be used to tackle another and related problem: that 
of determining the lawful extent of the government's authority. And it 
is this latter problem that Priestley, his attention focussed on the 
glorious future and on the roads by which it may be reached, is most 
interested. It is towards this question that he is anxious to hurry us.
He is not, though, uninterested in the origins of government, and 
in the Lectures on History (written before the Sssay, though published 
long after it), he essays an explanation in the quasi-sociological style 
of the Abbe Turgot. It was Turgot's contention that human society had 
passed through several stages: from the earliest, when men lived as 
nomadic hunters, through the pastoral stage to the stage at which 
agricultural cultivation generated so much surplus that towns could
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arise, along with ‘trade, and all the useful arts and accomplishments' 
and, with them, the division of labour and social inequality.^0 
Priestley’s account, though more informal, follows a similar course. >He 
describes the various forms of government and then remarks that any of 
them would be preferable to no government at all:
Idleness, treachery, and cruelty, are predominant in all 
uncivilized countries, notwithstanding the boasts which the poets 
make of the golden age of mankind, before the erection of empires; 
and their vices and bad habits lose ground in proportion as 
mankind arrive at settled and regular forms of government. There 
is no borrowing in barbaric countries, says Montesquieu, but upon 
pledges; so little influence have ideas of property and a sense of 
honour over uncivilized people.
So the struggle out of barbarism is accompanied by, perhaps even 
propelled by, the growth of property: ’There is ... a natural connexion 
between government and ideas of property. 1 ^
Philosophical analysis and conjectural history thus reach the same 
conclusion: that labour in conditions of scarcity makes government 
necessary and that the human faculty for co-operation makes government 
possible. Both assume a basic selfishness in human kind, but this 
offends neither Priestley's Pelagian theology nor his Lockean 
philosophy; it certainly does not conflict with the assumption that 
human beings come into the world innocent of knowledge and of vice. The 
twin principles of selfishness and sympathy, both prerequisites of human 
society, can be deduced from first principles as Hartley explained: ’Let 
Sensation generate Imagination, then will Sensation and Imagination 
together generate Ambition; Sensation, Imagination and Ambition, Self- 
Interest; Sensation, Imagination, Ambition, and Self-Interest, Sympathy.
C O
... ^ Priestley says nothing of this (perhaps taking it for granted),
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but his 'independent and unconnected' people clearly possess not only 
sensation but also imagination, ambition and self-interest, because they 
are aware of 'the advantages, which ... might easily be compassed by 
united strength.' They possess sympathy too; as Priestley remarks in 
the Lectures on History, 'Man is social beyond any other a n i m a l . B u t  
in the Essay, having given to his aboriginal men and women these bare 
requisites for human society, he turns his attention immediately to the 
question that really interests him: to what degree will the preservation 
of these people's liberty be consistent with life in civil society?
If his answer is different from Locke's, it is because his mind 
moves in directions other than that of synthesis. His thought, more 
decidedly theological even than Locke's, moves not only backwards to an 
hypothetical state of nature, but also forwards to a prospective state 
of paradise. Locke, though he certainly believes that man is social by 
nature, is reluctant to accord anything more than a merely protective or 
umpiring function to that joint stock company which he calls political 
society.^ Priestley too explains in his Lectures that government will 
enable a community both to police itself and to repel foreign invaders, 
and he adds that to seek for government some more positive purpose than 
this is tempting but dangerous: 'by aiming at too much positive 
advantage, great numbers may be deprived even of that negative advantage 
which they first proposed to themselves. ...'^ However, in the Essay 
we discover that society, though it may have less than transcendent 
origins, certainly has transcendent purposes. And, though Priestley is 
cautious in seeking from government anything more than basic protection,
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he is in no doubt that these purposes are to be effected by means of 
* society, and, consequently, government.'
This strikingly easy elision from society to government might 
suggest that Priestley was one of those writers whom Tom Paine was later 
to castigate for having blurred or removed the important distinction 
between the two. The distinction, Paine claims, is in fact quite clear: 
'Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wretchedness; 
the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, 
the latter negatively by restraining our v i c e s . P a i n e  - one of the 
first of those terrible simplifiers who mistake ignorance for an 
uncluttered mind - always insisted that he had never read Locke: 
nonetheless his very negative view of government makes him a more 
faithful disciple of Locke than ever Priestley was. All three want 
minimal government, but Priestley is much more respectful than the other 
two of what government there is. He believes that government must be 
minimal not because synthetic investigation of the state of nature has 
brought him to this conclusion but because only a minimal government can 
properly serve both as man's instrument of self-preservation and as 
God's instrument of human improvement. As an instrument, it is more 
like an umbrella than a hammer: beneath its protective canopy, 
philosophers can explore God's universe and religious societies can 
offer rival interpretations of God's word; for this in the only way to 
truth and unanimity.
Two years before the publication of Priestley's Essay, the 
Reverend Dr. John Brown, whose thoughts on education had provoked it, 
died by his own hand. Not long before that, however, he had enjoyed 
great success as the author of the Estimate of the Manners and 
Principles of the Times; a very lively polemic in which he had sought 
the origins of 'our public Miscarriages' not in the actions of the 
nation's rulers but rather, as Montesquieu - 'the greatest of all 
political Writers' - advises, in 'the manners and Principles of its 
People'. These he found to be corrupt. The age, he says, is one not of 
'abandoned Wickedness and Profligacy' but of 'vain, luxurious, and 
selfish EFFEMINACY.'57
Many circumstances have contributed to this regrettable state of 
affairs, from the Grand Tour ('premature and indigested Travel') to 
frivolous habits of reading, from the false delicacy of life in the 
capital to the malign effects of modem carpentry, which, by providing 
town houses with well-jointed windows and doors, has excluded from
C O
English life all invigorating drafts of cold northern air. But the 
chief factor is the 'mistaken Tenderness and Care' with which young 
children are educated, and it was to this that Brown turned in 1765, 
when, finding that matters had grown worse, he published his Thoughts on 
Civil Liberty, on Licentiousness, and Faction. The infant mind, he says 
in this new work, is 'pregnant with a Variety of Passions'; it is the 
business of education to ensure that these are fixed on their proper 
objects and to embue the child with 'public Spirit, or the Love of our
Country; the highest Passion that can sway the human Heart, considered 
as a permanent Foundation of true Liberty.'^
In speaking thus of patriotism, in urging the need for a rugged 
spirit of self-defence, in deploying a vocabulary in which •corruption', 
'degeneracy' and 'luxury' are key words, Brown places himself squarely 
in a very ancient tradition of political thought. It was born in the 
classical world, in the writings of Aristotle and Polybius, regenerated 
in the renaissance by certain Florentine authors of whom Machiavelli was 
the greatest, and transported to England in the seventeenth century. 
There it came to be associated with those radicals whom modem 
historians call the Commonwealthmen and who were to be found over the 
next hundred years among the enemies of the House of Stuart, the 
opposition to Robert Walpole, the friends of John Wilkes and the 
members of the Society for the Supporters of the Bill of Rights. 0 
According to this tradition, generally known as 'republicanism' or 
'civic humanism', man can find fulfilment only in the life of the 
citizen: the true sphere of human existence is not private but 
political. And if the end, or telos, of the citizen is the service of 
the republic, the telos of the republic is nothing but the preservation 
of itself in a condition of perfect stability; for change is corruption 
and history an enemy of the state. Any alteration in their mode of life 
which may disrupt the equality in which the citizens live, or, worse, 
seduce them from the pursuit of the common welfare to the pursuit of 
private good, is corruption. And of all things tending to corrupt, 
luxury is particularly to be feared: it enfeeble the citizenry, it 
diminishes their spirit of self-defence, inclining them to pay others to
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fight rather than to fight for themselves. But luxury is, of course, 
the child of wealth, which may itself be b o m  of the republican virtues 
of frugality and industry, so all republics are liable to run what one 
of Handel’s librettists called 'the same shadowy round of fancied 
greatness': from virtue to wealth, from wealth to luxury, from luxury 
to corruption and from corruption to decline. However, corruption, once 
smelt out, may be repelled by a renewal of public spirit, such as that 
to which Brown called his fellow countrymen: the ways of luxury must be 
abandoned and public affairs must once again become the supreme concern 
of all.
By assuming that man is b o m  not a blank slate but a political 
animal and by making the boundaries of the moral universe coincide with 
those of the state, classical republicanism provides almost as powerful 
a system of political legitimation as one could wish for; and by doing 
so in a way that is markedly secular, it circumvents whatever moral or 
epistemological problems may have been posed by the tumults of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This, indeed, is why it is worth 
comparing Brown to Priestley: they stand as representatives of two 
opposing traditions of English political thought, both of which have 
their origins in the search for the Godly magistrate.
For the people of the seventeenth century, magistracy had been 
part of the cosmic order, but in 1649, an anointed king was tried and 
beheaded, and traditional magistracy collapsed. God seemed to have 
withheld his word as to where authority lay and, as J.G.A. Pocock tells 
us, theorists were faced 'with the necessity of re-conceptualising it 
from its f o u n d a t i o n s . O n e  might set about this task, without making
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any mention of a state of nature, by assuming that men are essentially
u/A/cZf
political animalsj This is what James Harrington did in his Oceana, 
published in 1656,
On the other hand, one might try to show how possessions and 
rights could have been acquired by individuals who had been set first in 
a state of nature. As applied by Thomas Hobbes in his Leviathan 
(published six years before Harrington's book), this method requires 
far-reaching, and very grim, assumptions about human nature, and it is 
more radical than Harrington’s method in that it concerns itself with 
what went on before any polis existed. Its appeal to a lover of 
objectivity like Priestley is clear: emerging from a tradition that is 
juristic rather than political, it defines the citizen by whatever 
rights he may have acquired rather than by the virtues which he may have 
to exercise in order to fulfil his telos as man; and though the claim to 
rights may be contested, all argument must be conducted coram populo, 
leaving discussion of ultimate ends to the private and the inferential.
But within this juristic tradition problems may arise which it 
seems ill-equipped to tackle. Priestley, for example, naturally unable 
to embrace Hobbes' authoritarianism, is faced with the difficulty of 
reconciling freedom of conscience with the need to keep the political 
show on the road. Knowledge, he believes, is indivisible; to deny 
liberty of conscience in one area of thought is to prevent that free 
play of the mind which is necessary if truth is to be sought anywhere 
else. A religious establishment, even one that tolerates dissent, 
necessarily shackles the seeker after truth and so frustrates the
ultimate purpose of government, which can be achieved only by 
experimentation. But how is an untutored mind, one that has as yet 
received few associations, to assess its experiments? Reason cannot be 
relied upon here, because reason - as Priestley's philosophy implies, 
though he fails to acknowledge the fact - is incapable of activity until 
moved by the affections; and 'the true theory of human affections' 
teaches that they take their egoistic rise from the pleasurable 
sensations derived from favours received. There is no question but 
that a mind so constituted may easily be corrupted in infancy by the 
gaudy blandishments of vice, nor can it be doubted that minds corrupted 
in this way make at best for unreliable citizens. But were the state to 
assert its interest in the case by interfering in the instruction of its 
potential citizens, it would threaten ruin to itself by restricting 
freedom of education. This is a vicious circle from which only Divine 
Providence, working through the laws of necessity, can rescue us; but 
that promise of rescue lies in a future too indefinitely removed to be 
consoling to minds less philosophical than Priestley's.
If, however, man's moral destiny lies wholly within the state, 
then a system of education that inculcates good citizenship is not only 
allowable but morally imperative. Reason's new and humble status will 
represent no threat to such a system. Indeed, Brown is able to speak 
quite openly of it:
they are superficially informed of the Frame and Tenor of the 
human Mind, who think that mere Reason (as it exists in Man) is 
more than a Power of discerning and chusing the properist Means 
for attaining his desired Ends, whether these Ends be Good or 
Evil. The Passions, pre-established habits, and infused 
Principles of the Soul are the universal Motions to human Action. 
Where these point not to an End desired, reason may indolently
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exercise its Eyes; but can never find nor create an Object, of
Force sufficient to the Powers of the Soul and Body in Motion.
So the educational policies which Brown advocates will not violate the 
freedom of the infant mind; they will merely divert it to the best ends.
The attraction of classical republicanism lies in its ability to 
solve - or at least to avoid - problems like these, to provide some 
measure of moral and political certainty even in a secular world. 
Priestley responds to the challenge it poses by devoting much of his 
Essay to a defence of educational freedom (and what he says of state 
education may be applied, mutatis mutandis, to state religion).
However, republican ideas pervaded the thinking of so many educated men 
- Handel even set some of them to music in his oratorio Belshazzar - 
that it would be surprising if elements of them were not to be found in 
Priestley’s work. For example, he spoke much of corruption, in a 
religious and sometimes in a political context; and, as we have seen, he 
endorsed the programme of political reform associated with the 
Commonwealthmen - more frequent election, the expulsion of placemen from 
Parliament, opposition to the influence of the court and the use of 
military power - and he feared, as they feared, for liberty of the press 
and for the Bill of Rights. But, equally, there is much in his 
political thought that seems to distance him from the republican 
tradition. He was suspicious of Machiavelli, whose 'very name conveys 
the idea of baseness and villainy as a politician', and he regarded 
Harrington as a mere utopian, ignorant of human nature and society. 
Neither, as we saw in an earlier chapter, did he nurse longings for the 
Anglo-Saxon constitution (an English twist on republican doctrine was to 
identify the ideal republic not only with a classical but also with a
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’Gothic' or Anglo-Saxon past of landowning warriors). Nor did he allow 
the cycle of corruption more than a very limited role in his thought. 
More than this, though, the very tenor of that thought - 
individualistic, optimistic, on the side of history - seems to harmonise 
ill with civic humanism’s sombre themes.
But civic humanism is not a regiment, such that one either is or 
is not a member of it, and Pocock, its most influential historian, is 
always careful (the idea is essential to his thought) to speak not of 
causes to be joined or of dogmas to be defended but of languages and 
paradigms. Two languages may, of course, be incompatible in as much as 
a string of words and constructions drawn eclectically from both may not 
be a well-formed sentence in either, but it is still possible to be 
bilingual. It is even possible to employ the phrases of one language in 
the sentences of another. ^ 5 So we need not suppose that Priestley 
intends either irony or argumenturn ad hominem when he asserts that the 
balance of the constitution will be preserved only if every man educates 
his children in his own way and that Brown's proposals threaten this 
balance. The Aristotelian or Polybian ideal of a mixed constitution - 
balancing elements of monarchy, of aristocracy and of democracy - was 
one of those aspects of republican thought that had become a
commonplace, for it was believed that this ideal was embodied in the
cc>Mfituh'on's
British condition-1^  balance of King, Lords and Commons. But which of 
these three, asks Priestley, could be entrusted with the sort of 
educational system that Brown advocates? His system would not have the 
effect intended unless it were 'universal and uniform'; it would not be 
universal and uniform unless it were 'conducted by one set of men'; but
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in a mixed constitution, composed 'of regal, aristocratical, and 
democratical power', there is no one set of men who so respect every 
part of the constitution that they could be entrusted with the care of 
young minds.
In his fears for the balance of the constitution and his belief 
that great power will always be abused, Priestley is typical of his age, 
though his admiration for the theory of a mixed government is 
considerably greater than his enthusiasm for the actual practice of 
contemporary British politics. This is apparent from the Lectures on 
History, in which he speaks of Britain's much-lauded balance in terms 
that are cool and cautious: 'We are not ... to be governed by names, but 
by things,' and the nature of things is this: Kings and Lords have 
little direct power - and that would be lost if they tried to use it 
against the people - but they have much influence, both direct and
£ Q
indirect, upon the Commons. A better form of government would be one 
in which the three interests - the One, the Few and the Many - truly 
balanced each other; a mere duality may produce imbalance, for one 
interest may secure a permanent advantage over the other, but a trinity 
is likely to preserve its equilibrium, since one of the three may always 
prefer to remain independent of the others and to shift its weight as 
advantage dictates. But, republican though all this may appear to be, 
the corollary that Priestley draws from it seems to reveal a train of 
thought that is quite unrepublican: 'it may be asserted, that the more 
distinct interests there are in a state, the easier it will be to 
preserve the balance of power with it.' ^ The republican advocates a 
balanced polity because each of the three interests which comprise it
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will represent one of the three principles of government. Priestley, on 
the other hand, is concerned not with the balance of principles but with 
the multiplication of powers: if three interests are better than two, 
four would better than three, and so on. This is not republican: it is 
the pluralism of a minority which would feel safer if everybody were in 
a minority. It is also the pluralism of the rationalist, who maintains 
that truth willsmerge from the experimental clash of interests.
This pluralism is Priestley's reason for valuing civil liberty so 
highly and for exalting it above that other form of liberty from which, 
he explains in the Essay, it must be distinguished: 'Political liberty,
I would say, consists in the power, which the members of the state 
reserve to themselves, of arriving at the public offices, or at least of 
having votes in the nomination of those who fill them: and I would chuse 
to call civil liberty that power over their own actions, which the 
members of the state reserve to themselves, and which their officers 
must not infringe. ' 70 Though Priestley describes this distinction as an 
innovation, it by no means originated with him: we find it, or something 
like it, at least as early as the fifteenth century, in the works of the 
Italian civic humanists. But what for them and for their ideological 
descendants was true liberty is for Priestley the less important of the 
two kinds; for him political liberty is valuable chiefly because it is 
'the only sure guard of civil liberty', and it is civil liberty which 
most engrosses his attention. 71
The two concepts of liberty arise in very different universes of 
discourse. Political liberty is fitted best to a universe in which the 
limits of conceivable human action are the frontiers of the state; a
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State thought of as an entity out of time, or, at least, as an entity
which must strive to be timeless against the corruptions of history.
Civil liberty, on the other hand, is a product of historical thought, of
thought about a time (real or imaginary) before the state, when all men
were completely free and each incursion on their freedom had to justify
itself by the canons of moral, rather than political, legitimacy. If,
Priestley argues, every government is in its origins 1 an equal
republic1, then no man will delegate his natural rights except 'for the
more easy management of public affairs and in order to make the more
effectual provision for the happiness of the whole.' In other words,
civil right is not something which the state allows the citizen; it is
something which the individual, in becoming a citizen, cedes in part to
the state so as to achieve some political benefit, and loyalty may
quite properly be withdrawn if the state reneges on its debt to its
79
moral creditor, the citizen. There need be little doubt when this has 
happened, because there is no doubt as to why loyalty was originally 
given: 'the good and happiness of ... the majority of the members of any 
state is the great standard by which everything relating to that state
70
must finally be determined.
How far from republican thought is this assertion of natural right 
against overweening government will become apparent if we turn to what 
Brown has to say about civil liberty. He distinguishes it not from 
political but from natural liberty; and natural liberty, he says, 
belongs to the state of nature, a savage state in which brutal human 
appetite encounters no restraint. This is a condition worse than that 
of animals, because it is contrary to nature: oian is a being formed for
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society, endowed with potentialities that can be realised only under the 
restraint which society imposes. True liberty is to be had only in 
society; it is not a residuum of the liberty exercised in a pre-social 
condition. There may be such a residuum, but in society it acquires a 
new name: ’an unlimited Indulgence of Appetite, which in the savage 
State is called natural Liberty, in the social State is stiled 
Licentiousness *, and licentiousness is one of those great corruptions 
which tend to the destruction of the state. What then is true liberty? 
Brown’s definition concedes very little to the right of private 
judgement: it is 'a certain System of Manners and principles, mutually 
supporting each other, and pervading the whole Community. ...'7^
Here lies the basic distinction between Brown's world of virtue 
and Priestley's world of rights. Law, which is universal and not merely 
civic, is concerned with what may be distributed, and as Pocock remarks, 
'you cannot distribute a telos, only the means to it; virtue cannot 
therefore be reduced to a matter of right. ' 75 The means to a telos is, 
of course, just what Priestley wants to distribute, and this is not 
merely a matter of apportioning rights to individuals nor of curtailing 
the pride of governments: if we are to enjoy that paradisaical condition 
which is our telos in as much as it is what the associative mechanisms 
of the mind will bring us to, then we must rely both on individual 
genius and on concerted effort. Priestley is in no doubt as to the 
importance of individual virtue to the successful operation of 
government, but, for him, the exercise of civic virtue is not itself the 
fulfilment of the human telos; it is merely a means to a divine end,
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just as government is an means, an instrument in the hands of 
providence.
Of course, corrupt public morals may stand in the way of this
divine end, just as they may stand in the way of the civic ends which
Brown describes. Priestley, who has filled his sermons with
observations on the ill effects of bad society on the Christian mind,
knows this as well as Brown does, and this awareness gives his
philosophy of education an initial similarity to Brown1 s. Human nature,
he explains in the Miscellaneous Observations Concerning Education which
he published in 1778, is so constituted that it will adapt itself to any
circumstances in which it is placed; so nature is the best of all
tutors. She, however, gives her lessons at random, and human life is
short. Besides, the world, as opposed to nature, man's handiwork as
opposed to God's, is not at all a good tutor; it will neither punish
irregularity nor encourage virtue. Consequently, great care must be
taken by educators to protect their charges from the contagion of vice
in this 'foolish and corrupt age'.7^ This is all very like Brown and it
soon becomes more so, for Priestley goes on to condemn as mistaken the
but
idea that children should be taught nothing buy what they can 
understand. Divine Providence, he knows, proceeds in a quite different 
way: it shows us things long before we can appreciate what they are or 
what they have to teach us, and the labour of discovering their true 
significance greatly enhances their value to us. So it should be with 
children: they should be accustomed first 'to the outward forms' of 
religion, of etiquette and respect, thus acquiring a 'mechanical habit'
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which will prepare the way, as nothing else could have done, for 'a 
rational knowledge and practice. ' 77
Like Brown, Priestley pauses to consider whether this is not 
inculcating truth 'by such a kind of mechanical prejudice as would 
enforce the belief of any thing,' and, like Brown, he decides that it is 
not. The education of children can only take the form of 'prejudicing 
them in favour of our own opinions and practice' before they are capable 
of rational conviction. Reward and punishment can be the only
70
educators. 0 But the teacher, though he performs a task which 
Providence has delegated to him, must not seek to usurp that divine 
authority. It is not he but Providence who is the chief protagonist of 
the Essay, where it is explained that Providence must continue to work, 
as it has always worked, through the mechanism of associations. And if 
we withhold our Brownian spanner from the works, this mechanism will 
bring good out of evil just as it brought letters and arts out of the 
turmoil of Athenian life. Better this turmoil than the stagnation of 
John Brown's much-admired Sparta. This is a theme strikingly 
illustrated by British history, which reveals fefean Providence, having 
great things in store for the British people, has conducted them through 
successive convulsions and changes out of that condition of pagan 
ignorance in which they surely would have remained if some Druidical Dr. 
Brown had had his way. Under the supervision of Providence, societies 
learn, just as children leam, in the school of experience, self-tuition 
and hard knocks. Perhaps it may be possible to experiment over-boIdly, 
but acceleration is never as dangerous as too much use of the snaffle 
and the curb.7^
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It is here, rather than when he talks of the happiness of the 
greatest number, that Priestley seems to anticipate the Utilitarians, 
and it is John Stuart Mill whom he most resembles, not Bentham. Like 
Mill he offers a sober celebration of variety and eccentricity, of
on
individual genius and 'experiments in living.'ou Only if education is 
conducted with 'unbounded liberty, and even caprice', can human nature 
be brought to perfection. A uniform system of education will produce a 
dull consistency among men and women, but 'new, and seemingly irregular 
methods' will give us at least a chance of 'something extraordinary and 
uncommonly great'. Of course, they may also give us something merely 
odd, but the world is so various a place that there is no lack in it of
o - i
room for eccentric genius.
V.
It is hardly surprising that Priestley, writing as he does of an 
educational free market, should regret the parliamentary restraints 
under which manufacturing has laboured and hope that education will not
oo
suffer the same impositions. The point is not that education may be 
subsumed under an economic model, but that the human activities of 
learning, of making things and of exchanging them are all to be seen as 
part of one great plan of history. The plan itself tells us, of course, 
that all will be well if teachers, manufacturers and merchants are left 
to their own devices, but within it is a psychological theory which 
explains how commerce and education may be of mutual benefit to each 
other.
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Brown presents things in a very different light. Commerce, or 
’regulated selfishness' - though innocent enough, and even useful, in 
its early stages - will ultimately have disastrous effects: avarice, 
luxury, excessive refinement and loss of principle. He has a 
psychological theory to account for this, and indeed for the whole turn 
of the cycle from industry to corruption: 'The Passion for Money, being 
founded, not in Sense, but Imagination, admits of no Satiety, like those
QO
which are called the natural Passions.'OJ It is therefore able to crowd 
out all those other passions, so that trading nations are always ruled 
by industry and avarice. Exorbitant property, ever unfavourable to 
civil liberty, always produces licentiousness and faction. So it is in 
the interests of even the rich, and ''tis certainly the general Interest 
of a free Community*, that there be some legal limit to individual 
wealth.8^
Republican thought detected other perils, as well as these, in 
commercial life. The ancient polis was composed of equal and 
independent freeholders. Each citizen was at once senator, soldier, 
father, farmer - and, it was sometimes pointed out, slaveholder - but 
the citizen of a commercial state was usually one thing only; he paid 
others to fight for him, thus admitting that instrument of tyranny, a 
standing army. Worse, his property was in many cases not solid, real 
property, the real estate of the freeholder, but mere credit; a bundle 
of promissory notes whose value depended upon the future stability of 
government and, consequently, upon something which, properly speaking, 
did not as yet exist. The sovereign advantage enjoyed by the freeholder 
in land was his independence: the very ground on which he stood gave a
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material foundation to that personal autonomy without which he could not 
be a good citizen. The merchant, on the other hand, depended for his 
subsistence upon his relations with others, and these relations were not 
the political relations of citizen with citizen; they were purely 
instrumental, founded upon fantasy and passion. To this, however, the 
merchant, or those who spoke for him, could reply with an alternative 
psychology more suited to a mobile commercial society. It was necessary 
for them merely to admit what at first they found it difficult to admit: 
that, as Pocock puts it, 'passion, opinion, and imagination were indeed
or
the motors of human behaviour and the sources of human cognition.'
Of course, Priestley - who in his own work had raised opinio to a 
status close to that of scientia - had no difficulty in admitting any of 
this. Indeed, when he turns to the subject in the Lectures on History, 
he writes as one who has a cause to champion. He acknowledges the 
widespread belief 'that living in luxury tends to make men effeminate 
and cowardly', but not before pointing out that the conveniences of life 
make people happy and that luxury may be favourable to liberty, for when
men acquire property they begin to desire equal laws that will help them
0 /1
to preserve it. . Instead of regarding luxury, even the luxury of a 
well-joined window frame, as the misbegotten child of industry, he 
suggests that a desire for ornament ('that innocent and really useful 
branch of luxury') actually promotes habits of industry. For this 
reason the vanity of the Frenchman is preferable to the pride of the
07
Spaniard; the one conduces to industry, the other to idleness.
But it is commerce, and not merely the luxury which it makes 
possible, that needs to be defended: it needs to be defended against the
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republican belief that it is irreconcilable with virtue because it is 
inimical to moral autonomy. In Brown’s work this belief is embodied in 
a psychological argument purporting to show that commerce not only 
begins in selfishness but ends there as well. According to Brown, in 
commercial states avarice represents wealth as the chief good; in mixed 
states (those founded on agriculture as well as commerce), effeminacy 
represents pleasure as the chief good. 'These Delusions,' he says, 
'create a new Train of Wants, Fears, Hopes, and Wishes: All these 
terminating in selfish Regard, naturally destroy every Effort of
OQ
generous and public Principle. ' 00 This is bad enough, but there are
other reasons for being suspicious of commerce, and Brown draws
attention to them when he speaks contemptuously of those who will pay
for an army but n9t fight in one.8^ He was not alone in his fears; as
many saw it, commerce was dangerous because it allowed not merely luxury
but also choice, and choice made for specialisation, which led to
corruption. Priestley knew of this possibility but it did not much
trouble him. Having read of the division of labour in the Wealth of
Nations, he thought specialisation in industry very conducive to
efficiency and, though he sometimes speaks in rather republican terms of
the dangers of specialisation, he seems to take it for granted in what
from.
he has to say about one of the greatest benefits to be derived £orm
90commerce.
That benefit is the growth and diffusion of political knowledge 
and of the other useful sciences. And, like all the benefits that 
derive from commerce, this knowledge is particularly prevalent amongst 
the trading classes. Indeed, Priestley's description of them as 'the
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middle classes of life1 (a use of the term which considerably antedates 
the earliest recorded in the Oxford English Dictionary) is itself 
significant. Being in the middle, these good people are free alike from 
’fear of want’ and the distracting idleness of wealth; they are not only 
happier and more virtuous than the upper classes but more polite too, 
for the more time people spend in the company of their equals, the more 
they will learn to accommodate themselves to others.^1 The life of the 
small businessman is, indeed, not without its dangers - 'buying and 
selling in a small way ... is apt to lead to mean tricks' - but the 
merchant is a princely figure: 'as by his traffic he connects distant 
countries, conveying to each the peculiar produce of the rest, he is, in 
an eminent degree, the benefactor of his species; he has many 
opportunities of enlarging and improving his mind; and, in fact, many 
merchants do certainly, together with great opulence, acquire the 
generosity of princes, and are foremost in all public benevolent 
u n d e r t a k i n g s . S o  beneficent, in fact, are the effects of commerce, 
and so complex its operations, that on no account ('as Dr. Smith justly 
observes') should kings and ministers seek to interfere with what they 
cannot understand.^
There are traces here of the theory, very popular at the time, 
that commerce arises not when the passions are forceably tamed but when 
passion is opposed to passion or to interest. The idea was that men 
engaging in commerce had to restrain their destructive passions 
(ambition, the lust for power or for sex) in order to pursue the 
material interests which were b o m  of their acquisitive passions. Thus 
it was that coiunerce became, in Montesquieu's influential phrase,'le
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doux commerce1, an activity which, by bridling men's passions, softened 
their conduct. Priestley, who knew his Montesquieu, speaks of commerce 
in a similar way: it takes its rise from the union of human genius with 
that 'endless craving, to which the nature of man is subject,’ but, by 
bringing us ’into closer and more extensive connexions with our own 
species,’ it enlarges our minds and cures our prejudice.^
Moreover, the causal connection between the growth of commerce and 
the growth of knowledge does not operate in one direction only. Rather, 
commerce is joined to knowledge, knowledge to peace, and peace to 
commerce in a circle of amiable symbioses. Thus we learn from Priestley 
that knowledge is the product of economic surplus, for as wealth 
accumulates, the economically-unproductive classes will increase in 
size, and so, consequently, will the number of those whose 'leisure for 
speculation' allows them to inquire into the mechanism of the society in 
which they live. Naturally, they will strive to ensure that their 
treasure is well spent on government, defence, religion and the care of 
the sick, and, it may be hoped, they will know that the true interest of 
a commercial nation lies in peace.^ And peace, b o m  of mercantile 
self-interest, makes possible more than one sort of commerce, for 
'nothing is so favourable to the rise and progress of learning and the 
arts as a number of neighbouring independent states, connected by 
commerce and policy.
The point is not simply that knowledge reveals to nations that 
their true self-interest lies in peaceable trade. It is also that the 
filaments of commerce are so many and so subtle that those engaged in 
it, whether nations or individuals, find themselves bound to each other
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by countless ties of affection and interest. The associationist scheme 
of things described by Hartley has a place and a name for these ties: 
they are the sympathetic affections, generated, Hartley explains, out of 
sensation by way of imagination, ambition and self-interest. They cause 
both pleasures and pains - for as we may sympathetically rejoice or 
grieve at the happiness of others, so we may rejoice or grieve at their 
misery - and among their pleasures 'is Sociality, or the Pleasure which 
we take in the mere Company and Conversation of Others, particularly of 
our friends and Acquaintances, and which is attended with mutual 
Affability, Complaisance and Candour.' We would expect this sociality 
to engender politeness, and for Hartley it probably does (since in the 
world of associationism few things are unconnected with each other), 
but, more strikingly, Hartley also believes that politeness engenders 
sociality; the rules of good manners demand obedience even when they do 
not meet with internal assent, but polite behaviour will at last, thanks 
to the machinery of associations, beget polite f e e l i n g s . I n  this way 
associationism can account for the softening effects of commerce: if 
business is to be carried on, then men and nations must at least behave 
politely to each other, and if they behave politely, they will come to 
feel politely. This being so, it is not surprising that the mercantile 
classes should be so polite, nor that the ancient republics, which knew 
little of commerce, should have been so lacking in this quality.
Politeness is important to Priestley, for he believes that no 
society can be happy without it, and so is the knowledge of politeness, 
for he believes also that no society can be polite unless it knows what 
politeness is:
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True politeness is the art of seeming to be habitually influenced 
by those virtues and good dispositions of mind which must 
contribute to the ease and the pleasure of those we converse with. 
And wherever nature lias given the mind a propensity to any vice, 
or any quality disagreeable to others, refined good-breeding has 
taught them to throw the bias on the opposite side, and to 
preserve the appearance of sentiments quite contrary to those they 
are naturally inclined to.
The suggestion here is that politeness, consistent with what Hartley 
says on the subject, is not a matter of moral virtue or sincerity but a 
skill learned in social intercourse. Republicans, unfortunately, have 
little opportunity of perfecting their social skills. Priestley knew of 
the importance of virtue to republics, but when he came to consider 
politeness, he found it conspicuously absent from the antique world:
’The haughty republican, who is constantly engages in a fierce 
contention for his own prerogatives, is not likely to acquire a habit of 
condescension to others. ...'^ What really matters here is not the 
political or economic equality of the republics' citizens but the moral 
autonomy without which they cannot practice the virtue demanded of them 
by the state. That autonomy is best preserved if the citizen - be he 
Greek, Roman or Anglo-Saxon - is a freeholder in land, for then his 
property will be such as to involve him in a minimum number of 
transactions with others. 100 Obviously, then, his condition has nothing 
to do with the sociable equality enjoyed by the middling sort in a 
trading nation. This is why Priestley sees the republican as a haughty, 
jealous figure, and also why he sees any form of life, whether courtly 
or commercial, in which the individual is brought into significant 
contact with others as more conducive to politeness than life in the 
polis. He seems to have believed (as Daniel Defoe had believed before 
him) that a society without the specialisation that commerce encouraged.
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a society founded on military tenure, was a realm of barbarism and 
anarchy. He describes the chivalric heroism of the 'Gothic' freeholder 
as a virtue which would be useless in a well-regulated society, and he 
depicts the decline of the feudal system as the rise of order out of 
chaos.
Others took a similarly disenchanted view of the antique world. 
Hume, Montesquieu and Gibbon, and after them the political economists of 
Scotland, agreed that the liberty and equality of republican society 
engendered a certain gracelessness and were unfriendly to the polite 
arts. It was proper, they declared, that the citizen take advantage of 
what a market economy with its division of labour had to offer, that he 
pay specialists to defend and to govern him, so allowing himself leisure 
for the polite conversation and cultivated pursuits of which antiquity 
knew nothing. Here, the intellectuals of Edinburgh and Glasgow found a 
model in the Image of polite society, urban and urbane, which Joseph 
Addison had described in London.10^ During the first two decades of the 
century, Addison had used the pages of the Spectator to describe the 
club of which his eponymous narrator was a member. Here the country 
squire, the rich merchant, the soldier, the lawyer and the clergyman 
could all meet and talk together freely on terms of equality. It was a 
microcosm of a world which did not yet exist but which might come to be: 
an orderly, tolerant society in which man could realise himself as the 
sociable animal that he truly was.10^ Addison's ideal was iniddle-class 
and mercantile, but he rejected Defoe's naked, buccaneering picture of 
capitalism in favour of something very close to what we later find in 
Priestley's work. Trade, even trade in what is merely 'convenient and
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ornamental1, smooths down the rough edges of English provincialism, 
making Englishmen 'kind, benevolent, and open-hearted to their fellow- 
creatures. ' In short, it makes them candid, in the full eighteenth- 
century sense of the term.
What Mr. Spectator and his friends achieved in their club, 
Priestley (who admired Addison's work) sought to achieve by 
correspondence. In 1769 he founded the Theological Repository, a 
journal 'Consisting of Original Essays, Hints, Queries, &c. calculated 
to promote Religious Knowledge.' He explained in his introduction to 
the first number that the best way of promoting such knowledge was to 
promote the communication of ideas; and, in order that the range of 
available ideas be as wide as possible, the pages of the Repository 
would, he went on, be open 'not only to all denominations of Christians, 
but to persons who disbelieve Christianity and revelation in general.' 
Christians were to be encouraged to publish objections to their own 
faith, for everything was to be open to examination and all arguments 
were to be treated with 'candour and respect. ' 105 It was a bold 
concept, assuming as it did a national constituency of the like-minded 
and the candid, and Priestley celebrated it by displaying on the title 
page of his first number an epigraph from the Epistles of Horace:
... si quid novisti rectius istis
Candidus imperti ...
These lines - which a contemporary translator rendered as, 'If you know 
any maxims better that these, impart them with your usual candour ...' - 
seem to have meant a good deal to educated men in the earlier part of 
the century: Pope wrote an imitation of the epistle in which they
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appear, and he used the lines themselves as epigraph to his Essay on 
Criticism; Lord Chesterfield quoted them in three of his letters; 
Fielding quoted them in his journalism; Steele used them as epigraph to 
an issue of the Tatler and Addison as epigraph to an issue of the 
Spectator.10^ There is something poignant in this, particularly in 
Priestley's use of lines which Addison also had employed; for even as he 
wrote, the candid society which Addison had evoked in the Spectator, and 
which he had tried to invoke by means of the Repository, was slipping 
irrevocably from the realm of the possible. The year 1763 may serve 
symbolically as the turning point, for it was in that year that the 
Reverend Charles Churchill published his Epistle to William Hogarth.
In Churchill's eyes, Hogarth's crime was to publish a malicious 
caricature of John Wilkes's eminently-caricaturable features, sketched 
whilst the Court of Common Pleas was restoring him to liberty. Virtues 
like Wilkes's, says Churchill, seldom go unpunished; but then, after 
fifty-two lines, the flow of his indignation is checked:
CANDOUR, who with the charity of Paul,
Still thinks the best, when'er she thinks at all,
With the sweet milk of human kindness bless'd 
The furious ardour of my zeal repress'd. '
Candour urges the poet to abandon his satire and to follow 'soul- 
soothing PANEGYRIC'S flow'ry way'. But the poet will have none of this:
When Justice bids me on, shall I delay 
Because insipid CANDOUR bars my way?
When she, of all alike the puling friend,
Would disappoint my Satire's noblest end,
When she to villains would a sanction give,
And shelter those who are not fit to live,
When she would screen the guilty from a blush 
And bids me spare whom Reason bids me crush,
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All leagues with CANDOUR proudly I resign;
She cannot be for Honour's turn, nor mine.
Candour, 'cold monster', though an 'equal-blooded judge', is not just. 
She is 'half foe, half friend', not merely to Churchill but to everyone. 
She gives to all more or less than their due, and so cannot be a true 
friend because she cannot be a true enemy. 108
Of course, Churchill cannot have been the first person in 
eighteenth-century England to be possessed by an honest rage which was 
not to be checked by the voice of moderation. He is distinctive, 
however, in finding it necessary to clear candour from his path before 
giving vent to his rage. The reason for this - the reason, that it, 
which the poem offers us - is that he had been provoked into speech by 
the threat of ruin to the nation's liberties and to 'that GREAT CHARTER, 
which our fathers bought with their best blood. ...' So great is his 
antipathy to candour that even when he does take notice of his victim's 
good points, he describes himself as acting not candidly but justly, for 
it is justice who,
... with equal course bids Satire flow,
And loves the Virtue of her greatest foe.
Of course, justice implies more than the lazy toleration of conflicting 
opinions: it also implies judgement between them. And, though the 
Epistle to William Hogarth was extreme, though candour had never been 
what Churchill represents it as being, it is worth asking why it was 
that a virtue which was so eminently the virtue of polite conversation 
could now be made to seem so insipid.110
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The function of candour in establishing a bridge between strangers 
may be expected to recommend it to all but the most isolationist of 
Dissenters. However, its appeal to those who called themselves Rational 
Dissenters surely lay also in its impersonality, in the fact that 
candour and sincerity were not the same thing. The old Puritans put 
their trust in those who could speak sincerely of the motions of the 
spirit within their hearts; the new Rational Dissenters, trusting to 
more objective criteria of religious authenticity, had less need of 
sincerity and its manifestations than of forms of behaviour that would 
enable people to deal honestly with each other without any spiritual 
interrogation. To move to their world of candour from the world of 
sincerity is to divert one's gaze from what people are and what they 
feel to what they say and what they do. 111 This being so, any 
alteration in the rhetorical atmosphere which pushes personality to the 
fore in public events is likely to have the most damaging effect on 
candour. Such a change was wrought by Churchill's friend John Wilkes, 
and Churchill's poem is a symptom of that change. Wilkes may not have 
been the first figure in English political life to derive his power from 
the magnetism of his personality (according to Plumb, he was just beaten 
to the post by the elder Pitt), but there was something strikingly new 
in the breadth and nature of his appeal.11^ The common people, artisans 
and labourers, felt that he was their friend and equal. His cause, he 
told them was their cause and responsibility for its success lay with 
them, even the humblest of them. Never had an English politician 
appealed so personally to so many people. .As Brewer remarks, Wilkes's
i  i  n
aspirations may not have been radical but his methods were. J
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It was at the height of the Wilkes affair that Edmund Burke
condemned as cant the popular motto of 'not men, but measures', and a
couple of years later, Junius, pseudonymous writer of letters to the
press and scourge of the ministry, spoke of it in very similar terms.
He called it 'the common cant of affected moderation', adding that,
'such gentle censure is not fitted to the present, degenerate state of
society.'11 *^ In earlier times character had mattered only in so far as
it might lead a man to support particular policies. Now, however,
policy was seen to be embodied in character: Wilkes embodied liberty,
his enemies embodied tyranny. 'An assassination of their character
sufficed to delegitimate the measures with which their names were
associated, ' writes Richard Sennett. 'The very basis of a public
gesture was therefore erased: public speeches of both friends and enemy
did not signify of themselves; they were only guides to the character of
the speaker. ' 115 So Churchill readily joins the mob in coupling the
names of Wilkes and liberty, and upon Wilkes's enemy Hogarth, vain
116lackey of the tyrant, he heaps the most personal abuse.
In such a climate, it was difficult to play the Addisonian censor, 
sociable though high-minded, just though forbearing, but that is what 
Priestley wanted his fellows Dissenters to do. He reminded them in a 
couple of sermons that they must live for others and not for themselves, 
and in the preface to one of these sermons he invoked, 'Dr. Hartley's 
Theory of the Human Affections. ' 117 Associationism explains to us why 
it is that the creator has appointed that all our appetites and desires 
should point to something beyond themselves; for by this means he has 
insured the 'mutual connexion, dependence and harmony' of his works.
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There can be no pleasure in solitude - all our passions, whether gloomy 
or cheerful, are contagious - and daily, as man advances 'to general 
happiness', the connections between men grown more numerous. 118 In a 
later sermon, he explains how such obligations are to be discharged: 
Christians owe to all their sympathy and charity, but they must also, 
'according to their several stations in life', labour to suppress vice 
and to advance virtue and religion. From this duty to advise and to set 
a good example, in the hostile world as well as in the meeting house, 
not even 'the most ignorant, poor and necessitous' are exempt.11^
It was a a heavy duty to lay upon a set of religious outcasts. 
Years before, Addison, by placing his own surrogate, Mr. Spectator, at 
the centre of a group of individuals who, though very disparate, were 
all members of the same club, had been able to give an earnest both of 
his forbearance and of theirs. But now it was becoming increasingly 
difficult to hate the sin while loving the sinner - in politics at 
least, sin and sinner were close to being one - and amidst such 
difficulties the spirit of candour began to grow faint.
Nonetheless, it would not be easy for Rational Dissenters to
abandon the idea of candour, and they never really did so, though the
last three decades of the century saw an alteration of the language in
which they sought reform. In the early seventies, many of them,
surveying the political scene, found reason for optimism when they saw,
or thought they saw, what Andrew Kippis described as, 'a generous prince
of the Brunswick line: a seemingly equitable administration: moderate
and wise members of both houses: candid bishops: a liberal spirit in all
120ranks of men and Toleration lifting her voice loudly in Europe. As
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things stood, English toleration was embodied in the Toleration Act of 
1689; which, however, exempted from prosecution only those Dissenters 
who would abjure the doctrine of transubstantiation and subscribe to 
most of the Articles of the Church of England, including the trinitarian 
creeds. It thus excluded form its provisions all Roman Catholics, 
deists, atheists and 'blasphemers of the Trinity'; the Establishment 
continued to assume authority over matters spiritual, allowing the 
citizen a certain freedom of worship but not recognising any right to
1 01
that freedom. But it was the language of candour, rather than the 
language of rights, that a group of metropolitan Rational Dissenters 
spoke when, in 1772, they sought repeal of the trinitarian articles of 
the Act. Their failure - the bill for their relief was passed by the 
Commons in 1773 but thrown out by the Lords - was doubly disillusioning. 
In the first place, it appeared to show that candour was not to be 
looked for in bishops or ministers of state. In the second place, and 
perhaps more importantly, it showed them that even their fellow 
Dissenters were not to be trusted; for the one thing that had guaranteed 
their failure had been a counter-petition from provincial Dissenters - 
Calvinists and trinitarians - who resented this attempt of urban 
Socinians to speak as though theirs was the voice of all Dissent.
Clearly, then, the appeal to candour was no longer going to be 
very useful; it struck no responsive chord in the Establishment's heart 
and, in any case, there was little use in asking them to listen candidly 
to the pleas of Dissent when Dissent was conspicuously not united on the 
matter. So it is easy to suppose that it must have been about this time 
that the language of the universal rights of man began to seem very
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attractive to Rational Dissent. By employing the language of natural 
rights, they could appeal not to the generosity of those in power but to 
their moral intelligence and their consciences. They would not be 
asking for something to be granted them: they would be asking for 
recognition that they already possessed it. And that recognition need 
not be swayed by numbers, so any amount of counter-petitions by 
provincial Dissenters would not (according to the presuppositions of 
this doctrine) affect the rights of the case.1^
Even before the failure of 1773, Priestley was telling his fellow 
Dissenters that, where they had hitherto appealed as Christians, they 
should 'stand forth now in the character of men'. They should 'ask for
190
the common rights of humanity. With the rejection of the appeal, he
abandoned his willingness to compromise: if nothing could be won by an 
appeal to candour, then why not go all the way and demand toleration as 
of right? In 1773 he had been prepared to admit that there was at least 
no harm in the state's demanding a religious declaration of the citizen; 
by the following year, however, after the defeat of the appeal, he would 
no longer countenance such accommodations. They had been made, he said, 
in the belief (engendered 'by the artifices of courtiers') that they 
would further the Dissenting c a u s e . N o w  they should be abandoned, 
having been shown up as futile. But although it was right and not 
toleration that were now to be sought (and sought for all, for Catholics 
and atheists as well as for Protestant Dissenters), Priestley could 
never abandon the appeal to candour; it was as essential to his thought 
as the rights of man, if only because he believed that rights were most 
clearly apparent to a candid gaze. Some such idea as this seems
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implicit in the words in which, as late as 1790, his friend Anna 
Laetitia Barbauld addressed the defenders of the Test and Corporation 
Acts:
We know you will refuse us while you are narrow minded, but you 
will not always be narrow minded. You have too much light and 
candour not to have more. ... We appeal to the certain, sure 
operation of increasing light and knowledge. ... 5
Indeed, Priestley was even to go so far as to suggest that candour might 
be more valuable than the 'right decision in any controversy': a candid 
controversy was one in which all the evidence was properly exhibited and 
both sides displayed a 'truly Christian temper' and 'the love of 
truth. ’ 126
But in the heightened rhetorical atmosphere of the years that
followed the Wilkes affair, many found it difficult to be candid,
Priestley not least among them. His own character did little to help
matters; though seldom waspish and hardly ever witty, he was an acerbic
writer, quick to take offence in controversy and very apt to give it.
Thomas Reid, one of the many victims of his zeal, suggested that 'from
D17 Hartley his Paragon,' he might 'have taken a Lesson of Meekness, good
Manners and Candor.' Samuel Badcock agreed. While conceding that the
enemies of materialism had treated Priestley uncandidly, he remarked
that Priestley himself had 'sometimes written as if he imagined that
1 97
occasions would justify the sacrifice of urbanity to zeal. '
The Theological Repository did not succeed; it had to be wound up 
after three volumes, and a later attempt at a revival failed, as 
Priestley confessed, for lack of sales. In the eighties, however, he 
tried to bring its spirit of candid conversation to a wide public by
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engaging in debate on several fronts on the issue of whether the 
primitive church had been Unitarian. But neither his character nor the 
spirit of the age was conducive to candour; the failure of this debate 
opens the final chapter in Priestley’s career as a radical in England.
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the people's consent), this subordination of Parliament has 
upset the balance of power, too. See p.236.
-307-
69. Ibid.t p.264. Properly speaking, we ought perhaps to 
distinguish between principles (monarchy, aristocracy, 
democracy), interests (crown, nobility, people) and powers 
(legislative, executive, judicial). Montesquieu does something 
like when he praises the British constitution for its balance 
of powers (Montesquieu [1748], 3k.XI, sec.6) and in this 
Priestley follows him, with due acknowledgement ([1788a],
pp.240-241). However, the first expression of the view that 
England enjoyed a mixed constitution - the Answer to the 
Nineteen Propositions of Both Houses of Parliament written for 
Charles I in 1642 by Lord Falkland and Sir John Culpepper - 
seemed to suggest that, just as the balance of principles was 
instantiated in the balance of interests, so the balance of 
interests was preserved by the allotment of one power to each 
interest. 'It was ...', says Pocock ([1975], p.364), 'a 
recurrent problem in Aristotelian theory to relate specific 
political functions to elements defined by their virtue; and in 
the case of English government, the problem was to prove 
particularly recalcitrant. The legislative power, being lodged 
in the trinity-in-unity of King-in-Parliament, could not be 
further employed in distinguishing between the powers 
supposedly allowed to the three elements; and we notice how, in 
the [Answer to the Nineteen Propositions] it is easier to state 
how each may check the excesses of the others than to specify 
just what powers the lords and commons wield.' But, he adds, 
the authors of the Answer did speak of the lords as 'entrusted 
with a judiciary power1, which suggestion 'appears in 
retrospect a step towards the later theory which equated "mixed 
government" with "separation of powers", assigning to the lords 
a judicial function while seeking to separate executive, 
judiciary and legislature in a way which clearly revealed how 
Aristotelian analysis was bedevilled by English parliamentary 
monarchy.' This equation survived into the eighteenth century: 
see Pocock [1985], pp.77-78. Of course, the virtue of a mixed 
constitution is that it avoids the defects inherent in each of 
the three forms of government, and these defects all have to do 
with the abuse of power, which is, of course, exercised by 
interests. However, it is possible to talk of a mixed 
constitution as balancing principles rather than interests, and 
this Priestley notably fails to do.
70. Priestley [1768a], pp.12-13.
71. C.f., Priestley [1788a], p.237. In his Oration at the Funeral 
of Nanni Strozzi (1488), Leonardo Bruni uses the term ’liberty' 
to mean both independence and self-government, and he calls 
'the true liberty' that liberty which consists of the 
maintenance of a free constitution in which every citizen has a 
part to play in government (quoted, Skinner [1978], i, 78). 
However, it is not clear from Skinner's account whether the 
humanists, when talking of independence, ever meant not just 
the independence of the city-state from foreign dominion but 
the independence of the individual from any external coercion. 
The distinction is discussed in a review of Pocock [1975] by
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Hexter ([1979], ch.vi), who finds it exemplified in a passage 
of the Acts of the Apostles. Pocock discusses the distinction 
and responds to Hexter in his [1931], p.53, and [1985], pp.40- 
44. It is around this distinction that Canovan shapes her
[1978]. The classic theoretical discussion is, of course, 
Berlin [1958].
Priestley [1768a], pp.41-42, 45. When Priestley comes to 
consider the loss of civil liberty, his language is often 
republican: he speaks of 'tyrannical governors, who have 'no 
friends but a few sycophants'; he invokes the Commonwealthman's 
heroes Russell and Sydney; and he speaks of the revolutionary 
as a ‘noble and daring patriot' (ibid., pp.36-37).
Ibid., p.17. These are the words at which Jeremy Bentham, if 
his own account is to be believed, 'cried out, as it were in an 
inward exctasy, Eureka.' He may have done so, but there is 
nothing utilitarian or proto-utilitarian in Priestley's words. 
For one thing, he talks, as utilitarians do not, of happiness 
and good; he does not identify the two, nor does he define 
'happiness' in a narrow non-moral and non-theological way. 
However, it is a happy (and good) fact that we need not labour 
to prise Priestley from the Benthamite embrace, since Margaret 
Canovan has already done the job very deftly in her [1984].
Brown [1765], pp.12-14, 25.
Pocock [1985], p.43.
Priestley [1778], p.33.
Ibid., pp.43-44. Priestley gives as his example the practice 
of lighting fires on Guy Fawkes' night, which, he says, early 
inspires children 'with an abhorrence of arbitrary power.'
Ibid., p.46.
Priestley [1768a], pp.131-132. Others - Defoe, Montes'quieu, 
Hume, Smith, Gibbon and Priestley's friend Jefferson - feared 
what Pocock ([1935], p.147) calls 'the nightmare utopias of 
Lycurgus' law or Plato's republic.'
The phrase is Mill's, of course (see Berlin [1958], pp.176- 
181). Berlin points out (p.188) that Mill's arguments are 
plausible only on the assumption that human knowledge is in 
principle fallible and incomplete. Priestley, of course, says 
explicitly that our knowledge is fallible and, though he does 
not believe that it must always remain incomplete, he does 
believe that completion is a very distant (though always 
glorious) prospect.
Priestley [1768a], p.145.
83. Brown [1758], i,22, 152-153, 155. On the theory that the love 
of money is founded upon nothing but imagination, see Pocock
[1981], p.64, [1985], pp.98-101, 112, and especially [1975], 
ch.xiii, where (p.435) he quotes Locke: 'Gold, Silver, and 
Diamonds, are things, that Fancy or Agreement hath put the 
Value on, more than real Use, and the necessary Support of 
Life.' (Locke [1690], ii, sec.46)
84. Brown [1765], pp.104-105, 149-150.
85. Pocock [1975], pp.458-459. See also Pocock [1985], p.97.
86. Priestley [1788a], pp.321, 354-355.
87. Ibid.f pp.354. 356, Priestley believes, of course, that any 
passion will be dangerous if carried to excess. The love of 
money is dangerous when it causes money to be treated as an end 
and not a means. See Priestley [1772-74], i, 104-108, and ii, 
39-45.
88. Brown [1758], i, 174.
89. Ibid., i, 197.
90. Priestley [1788a], pp.315-316, and [1778], pp.17, 60-63. On 
the dangers of specialisation, see Pocock [1975], p.430.
91. Priestley [1806], pp.114-115. (This part of the Memoirs was 
written in 1787.) For an earlier use of the term 'middle 
classes' see Priestley [1778], sec.xiv. The earliest use of 
the term 'the middle class' recorded in the Oxford English 
Dictionary is from 1812; that of the term 'the middle classes' 
is from 1831. The 'middling sort' had, however, been spoken of 
for rather longer: the first recorded use of the term is from 
1692, and in 1708 the Freeholder declared that 'The Middling 
People of England are generally Good-natured and Stout-hearted. 
...' In an interesting discussion of the eighteenth-century 
radicals' concept of the middle class, Kramnick ([1980], p.41) 
mentions John Aiken's use of the term 'the middle class ' in 
1790 and Mary Wollstonecraft's in 1792. See also Kramnick 
[1977], especially pp.517-521. The concept of the middling 
sort is, however, not unproblematic. For a discussion of the 
problems of interpretation and for references to Hume and 
Goldsmith, see Forbes [1975], pp.176-178..
92. Priestley [1778], pp.23-24.
93. Priestley [1788a], pp.315, 332.
94. Ibid., p.315, 332. On 'le doux commerce', see Montesquieu 
[1748], bk.xx, i, and Hirschman [1977J, especially pp.59-62.
95. Priestley [1788a], pp.313-315.
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96.
97. 
93.
99.
100. 
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
103.
109.
110.
111.
Ibid.t pp.322-323, 337.
Hartley [1749], i, 473.
Priestley [1733a], p.361.
Ibid., d .362.
See Pocock [1985], p.97.
Priestley [1788a], pp.283-284. On the idealisation of medieval 
society as one in which 'the "Gothic" freeholder had been at 
one and the same time his own warrior, judge, and legislator', 
see Pocock [1985], p.176. For Defoe, see ibid., p.231.
See Pocock [1981], p.67, and [1985], pp.131, 235-238. On this 
aspect of Addison's work see Bloom and Bloom [1971], chs.i-iii.
Joseph Addison, Spectator, no.9, 10 March 1711, quoted in Bloom 
and Bloom [1971], p.4.
Joseph Addison, Spectator, no.464, 22 August 1712, quoted in 
Bloom and Bloom [1971], p.12; Spectator, no.69, 19 May 1711, 
and Freeholder, no.34, 10 April 1716, quoted ibid., pp.64-65.
On Addison's repudiation of Defoe's ideas see Pocock [1985], 
pp.49, 236.
Priestley [1769d], pp.514, 517, 518.
For these references see Goad [1918], pp.157, 336-337, 374,
389, 484, 503, 591, 597, 600. The translation is from Watson 
[1741], ii, 233.
Churchill [1763], 11.55-58.
Ibid., 11.100, 101, 163-172.
Ibid., 11.401-402, 539-540.
Churchill's poem was 'the most bloody performance that has been 
published in my time', said David Garrick (in R.B. Peake, 
Memoirs of the Coleman Family, 1841, i, 71, quoted by Douglas 
Grant in his notes to Cnurcnill [1763], p.519). On candour as a 
conversational virtue and on the difficulty of maintaining 
truly candid conversation, see Davie [1964].
C.f. Sennett [1977], p.39: 'to the extent a public geography 
exists, social expression will be conceived of as presentation 
to other people of feelings which signify in and of themselves, 
rather than as representation to other people of feelings 
present and real to each self.'
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113.
114.
115.
112.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
Plumb says ([1950], pp.108-109) of Pitt that 'he could create 
the sense in all who listened to him that he was their 
mouthpiece.'
Brewer [1976], p.198. See also pp.170-171.
Junius, footnote (1772) to a letter of 7 October 1769, in 
Cannon (ed.) [1978], p.230 (quoted in Sennet [1977], p.104) and 
Burke [1770], p.41.
Sennet [1977], p.104. (This is quite consistent with Clark's 
claim that after 1760 political commitment became 
depersonalised. His point is that in a hierarchical society, 
the state was personified in its ruling family, so that 
political attitudes were cast in a personal mould, creating the 
possibility of expressing political choices in terms of 
dynastic allegiance.' (Clark [1935], p.197) After 1760, he 
believes, the choice lay between parties and not dynasties.
But, of course, dynasties do not embody principle like liberty, 
nor do they do as Pitt and Wilkes did and pose as the people's 
mouthpiece. Before 1760, we may say, politics was personalised 
in that political principle consisted of allegiance to persons; 
after 1760 politics was more truly personalised in that 
abstract principle was held to be personified by certain 
individuals who had no dynastic standing.) On Wilkes as the 
embodiment of liberty see, for example, Junius' letter of 8 
July 1769 (Cannon (ed.) [1978], pp.80-86). Of course, neither 
Junius nor Churchill was the first satirist to aim his darts at 
personalities. Boulton reminds us ([1963], p.24) that 
'pamphleteers and satirists have traditionally centred their 
attacks on personalities either real or imaginary'; but he adds 
that, 'It is, however, significant that the two major Augustan 
satirists, Pope and Swift, had moved increasingly in the 
direction of attacking leading individuals by name.' Junius 
himself invokes Pope in the footnote of 1777 cited in n.126 
above.
See, for example, Churchill [1763], 11.419-486.
Priestley [1787a], p.101. This sermon, 'on the duty of not 
living to ourselves', was delivered in 1764.
Ibid., p.126. Priestley believed that a shared relation 'to 
some common society' - a nation, a tribe, a family or even a 
trade - bound individuals to each other. See his [1770a], 
pp.431-432.
Priestley, 'Christians the salt of the earth', p.10, and the 
second of two untitled sermons on Matthew xxiv, 12, 13, p.17 
(MS. sermons, Manchester College, Oxford). See also ppp.6-7 of 
the latter sermon.
Andrew Kippis, Vindication of the Dissenting Ministers, London, 
1773, quoted in Lincoln [1938], p.210. See also pp.196-197 and
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Barlow [1962], pp.171-172, for descriptions of the situation 
that gave rise to this optimism.
122.
121.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
Barlow [1962], p.23. See Stephen [1982] for the fullest 
account of the appeal against subscription.
The account given here differs somewhat from those given in 
Barlow [1962] ch.v and Lincoln [1938] ch.vi. Both of them 
argue, with impressive documentation, that the failure of the 
appeal for reform of the Toleration Act propelled Dissent out 
of the world of candour and into the world of rights. Thus 
Lincoln writes (p.211): ’The cry in 1790 was "give us back our 
rights which your government has usurped", but in 1772-3 it was 
no more than a plea for co-operation in erecting a common 
monument to Justice. ...’ and he says (p.183) of Dissent in 
those years that its faith in candour was 'shaken by the 
failures of those years.' I suspect they underestimate the 
extent to which it is possible to appeal simultaneously to 
candour and to rights: as I argue below, after 1773 Dissenters 
hoped that the dissemination of candour would result in the 
recognition of their rights. When even that hope had to be 
abandoned, there was to little to do but emigrate; which, of 
course, is what Priestley did in 1794. I would suggest also 
that Barlow and Lincoln do not recognise the extent to which 
the Dissenters of London could themselves be accused of 
behaving uncandidly in 1772 by claiming to speak for Dissent 
when they very obviously did not (this is argued vigorously in 
Davie [1982], pp.83-93). Consequently, they overlook the 
possibility that one of the tactical virtues of the appeal to 
rights was, as I have argued above, that it could be made over 
the heads of Calvinist Dissent.
Priestley [1773], pp.442, 443,450. Both Barlow ([1962], 
pp.195-198) and Lincoln ([1938], pp.218-235) cite this work in 
illustration of their argument about the abandonment of 
candour, though, of course, having been written before the 
rejection of the appeal, it cannot be taken as one of the 
effects of that rejection.
Priestley [1774a], p.485.
Barbauld [1790], p.30
Priestley [1781], postscript, p.2, quoted in Fitzpatrick
[1982], p.27
Thomas Reid to Richard Price, Edinburgh, 10 April 1775, in 
Peach and Thomas (eds.), p.195; Badcock [1780], pp.2-3. See 
also Dr. Williams's Library, Mss., 24.157, Samuel Kenrick to 
James Woodrow, Bewdley, 15 August, 1781: 'our Dr attacks yours 
[i.e., Adam Smith] wc a good deal more civility, & good 
manners, than 3 or 4 years ago he brandished his tawmahawk 
against the celebrated Oswald, Reid & Beattie.' Nine years 
later, on 28 September 1784, Kenrick was still upset by
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Priestley's incivility, writing to Woodrow that '... I confess 
there was a time that I highly blamed his furious attack on 
your harmless threefold Doctors. To treat the amiable 3eattie 
wttl such severity shocked me - & I thought the modest 
industrious Reid much too Roughly handled. I am not 
sufficiently acquainted wttl my hero's character to account for 
it.'
128. Priestley [1806], pp.122-123. There were six volumes in all, 
published in 1769, 1770, 1771, 1784, 1786 and 1788. Lindsey 
thought that the journal's discussion of the miraculous 
conception had done nothing to to improve its sales (letter to 
William Tayleur, 5 April 1785, in McLachlan (ed.) [1920], 
p.112.
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EPISODES IN THE LIFE OF JOSEPH PRIESTLEY: FROM 1730 TO 1794.
CHAPTER SIX.
The puritans were here so unreasonable 
as to complain of a partial and unfair 
management of the dispute; as if the 
search after truth were in any degree 
the object of such conferences, and a 
candid indifference, so rare even among 
private inquirers, in philosophical 
questions, could ever be expected among 
princes and prelates, in a theological 
controversy.
David Hume, 
The History of Great Britain
I.
With hindsight it is as easy to give a shape to Priestley's career 
as it is to give one to the century in which he flourished. In both 
cases, the final act seems to open in the late seventeen-eighties: there 
is a quickening of the pace, every utterance takes on an added weight, 
all the strands of the plot - and both are stories of self-conscious 
enlightenment - seem to be converging on a single scene. If, though, we 
do want to think in these terms, we will have to think of the 
catastrophes as being exactly two years apart; the two years that 
separate the fall of the Bastille from the riot that destroyed 
Priestley's house and laboratory on Bastille Day 1791.
Hindsight aside (if it ever can be put aside), there is a very 
definite sense of denouement about Priestley's Birmingham years and 
especially about the controversy that followed the publication of his
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History of the Corruptions of Christianity. Most of the threads that we
have traced in the preceding chapters can here be drawn together. By
1782, when the Corruptions appeared, he had long since abandoned a
number of orthodox Christian doctrines: the Trinity, atonement and
original sin, the divinity and pre-existence of Christ, the
immateriality of the soul. As we have seen, a painstaking, literal,
metaphor-demolishing way of reading scripture, founded in associationist
psychology, was what at first led him to reject these doctrines; though
he was much encouraged in his pursuit of these questions when his
philosophical work took him in the direction of a very general
materialism. Now, if, as Priestley believed, history does not proceed 
d^crHe
by discree-t revolutionary leaps, then it ought to be possible to trace 
the rise of each of these affronts to scripture and right reasoning.
This is what Priestley sought to do in the Corruptions, a thematically- 
organised history of the various doctrines that offended him, in which 
Platonist philosophy and the kingdoms of this earth are identified as 
the principle agencies of corruption.
Though Priestley sometimes spoke as if he thought of the 
Corruptions as the opening gambit in a conversation with orthodoxy, it 
is difficult to believe that he cannot have realised how polemical a 
work it must have seemed; he did, after all, dedicate it to his friend 
Tlieophilus Lindsey, who had taken opposition to established religion to 
the extent of leaving the Church of England to found a church of his 
own, run upon Unitarian lines. In the ensuing controversy, Priestley - 
faced with perhaps his most formidable antagonist - proceeded upon two 
assumptions, neither of them fully avowed, which together were to have
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disastrous consequences for him. The first arises from that extreme 
empiricism which had already been tempered in his polemic against the 
Scottish philosophers: for him all knowledge - or, at least, all the 
knowledge that counts in public controversy - is objective knowledge and 
all objective knowledge is of the same kind; there is no special 
knowledge, whether sacred or political, to which the standards of 
scientific investigation do not apply. The second assumption is that 
there can always be candid, open debate and a perfectly free market in 
opinion unaffected by changing political circumstances. Priestley seems 
not to have understood that people who could not accept the first 
assumption would not be able to accept the second. They would at least 
have an understanding of candour very different from his, and what to 
him were open and candid avowals of a difference in opinion increasingly 
looked to them like political agitation, naked and subversive.
II.
It is curious that a book which sets out to tell of Christianity 
pure and simple darkened by a love of pagan mysteries should draw its 
epigraph from a passage of the Gospels in which much is made of the 
esoteric nature of Christ's teaching:
For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more 
abundance: but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away 
even that he hath. Therefore speak I to them in parables: because 
seeing they see not; and hearing they hear not, neither do they 
understand.
The Son of i!an is not an empiricist; a blank slate is passive beneath 
the engraver's hand, but seed, however good, will not improve the ground 
on which it is sown unless that ground is already fertile. Even good
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seed sown on good ground may not yield the best results: 'Didst thou not 
sow good seed in they field?' a householder is asked by his servants.
9
'Whence then hath it tares?'“ Priestley takes these two questions for 
his epigraph, but he does not provide the answer to them, which is that 
an enemy has secretly sown tares among the wheat, nor does he mention 
what happens next: tares and wheat are allowed to grow together until 
the harvest, when the tares are gathered in and burned. His 
contemporary readers would have known all this, of course, and they 
would have recalled its original meaning: 'He that soweth the good seed 
is the Son of man; The field is the world, the good see are the children 
of the kingdom; but the tares are the children of the wicked one; The 
enemy that sowed them is the devil; the harvest is the end of the world; 
and the reapers are the angels.' Though this apocalyptic message 
resonates behind Priestley's title-page (to burst out in the closing 
pages of the second volume), it soon becomes clear the Priestley does 
not intend to write of a world corrupted by the children of the wicked 
one. It is Christian tradition and practice that have been corrupted, 
and every corruption is 'a departure from the original scheme, or an 
innovation.'J
To return to the original scheme is to make a radical journey; as 
Pocock points out, 'the posture appropriate to a rebel in a traditional 
society ... is that of a reactionary.'^ This is, of course, the posture 
of the Protestant, who desires a return to the pure religion of the 
Bible. It is, for the most part, Priestley's position, but his is not a 
traditional society; it is a society in transition, and he cannot remain 
untouched by that rationalistic form of radicalism which is so
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distinctively modem. It is to rationality - whether embodied as 
equity, efficiency, universalism or human rights - that the modem 
radical most readily appeals, and though the nature of the verdict is 
often debated, the jurisdiction of the court is seldom challenged. 
Priestley's leanings towards this sort of radicalism help him towards 
some answers to the question that must be asked of the more traditional 
sort of radical: if there is something in the past (a book, an event, a 
covenant, a charismatic figure) that can confer authority in the 
present, whence comes this authority if not from the continuity which 
the radical is challenging with his talk of corruption? And if, as the 
radical claims, this past something does not authorise present practice, 
what is its authority and why should we return to it? And why is its 
authority no longer actualised in present circumstances? The radical 
must legitimise his depiction of tradition, says Pocock, and in order to 
do this he must legitimise a picture of its beginnings. 5
But in the eighteenth century, both the Deists and a certain sort 
of high Catholic were doing their best to make this impossible. In 
1762, the French Jesuit Isaac Berruyer denied that the Church could 
enjoin acceptance of a doctrine merely because an early council had 
defined it; for there could only ever be probable evidence of the 
council's having made that decision or even of its having existed. Only 
the authority, the present authority, of the Church can command assent. 
Scripture cannot authorise doctrine; rather, Scripture is to be read in 
the light of doctrine which has already been accepted because of the 
Church' s authority. The past can, then, be known only through the 
present. Six years before, Conyers Middleton had - like Berruyer,
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though for different reasons - set out to show that none of the early 
Fathers' claims to miraculous authority could be upheld and that 
therefore any interpretation of Scripture which depended upon them must 
fall along with that authority. Both men had amployed a sceptical 
historiography in order to reassert a present authority: in one case 
that of the Catholic Church, in the other that of Protestant common 
sense. Both were unorthodox, but, though repudiated by the authorities 
they thought to serve, they posed a problem: how is the past to be 
reconstructed in a way that preserves or restores its authority?0
Priestley must, then, present and justify a picture of Biblical 
Christianity. The first Protestant reformers, whose aims were similar, 
did so by means of a claim to spiritual illumination: that divinity 
which had conferred authority on the Scriptures conferred it also upon 
them and so justified their scriptural interpretations. But, of course, 
this way is not open to Priestley, who maintains in the Corruptions his 
habitual dislike and distrust of the subjective, of any talk of 'inward 
consent' or of the 'miraculous work of grace' . 7 And so, denying, as 
usual, any importance to the private realm, he turns, as ever, to the 
public; like all rationalist radicals, he appeals to reason rather than 
to history. Of course, he cannot, like the deist or the political 
radical, appeal to reason alone and take his readers back to a state of 
nature, but (remembering, perhaps, that Robinson Crusoe was the only 
romance he read as a boy) he takes them as far as he can:
Suppose a number of persons, educated in the Christian faith, to 
be cast upon a remote island, without any bible. It is probable 
they would first of all lose all remembrances of the apostolical 
epistles, which may show that these are a part of the New 
Testament the least necessary to be attended to. After this, they 
would be apt to forget the particular discourses of our Lord; but 
the last thing they would retain would be the idea of a man, who
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had the most extraordinary power, spending his time performing 
benevolent miracles, voluntarily submitting to many 
inconveniences, and last of all to a painful death, in a certain 
expectation of being presently raised to an immortal life, and to 
great happiness, honour, and power after death; and that these his 
expectations were actually fulfilled. They would also remember 
that this person always recommended the practice of virtue, and 
assured his followers that they would also be raised again to 
immortal life and happiness, if they persevered in well doing, as 
he had done.
And who, Priestley asks, would deny these castaways the name of 
Christian?
The Christian as shipwrecked mariner, monarch of all he surveys, 
unencumbered by the Schoolmen, the Fathers or even the Apostles, is a 
figure who haunts the Corruptions. Though he is mentioned only once, we 
can easily detect his footprint whenever the author turns from history 
to reason, from exposition to criticism. The desert island serves 
Priestley as laboratory much as the state of nature has served others: 
just as rational man in a state of nature seeks whatever staples of 
survival the world can provide, so rational Christians on a desert 
island seek whatever staples of religion can be afforded by reason and 
memory.
The point of the state-of-nature argument is that, cutting away 
mere desire along with all that is purely accidental or customary, it 
concentrates our attention on men's needs and therefore on what they 
cannot be denied. It also (and this is its main purpose) shows how 
civil society may be legitimated: God has set men in this situation and 
given them not only their needs but also the capacity for co-operation 
which is the principal means of attending to these needs; and so civil 
society, the necessary product of their co-operation, must be lawful.
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In Priestley's argument there is a similar connection between human need 
and human capacity. God desires the salvation of castaways no less than 
anyone else's, but, since there is one revelation for all, no more iof it 
must be absolutely necessary than such lost people might be expected to 
remember. God, well knowing our human tendency to speculate and to be 
guided by general principles, has imparted to us information which, 
given our circumstances, we could not otherwise have acquired, and thus 
he prevents our forming 'very absurd notions' or engaging in 'foolish 
and pernicious p ra c ti c e s . T h i s information is contained in the 
Scriptures. We may subtract from it (we should not, though as forgetful 
castaways we may) but we must not add to it. Nor indeed would people 
left to their own devices have sought to do so.
However, what is most striking about Priestley's example is not 
the stark condition of his castaways but the poverty of their needs.
What they are supposed to have forgotten are discourses and doctrines, 
and what they are supposed to remember are the deeds and teachings of a 
great man: religious experience, liturgy and worship, the life of the 
church are never mentioned - we are not even told that they have been 
forgotten - and the one, the only, need or appetite which the argument 
lays bare is for 'immortal life and happiness'. In this, of course, man 
in the state of nature and the Christian castaway are agreed: both seek 
to prolong their existence, the one to the farthest possible limit of 
its earthly span and the other beyond even that point. Moreover, both 
seek to do so by treating an important form of human activity as purely 
instrumental. Men in a state of nature learn to behave politically in 
order to make room in their lives for other, non-political, ends.
-322-
Priestley's castaways, seeking immortal life and a happiness whose 
nature is not explained to us, seem to be doing something similar.
Their rather vestigial religious behaviour secures ends which are not 
defined in religious terms, and they do not regard as an end in itself 
that which they have treated instrumentally, any more than men newly 
emerged from a state of nature treat the life of the citizen as an end 
in itself. This point was made even more explicit by Priestley during 
the controversy which followed publication of his book: 'What is all 
religion', he asked, 'but a means to a certain end; and if any man can, 
in fact, attain to this end, viz. to lead a godly, righteous, and sober 
life, without Christianity ... he is as good a man, and as valuable a 
character, as any other person who attains the same end by the help of
u .-10
By ignoring all religious activity that is not directly end- 
related, Priestley at once makes the life of his castaways explicable in 
terns of his egoistic ethic and dismisses from the scene those 
institutions which give form and meaning to this activity. (Such a 
dismissal is, of course, implicit in the state-of-nature argument, 
though more brutally apparent in Paine's version of it than in 
Priestley's.) Whatever Priestley may have said about the value of 
'Christian societies', institutions must be banished from the desert 
island - as they usually are from liberal or radical considerations - 
because the whole of the Corruptions is devoted to showing that they do 
little but obstruct the vision. The ocean which has cast these 
Christians upon their island has also washed the prejudice from them, 
and Priestley would have his reader bathe in similar waters.
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He has spoken directly of this need for mental hygiene in The 
Scripture Doctrine of Remission, where he tried to show that Christ's 
purpose on earth was not to be learned of by the application of literal 
European minds to the gaudy arabesques of Asiatic prose. He returns to 
this theme now, proposing a way of reading scripture guided by 'general 
considerations, derived from the whole tenor of scripture, and the 
dictates of reason.' We must interpret the few obscure texts in the 
light of the the many clear ones and suspend judgement on whatever seems 
inconsistent with the plain message of the whole. 11 Thus we narrow our 
gaze to the essentials and forget the misleading graces of an alien 
style; doing deliberately, it may be said, what our Christian castaways 
have done through force of circumstance.
The false doctrines to which errors of interpretation give rise 
are not merely superfluous to salvation but positively dangerous to 
Giristianity:
For if the general body of Christians retains any doctrine as 
essential to revealed religion, which true philosophy shall prove 
to be actually false, the consequence will be, that the whole 
system will be rejected, by those who consider that tenet as an 
inseparable part of it. So greatly doth it behove us thaj; 
Christian knowledge should keep pace with philosophical.^
True philosophy (that is, Priestley's materialism and Hartley's 
associationism) coincides with true Christianity, both teaching that man 
is dust and that his only hope of a future life lies in the promise of 
bodily resurrection, but true philosophy is quite at odds with received 
Christian doctrine. So theological research, which consists in the 
excavation of precious objects inundated beneath the rubbish of 
centuries, must never lag behind scientific research; for Priestley it
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goes without saying that philosophy will not be the handmaiden of 
theology and that thinking men will reject Christianity if science 
appears to contradict it. The criteria of theological truth are secular 
and external: science must determine the nature of man, and the canons 
of historical interpretation - using tradition, testimony and the works 
of profane historians - must be employed to assess the authority of 
Scripture. And this authority, Priestley claims, is not always that of 
sacred charisma. St. Paul, for example, does not invariably appeal to 
divine inspiration; sometimes he argues; often he argues inconclusively; 
and when he does not reason, we must believe him simply as someone who 
is unlikely to have been deceived or to have had any interest in 
deceiving, and ’whose authority in general was supported by his power of 
working miracles.'^
Thus Priestley has shown, to his own satisfaction at least, that 
his picture of the roots of Christian tradition has the authority both 
of divine charisma and of reason. He has also shown what dangers may 
attend if this picture is ignored. This seems to answer two of the 
questions which Pocock asks of the radical in a traditional society: 
whence comes authority if not from tradition, and why should we return 
to the origins of our tradition? The third question - why is the 
authority of the origin no longer actualised in present circumstances? - 
remains to be answered. Priestley's epigraph, as interpreted by its 
author, answers very clearly: 'the tares are the children of the wicked 
one; The enemy that sowed them is the devil.' But Priestley has allowed 
the Prince of Darkness to slip, more or less unnoticed, from his 
cosmology. Indeed, it is difficult to see that he could with
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consistency have done otherwise: the devil cannot, of course, usurp the 
sovereign power which Priestley ascribes to God, that of setting up the 
providential mechanism of the universe, but neither could he interfere 
with its exercise unless he were able to do what even God will not do: 
directly influence the human mind and earthly affairs. The rise of 
Christianity, as Priestley tells Edward Gibbon in that part of the 
Corruption which is addressed to him, is a fact of such historic 
importance and involving so many people that it 'requires to be 
accounted for from the most obvious principles of human nature, 
principles common to all men, and all classes of men. ...' And if its 
rise is to be accounted for by natural means, so is its fall. The 
circumstance in which Christianity was promulgated caused all its
i r
corruptions; different circumstances will bring about its revcovery.
III.
The story is not a fast-moving one. It scarcely could be since, 
as Priestley has so often explained, God's influence on human affairs is 
not direct and cataclysmic but instead is mediated through secular 
circumstance. So in seeking to trace the growth of corruption, we must 
be sensitive to symptoms of gradual change: 'As the greatest things 
often take their rise from the smallest beginnings, so the worst things 
sometimes proceed from good intentions. ' 15 Those early heretics who 
introduced pagan spiritualism into Christianity did so only because they 
thought thereby to recoinmend their new faith to the heathen and to their 
philosophers. Other evils - the worship of dead men, called 'saints', 
the practice of granting indulgences and of hearing confessions, the
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'abuse of pilgrimages' - arose from similarly innocent beginnings, and
even that great corruption of church government, the transformation of
elected presbyters into appointed bishops, took place in a manner
l f)'gradual and easy. u
What we see here is, of course, providence operating according to 
that law of unintended consequences which Priestley has already 
identified in profane history. This law is even more strikingly 
demonstrated in the Corruptions by the effects that controversy is said 
to have had throughout the history of Caristianity. There are two such 
effects. First, controversy may cause people to clarify their 
doctrines: we may, Priestley suggests, reasonably suppose that the 
primitive church did not believe in atonement because, if it had, 
controversy would have drawn forth its senteLments on the subject. 17 
Second, the effect of controversy is also 'to push men as far as 
possible from that extreme which they wish to avoid, so as often to 
drive them into the opposite extreme.' Priestley makes his most 
explicit statement about this effect while considering the doctrine of 
predestination, but here his historical methods lead him to what seems a 
somewhat unfortunate admission. He points out that the medieval church 
had no consistent doctrine of atonement and that its doctors, though 
they agreed with St. Augustine about grace, 'were not without expedients 
to make room for the doctrine of the merit of good works, and even to 
provide a fund of merit, transferable to those who had it not, of which 
the court of Rome made a most intemperate use.' Believing thus in 
merit, they naturally had little reason to perfect the doctrine of 
atonement, which at its strongest leaves no room at all for merit. Now,
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Luther's initial objection to Papal policy centred on the sale of 
indulgences, a traffic which was justified by the doctrine of the fund 
of merit. Thus it happened that Luther and other reformers perfected 
the doctrine of atonement. 'In general ...' says Priestley, ’as the 
advocates of the church of Rome were inclined to explain away the 
doctrine of gracet and to introduce that of merit, those who wished for 
a reformation of the abuses of penance, purgatory, and indulgences, 
which were founded on the doctrine of merit, would lean to the other 
extreme, and lay great stress on the satisfaction made for the sin by 
the death of Christ alone.
Thus far Priestley's account of the sixteenth-century revolution 
in the history of the church resembles the account he gives of the 
scientific revolution of the following century. Like Descartes, Luther 
and Calvin could reform an erroneous system only on principles equally 
erroneous. And, we may infer, their system, like his, had the advantage 
that, though as erroneous as that which it replaced, it was not as 
inert; once the idea of reform was accepted, further reform was 
possible. But, enlarging on these matters, Priestley introduces a 
principle which, though it lies not far beneath the surface of his 
account of scientific revolution, only here emerges fully:
As good generally comes out of evil, so sometimes, and for a 
season at least, evil arises out of good. This, however, was 
remarkably the case with respect to these doctrines in consequence 
of the reformation by Luther. For the zeal of this great man 
against the doctrine of indulgences, and that of merit, as the 
foundation of it, unhappilly led him and others so far into the 
opposite extreme, that from his time the doctrines of grace, 
original sin, and predestination, have generally been termed the 
doctrines of the reformation, and every thing that does not agree 
with them has been termed popish, and branded with other 
opprobrious epithets.
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Tois admission that evil, even great evil, may come out of good inflicts 
a severe battering on Priestley’s theory of history. Central to that 
theory is a view of history as God's laboratory: no less than the 
natural world, the world of human activity is held to display an 
admirable fittedness of things and events one to another. But a problem 
arises if we admit, as Priestley now does, that evil sometimes arises 
out of good or that 'we are not authorized to expect any great good, 
without a proportionable mixture of evil.'^ A world in which good 
always arises out of evil may well be said to bespeak its divine 
origins, but a world in which evil also arises out of good looks no 
different from a world in which things just happen. Of course, it may 
still be a divinely-ordered world, and God will no doubt see to it that 
good arises out of that evil which has arisen out of good, but it will 
not be a world in which divine order is manifest. Not only will it have 
nothing to teach us, but it may even be said to resemble the distinctly 
secular world of the civic humanists, in which empires rise and fall 
obedient to blind fortune alone.
The problem, arising in the context of Priestley's discussion of 
Luther, is, of course, one that hovers over the whole of the 
Corruptions. We have seen that the third question which Pocock asks of 
the radical - why is the authority which we are asked to restore no 
longer actualised? - is implicitly answered by Priestley with an appeal 
to secular circumstances. God allows it and circumstances secure it: 
'This corrupt state of Christianity has, no doubt, been permitted by the 
supreme governor of the world for the best of purposes The
problem arises, of course, precisely because the evil, though 'in a
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proportionable mixture1 with the good, does not equal it. If the 
balance of good and evil were always one of exact equivalence, there 
would be no progress. But Priestley's problem is that he believes in 
progress and, consequently, that the good normally preponderates over 
the evil. For him the Reformation is not an event to be viewed 
dispassionately and appraised for its good and evil quantities; it is, 
beyond doubt, a great and good, not an indifferent, thing. Of course, 
if he could bring himself to see it as an evil thing, as the triumph of 
the doctrines of atonement and of sovereign grace, he could then present 
the weakening of Papal power and the discrediting of Popish superstition 
as good things arising out of this evil. But this he cannot do. The 
picture grows smoky and only with the eye of faith can we see the hand 
of God.
If, as all this seems to imply, history is ironic in the full 
Mandevillian sense, betraying the virtuous as well as the malicious, 
might it not be that normal historical processes will be insufficient to 
ensure the triumph of good? We need not, of course, expect any divine 
irruption except the last, apocalyptic, one; but we are told that the 
evil which Luther introduced was so great the we cannot reasonably hope 
for its removal 'till it shall please divine providence to overturn all 
these corrupt establishments of what is called Christianity, but, which 
have long been the secure retreat of doctrines disgraceful to 
C h r i s t i a n i t y . S o m e  abuses, like this one, may be so deep|y embedded 
that their removal will require something more radical that the gentle 
succession of revolutions which has so far characterised ecclesiastical 
history.
-330-
This embedding can in considerable measure be attributed to the 
power of associations, which, though Priestley never mentions it 
specifically, can easily be seen to underlie his thought in this book as 
in so many others. Christianity's single greatest corruption is, of 
course, the transformation of a man into a god, and this was the work of 
people well disposed to the Gospel who knew what hideous associations 
clustered around the idea of crucifixion.^5 And, though these victims 
of irony many have acted deliberately, others were the unwitting dupes 
of paganism, a system so extensive as to exert a powerful hold on men's 
minds even after they had been converted formally, and in their own eyes 
effectively, to another.
Habit, the effect of often-repeated associations, is the cause of
other abuses too. Christians who had been converted from paganism
'could not all at once divest themselves of their fondness for pomp and
mystery.' The Lord's Supper, instituted as a sharing of bread and wine
in memory of Christ, became in their hands a mystery to which only
initiates were admitted, like those rites which were 'so striking and
captivating' an aspect of heathen worship. D Baptism and the recital of
the apostles' creed were similarly perverted, and from all this it was a
short step to the pagan belief that it is not good thoughts and deeds
but the punctilious performance of certain rites that will commend us to
God. And in time the moral virtues ascribed to these divinely-ordained
actions cane to be ascribed also to other actions which, though related
27to matters religious, had not been commanded by God. Thus the sign of 
the cross, originally a means by which Christians could recognise each 
other, acquired a talismanic significance. So also did the sacraments
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and the use of holy waters. It is easy, of course, to provide an 
associationist explanation for this: Priestley himself had pointed out 
that ideas arising from the objects of passion are often transferred by 
association to 'indifferent objects' related to them either properly or 
accidentally.
In due course, the same processes of association which had given 
pagan ideas such a grip on the early Christian mind gave Popish ideas an 
equally strong grip on the minds of the first Protestants. Luther and 
Calvin could deny the spiritual power of the Papacy but not the 
infallibility of the universal church; they could repudiate the doctrine 
of transubstantiation but not their belief in some sort of real divine 
presence in the bread and wine. And the fact that not even they - nor 
even, as Priestley elsewhere makes clear, the Apostles themselves - were 
immune to the effects of association should impress upon us the 
importance of cleansing the mind. It should also leave us in no doubt
OQ
as to the enormous difficulty of the the task. ° We now see that the 
reason why Priestley's Christian castaways were assumed to remember 
nothing of Christian practice was that all practice is the the practice 
of churches and therefore corrupt. Degraded institutions exert such a 
hold on those trapped within them that even good and reforming 
intentions are perverted. For this reason it is simply not true that 
the early reformers of the English Church were as well placed as 
ourselves to judge of Christianity and that we may therefore rest 
satisfied with their reforms. It will not do to say that they had only 
to read the Scriptures, 'as if it required nothing more than eyes, 
capable of distinguishing the words of scripture, to enter into their
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real meaning. 1 On the contrary, the reformers, though they might 
pretend to be guided by Scripture alone, were prejudiced by their 
adherence to the doctrines of the second, third and later centuries: 'Or 
should the English reformers have seriously proposed to themselves to 
make the scriptures their only rule, how was it possible for them, 
educated as they were, in the complicated system of popery, to read them
o n
with unprejudiced eyes? y
Prejudice is the product of situation; or so Priestley, as a good
associationist, believes, candidly admitting that if he were a bishop he
would probably not be a reformer but would see things as bishops see
them. As long ago as 1769 he had suggested that the understandings of
erf:
men were all so similar ('as least so much, as that no persons can 
seriously maintain that two and two make five') that if all could read 
the same books uninfluenced by previous knowledge, they could not help 
but draw the same conclusions from them. In this, of course, he 
reflected the deep yearning of his epoch for some proof that the truth 
must be manifest to an unprejudiced eye or that free discussion, candid 
and unbiassed, must end in rational unanimity: earlier in the century, 
Swift had said that 'all rational and disinterested People in the World' 
would come to be of one religion if they did but talk together every 
day, and French writers had maintained that two painters of exactly 
equal talent, presented with the same vista, would produce exactly
orj
identical pictures. But this, Priestley lamented, is never the 
situation in which we find ourselves. Inheritors of other men's 
hypotheses, we read the Scriptures with minds 'prepossessed'. Only one 
course is open to us: 'To remedy this inconvenience, we must go back to
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first principles' (as some go back to a state of nature and others to a 
desert island). Reading only the Scriptures, disclaiming commentators, 
we shall all be exposed to the same influences and so must in time 'come 
to think in the same manner.' This was strong medicine, Priestley 
thought, and not to be prescribed for those of advanced years: a regimen 
of unprejudiced reading could do nothing for them, expect, perhaps, 
unbalance their minds. The same message is implicit throughout the 
Corruptions, but here the focus of attention has shifted and it is not 
the mind of an old man that risks derangement but the political and 
ecclesiastical establishment of a society old in corruption.
Of the two kindsof corruption, those of doctrine and those of 
church government and practice, the former generally result from the 
influence of pagan philosophy and the latter from the influence of the 
civil power. However the two support each other and, though the very 
powers that were once the chief supporters of the harlot 'now begin to 
hate her, and are ready to make her desolate and naked', the continued 
alliance 'of the kingdom of Christ with the kingdoms of this world' is
oo
still all that sustains the corruptions of Christianity. Until this 
alliance has been severed, true reform will be impossible, and so 
severed it must be, at whatever cost. If we are to break the spell of 
pernicious associations, if we are to escape those traps in which ironic 
history ensnared earlier reformers, the cost will be high. So 
Priestley's epigraph has been well chosen and he, satisfied that he has 
explained why the tares have sprung up amongst the wheat, and 
remembering no doubt that 'the harvest is the end of the world', ends 
his book on a thoroughly apocalyptic note:
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It is nothing but the alliance of the kingdom of this world (an 
alliance which our Lord himself expressly disclaimed) that 
supports the gravest corruptions of Christianity; and perhaps we 
must wait for the fall of the civil powers before this most 
unnatural alliance be broken. ... May the kingdom of God, and of 
Christ (that which I conceive to be intended in the Lord's prayer) 
truly and fully come, though all the kingdoms of the world be 
removed, in order to make way for it!'
IV.
The History of the Corruptions of Christianity brought its author 
what he always professed to desire: protracted, involved and erudite 
controversy. By 1785, one observer, James Woodrow, was writing of 'a 
powerful Corps in the field' against Priestley, though he was confident 
of the result: 'he is a bold and able knight and will doubtless think it 
but a small thing to overthrow these united Chieftains, by the prowess 
of his single a r m . W o o d r o w  was not alone in having recourse to 
military metaphor; such language recurs on all sides throughout the 
controversy, sad evidence that candour had been the first casualty.
Hostilities commenced with the defection of a former ally. Samuel 
Badcock, once an extravagant admirer of Priestley's, reviewing the new 
book anonymously over two issues of the Monthly Review, found it too 
rash a work, too full of 'perversion and misrepresentation. J 
Priestley sprang to reply even before the second part of the review had 
been published, but by then a more powerful adversary had taken the 
field. On 22 May 1783, the Reverend Dr. Samuel Horsley, F.R.S., 
publicly warned the clergy of his archdeaconry about an attempt 'to 
unsettle the faith, and to break up the constitution of every 
ecclesiastical establishment in Christendom.' In autumn of the same
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same year, Priestley published some Letters to Dr. Horsley, which were 
answered the following summer by Letters from the Archdeacon of St. 
Alban's, in reply to Dr. Priestley. A few months after that, Priestley 
responded with a second set of Letters, 'in which,' said Horsley, 'all
07
professions, of personal regard and civility were laid aside. ' By now 
Priestley had other enemies to contend with, but in November 1785 he 
drew Horsley's fire with a sermon on free enquiry; and Horsley himself 
delivered a controversial homily that Christmas before returning to the 
attack in the new year with Remarks on Dr. Priestley's Second Letters to 
the Archdeacon of St. Alban's. This was almost his last word on the 
subject (though he wrote a bitter preface to the collected edition of 
his tracts against Priestley), but Priestley kept up his side of the 
war, firing off two more volleys of correspondence before other and more 
violent matters interrupted the debate.
The two men had met before in public controversy, when, a few 
years earlier, Horsley had attacked the doctrines of materialism and 
determinism; but the politeness which had characterised that exchange
oo
was not to survive a longer encounter. This was, perhaps, not to be 
wondered at, for their minds could scarcely have been more dissimilar. 
Priestley, contemplating God's power, found it most strikingly 
manifested in human history, but Horsley worked on an altogether more 
grandiose scale and in an altogether more abstruse manner. Having 
offered a new computation of the distance of the earth from the sun, he 
concluded, after a series of calculations based on the densities and 
mutual gravitation of the sun and planets, that 'a force of motion is 
every instant produced a-fresh in the solar system, exceeding
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344658200000000000000001b. Troy, or 255260400000000000000 hundred weight 
Averdupoize.1 This act of creation, which was duplicated in every one 
of the innumerable planetary systems of the universe, which had occurred 
at every instant since the beginning of things and would continue to 
occur at every instant to come so long as the universe subsisted, was, 
thought Horsley, a notable example of 'the instantaneous efficiency (in 
one article) of that mighty Cause, whose power produced, and whose 
incessant activity maintains, this great and beauteous fabric. ...'^ 
These speculations recall the scientific theodicies propounded by 
Newtonian divines in the earlier part of the century; though by 
Horsley's time this mode of thought was beginning to be rather passe and 
even he admitted that it might seem rather whimsical.^0 It does, 
however, demonstrate the way in which his mind worked. His was a formal 
intellect, mathematical, even scholastic; so much so that he regarded 
the election of Sir Joseph Banks, a mere collector of bugs and animal 
skins, to the presidency of the Royal Society as a falling-off in 
scientific standards and he spoke bitterly of the new president and 'his 
train of feeble amateurs.'^1 His greatest regard was reserved for the 
Society's greatest president, of whose complete works he was editor (in 
which role he was somewhat embarrassed by the discovery of his hero's 
unitarianism). However, he claimed to prefer Aristotle to the 
empirical investigators of his own day: 'these gentlemen can play tricks 
with an electrical machine or an Air-pump, but when they have played 
their trick, they have done; for they have no principles of reason to 
apply to it,' he told his son in 1797. By then his hatred of Priestley 
was confirmed, and it cannot be insignificant that his emblems of 
futile, unguided empiricism should have been pieces of apparatus with
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which Priestley had made some of his ’lucky discoveries in the 
prosecution of physical experiments.'^
But it was Horsley's ecclesiastical character that most separated 
him from his adversary. As an archdeacon he held (and was evidently 
proud to hold) one of those hierarchical titles which were unknown to 
the New Testament and therefore offensive to Priestley. Nor was he 
without that personal ambition which Priestley had long thought 'utterly 
unworthy of the character of Christian ministers': on his way to the top 
he had collected several livings without always troubling to make his 
home in them, and was thus guilty of pluralism and non-residence, two 
practices which scandalised Priestley, who had written in 1769 that, 
because of them, a great deal of clerical work was left in the hands of 
under-paid and ill-qualified curates, 'while the higher ranks of the 
clergy roll in wealth ...'^  In fact, Horsley spent his wealth too 
quickly ever to have time to roll in it: he lived in great style, kept a 
carriage and four, and disbursed large amounts of charity. But even in 
his compassion for the poor he contrasts significantly with Priestley; 
Dissenting politicians were little troubled by the poverty around them. 
Priestley opposed state welfare on the grounds that it discouraged both 
private charity and self-improvement, whereas Horsley, distrustful of 
social mobility and convinced that inequality was divinely-ordained, 
believed in the duty of the rich to relieve the poor (and secure the 
balance of society) both by public charity and by private.^5
Horsley's social views are, then, much like his scientific and 
theological convictions, static and hierarchical. His God makes himself 
known not in the turbulence of human history but in the impersonal
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demonstration of of his sovereign power, exercised in eternal 
repetition. And for Horsley scientific truth is to be sought less on 
the laboratory bench than in the immutable certainties of the equation 
and the syllogism. In short, he believes in established truth and the 
order of things. In a passage reminiscent of Bossuet, he maintains that 
from ecclesiastical history ’the student learns what the faith of he 
church hath at all times been; and he is enabled to separate the pure 
doctrine of the first age from all later innovations. ...’ The divine 
revelation, mysterious though it may be, contradictory though it may 
seem, is 'an imperfect discovery, not a contradiction.’ It is, of 
course, an infallible discovery, conferring infallibility upon the first 
preachers to whom it was made and upon the traditions of the church 
which they founded.
Priestley and the Archdeacon were thus bound to be at cross 
purposes, for whereas Horsley saw himself as defending orthodox doctrine 
against insolent heresy, Priestley seems to have thought at first that 
he had embarked with a fellow voyager in search of truth. 
Characteristically, he claimed to welcome Horsley's attentions and to 
hope that the controversy would continue. It was no 'mere trial of 
skill,' he said, but an affair of the greatest moment, and, though they 
were both probably too old to convert each other, he and Horsley would 
perhaps throw 'new light' on important questions.^7
But Horsley's attentions were directed elsewhere. Reviewing the 
controversy some years after its close, he took pride in the fact that 
he had not allowed himself to be drawn on the main question, that of 
Christ's divinity (a contention 'long since exhausted'), but had instead
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diverted the discussion towards numerous points of ecclesiastical 
history related to it; and by then he had already explained that his 
attack was aimed less at Priestley's opinions than at his credibility as
AO
a writer. Horsley never speaks as Bossuet does of the presumption of 
those individuals who challenge the traditions of the Church, but an 
attitude similar to Bossuet's seems implicit in what he does say. It 
ought to be enough to teach the truth, but it is not: truth must be 
defended as well, against the 'stubborn infidel', the 'restless spirit
A Q
of scepticism' and 'the refinements of a false philosophy.' 7 The 
picture of truth as a monolith, a citadel to be defended, is never far 
from his thoughts; he is a member of the garrison, but Priestley must 
make his assault alone and unsupported. This is why he wishes to attack 
not Priestley's opinions but his learning. The opinions have long since 
been rejected, but the learning, false though it is, may mislead 'the 
weaker Brethren'.
In fact, though Priestley may at first have misunderstood 
Horsley's intentions, each man has a clear idea of his own role in the 
controversy. Priestley is aware that for him the question is one of 
personal judgement and integrity (as it most emphatically is not for 
Horsley). So he is anxious to protest his candour, to emphasise that he 
is not moved by zeal for reputation and is no more prejudiced than other 
men. He knows that he stands alone - though he believes that history is 
on his side - and that it is his task to defend both a method of 
interpreting scripture and a particular interpretation. He speaks of 
the difficulty of combatting ingrained prejudice and, to demonstrate it, 
furnishes a short history ('not a little humbling') of his own progress
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from 'the strictest principles of Calvinism', to Arianisra and thence to 
Socinianism. Convinced as he now is that unitarianism was the faith of 
the early church, he does not expect to change, but the young and 
indifferent, 'whose minds have not acquired the stiffness of ours who 
are turned fifty', may certainly learn from the controversy, if it is 
conducted in the right spirit:
It becomes us, however, to consider, that they only will be 
entitled to praise, who join in carrying on the designs of 
providence with right views of their own; who are activated by a 
real love of truth, and also by that candour and benevolence, 
which a sense of our common difficulties in the investigation of 
truth most effectually inspires. A man who has never changed an 
opinion cannot have much feeling of this difficulty, and therefore 
cannot be expected to have much candour, unless his disposition is 
uncornnonly excellent. I ought to have more candour than others, 
because I have felt more than many can pretend to have done, the 
force of those obstacles which retard our progress in the search 
of truth.-50
Horsley is not impressed. Nor should he be given his assumptions: if a
he
man attacks established truth, it matters not at all that/does so from 
the best of motives. This ought to have been apparent to Priestley, for 
the first blow of Horsley's attack had aimed at exposing the 
contradictions of his adversary's position as one man against the world.
Horsley points out that, instead of inferring the doctrine of the 
early church from the plain sense of scripture, Priestley moves in the 
opposite direction: he wants to trace changes in doctrine so as to 
arrive at the uncorrupt original, 'the faith of the first ages’, and he 
wants to use that original in order to settle disputed points of 
scriptural interpretation. Therefore, he cannot in logic employ a 
particular interpretation of scripture as proof that the faith of the 
first ages was such as would support that interpretation. This, 
however, is just what Priestley tries to do: he asserts that the faith
-341-
of the ancient Jewish church may be known from scripture and from 
ecclesiastical history, but his evidence from ecclesiastical history 
will hold water only if his interpretation of scripture will, and the 
validity of his interpretation of scripture is, of course, just the 
question which is to be decided. Things would be different, Horsley 
implies, if Priestley’s interpretations were acknowledged by the 
'majority of the Christian Church', but they are not; however obvious 
Priestley may believe them to be, they are particular interpretations 
only, and very strange ones at that. Indeed, when St. John writes of 
the logos and St. Paul describes Christ as the 'image of the invisible 
God, the first b o m  of every creature, by whom all things were created', 
Priestley has to assume that these inspired authors were really saying 
the very opposite of what they seem to be saying; and he can foist such 
interpretations on the early church only by means of a 'circulating 
syllogism'
Priestley's answer to this can only be that he is not as singular 
as he looks, and this indeed is more or less the answer that he does 
give. He has, he claims, independent evidence of the gospels' 
unitarianism and the principle upon which he proceeds is this: if we 
wish to prove two assertions and we know that if one is true then the 
other must also be true, then it is usual for us to begin by observing 
that they prove each other and that therefore any proof of one is a 
proof of the other. Earlier commentators, says Priestley, have shown 
the doctrine of the scriptures to be Unitarian; his task in the 
Corruptions was to prove from independent evidence the unitarianism of
C l
the primitive church. But for as long as the interpretations of these
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commentators are, as Horsley puts it, ’disallowed by the majority of 
Christians', they cannot be submitted as the clear sense of scripture.
So Horsley confronts Priestley with a dilemma: if he still argues that 
the primitive faith must have been Unitarian because unitarianism is the 
clear sense of the scriptures (clear in that it is 'clearly conveyed in 
the words'), then he is still arguing in a circle, because the sole 
purpose of inquiries into the primitive faith is to settle disputed 
points of scripture; if, however, unitarianism were shown to be the 
clear sense of the scriptures (clear in that it could be clearly proved 
to be the sense intended by the authors), then the only conclusion must 
be that its authors were of all writers 'the most unnecessarily and most 
wilfully obscure.' In fact, Horsley continues, this obscurity is 
acknowledged by Unitarians themselves, who cannot pretend that their 
doctrine is plainly conveyed by scripture and who are forced to assume 
that the sacred authors delighted in metaphors and imagery strange to
CO
European eyes but supposedly familiar to Asiatic readers. J Even if the 
argument were not circular, it would be brought down by this assumption, 
which, as Horsley realises, undermines the very foundation of 
Priestley's egalitarian theology:
The gospel is a general revelation. If it is delivered in a style, 
which is not perspicuous to the illiterate of any nation except 
the Jewish; it is as much locked up from general apprehension, as 
if the sacred,books had been written in the vernacular gibberish 
of that age.
Priestley's situation is like that of those radicals whose historical 
researches into past glories has been so thorough as to reveal an 
antiquity quite unlike the present; an antiquity that is therefore
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totally irrelevant and useless for radical purposes. Priestley has 
turned a universal gospel into an historical curio.55
This is a situation in which the conservative is never very likely 
to find himself, for he seeks authority in perduring institutions rather 
than in recently-excavated monuments. The commonsense interpretation 
of scripture ('that which will be the first to occur to common people of 
every country, and in every age1) is almost enough for Horsley, but it 
is supplemented by the traditions and teaching authority of the Church. 
Of course, as an Anglican he cannot issue commands from out the mists of 
authority; he cannot, like Berruyer, employ an extreme historical 
scepticism. He wants to show both that his Church has an apostolic 
constitution and that its doctrines are agreeable to scripture and to 
reason. For this he needs to be able to point to a continuous history; 
not necessarily to an entirely unspotted history, but certainly to one 
free from the disfiguring corruptions of which Priestley writes. He 
concedes his adversary's point that 'there is nothing that can be called 
an account of the divine nature of Christ in the gospels', but remarks 
that the gospels were not intended to be a system of general principles. 
Our method must be to look not at any single gospel or at all four 
gospels or at the gospels, the Acts and the epistles together, but at 
the 'whole code of revelation', at both the Old Testament and the New. 
This of course, is just the method that Priestley recommends when he 
argues the importance of adhering to 'the general tenor' of scripture. 
Horsley flings the phrase back in his face: 'I contend, that your 
doctrine is what stands upon particular texts; while the catholic faith 
is supported by the general tenor of the sacred writings, and by the
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consent of those writings, in many parts, with an universal tradition of 
unexplored antiquity.'5*5
But even Priestley's explorations of antiquity are of dubious 
value, Horsley contends. Every corruption has a history, so we are 
entitled to ask whether Priestley can prove that the first Christians 
did not worship Christ as a God. That is to say, can he prove it by 
means of the sort of evidential proof which alone is acceptable in 
historical research?
For as for that kind of proof, in which you so much delight, which 
is drawn by abstract reasoning from general and precarious maxims; 
it is of no more significance in history, than testimony would be 
in mathematics. ... Scientific truth can only be established by 
abstract reasoning. Testimony can in science produce nothing more 
than probability. In history it is quite the reverse: abstract 
reasoning can never go beyond a probability: proof must arise from 
evidence. And the reason of this is plain. The principles of 
scientific truth are all within the mind itself: the truths of 
history are the occurrences of the external world. Neglecting 
this necessary distinction, the great Berkeley questioned the 
existence of the material world, because he found it incapable of 
demonstration;, and I have known many seek a confirmation of 
geometrical theorems from experiment.
In other words, Priestley is here accused of just that error which he 
believed underlay the false philosophy of the Scots: that of seeking 
more proof, and proof of a different kind, than the nature of the 
subject will admit. Clearly the problem arises because he so frequently 
invokes general maxims of historical method - based, often enough, on 
associationist principles - and then draws particular conclusions from 
them. For Horsley, logic and mathematics are the master sciences and 
theirs is the realm of demonstrable truth. However, the tenets of the 
Catholic faith have no need of demonstration: they derive from an 
infallible source and have been communicated by the inheritors of that
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infallibility. Horsley is therefore free of that concern with 
legitimation which troubles Priestley and from which derive those 
methodological habits which he criticises. Having, because of this , 
concern, espoused associationism, Priestley was never much inclined to 
resist two temptations to which associationism gave rise: the temptation 
to conflate the logical and the empirical, and the temptation to 
establish a priori general principles of human psychology with which 
historical fact is expected to conform.
The habits to which Horsley objects are perhaps at their most 
egregious in the postscript to Priestley's first set of letters, in 
which fourteen 'maxims of historical criticism’ are, in his slippery 
phrase, 'adapted to’ a set of sixteen propositions which summarise the 
evidence for the unitarianism of the early church. These maxims are 
generally of two kinds: those which seem to have associationism behind 
them and those which derive from that argument from silence which 
Priestley had been using for the last twenty years. The two approaches 
converge at last in a single argument: the theory of the human mind 
bequeathed to us by Locke and Hartley teaches us that early impressions 
are long retained and that the mechanism of the mind has not altered 
over the centuries; from these considerations taken together we may 
deduce that great doctrinal innovations will occasion great shock and 
that if an innovation which would today occasion shock did not do
so centuries ago, then it is probable that no long-established prejudice 
was offended. The Apostles' Creed condemns only Gnosticism, not 
Unitarianism; Tertullian did not consider Unitarians outcasts from the 
Church; no member of the primitive Church was executed for Unitarianism:
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’Now, since the minds of men are in all ages similarly affected in 
similar circumstances, we may conclude, that the Unitarian doctrine, 
which was treated with so much respect when it was first mentioned, was 
in a very different predicament then, from what it was at the time of 
the Reformation.'5^
In a related line of attack, Priestley suggests that the 
difficulty of tracing the doctrine of Christ's divinity to its origin is 
a reason for believing that origin to be comparatively recent, and he 
twice tries and fails to get Horsley to assign a date to the 
announcement of Christ's divinity.5^ Horsley's refusal is founded on 
the correct observation that an inability to do so would embarrass his 
case only if he were to concede that the early church was Unitarian. As 
long as he refuses to make this concession, he can, believing as he does 
in the infallibility of tradition, direct his attention towards the 
charismatic origin of his faith and not to the secular question of its 
transmission:
It concerns not me; because, with my notions of inspiration, I am 
obliged to believe what the inspired Apostles taught, however late 
the time might be when they themselves received their information. 
It concerns not you; because with your notions of inspiration, you 
are at liberty to dispute what the inspired Apostles taught, 
whatever pretensions they may have to the earliest information.
If the knowledge was infallible which they received from 
inspiration, it matters not how late; ifnnot infallible, it 
matters not how early they received it.
The question might, of course, be more compelling to Horsley if he were 
to admit (as he does not) that the Jews had expected a mortal messiah, 
but even this admission would lead merely to a problem of secular 
history - why did nobody express surprise at the announcement of the 
Messiah's divinity? - and Horsley is not a secular historian. The
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scriptures are not for him, as they are for Priestley, documents to be 
interrogated, like Caesar's Commentaries or Plutarch's Lives, for he 
maintains a distinction between the sacred and the profane which is 
quite unknown to his adversary.
It is this distinction that gives him so grave a sense of his own 
sacerdotal importance and leads him to adopt a tone which Priestley 
believes injurious to the investigation of truth. But requests that he 
drop 'that sarcastic manner of writing' are, of course, unavailling, for 
the truth is that Priestley and the Archdeacon are never so far apart as 
when each protests his own candour whilst regretting his adversary's 
ill-bred manner. For Horsley, to be candid is to be tolerant; a 
beneficed servant of the Church by law established, engaged not in the 
pursuit of truth but in the refutation of heresy, he is indulging 
Priestley merely by talking to him. It is part of his duty to rebuke, 
to speak de haut en bas, to emphasise that he is the professional and 
Priestley the amateur, skilled enough in 'philosophical subjects' but at 
a loss when it comes to theology.^1
Priestley, to whom a belief in the unity of knowledge is central, 
can neither accept this nor, it seems, properly understand it, for he 
admonishes Horsley as though expecting to convince him: 'if I have been 
so cautious and so successful in the investigation of truth in one 
province, I may, having the same talents, make the same successful 
application of them in other provinces. For the same mental habits 
generally accompany the same men in every scene of life, and in every
(y)mode of exercise.'04. But if Horsley were to concede that the mental 
habits formed in the laboratory might be useful in the interpretation of
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ecclesiastical history, then he would be violating not only the 
distinction between sacred and profane knowledge but also the theory of 
divine providence that underlies it. For he is committed to the belief 
that the Catholic Church is the favourite child of providence, 
displaying this status in history by its maintenance of a pure faith and 
an infallible tradition. Priestley, on the other hand, has expressly 
stated that divine providence has no local operation and God no direct 
influence on either the individual mind or the collective mind of the 
Church. He can therefore allow himself an egalitarian and optimistic 
view of knowledge: any research, whether scientific or theological, may 
contribute to our understanding of God, and any researcher, whether 
professional or amateur, may be fortunate enough to add to what we know. 
Horsley, though, little impressed by Priestley's own 'lucky 
discoveries', has no reason to believe that an amateur may stumble on 
the truth:
A writer, of whan it is once proved that he is ill-informed upon 
his subject, hath no right to demand a further hearing. It is a 
fair presumption against the truth of his conclusion, be it what 
it may, that it cannot be right but by meer accident. To be right 
by accident will rarely happen to any man in any subject; because 
in all subjects truth is single, and error infinite.
It is clear from Priestley's reply to this that he is now without any 
illusions that this will be the 'perfectly amicable' discussion for 
which he hoped. In the attempt to discredit him, Horsley has attacked 
not only his learning and ambition but his honesty as well. He begins 
his reply with a long complaint against the Archdeacon's insolence, his 
misrepresentations of the living and his defamations of the dead. But, 
most of all, it is Horsley's 'want of common candour' that upsets him.
In exchange for candour he has been offered 'gross insults' and the
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language of the battlefield, for Horsley frequently boasts of his 
'victory' and exults over his 'prostrate enemy'. It would be absurd for 
the victim of such abuse to return to the respectful style with which he 
began the discussion. He will now write with greater freedom, and the 
'candid reader' will make allowances for his prejudices. Indeed, 
Priestley is no longer above a little military metaphor himself as he 
advances (so he believes) through the ranks of his critics: 'If I had 
left all their darts sticking in my buckler they would not have retarded 
my progress.'^5
Such rough usage perhaps indicates a greater willingness on 
Priestley's part to enter into the spirit of things - and he was 
certainly enjoying himself in what the called 'the easiest and the 
pleasantest piece of controversy I was ever engaged in' - but, though he 
seems now to have recognised that Horsley was a foe and not a colleague,
L’ (L
he was still unable to take the measure of the enemy. The very idea, 
so precious to Horsley, of a sacerdotal succession descending from the 
Apostles through the Popes to the Archdeacon and his brethren, is so 
outlandish to Priestley that he can scarcely credit that he is living at 
the end of the eighteenth century.07 But in his exasperation, he 
betrays a fatal inability to understand the passions that sway his High- 
Church opponents. Horsley fears for his country; for the broken unity 
of her Church, for the unsettled faith of her people, beset by 
philosophical scruples, and for the Protestant religion, disgraced of 
late by the fanaticism of the Gordon rioters. All these scandals serve 
to discredit true religion: on the one hand, devotion to it is inflamed 
by enthusiasm; on the other, its doctrines are stripped of their
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mystery. And at the root of these evils he detects a principle which 
Priestley seems disposed to advocate: 'that every man who hath credit 
enough to collect a congregation, hath a right, over which the 
magistrate cannot without tyranny exercise controul, to celebrate the 
divine worship according to his own form, and to propagate his own 
opinions. ... ° This was indeed what Priestley believed, and in 
proclaiming his belief he struck his most undiplomatic blow so far.
November 5 was a date twice-glorious in Dissenting eyes: 
anniversary of the frustration of Popish conspiracy in 1605 and of 
Popish tyranny in 1688. To Priestley it must have seemed an appropriate 
day on which to celebrate the banishment of darkness, and he chose to do 
so in a sermon which he later published as The Importance and Extent of 
Free Inquiry in Matters of Religion. In it ha proclaimed the boundaries 
of religious knowledge to be as thrillingly and as challengingly distant 
as those of scientific knowledge, and he made it clear that he differed 
from his opponents not only not only in his open-ended view of religion 
but also in his individualistic r a t i o n a l i s m . ^  This is apparent from 
one rather extraordinary sentence: 'No person whose opinions are not the 
result of his own serious inquiry can have a right to say he is a 
dissenter, or any thing else, on principle; and no man can be absolutely 
sure of this whose present opinions are the same with those that he was 
taught, though he may think, and be right in thinking, that he sees 
sufficient reason for them, and retains them on conviction.'7^ Such an 
appeal for independence of mind would, of course, have been familiar to 
any Dissenter of.Priestley's day, and indeed to any of the old Puritans, 
but the idea that the only sure proof of independence is rebellion is
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unusual. It recalls Priestley's insistence that it is in our behaviour 
and not in the affections of our souls that we must seek for assurance 
of our faith, and, of course, it has a similar origin. In both cases we 
are to look for the decisive act of will as the only objective proof of 
a proper condition of mind. The system of ideas that association builds 
up in our minds is so complex and tenacious that only by exchanging them 
for others can we truly know that our ideas are our own; though we can 
do without this knowledge, and many of us will have to (as Priestley has 
to admit if his sermon is not to appear too blatant a piece of special 
pleading for his own religious history). If our religious convictions 
are to be put to this sort of test, there must, of course, be 
alternatives. There can be no one church, but all must be 'equally 
parties' in a religious free market with no earthly power to judge 
them.71
He enlarges on this theme in the 'Reflections on the present state
of Free Inquiry in this country' which he appends to the published
version of his sermons. Only after all our doctrines have been tried in
the fire of controversy can we hope, he says, to arrive at that
happy state of affairs in which all will unwaveringly acquiesce in 'a
7?permanent and useful uniformity. ... It is unfortunate, then, that 
the times are not favourable to free inquiry. There is, Priestley 
admits, no actual persecution, but such is 'the influence of habit, of 
fashion, and of connections, in these peaceable times' that few have the 
courage to act on their convictions and most pay lip-service to the 
orthodoxies of the age. Priestley's line of insinuation here is one 
with which two centuries of radical thought have made us very familiar:
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in the regrettable absence of any one identifiable oppressor, public 
opinion itself is made out to be the persecutor; we are subtly invited 
to assume that the public - or at least the less enlightened part of it
- simply does not know its own mind. (Of course, any theory of progress 
will serve to justify a theory of false consciousness; Priestley's 
determinism, though Christian, will do the job as well as Marx's.) But 
there will always be some whose consciousness is not false, who are on 
the side of history, and once their spectral presence makes itself 
known, then the slightest political tremor may, as Priestley hopes, 
cause the establishment suddenly to vanish 'like an enchanted castle in 
romance.' This idea of subterranean progress, slow in its course but 
sure in it effects, so beguiled him that he was inspired to illustrate 
it with a disastrous metaphor: 'We are, as it were, laying gunpowder, 
grain by grain, under the old building of error and superstition, which 
a single spark may hereafter inflame, so as to produce an instantaneous 
explosion:; in consequence of which that edifice, the erection of which 
has been the work of ages, may be overturned in a moment, and so 
effectually as that the same foundation can never be built upon
70
again.'
In vain did he later protest, to the citizens of Birmingham and 
even to the Prime Minister, that his gunpowder was 'nothing but 
arguments'. The damage had been done - not only to him but to his 
fellow Dissenters - and from now on he was 'Gunpowder Priestley' to the 
mob.7^ Of course, his intentions were not sanguinary, but his 
disavowals of violent designs on the establishment are at least very 
naive. His language, metaphysical or not, was, as Horsley pointed out,
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'audacious', and he can hardly have complained if his critics inferred 
that such audacity was intended to have its effect. The battle lines 
are now very clearly drawn up and martial language is freely used on 
both sides. Priestley describes the controversy in terms of 
strongholds, outworks and sallies; he speaks of strengthening his 
fortifications and of his hopes to withstand 'a close and regular 
siege', or at least to surrender 'with all the honours of war.' For his 
part, Horsley frankly announces that the controversy between Priestly 
'and the advocates of the catholic faith' now amounts, by Priestley's 
own declaration, 'to a state resembling that of a war, in which no 
quarter is to be given or accepted. . . . ' 75
On Christmas Day 1785, the Archdeacon delivered a 'Sermon on the 
Incarnation', in which, having scored some palpable hits at the very 
idea of a Christian materialism, he sets about constructing a 
philosophical defence of the Catholic faith. But before he has gone 
very far, he breaks off:
Would to God the necessity never had arisen of stating the 
discoveries of Revelation in metaphysical propositions. The 
inspired writers delivered their sublimest doctrines in popular 
language, and abstained, as much as it was possible to abstain, 
from a philosophical phraseology. By the perpetual cavils of 
gainsayers, and the difficulties which they have raised, later 
teachers, in the assertion of the same doctrines, have been 
reduced to the unpleasing necessity of availing themselves of the 
greater precision of a less familiar language. 10
This is a version of an argument which had earlier been perspicuously 
put by Bossuet. That which is orthodox now, he had said, always was 
orthodox. Nor can the Church be said to have deepened her understanding 
of it; for she has always known her mind. Sometimes, however, moved by 
the need to answer the heretic, she has had to clarify and explain her
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meaning, to refine her language and to explicate what before was merely 
implicit. 77 It is some such thought as this that moves Horsley when he 
condemns 1 the folly and crime of setting up private judgement for the 
role of public opinion, in opposition to a tradition traced to the first 
ages, and by consequence of the same authority with that on which the 
rest of the Canon rests. ...' This is the language of the Catholic 
faith, and Horsley - who remarks that mere distance from Rome is not in 
itself 'the true standard of purity' - 3eems happy to share it with 
Popes and Cardinals.7^
In the face of this sort of thing, Priestley tried to depict the 
Archdeacon as a curiosity - tilting at windmills and affording with his 
arrogance more entertainment thafc. any public figure since the great Tory 
hero Dr. Sacheverel - but Horsley had a final trick to play.7^ 'The 
best policy, in the enemies of truth,' Priestley had said, 'is no doubt, 
that of those who endeavour to stifle all inquiry, who read nothing, and 
who reply to nothing.' This was now the Archdeacon's policy. He spared 
himself 'the insipid task' of reading Priestley's History of Early 
Opinions Concerning Jesus Christ, explaining that his experience of the 
author's work hitherto had left him with no hope of learning anything 
from 'that large work in four volumes, the result of a whole two-years
o n
study of the writers of antiquity. ... It is not hard now to envy 
him his foresight; in part these four volumes recapitulate the argument 
of the Corruptions (though that book, says Priestley, is addressed to 
the unlearned and this to the learned) and in part they rehearse again 
Priestley's side of the debate with Horsley. There is little that is 
new in this account of the advance of Platonism in the early Church and
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the retreat before it of Unitarian orthodoxy, but Priestley's method of 
research does possess a certain naive originality. He has, he says, 
attempted to write his book without preconceptions, not looking into any 
commentators before reading all the early authors. Once more, then, he 
seeks to regard sacred history with a secular and scientific gaze, 
claiming that his object is not to persuade his readers but to enable 
them to do the same, to form their own judgement from the facts that he 
has laid before them. More than once, the reader is urged to foreswear 
preconception and 'take up the matter ab initio', which often means, of 
course, trying to understand the scriptures not as tradition understands
01
them but as their contemporary readers would have understood them.
According to Priestley, these, the methods of profane scholarship, 
are the methods by which we determine that Homer, for example, was a 
polytheist; and what is good enough for Homer is good enough for Moses 
and the gospel writers. Priestley's tendency, already pronounced, to 
treat sacred works as though they were secular is here made quite 
explicit: 'all those to whom it can be worth my while to make an 
apology, think as I do with respect to the scriptures, viz. that they 
were written without any particular inspiration, by men who wrote 
according to the best of their knowledge, and who from their 
circumstances could not be mistaken with respect to the greater facts, 
of which they were proper witnesses, but (like other men, subject to 
prejudices) might be liable to adopt a hasty and ill-grounded opinion 
concerning things which did not fall within the compass of their own 
knowledge. ...' Unbelievers will scarcely be impressed by talk of 
inspiration. If they are to be persuaded, it must be by 'a just and
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rational defence of this most important history1, mounted on the 
principle that the gospel writers are 'simply historians, whose credit 
must be determined by the circumstance in which they wrote, and the 
nature of the facts which they relate.'^
But though Horsley had withdrawn, convinced of his victory (these 
martial metaphors are irresistible), Priestley was by no means left to 
undisputed dominion of the field. There were many other blows to be 
parried, more than could be met individually, and so, over the next few 
years, he published three volumes of Defences of Unitarianism, for 1786, 
for 1787 and for 1788 and 1789. Relieved, he said, to be speaking to 
persons better tempered and more knowledgeable than the Archdeacon, he 
addressed himself now to his friend Richard Price, to Dr. Home, Dean of 
Canterbury, to several other reverend gentlemen, to the students of 
divinity at Oxford and Cambridge, and at last even to the silent Horsley 
(by now raised to the See of St. David's, or 'pretty well comforted for 
his defeat,' as Priestley put it). He was pleased to have so many 
opponents; not only would this excite public interest but it seemed to 
show that each would combat for a while and then, despairing of victory 
(he uses military metaphors constantly now), step aside to allow another 
champion to step into the breach. But he was not happy with the tone of 
the correspondence. Drs. Price and Geddes, the one a Dissenter and the 
other a Roman Catholic, were candid men, but such candour was not 
everywhere to be looked for: 'Why is it that, excepting only the dean of 
Canterbury, the members of the church of England cannot write with the
QO
same liberality, such as becomes gentlemen, scholars, and Christians?' J
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The Dean of Canterbury, though a member of the established church, 
was a valuable opponent and a candid man; but still he was a member of 
the established church and, as such, a prisoner:
Your system is so complex, and involves such an unnatural 
connexion of things ecclesiastical with things civil, that though 
you might know where to begin a reformation, you will never be 
able to agree among yourselves where to stop. It must, therefore, 
be done in a manner in which the leading persons in the church and 
state will not be the primary agents.
We are perhaps not intended to read this as a threat of revolution from 
without, a hint that the citadel, since it will not be surrendered, must 
be taken by storm. It is, however, of a piece with Priestley's advice 
to the undergraduates of Oxford and Cambridge that they should act for 
themselves and not wait for the lead of 'some great man' in church and 
state. It was not by great men that Christianity was propagated or the 
Reformation begun, but rather by individuals of all ranks thinking for 
themselves, till at last those in power saw that it was in their 
interest to favour them. Now, as then, ministers of state 'ought to 
follow the lead of the people. ' ^ 5 Such arguments as these struck so 
near to the heart of the English polity that only a short step was 
enough to take them from theology to the world of affairs.
V.
The times seemed propitious for reformers. Great things were 
expected of the young Prime Minister. He was believed, on good grounds, 
to be a friend of reform: Dissenters had, as Price said, 'contributed 
much towards giving the last general election a turn in Mr. Pitt's 
favour,' and they believed that he had incurred an obligation which he
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was bound to repay. Reform could, it seemed, be urged, and with some 
confidence, in a language of judicious moderation. And so, on 28 March 
1787, Henry Beaufoy, arguing that every man had a right to the 
privileges of the society in which he lived, moved a bill in the Commons 
for the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts. But the Dissenters’ 
confidence was misplaced: not only did the Prime Minister oppose reform, 
but he did so with arguments very similar to some of Priestley's. He 
distinguished between civil and religious liberty, arguing that the 
latter was not a natural right but a trust which the state had a 
discretionary power to grant to those of sound principles, religious and 
political. Dissenters, he said, already possessed civil liberty; if the 
state - united as it was with the church on principles of expediency - 
chose, for reasons of expediency, to deny them political liberty, they 
were not thereby being treated as second-class citizens. In the 
debate that followed, Priestley's gunpowder metaphor was quoted with 
consequences disastrous to the Dissenting cause: the appeal was rejected 
by 176 votes to 98.
But Priestley denied being a spokesman for Dissent, and, indeed, 
it is true that the moderate reformers who initiated the appeal had been 
careful to repudiate his extremism. Knowing, he says, his own 
unpopularity ('even among the Dissenters'), he had taken no part in the 
campaign. However, he did hear Pitt's speech, and he felt bound to 
reply.^ This he did in an open letter heavy with condescension. The 
Prime Minister, he said, had been misled by his education and 
connections and by a desire for popularity. But he should take it from
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an old man that honesty was the best policy and that there was nothing 
disgraceful about a change of mind in one so young.
The Letter was not a success - some of its readers seem to have 
considered the author too violent to do any good, others thought him mad
- and, though Priestley later complained that the he had been 
misrepresented as insolent and menacing, the plain word of his text is 
quite menacing enough:
It has been said that, if Dissenters gain this point, they will 
aim at something more. This I acknowledge: we should ask many 
things more, because there are many things that we conceive 
ourselves to be entitled to, and which it will be no injury, but 
an advantage, to our country to grant us. ^
But he still believed that these many things would be the fruits of open
discussion, and he was not alone in his optimism; it was typical of the
mood of Dissent in the seventeen-eighties. The note of expectation is
sounded very clearly in the discourse which Richard Price delivered in
1787 to the supporters of the proposed academy at Hackney. Like
Priestley, he calls for a cleansing of the mind - claiming that only
those who have examined everything impartially can be properly attached
to true principles - and, like Priestley, he is clear as to the
political implications of what he has to say: it is 'our national code
of faith and worship' that is to be tried at the bar of impartial 
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These blithe expectations found focus the next year in the 
centenary celebrations of the Glorious Revolution, and these in turn 
gave impetus to a second attempt at repeal. Again the Commons threw out 
the motion, but by a margin so narrow (only 122 votes to 102) that 
Dissenters, scenting victory, were led into what one of their number
-360-
called 'gross and fatal indiscretions. ' ^ 1 Provincial Dissenters, now at 
the helm, abandoned the cautious tactics with which their metropolitan 
brethren had hitherto conducted the movement. They agitated in the 
press, formed associations and demanded the abolition of all 
ecclesiastical tithes and the repeal of all penal statutes affecting 
religion. However, even at this stage of events - as the atmosphere 
warmed and the language of the rights of man came increasingly to be 
used - Priestley could still assert that if the facts of the case were 
candidly represented 'to the nation at large, and especially to those 
who have power to give us relief', then reason, truth and right would
Q O
prevail. (Of course, this sort of thing may be a display less of 
optimism maintained than of wells poisoned: we are perhaps meant to 
infer that if the Dissenters' case is as obvious as all that, then those 
who oppose it must be uncandid obscurantists.)
However, this belief, proclaimed in Priestley's 5 November sermon 
in 1789, is accompanied by a new and darker picture of the Dissenters' 
present situation. In a passage which reads like a direct reply to 
Pitt, Priestley tells the congregation of the Old and New Meetings at 
Birmingham that they are 'in a state of comparative servitude, not 
enjoying the privileges of other citizens': their situation differs from 
severe persecution in degree but not in principle.^ This, of course, 
is to answer Pitt's argument only by begging the question. Priestley 
assumes, without arguing for the assumption, that the political 
disabilities under which Dissenters labour are civil punishments. If 
this is so, then obviously, since there has been no offence, those 
punished may indeed be said to be in a state of servitude In this sort
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of argument the language of the rights of man more than justifies its 
growing popularity: when Dissenters appealed merely to the candour of 
those in office, their first task, was to draw attention to the 
particular details of their case; now, by appealing to a universal 
concept rather than to local sympathies, they are able to blur the 
distinctions between particular cases. There is a singularly virtuosic 
example of this in the peroration to Priestley's sermon. Here, with one 
sweeping movement of rhetoric, he gathers together the prosperous 
Dissenters of Birmingham with all the wretched, huddled masses of the 
earth: 'Lastly, while we join in asserting our own rights, let us not be 
unmindful of the rights of others, especially the common rights of 
humanity, of which the poor negroes have long been deprived, being 
treated as brutes, and not as men, and also of the just claims of all 
men to the rights of a free and equal government. 1 ^  But Pitt's 
argument was that the Dissenters possessed civil liberty - their lives 
and property were their own - and were denied only certain political 
privileges to which they were not entitled as of right. So they were 
not being punished, nor were they in anything like a state of servitude, 
and the poor negroes had nothing to do with the case.
Priestley's sermon went down well with its audience - as its 
title-page proudly proclaims, it was printed by request of the seven 
congregations of the three Dissenting denominations in Birmingham - and 
Lindsey said that 'friend and foe' spoke favourably of it .^5 But its 
optimism, and that of its friends, was ill-founded. The politicking of 
radical Dissenters had produced an loyalist counter-movement; there 
could no longer be any question of a growing consensus in their
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f a v o u r . A n d  though this opposition was distinct from anything done in 
reaction to events across the Channel, these events began to cast a 
shadow over the world in which the Dissenters had, so recently, found 
such cause for hope.
On the day of Priestley's sermon in Birmingham, Price preached one 
of his own in London, his audience the members of the London Revolution 
Society, who met every year on this day to commemorate the birth of 
William III. He began soberly enough, but, warming to his theme, was 
led into more controversial fields: he condemned church establishment as 
destructive of true devotion; though not a member of the church, he saw 
fit to demand reform of its liturgy and articles of religion; and he 
went so far as to congratulate his sovereign for being 'almost the only 
lawful king in the world, because the only one who owes his Crown to the 
choice of his p e o p l e . A t  last, as he approached the end, he 
addressed the great event of the year, He congratulated himself on 
surviving to see superstition and error undermined, liberty exalted, 
slavery spumed. 'Tremble all ye oppressors of the world!' he cried, in 
language that recalls the apocalyptic final paragraph of Priestley's 
Corruptions. 'Restore to mankind their rights; and consent to the
QO
correction of abuses, before they and you are destroyed together. ' 7
These were the sentiments, both subversive and metaphysical, that 
drew upon their author's head the fury of Edmund Burke; formerly the 
friend of Dissenters, now their implacable enemy. Burke had not spoken 
in either of the first two debates on the Test and Corporation Acts, but 
on 2 March 1790 the chance came again - Charles James Fox proposed 
repeal in the name of 'the Universal Rights of Human Nature' - and this
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time he took it. Opposing the motion, he paraded for the House's 
inspection several examples of Dissenting excess, including extracts 
from Price's sermon and from an open letter in which Priestley had 
predicted that the zeal of the orthodox would at length ignite 'those 
grains of gunpowder' whose explosion would bring down the Church 'as 
suddenly, and completely as the overthrow of the late arbitrary 
government in France.' After this, the bill was doomed: it was defeated 
by 294 votes to 105 and there was national rejoicing.^
Priestley seems by now to have been running out of friends. His 
'bold and decisive spirit,' said Kenrick, had 'raised him many enemies 
among the moderate & discrete of all parties - particularly the 
dissenters - whose minds ... are not yet sufficiently enlightened to 
keep pace with his.'1^  Priestley no doubt thought himself more popular 
in Birmingham - nowhere, he said, were there more Dissenters who were 
not Calvinists - but here, where the Dissenting population had been very 
active in the campaign against the Test and Corporation Acts, these 
national differences mingled with more local resentments. So the battle 
lines were already drawn up by the time Priestley delivered his sermon 
of 5 November 1789.1^1 Nor did he still the controversy with his 
Familiar Letters to the Inhabitants of Birmingham. Intended as a reply 
to his many and bitter critics among the local clergy, these letters, 
says John Money, 'called forth a mass of vernacular replies, most of 
them bogus ... some of them possibly genuine. Priestley himself later 
admitted that his letters had only exacerbated matters. He was, he 
said, followed and taunted by boys in the street.
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The Letters go over ground already covered, in less popular form, 
in Priestley’s other publications.1*^ His particular target, though, 
are the clergy, who have denounced him from their pulpits and slandered 
him in their pamphlets. In order to undermine their position, he tries 
to show that they are not, as they claim to be, the possessors of 
special knowledge. Far from being knowledge of any sort, the principles 
which their church takes for granted have no foundation, he claims, 
either in scripture or in common sense. And scripture itself is a 
matter of common sense: there are no deep mysteries in the Christian 
religion; the Apostles were plain men.1^  Their testimony regarding the 
person of Christ is, indeed, not inspired, but - despite what the High 
Cnurchmen of Birmingham allege - Priestley does not for that reason 
reject it. On the contrary, since they were 'naturally competent to 
judge in the case', their testimony is decisive, and divine inspiration 
could have added nothing to its validity. Moreover, even if they were 
inspired, succeeding generations have not been; so neither their 
inspired testimony nor even the knowledge that it was inspired could 
have been transmitted to us by anything other than the entirely fallible 
conduit of historical evidence. 1®5
A few years later, Priestley - by now Citizen Priestley and an 
honorary Frenchman - pursued the same line of argument in his Letters to 
the Philosophers and Politicians of France. He urged his new 
compatriots to subject the scriptures to close historical scrutiny.
They would find, he said, a narrative, at once truly plain and plainly 
true, that had no need of divine inspiration nor claimed it; a narrative 
'as circumstantial, and as open to inquiry, as that of Caesar and
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Pompey'. It is typical of Priestley - never one to employ diplomacy 
when a frontal assault across open ground against an impregnable 
position was possible - that he should have thought it proper to address 
the same argument both to the Christian inhabitants of Birmingham and to 
the philosophers and politicians of France, who, one assumes, were 
deists or atheists. An argument that compares the gospel narratives to 
those of Caesar and Pompey is, perhaps, the only sort that will prevail 
with an audience who recognise no authority but that of human reason.
In Birmingham, however, Priestley is addressing Anglicans, as he himself 
recognises, and Anglicans are committed to belief in an authority other 
than those of reason and historical scholarship. They believe that the 
church is, as its articles proclaim it to be, fa witness and a keeper of 
holy Writ', that the divine inspiration granted the Apostles has been 
transmitted through the generations to the visible church of the present 
day. So Priestley, in insisting that we never could have more than 
historical and fallible evidence for our faith in the inspiration of 
others, is dismissing out of hand the teaching authority of the church.
The line of argument is entirely secular and what makes it so is 
its egalitarian epistemology. For Priestley, knowledge is a single, 
unbounded republic; it harbours no autonomous kingdoms, secure in their 
privilege and safe from investigation. He has already spelt this out in 
his controversy with Horsley and in his History of Early Opinions 
Concerning Jesus Christ; here it is joined to the pluralism expounded in 
his political works. As usual, he wants to argue for a multiplicity of 
competing sects and the argument is illustrated with an analogy of which 
he grew so fond that it appears twice in the Letters to the Inhabitants
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of Birmingham: suppose that there were state physicians as well- 
established as the state clergy: would not any suggestion of reform - 
even of so slight a reform as the introduction of a new medicine - alarm 
them just as much as innovation now alarms the clergy? Would not they 
too say that the constitution was in danger?1®7
The most striking thing about this analogy is the fact that it is 
neither developed nor explained. Priestley assumes that he has only to 
lay it before his readers, leaving them to infer that it is as absurd to 
conduct ecclesiastical affairs in this way as it would be to practice 
medicine. The hidden assumption in all this is, of course, that the 
world of medicine is indeed comparable to that of religion. Once more 
Priestley has smuggled secular ingredients into his dish, expecting his 
readers to swallow it without a qualm. Clearly, if clergymen are no 
different to physicians or (to use a couple of other analogies that 
Priestley employs) apothecaries or builders, then the public should be 
allowed to decide which it wants; market forces should prevail in 
religion as in other things. This, of course, is already the regular 
practice among Dissenters: ’We are used to free inquiry, and love to 
encourage it,' says Priestley, though he does not explain who ’we’ 
are.1®^ (He uses the pronoun as though it referred to all Dissenters, 
but ’we' cannot be Particular Baptists, Independents, or any of those 
Dissenters who remained loyal to their Calvinist roots.)
It is curious that Priestley should still have believed, so late 
in the day, that the candid spirit of the Theological Repository and of 
his published exchange with Price could be revived in public debate:
Let all points of difference be freely discussed. Truth will be a
gainer by it. But let us respect one another, as we respect truth
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itself; love all, and with the good of all, without distinction. 
This is true candour, and consistent with the greatest zeal for 
our particular opinions. 1^
The hope was, of course, quite unrealistic: in these Letters, wrote a 
sympathetic observer in the following year, ’the seeds of that 
implacable dislike were scattered which produced the late riots. ...' 
Some of Priestley’s associates foresaw violence, but not he.11®
VI.
For most of Priestley's career, spectacle and sudden change were 
not important features in his philosophy of history. But in writing the 
Corruptions, he had found himself depicting a society so confirmed in 
its corruption that nothing short of a great cataclysm could make it 
clean again. The controversy with Horsley and other members of the 
establishment can only have confirmed this impression. It must be for 
this reason that in 1789 the moral drama of revolution proved impossible 
to resist. He much approved of the language, so similar to that of the 
Corruptions, with which Price had greeted the fall of the Bastille and, 
when the moment came, he sprang to the defence of his friend's sermon.
Priestley's Letters to the Right Hon. Edmund Burke was hardly the 
most considered of the many replies to Burke's Reflections on the 
Revolution in France - it appeared on the first day of 1791, only two 
months after the publication of Burke's essay - but he had good reason 
for wanting his voice to be heard. Much of Burke's general argument 
was, of course, obnoxious to him, depending as it did upon a defence of 
ecclesiastical establishment and an appeal from disorderly 1789 to 
constitutional 1688; but, this apart, his friend Price was held up by
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Burke as a bloody and prophetic sennoniser on seventeenth-century lines, 
'a man much connected with literary caballers, and intriguing 
philosophers; with political theologians and theological politicians 
both at home and abroad. ' 111 (Indeed, Price and Priestley were together 
doing so much to associate Dissent with dissidence - 'Dissenters,' said 
the Gentleman's Magazine in 1793, 'are levellers by principal and 
education' - that to this day the misconception persists that every 
Dissenters was as a matter of course disaffected with the government and 
laws of his country.11^)
A good deal of Priestley's Letters to the Right Honourable Edmund 
Burke appears to have been written more in sorrow that in anger. Though 
he shows little sign of hoping to convert Burke back to the cause of 
liberty, he tries throughout the book to be conciliatory in tone.
Burke's imagination, he suggests, is heated, its ideas confused; objects 
appear distorted to him and, without denying their existence, he 
nonetheless fails to see the great principles which underlie them.
These principles - those of England in 1688 and America in 1776 - are, 
or were, Burke's principles, and traces of them may still be perceived 
in the Reflections, Priestley believes. But, of course, there are 
passages in the Reflections in which even so conciliatory an antagonist 
as Priestley can find no trace of a principle to which he can own. 
Indeed, faced with Burke's dithyrambs on the Queen of France - 
'glittering like the morning-star, full of life, and splendor, and joy'
- he is able to do little more than try to explain their author's 
extraordinary behaviour psychologically, ascribing it on associationist 
principles to his early education. J
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Of course, he has missed the point of this passage by failing to 
take it in context. By this stage of the argument, Burke has contrasted 
the 'juvenile warmth' of Price's sermon with the horrible reality of 
what happened in October 1789: the royal family dragged from a palace 
strewn with mutilated corpses; their bodyguard, unresisting, slain; 
heads stuck on spears, 'shrieking screams and frantic dances. ...' The 
scene is painted for us as a sacrificial orgy, so that we are left with 
an idea of Price as a starched, academic orgiast, untouched by the blood 
and the shrilly-screaming women but letting his hair down a bit and 
applauding from a safe distance. Coming after all this, Burke's 
apostrophe on the Queen of France is a gauntlet flung at Price's feet; 
and, like a gauntlet, it is both challenging and medieval. The language
- celebrating 'the age of chivalry', 'the decent drapery of life', 'the 
pleasing illusions, which made power gentle and obedience liberal' - is 
deliberately provocative, suggesting as it does a gothic monument 
overrun by uncomprehending hooligans. But Burke's devotion to the 
monument (which is quite comprehensible, despite Priestley's 
difficulties) is genuine and is founded on the strong belief that the 
alternative edifice now under construction is much less humane. Strip 
away these pleasing illusions, demolish this system of ancient 
loyalties, and you are left with a coldly exploitative, unlovely and 
barbarous polity: 'laws are to be supported only by their own terrors, 
and by the concern, which each individual may find in them, from his own 
private speculations, or can spare to them from his own private 
interests. In the groves of their academy, at the end of every visto, 
you see nothing but the gallows.'11^
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This is why Burke mourns the age of chivalry; he is not merely 
nostalgic, though he makes his lament in nostalgic and romantic language 
designed to puzzle and annoy the men of the new age, the 'sophisters, 
oeconomists, and calculators ' . 115 When he writes of politics as an 
experimental science, not to be taught a priori nor learnt by short 
experience, he sounds a little like Priestley writing about religion and 
scientific method.11^ But by now, by 1791, Priestley, battle-hardened 
after his struggles with Horsley, was more inclined to emphasise the 
virtues of simplicity: a lean church and a trim state, each unencumbered 
by ties with the other, both founded upon principles openly proclaimed 
and easily grasped. Consequently, he cannot advance much beyond Mary 
Wollstonecraft in understanding Burke's political thought. In the first 
published response to the Reflections (rushed out only four weeks after 
the appearance of Burke's essay), she had declared that they had made 
her 'glow with indignation', so antipathetic were they to reason and so 
lacking in avowed first principles, and Priestley too was irritated to
find that his adversary did not 'deal much in definitions, or axioms.
,117
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Burke's refusal to deal in first principles, definitions and 
axioms is an aspect both of his art - he wants to provoke those who 
believe that government is geometry - and of his matter; he wants to 
emphasise that government is a practical business which demands skilled 
workers who will not be so 'grossly ignorant of their trade, or totally 
negligent of their duty' as to look for geometrical simplicity in 
political constitutions. At bottom the trade is a matter of
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sensibility: the true lawgiver is one who can 'catch his ultimate object
118
with an intuitive glance'.
So political knowledge cannot be available to all. For Burke it
is a special form of knowledge, just as religious knowledge is for his
friend Samuel Horsley. Both men oppose the doctrine, so close to
Priestley's heart, of the unity of knowledge, and they do so for the
same reason: they want to preserve a traditional understanding of church
and s t a t e . ^  Indeed, Burke's ideas of political knowledge, though
expressed in startling and provocative language, have very traditional
origins. J.G.A. Pocock has explored the similarity between these ideas
and those habits of mind associated with the Common Law, and he has
emphasised the importance that Burke attached to these habits. The
Common Law, it was generally believed, was the Englishman's unique
inheritance; it was the unwritten custom of the realm, embodying the
wisdom of many generations, its roots lying not in abstract reason but
in the imnemorial past. The language of this law is an argot into which
Burke readily slips: in the early pages of the Reflections, he maintains
that, 'it has been the uniform policy of our constitution to claim and
assert our liberties as an entailed inheritance derived to us from our
forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity; as an estate
specially belonging to the people of this kingdom without any reference
1 90
whatever to any other more general or prior right. This scheme of
government resembles the Common Law in that its origins are unknown and 
its development consists of the response of each generation to the 
emergencies and problems of its time. Developing in this manner, both 
constitution and Common Law are, though immemorially ancient, always up
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to date and always liable to change. The constitution is therefore 
peculiarly suited to the genius of the nation because it has matured 
along with the nation; the spirit of the law and the spirit of the , 
people are b o m  of the same circumstances. 1^1
Given this account of the constitution, it is easy to see why 
Burke was so well disposed to prejudice. A prejudice is a prior 
judgement in favour of what is known, and in a country with a 
prescriptive constitution - where the prejudices grow out of the same 
soil as the laws and are wanned by the same sun - a prejudice is likely 
to be a judgement in favour of what is legal, true and tried. In this 
desire not to unmask popular prejudice but to elicit its latent wisdom, 
Burke may seem to have some intellectual affinity with his friends the 
Scottish philosophers of common sense. He appears to have been the 
author of a very favourable review of Beattie's Essay on the Nature and 
Immutability of Truth: an anonymous notice - published in 1771 in the 
Annual Register, of which Burke was editor - praises Beattie for 
vindicating 'the rights of the human understanding' and for opposing 
comnon sense, 'this primitive and fundamental standard of all Truth', to 
the 'cheap and lazy scepticism' of. the age.
Even if Burke did write this review it would, of course, be rash 
to suggest on the strength of these few pages, published anonymously 
twenty years before the Reflections, that Beattie or any other of the 
commonsense metaphysicians had a direct influence on the philosophy with 
which he opposed the French Revolution. But it is certainly significant 
that Priestley reacted to the Reflections very much as he had reacted 
sixteen years before to the principles of common sense:
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If the principles that Mr. Burke now advances ... be admitted, 
mankind are always to be governed as they have been governed, 
without any enquiry into the nature, or origin, of their 
governments. ... On these principles, the church, or the state, 
once established, must for ever remain the same. This is 
evidently the real scope of Mr. Burke's pamphlet, the principles 
of it being, in fact, no other than those of passive obedience and 
non-resistance, peculiar to the Tories and the friends of 
arbitrary power, such as were echoed from the pulpits of all the 
high church party, in the reigns of the Stuarts, and of Queen 
Anne. ^
Passive obedience and non-resistance - Jacobite doctrines unrestrained
by reason - were exactly what Priestley had claimed to fear when he
contemplated the commonsense philosophy; and Burke's assertion that we
regard kings with awe, parliaments with affection, priests with duty,
nobility with respect, because 'when such ideas are brought before our
minds, it is natural to be affected’ reads like a realisation of
Priestley's worst forebodings as to where the commonsense philosophy
might lead.1^  Burke's talk of the wisdom latent in prejudice disturbs
Priestley as much and for the same reason as the Scottish philosophers'
talk of the truth latent in common sense. In both cases he points to
the relativism to which such talk must, he believes, inevitably lead.
Burke's principles, which make him a staunch churchman in England, would
have made him a Moslem in Turkey or a devout worshipper of the Grand
Lama in Tibet. Worse, had he been a pagan in ancient Rome he would
surely have remained one; for Christianity was there a mere sect,
neither authorised by law, nor dignified by prescription, and certainly
not cherished by immemorial prejudices. The principle of prescription,
like that of common sense, may be used to legitimate any system of power
1 2S
which happens to be old. J
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There is nothing eccentric in Priestley's fear, at so late a date,
of the old Stuart principles of passive obedience and non-resistance;
Horsley was shortly to arouse similar fears in Richard Brinsley Sheridan
and they were to persist in Whig circles till well into the next
century. ° Nor was Priestley alone in suspecting that to reject
empiricism or deny the unity of knowledge was to open the way to
elitism. John H o m e  Tooke the radical pamphleteer and writer on
language was arguing at this time, as Priestley had years before,
against the philosophy of mind set out by James Harris in his book
Hermes, and there is no doubt that, like Priestley, he saw political as
1 27
well as linguistic implications in what he opposed. Both Tooke 
(whose work was widely read by radicals) and Priestley suspected 
empiricism's enemies of trying to keep important truths - of language, 
of philosophy and of politics - safe from profane eyes. Both saw it as 
their task to open the eyes of the oppressed, to banish obscurantism 
with plain fact: 'Either what God has ordained, or what antiquity 
authorises may be difficult to ascertain,' writes Priestley, 'but what 
regulation is most conducive to the public good, though not always 
without its difficulties, yet in general it is much more easy to 
determine.
Mildly put though this is, it seems to presuppose complete freedom 
of action, unaffected by any considerations of tradition or religious 
custom, and Priestley was soon to make it clear that such freedom of 
action was seldom available in monarchical governments. He seems to 
have begun to regard kings and their ministers in much the same way that 
he already regarded bishops, as prisoners in a web of corrupting
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associations, and he looked to the spirit of the French Revolution to 
free the world of such trammels. This is clear from the address, more 
apocalyptic in tone than the letters to Burke, that he delivered in 
April 1791 to the supporters of the Dissenting Academy in Hackney.^ 9  
Here - though the old heroes, John Hampden and Algernon Sydney, Newton, 
Locke, and of course Hartley, are still invoked - it is 'the glorious 
revolution in France1 which is seen as reshaping the hopes of humanity. 
Ahead, thinks Priestley (disclaiming prophesy himself, but looking to 
the prophetic passages of scripture), lie 'great revolutions' both 
political and religious. The evidence for this is plainly to be seen in 
the reaction of the friends of establishment to recent events and to the 
literature of liberty. Members of the Church of England openly lament 
the fall of the Popish church in France, as though correctly perceiving 
that the two are built upon the same foundations and that the 'light and 
good sense' which have overthrown one must in due course overthrow the 
other. ^ 0
A couple of months later, Priestley returned to this dangerous 
idea of enlightenment as the prelude to revolution. In his Political 
Dialogue on the General Principles of Government, he explains that, 
important though the financial difficulties of the French government may 
have been, they would not in themselves have engendered revolution 'if 
the minds of the people had not been previously enlightened on the 
subject of government, so that they could go at once to the proper 
source of their abuses.' In Britain desperate remedies of the French 
kind will not be necessary (as Priestley makes clear, though perhaps not 
quite so clear as discretion warrants); however, desirable reforms short
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of revolution could be obtained if public opinion were sufficiently
1 *31
united 'to overawe the governing powers.' •L Again Priestley has 
expressed with astonishing mildness sentiments whose implications are 
radical indeed. He suggests that public opinion might be unified 'by 
committees of correspondence, and other means', but he surely cannot 
have been unaware how dangerous such societies looked after the 
publication of the Reflections. Moreover, the London Revolution Society 
and the Society for Constitutional Information - to whose activities 
Burke had alerted the public - were no longer alone: their desire for 
provincial offspring had already been gratified in Manchester and in
Norwich, and Priestley himself was even now assisting at the birth of
1 'Y)
the Warwickshire Constitutional Society. ^ It looks, then, as though 
the Dialogue endorses a national network for the diffusion of subversive 
opinions.
The idea is made to look especially dangerous by the pages that 
come before it. Here enlightenment is displayed as a very subversive 
force indeed. The diffusion of knowledge, we learn, together with the 
spirit of industry and commerce, must inevitably put an end to those 
last remnants of feudalism, hereditary nobility and hereditary monarchy: 
'Every thing in society will now be brought to the plain test of use and 
expedience. This makes odd reading for anyone familiar with the
rest of Priestley's political writing. Not once in the whole work is 
there any mention of God or of that glorious future which he has in 
store for his creation. The future, indeed, is scarcely mentioned at 
all and the past is seen as a time of corruption and Gothic tyranny. 
Instead we are offered a timeless and austerely classical view of a
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State in which the citizenry are sovereign, rotating public office 
amongst themselves and overseeing an equitable distribution of labour 
and the fruits of labour. Such a state could be efficiently governed by 
an elective assembly consisting 'of the most respectable members of the 
society', whose function it would be to balance the various interests in 
the nation. Further checks and balances - a second chamber which could 
veto legislation or a monarch who could withhold from it his assent - 
would be neither necessary nor desirable: 'In every state, as in every 
single person, there ought to be but one will, and no important business 
should be prevented from proceeding, by any opposite will.'1^
Published anonymously in July 1791, these sentiments did not, 
presumably, help to provoke the catastrophe, which occurred on the 
fourteenth of that month. Nor was Priestley*one of the ninety or so 
reformers who that afternoon attended a dinner at the Birmingham Hotel 
to celebrate the fall of the Bastille (he had meant to go but wisely 
changed his mind at the last moment). But his public reputation - 
emphasised by the Familiar Letters and his attempts to recruit for a 
Warwickshire Constitutional Society - made him a principal target of the 
rioters who claimed the dinner as their provocation. He was not their 
only victim: three Unitarian meeting houses and one Baptist meeting 
house were destroyed or damaged, so were the dwellings of twenty-seven 
people who had attended the dinner or were Dissenters or were members of 
the Lunar Society. ^
Priestley had lost everything but his principles; to these he was 
firm, never forgetting, he said, that his sufferings were 'part of the 
plan of a wise and just providence ...' His Appeal to the Public on the
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Subject of the Riots in Birmingham, dedicated to 'the People of 
England1, is an elaborately candid work, in which, however, he at last 
recognises how things stand between him and his enemies. Once more, 
military metaphor recurs; but this time it appears to have been chosen 
with greater deliberation and with some awareness that an exchange that 
can be described in these terms cannot be a candid conversation amongst 
explorers in the search after truth:
With respect to the high church party in this country, I may be 
considered as in a state of open war. I utterly dislike their 
principles and maxims, as they do mine; and I scruple not to take 
any fair opportunity of expressing this dislike in the most 
unequivocal language. Let them do the same with respect to my 
principles; but let us observe the rules of honourable war. ... To 
conciliate these persons I consider as a thing absolutely 
impossible, and therefore not worth attempting.
The moment of understanding is, though, a brief one. Why, Priestley 
demands, should he be singled out for such treatment by a suborned mob 
(which was careful to spare the homes and meeting houses of Calvinist 
Dissenters) when he has never, in any of the controversies in which he 
has engaged in Birmingham, been the aggressor? He did not, he 
continues, initiate the controversy with Horsley, and all the Defences 
of Unitarianism were calm replies to virulent abuse. But he seems 
not to appreciate how disturbing his opinions were to Churchmen, and he 
goes on not appreciating it when he protests that Unitarianism bears no 
relation to any particular form of government and that the clergy have 
misled the people by representing all Socinians as republicans. On the 
contrary, he continues, he for one has again and again praised the 
tripartite constitution of his country: ’And though I might now 
recommend a very different form of government to a people who had not 
previous prejudices or habits, the case is very different with respect
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to one that has; and it is the duty of every good citizen to maintain 
that government of any country which the majority of its inhabitants 
approves, whether he himself should otherwise prefer it, or not . ' 1^7
Coming as it does from someone who had written so much of the 
importance of overcoming prejudice, and of the cataclysmic efforts which 
might be necessary in order that it be overcome by a whole nation, this 
can only have looked disingenuous to Priestley's Anglican readers. Nor 
can the suggestion that he is writing only theoretically have done much 
to assuage loyalist doubts: if his readers were also readers of Burke - 
as they were very likely to have been - they could well have seen the 
whole French Revolution as an attempt to impose upon an existing society 
a theoretical model much like the one which Priestley favoured, an 
attempt to treat a country which had a government as though it had none 
and was ripe for remodelling.
Priestley, though, no longer cared to win people. He would not 
emigrate, he said in 1792, but he was now attached to his fellow 
countrymen only as men, and he knew that many of them would favour 
arbitrary government. JO Circumstances had made him more radical. An 
exile from Birmingham, he had attended the London Revolution Society's 
annual dinner in November 1791, where the loyal toast was drunk 'in 
gloomy silence' and the Ca ira, most murderous of revolutionary songs, 
was sung. Here too a toast to 'The Revolution of the World' had been 
proposed by Tom Paine, the second and more radical part of whose Rights 
of Man Priestley was shortly to find 'striking and excellent much beyond 
the first part.' Priestley was also greatly struck by Joel Barlow's 
Advice to the Privileged Orders and thought that in these two
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publications political discussion had been brought to a new and
admirable pitch: 'Such boldness ... was never seen before in this or any 
1 “2 0
other country.'
But the sermon, on The Uses of Christianity, Especially in 
Difficult Times, in which he bade farewell to his country breathes a 
more tranquil spirit:
Our habitations here are perishable, liable to be destroyed by 
lawless violence; but there are 'houses not made with hands, 
eternal in the heavens.' Here we have no continuing city, no 
place of absolute security, where we can depend upon not being 
disturbed. But in heaven is 'a rest for the people of God,' a 
place where 'the wicked cease from troubling,' and where those who 
are weary with their unceasing persecutions may depend upon being 
unmolested. Let us, then, when we are harassed and disturbed 
here, and especially when we are exposed to disturbance because we 
ourselves are disposed to be quiet, willing to live at peace 
ourselves, and desirous of promoting a disposition to peace in 
others, look forward to that peaceful and happy state, and 
cultivate a temper of mind most suited to it.
He had changed his mind about leaving the country, and now not only was 
he an emigrant to America; he was also an emigrant of the spirit. In 
turning his attention from his earthly to his eternal home he was doing, 
of course, what he believed there was ample objective reason for doing; 
nonetheless the tone of defeat in these words, of withdrawal from the 
public stage to a cell of private hope, is impossible to ignore. 
Throughout his career he had sought to persuade. Fie had always had two 
objects in mind and ultimately he failed of them both: he had hoped 
through candour to persuade others to his way of thinking and he had 
hoped also to persuade them to join him in a candid conversation, which 
would have been both a project for the discovery of truth and a 
desirable end in itself. His failure was intellectual - he had not 
properly judged the temper of his society - but it was also personal: he
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was Coo vain, too touchy, too tone-deaf to moderate the sound of his own 
voice. In the end, and whatever his own intentions, the constantly- 
reiterated protestations of candour just ceased to be convincing.
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Though the leaders of all denominations in Birmingham had been 
brought together by their support for the campaign against 
slavery, Dissenters and Churchmen were soon at odds again over 
the issue of the local police. In the face of a growing rate 
of crime, the necessity for the establishment of such a force, 
to be maintained on the parish rates, seemed clear; yet it was 
opposed by a small number of ratepayers led by a Dissenter, 
Priestley's friend William Hutton. His arguments, based on 
principles of pure laissez-faire, sharply pointed up the 
difference between bourgeois Dissent and paternalistic 
establishment. The controversy did much to sour religious 
politics in Birmingham, and matters were not improved by two 
further disputes, concerning the Sunday school and the 
subscription library. In both cases, an institution 
administered at first by Churchmen and Dissenters together 
became the casus belli in a pamphlet war between the 
denominations. (See Money [1977], pp.8-18, 126-128) Priestley 
was also becoming alienated from the Royal Society. Annoyed 
that his radical friend Thomas Cooper should have been denied 
membership on grounds, he said, 'of party spirit, political or 
religious', he sent Sir Joseph Banks two angry letters on the 
matter before withdrawing from the Society's activities. (For 
these letters - dated 25 and 27 April, 1790 - see Bolton 
[1892], pp.100-102.)
Money [1977], p.222; Priestley [1791e], pp.xx, 21.
For some of these old favourites, see Priestley [1790a], ii, 7, 
20; iii, 13-14; v, 23-27.
Ibid., iii, 12, 22-23.
Ibid., v, 18.
Priestley [1793], pp.28, 38.
Ibid., ii, 18-20; v, 45-46.
Ibid., iv, 37.
Ibid., v, 63.
Hall [1791], p.36; Priestley [1791e], p.22
Burke [1790], p.93. See also pp.156-159.
Gentleman's Magazine, 1791, i, 556, quoted in Lincoln [1938], 
p.66. This misconception is a recurrent feature of Kramnick's 
recent work. 'Priestley was lyrical in his praise of the 
French Revolution, as were virtually all the dissenters', he
-390-
writes ([1986], pp.4-5), and the choice of words is 
significant: most Dissenters were not, of course, publicly 
lyrical about the French Revolution nor about anything else, 
because most Dissenters (like most of the rest of the 
population) did not set down their enthusiasms for posterity to 
read about. However, the Rational Dissenters - that small and 
self-consciously elitist elite upon which Kramnick's attention 
is exclusively fixed - were much more likely than others to be 
lyrical in print about foreign politics. It may be, suggests 
Donald Davie ([1984], p.324), that 'on the broad issue of 
loyalty to the Crown, there was at any time a substantial 
minority of English Dissenters, if not indeed a majority at 
times, who go unremarked because they were relatively 
inarticulate. They did indeed find articulate spokesmen. But 
these are hard to discern, perhaps because there were 
disproportionately few of them, more certainly because it has 
been in nobody's partisan interest, from their day to ours, to 
have tham remembered.' He goes on to mention John Merivale of 
Exeter; John Clayton, an Independent minister; Thomas Sheraton, 
the great cabinet maker, who was also a Dissenting minister; 
and the Rev. David Rivers: all of whom combined Dissent with 
loyalty to their country and its government. To this list we 
can add (from Lincoln ([1938], pp.21-22) the Rev. Edward 
Pickard and the Rev. John Martin. John Seed admits ([1985], 
pp.323-324) that Rational Dissent was unrepresentative of 
Dissent as a whole in the 1770's and 1780's but suggests that 
it did give voice to the aspirations of a significant number of 
the bourgeoisie.
113. Burke [1790], p.169, and Priestley [1791a], pp.17-20, 29-31.
114. Burke [1790], pp.171-172. 3urke's understanding of the old 
society is strikingly similar to that of Marx and Engels. In a 
famous passage of the Communist Manifesto (quoted in Laslett 
[1983], p.17), they describe the process by which the 
bourgeoisie - stripping away 'all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic 
relations' - has substituted naked exploitation for 
'exploitation veiled by religious and political illusions' and 
left between man and man no connections but self-interest and 
'callous "cash-payment"'. Of course, Burke would not have 
agreed that the 'pleasing illusions ' which were so happy a 
feature of the old society concealed a system of exploitations. 
His point is that the 'mechanic philosophy' severs head from 
heart, equates reason with calculations; so it is only when the 
illusions are stripped away and government reduced to a matter 
of sticks and carrots that exploitation becomes inevitable.
In the light of all this, Paine's famous comment on this part 
of Burke's essay - 'He pities the plumage and forgets the dying 
bird' - seems more than usually blockheaded (Paine [1791], 
p.73). Marx, it may be noted, thought Burke a sycophant, a 
'romantic laudator temporis acti' and 'an out-and-out vulgar 
bourgeois'. See Conor Cruise O'Brien's introduction to Burke
[1790], p.9.
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115.
116.
117.
118. 
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
Burke [1790], p.170.
Ibid., p.152.
Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Man (1791), 
in Butler (ed.) [1984J, pp.72-73; Priestley [1791a], p.56.
Burke [1790], pp.152-153, 266-267, 281.
Clark provides ([1985], pp.247-285) a useful corrective to the 
view - once common among political writers - of the Reflections 
as an unprecedented and very personal reaction to Lockean 
orthodoxy. However, in telling us (p.249) that 'Burke's 
achievement in his later works was to give eloquent but 
unoriginal expression to a theoretical position largely devised 
by Anglican churchmen', he underestimates, I think, the 
importance of these epistemological considerations.
Burke [1790], p.119 (emphasis in original).
See Pocock [1972], p.228.
Burke (?) [1771], pp.252-255. See also Wilkins [1967], to 
which I am indebted for this reference.
Priestley [1791a], p.viii. Queen Anne, of course, was a 
Stuart.
Burke [1790], p.182. For Priestley's very similar views of the 
commonsense philosophy, see his [1774b], pp.200-201, and 
pp.211-212 above.
Priestley [1791a], pp.60-64, 110-114.
See Clark [1985], pp.210, 233. John Wesley had been proud to 
own these principles, and so was Hannah More, distinguished 
educationalist and evangelical Christian, who named her two 
cats 'Passive Obedience' and 'Non Resistance' (ibid., pp.210. 
246.).
See Smith [1984], chs.i and iv. The first volume of Tooke's 
Diversions of Purley appeared in 1786. A revised edition 
followed in 1798 and a second volume in 1805. Priestley would 
not have followed Tooke in his belief that Locke's analysis of 
ideas should more properly be applied to words and that complex 
terms arise in the evolution of language and not from the 
existence of corresponding acts of mind. On this aspect of 
Tooke's work, see Smith [1984], p.133.
Priestley [1791a], pp.23-24.
On this institution, founded in 1786, see McLachlan [1931], 
pp.246-255. 'A costly and finished education was there 
intended to form preachers of socinianism to the rich. ...' say
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130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
Bogue and Bennett ([1808-12], iv, 267), contrasting it with a 
more recent foundation in the same locality, 'designed to 
prepare itinerants to publish the unsearchable riches of the 
gospel to the poor. ...'
Priestley [1791b], pp.5, 14, 36, 41. A few days later, 
Priestley, delivering the sermon at Price's funeral, remarked 
([1791c], p.8) that the deceased had been described as 'the 
apostle of liberty' by 'the most august assembly in the world', 
the National Assembly of France.
Priestley [1791d], pp.85, 103.
For the Warwickshire society, see Royle and Walvin [1982], 
pp.48-49; for the others, see Goodwin [1979], ch.v.
Priestley [1791d], p.92. Fourteen years before, Priestley had 
said something similar in the dedication to his [1777a]. The 
age, he says here, is one 'in which every thing begins to be 
estimated by its real use and value.' It is difficult to 
decide whether these sentiments are here softened or given an 
ironic edge by being addressed to Shelburne's son Lord 
Fitzmaurice. Certainly, Priestley seems at this time to have 
hoped for useful peers rather than for no peers at all.
Priestley [1791d], pp.88, 96.
For an account of the riot, see Rose [1960], and, for the local 
background, Money [1977], ch.ix.
Priestley [1791e], pp.xx-xxi, 50-51, 60.
Priestley [1792], ix, 15-16, 37, 41, 112.
Ibid., pp.110, 113-114.
British Library, Add. Mss. 44,992, ff.48-49v: Priestley to 
William Russell, Clapton, 15 February, 1792. For an account of 
the dinner, see Goodwin [1979], pp.186-188.
Priestley [1792], p.5.
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